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ABSTRACT

DEMOCRATIC EXCLUSION.
THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, AND
FRANCE
David Alexander Bateman
Brendan O’Leary

This research focuses on the forms of exclusion that democratizing processes have
historically facilitated. The dynamics of democratization often lead political coalitions
to change electoral rules to simultaneously extend and constrict the right to vote across
diﬀerent categories of persons, as well as to reinforce existing exclusions. This pattern
occurred in all the ‘exemplary models’ of early democratization, and yet the historical
narratives relied on by the comparative democratization literature neglect its exclusionary dimension, and thereby misinform comparative theory building. The dissertation
empirically documents the “dark side of democratization” in the three paradigmatic
cases of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and develops and tests a
theory explaining cross-national and cross-time variation. At key moments in a country’s development, political entrepreneurs advance ideas of community belonging for
the purpose of securing a governing coalition. When successful the ideas of political
community are embedded in new institutions and in public opinion, shaping the expectations of political agents across the political spectrum and resulting in higher costs of
coalition-building and political mobilization across categories of people. The exclusions
were thereby made resilient to subsequent democratizing processes. Rather than reject
alternative accounts of democratization, the dissertation demonstrates that the ideational
construction of a political community is of prior causal importance to well-studied processes associated with democratization, and that the ideological context of ‘peoplehood’
needs to be taken into account in theoretical models and empirical narratives. The
dissertation advances research the role of ideas in social science by focusing on the
micro-foundations of democratic exclusion. The model predicts various of political behavior that are integrally important to democratization, and is tested against debates,
voting behavior, and correspondence in and outside of parliaments, legislatures, and
constitutional conventions. The data draws on archival ﬁeld work research and multiple datasets of legislator behavior, constituency demographics, and institutional change.
These allow for the identiﬁcation of stable patterns as well as change across time, and
supplement a process tracing research design.
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Chapter 1
Democratic Exclusion and Progressive History

“Liberal democracy is a great philosophy of inclusion. It is rule of the people, by
the people, and for the people, and today the ‘people’ is taken to mean everybody,
without the unspoken restrictions that formerly excluded peasants, women, or
slaves. . . . Yet there is also something in the dynamic of democracy that pushes
toward exclusion”
—Charles Taylor (1998, 143)

Introduction
In a speech before the NAACP, United States Attorney General Eric Holder claimed “the
arc of American history has always moved toward expanding the electorate.”1 This claim
relies on a generous deﬁnition of “arc.” Given the various constrictions of the right to
vote—applied to blacks, women, aliens, the working class, natural born citizens—and the
constant churn at the margins of inclusion, the trajectory of the right to vote in the United
States is hardly analogous to a smooth, monotonic curve. Holder and his audience are
not ignorant of America’s tortured history regarding the right to vote. Rather, his framing
should be seen as part of a political project, one that places previous exclusions from
the suﬀrage in an historical narrative that can constitute a sense of shared and valued
peoplehood with clear political implications. This “arc” toward expanding the electorate,
Holder continued, “is what has made this nation exceptional.”
Holder’s invocation of a teleological narrative of American history—in which exclusions reﬂect temporary deviations from the core of American peoplehood and purpose, and whose overcoming constitutes the essence of America as providential, excep1

“Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the NAACP Annual Convention,” Houston Texas, July 10, 2012.
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-120710.html
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tional, and intrinsically valuable—reﬂects an eﬀort to build and maintain support for
the protection of voting rights. As such Holder might be excused his historical inexactitudes.The responsibility of scholarship is diﬀerent. Nonetheless, scholarly understandings of democratization—in the United States as elsewhere— continue to be structured
by a narrative of a gradual and largely unidirectional process of an expanding right to
vote. This presumption is not only problematic history, but leaves us ill-equipped to explain the enduring capacity of democratic states to maintain exclusionary regimes. The
belief that the logic of democracy is to converge on a homogenous and equal suﬀrage arrangement for the entire adult population is an old one. It continues to underlie theories
of democratization and suﬀrage expansion advanced by prominent scholars in political
science and economics. At the core of these accounts is the claim that once representative institutions are established a country’s subsequent trajectory will reﬂect the logic of a
democratic development path. Unless the country is knocked oﬀ this path—through conquest or defeat in war—remaining exclusions will be overcome. While some accounts
do not completely eﬀace disenfranchising reversals or long-term exclusions, these are
treated as temporary or “incomplete transitions,” implying the logic of enfranchisement
will eventually encompass the excluded categories of persons (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 120). This project takes aim at this contention by focusing on the exclusions
that accompany democracy and whose resilience to an enfranchising democratization
reﬂects neither “incomplete transitions” nor exceptional deviations but important and
common phenomena requiring explanation.
While the triumphalist narrative has long dominated accounts of democratization, it
has never been without criticism. One recent contribution to this revisionist project is
Richard Valelly’s The Two Reconstructions (2004). Valelly’s thesis is that “No major social
group in Western history, other than African Americans, ever entered the electorate of
an established democracy and then was extruded by nominally democratic means such
as constitutional conventions and ballot referenda, forcing that social group to start all
over again” (2004, 1). This, then, is the inverse of Attorney General Holder’s contention:
the United States is exceptional not in the progressive expansion of the electorate, but
rather in its constriction.
This claim is likewise mistaken. Neither the post-bellum exclusion of blacks nor the
United States is unique in this regard. The disenfranchisements of the French electoral
law of 1850 were comparable in magnitude to the disenfranchisements of blacks in the
southern United States, reducing the total male electorate by 30% and by as much as 80%
2

in the more industrialized cities of the North (Huard 1991, 54-57). The Roman Catholic
Relief Act (1829) in the United Kingdom gave Catholics the right to sit in Parliament but
was paired with a bill disenfranchising the primarily Catholic rural electorate of Ireland.
In Italy, revisions of the electoral registers in the late nineteenth century disfranchised
nearly a third of the electorate in a purge that was targeted at the urban working classes
(Bartolini 2007, 221). In South Africa, the racially neutral Cape Qualiﬁed Franchise
was gradually amended to fully disenfranchise black (1959) and coloured voters (1968)
in Cape Province from elections to the House of Assembly. In the years following
independence, Latin American countries imposed income, tax, and literacy requirements
that were considerably more exclusionary than existed before (Przeworski 2010, 50). The
excluded in each of these cases constituted “major social groups,” and each of these
exclusions were the product of representative legislative assemblies.2
These disfranchisements were proportionally large relative to the electorate. When
we expand our scope to include smaller disfranchisements, we ﬁnd numerous others.
Certain categories of indigenous peoples in Canada were enfranchised by the Conservative government of 1885 and then disenfranchised by the Liberal government in 1898.
While the 1839 constitution of the Commonwealth of Liberia had secured the vote to
every male citizen, the 1847 constitution restricted the right to vote to property owning
male citizens. Both the citizen and the property qualiﬁcation worked to exclude the
indigenous population, who were denied citizenship until 1904 and the suﬀrage until
1946. Denmark introduced higher property qualiﬁcations in the Landsthing, the upper
chamber, in 1866 (Bartolini 2000, 221). And as demonstrated by a notable scholar of democratization, “of the nineteen countries in which the ﬁrst qualiﬁcations gave the right to
vote to all independent men, suﬀrage was subsequently restricted in sixteen” (Przeworski
2010, 50).
Even in the United States the removal of voting rights from African Americans after
Reconstruction was not the only instance where existing voters were disenfranchised.
Most states removed free blacks from the electorate in the antebellum period, despite
their earlier enfranchisement. Several states enfranchised and then disfranchised aliens
2

Valelly notes that “disenfranchisements certainly took place in other nations, for example, in France,
which experienced several during the nineteenth century,” but insists that “such events occurred when
the type of regime changed, not under formally democratic conditions” (2004, 2). This is inaccurate in
the case of France, where disenfranchisement of the working classes occurred under formally democratic
conditions, before the coup of 1851. In fact, it was the coup that restored formal voting rights to the mass
of the male population. His claim that “in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, liberal democracies
never sponsored disenfranchisement” is likewise incorrect.
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who had declared their intention to naturalize. Residency requirements, which in the
U.S. as elsewhere have always been understood as targeting “the ﬂoating portion of the
proletariat,” have ﬂuctuated considerably, as political coalitions sought to enlarge and
constrict the electorate and alter the capacity of the working class to participate.3 And
while the twentieth century enfranchisement of women has been relatively uncontested,
women in both New Jersey (1776-1807) and Utah Territory (1870-1887) were enfranchised
and then disfranchised. These exclusions were not the product of regime change, but
were accomplished through the democratic process itself.
The narrative of progressive enfranchisement, however, is not without empirical support. There are compelling reasons to believe that there is an enfranchising logic to
democratic institutions, that each expansion of the electorate reduces the cost of a further expansion, and that competitive political parties have an incentive to extend voting
rights as they maneuver for electoral victory. But the occurrence of disfranchisement and
durable exclusions suggests that this logic does not operate equally across categories of
persons, regimes, and time. Understanding this variation is crucial to understanding
democratization.
This project takes aim at both the narrative of progressive enfranchisement as well
as an exceptionalism that sees the American deviation from this pattern as sui generis.
But the purpose is not simply to debunk Whig historiography of progressive liberty.
Rather, the purpose is to explore a central tension identiﬁed by numerous scholars
between the inclusive and exclusive faces of democracy. Charles Taylor, for instance, has
remarked that “liberal democracy is a great philosophy of inclusion,” where the people
rule and where ‘the people’ “is taken to mean everybody.” But Taylor is concerned that
“there is also something in the dynamic of democracy that pushes toward exclusion”
(1998, 143). For Taylor and other scholars, democracy has a greater requirement for
cohesion and trust than authoritarian regimes, which in turn makes a common identity
much more important in democracies than elsewhere (1998, 143; Miller 1995, 96; Kook
2002; see Tebble 2006). Their claim is not the truism that all states must exclude,
that no state can treat every person as “an equally entitled citizen” (Schmitt 1988, 12).
Rather, it is a claim that democracies in particular have an internal logic compelling
them to emphasize much more strongly some collective and homogenous identity, such
as nationality, ethnicity, religion, or secularism. But if there is an exclusionary impulse
in democracies, this varies considerably across countries and across the categories of
3

Jean Jaurès, leader of the French Socialist Party, in “Vues politiques,” Revue de Paris, April 1st 1898, 580.

4

persons. Rather than locating democratic exclusions in a functional requirement of a
democratic state, I seek to explain the variation in the form and extent of democratic
exclusion, both within and across diﬀerent countries.
This project advances two overarching claims. From these claims follow two main
contributions to the existing literature, the ﬁrst empirical and the other theoretical. The
ﬁrst claim is that sustained exclusions from political rights and disenfranchising reversals
are neither exceptional nor temporary phenomena in states with democratic institutions.
Accordingly, a central empirical contribution is to document the extent and form of these
exclusions in three of the paradigmatic cases of democratization: the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France. The second claim of this project is that the politics of rights
are structured by ideas of community belonging. That is, the construction of a vision
of political community is of prior or coincident causal importance to processes of elite
competition, mass-elite conﬂict, war-making or structural factors normally emphasized
in the literature on democratization. These processes are structured by ideological
delineations of membership and status, creating diﬀerent opportunities and costs for
political action and coalition building for diﬀerently situated classes of persons. The
result is that the various processes associated with democratization have a greater eﬀect
for those who can eﬀectively claim membership within the community than for those who
cannot. For those ideologically placed outside of the community, the ‘democratizing’
processes might have a smaller eﬀect, and in some cases might even have the opposite
sign, making disfranchisement more likely.
***
The chapter is organized into two main sections, the ﬁrst delineating the scope
of the project and deﬁning the key concepts, and the second detailing the degree to
which the literature on democratization has neglected, both empirically and theoretically,
disfranchisements and exclusions. I deﬁne and operationalize ‘democratic exclusion,’
and justify my decision to focus primarily on exclusions from the right to vote. I also
outline a normative claim about how democratic institutions should be organized. I do
this for two reasons. For one, it allows the reader to know my biases, an important piece
of information that ought to be disclosed. But also, as I make clear below, the ideal
of democracy in which I believe has always been a political loser. And the question
of why it has been such a consistent loser provides an entry into understanding why
some democracies exclude more broadly and more forcefully than others. Starting from
this basis, I examine the literature on democratization’s cursory treatment of exclusions
5

and the resulting limits of theorizing in this ﬁeld, and conclude with an overview of the
subsequent chapters.

Democratic Exclusion
The claim that sustained exclusions and disfranchisements are not temporary or exceptional phenomena in democratic states requires a deﬁnition of democracy that does
not make sustained exclusion an oxymoron and a deﬁnition of exclusion that does not
make this claim a truism. A workable deﬁnition of democracy need not perfectly capture a normative ideal, but it should clearly identify stable features of political life that
exclude regimes most observers would not qualify as democratic. It should also allow
us to avoid the mistake of some who have argued for a “dark side to democracy” while
including within their deﬁnition states that few observers would qualify as democratic
(Mann 2005).
Teri Caraway has noted that before Robert Dahl’s seminal work, Polyarchy (1971),
much of the literature on democratization had deﬁned democracy as “the government
[being] held accountable to its citizens, whoever they may be” (2004, 444). This was
in large part the result of Joseph Schumpeter’s inﬂuential deﬁnition of democracy as
“that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals
acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”
(Schumpeter 2006, 269). Schumpeter was explicit in arguing that exclusions did not
render a regime non-democratic, noting that “there have been nations that practiced
discrimination. . . and nevertheless displayed most of those characteristics which are usually associated with democracy” (2006, 244). Exclusions based on “personal unﬁtness”
did not invalidate a regime’s democratic credentials, even when ‘unﬁtness’ was based on
property, racial, sexual, religious, or other criteria
“For ﬁtness is a matter of opinion and of degree. Its presence must be established by some set of rules. Without absurdity or insincerity it is possible to
hold that ﬁtness is measured by one’s ability to support oneself. In a commonwealth of strong religious conviction it may be held—again without any
absurdity or insincerity—that dissent disqualiﬁes or, in an anti-feminist commonwealth, sex. A race-conscious nation may associate ﬁtness with racial
considerations. . . . [G]iven appropriate views on those and similar subjects,
disqualiﬁcations on grounds of economic status, religion and sex will enter
into the same class with disqualiﬁcations which we all of us consider compatible with democracy. We may disapprove of them to be sure. But if we do
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so we should in good logic disapprove of the theories about the importance
of property, religion, sex, race and so on, rather than call such societies
undemocratic” (2006, 244).
The precise nature of the exclusion mattered little for Schumpeter, and the deﬁning trait
of democracy was not the deﬁnition of the people—as we must “leave it to every populus
to deﬁne himself” (2006, 244)—than that oﬃce was allocated by competitive elections.
This project is concerned with the exclusions that have accompanied democratization. And from this perspective, there is good reason to prefer Schumpeter’s narrow deﬁnition, rather than those that set a threshold between non-democracies and democracies
depending on the proportion of the population included. For one, Schumpeter’s emphasis on a particular political process—competitive and binding elections—underlies much
of the literature’s narrative of progressive enfranchisement (North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009, 215-16). Dahl, for instance, argued that the most successful path toward polyarchy
saw “liberalization precede[] inclusiveness” and that inclusiveness without contestation
was less threatening to elites than contestation without inclusion (Dahl 1971, 34, 39).4
As much as Dahl stressed inclusion, he nonetheless suggested that public contestation
was the more important dimension. The claim that democracies exclude need not be
oxymoronic nor a truism, although at the extremes it can be both: a state excluding
all but a tiny oligarchy can hardly be characterized as a democracy, regardless of the
arrangements for decision making among this oligarchy, and even a state in which every resident person has the right to vote excludes at a minimum those not resident. A
Schumpeterian deﬁnition of democracy allows us to consider democratic exclusion as a
coherent and intelligible category, and treat the degree of inclusion as the variable to be
explained.
We are now able to deﬁne democratic exclusion: the exclusion of categories of persons from the electorate in regimes where the allocation of oﬃce is determined by means
of a competitive struggle for the votes of a variably enfranchised population. This is not
the only form that exclusion in democratic regimes can take, nor is it always the most important. Accordingly, a brief discussion of why this project focuses on disfranchisement
and how this relates to other forms of exclusion is in order. One of the central means
by which democratic states exclude is through the institution of citizenship, which is inherently a mechanism of “social closure” almost always entailing a denial of some rights
4

Dahl was even willing to suggest that the United States should be considered a “near” rather than a
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to political participation (Brubaker 1992; Parkin 1979). Even among putative citizens,
however, states have always imposed civil disabilities and institutional discriminations
between classes based on their race, religion, indigenous status, gender and other criteria. Democratic exclusion could be understood in this broader sense, in which categories
of persons are excluded from the full gamut of rights and privileges that are available in
a given democratic country. Furthermore, there are “also subtler and more ambivalent
ways” by which democratic states can exclude, including the symbolic construction of
national identities that exclude some segment of the citizenry and the “style” and “tone”
of political discourse (Taylor 1998, 145-46).
Why then focus on the right to vote? I suggest two main reasons: it is uniquely
important as a means of securing some form of political power, leverage, or inﬂuence;
and in part because of its importance, it remains one of the rights most clearly delineated
by citizenship. Institutional discriminations and disabilities are not derivative of electoral
disfranchisement, but they are closely imbricated. Civil and social rights do not derive
naturally from the right to vote, but the vote has been centrally important in securing
these.5 The disfranchised, accordingly, can be said to be especially vulnerable to the
denial of rights and discriminatory policies.
At a conceptual level, however, exclusions from the right to vote also merit attention
because of their centrality to our understandings of citizenship. By examining exclusions
from the suﬀrage, we are better able to understand the integrative and exclusionary
faces of citizenship. Citizenship is a formal legal status that structures the relationship
an individual will have with their ‘own’ and with foreign states, and that establishes a
contextually speciﬁc set of rights and responsibilities between the state and the citizen
(Bendix 1996, 89; Tilly 1995, 8). Despite T.H. Marshall’s well-known sequence of rights
moving from the civil to the political and ﬁnally to the social, it was political rights that
were initially central to citizenship (1950). The deﬁning aspect of citizenship in Roman
law was the right of political participation, namely the right to vote (jus suﬀragiorum) and
the right to hold oﬃce (jus honorum).6 While civil rights have been crucial elements of
citizenship, historically these rights were extended more broadly than those of political
5

This is the sole function of the vote in William Riker’s Liberalism against Populism (1982), as well as his
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Even in England, from which Marshall was generalizing, political rights were broadly held until 1430,
when Parliamentary concern that “elections had been crowded by many persons of low estate, and
that confusion had thereby resulted” led to the implementation of the ﬁrst non-resident householder
qualiﬁcation: the “ancient franchise” of the 40 shilling freeholders (Seymour 1915, 11).
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participation, the possession of which indicated full citizenship.7
To a considerable extent, this remains the case. Even those who are skeptical of the
continued importance of national citizenship acknowledge that “for full participation in
political activity, formal citizenship is crucial” (Soysal 1994, 127). And although aliens
have increasingly been extended the right to vote in local elections, the legal status of
citizenship remains the primary means by which belonging is indicated and political
rights are allocated (Bosniak 2008, 2, 15). The contemporary association of political
rights with citizenship, however, threatens to obscure or provide a language in which
ongoing exclusions can be legitimated. Exclusions of long-resident persons are now
justiﬁed not on the grounds of education, property, or some discriminatory metric for
assessing ﬁtness, but because they are non-citizens; and we run the risk of treating the
exclusions of non-citizens as an obvious and unproblematic. And when a politically or
normatively problematic disfranchisement is recognized, the suggested solution is often
citizenship, as was the case with the long-resident Turkish population in Germany.
For a variety of reasons, however, it might be both more practical and normatively
desirable to provide the right to vote divorced from citizenship. The formal status of
citizenship does not and has never overlapped perfectly with understandings as to the
boundaries of belonging (Ngai 2004, 8). In addition to the legal status there is a “cultural construction” of citizenship concerning “who qualify and who do not qualify to
become members of the community in the eyes of those who consider themselves to be
the majority or the hegemonic element of that community” (Gülalp 2006, 3). In some
places, historical and political processes have led to a relatively tight ﬁt between political
community and citizenship, and in others a much looser ﬁt, with broad segments of
the population being formally citizens but outside of the idealized political community.
Sometimes citizenship itself can be a potential barrier to democracy, as it is now a universal condition for full rights of democratic participation; and in other contexts, the
‘extension’ of citizenship to a population would itself be an act of oppression. Accordingly, we want to separate the question of democratic exclusion from that of access to
citizenship.
The same is true of the construction of exclusionary national myths and symbols.
These understandings of political community are of central importance, but they should
not be conﬂated with the speciﬁc institutional barriers to political participation. I argue
7
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that it is precisely because national myths shape political dynamics that we need to
distinguish these from the legal qualiﬁcations on voting rights. By treating democratic
exclusion as disfranchisement from the right to vote, rather than lumping various forms
of exclusion together, we are better able to explore the interactions between institutional
and symbolic—but not therfore inconsequential—exclusions.
Democratic Exclusion and an Inclusive Ideal of Democracy
All democratic states exclude. Despite Schumpeter’s relativism, some of these exclusions are morally wrong and others morally suspect. Many are widely recognized as
such precisely because they are felt to violate democratic principles. That Schumpeter
provides a useful deﬁnition for identifying a centrally important dynamic in democratic
regimes—political contestation for public oﬃce—does not mean his is a normatively adequate vision. But it is worth considering what I believe to be a more compelling vision
of democracy inclusivity, one whose consistent failure might provide a starting point for
understanding democracy’s exclusions.
Take for instance a longstanding claim in democratic theory, that all authority should
derive from the consent of the governed. This is not usually taken to mean a radically
libertarian position that laws are not binding unless each individual has consented to
each law or agreed to each delegation of authority. Rather, it is usually taken to mean
that all who are subject to the laws and authority of a state should have the capacity to
organize and participate in the changing of these laws and in the replacement of those
who wield public authority. They do not need to agree with or support all the laws or
any given authority. But there needs to be open, procedurally predictable, and equitable
institutions that enable any individual who disagrees with a law or disapproves of an
oﬃcial to organize in pursuit of a collective decision of non-consent, one that should
be binding. Institutional arrangements that impede or render inequitable this capacity,
including but not limited to franchise qualiﬁcation, are suspect from the perspective of
democratic legitimacy. This deﬁnition of consent excludes the very young, although it
almost certainly includes teenagers and even younger children. But the very young are
‘governed’ and we should not pretend that their exclusion is conformable to a democratic
ideal. It is a violation premised upon a temporary inability, not itself the product of social
or political process, to organize politically.
As for who constitute the governed, that depends on the claimed scope of the state.
The domain of democracy is that of authoritative organizations that have the ability to
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impose sanctions, the most consequential of which is the state. Given that the organizing
principle of the modern state is territorial—sovereignty over persons and things within
a delineated area—the identiﬁcation of the ‘governed’ is also, primarily, a question of
whether a person is within a given territory. While states do project their authority over
certain persons beyond their claimed territory—the requirement that citizens traveling
under a state’s passport obey the laws of their home state as well as the laws of the state
in which they are present—the eﬀectiveness of this is contingent upon the ability to ‘get’
you territorially: either by arresting you upon your return or by coordinating with other
states to arrest you abroad.
Robert Dahl succinctly articulated the scope of the electorate, which he equated with
the citizenry, in such a minimally exclusive regime: “the citizen body in a democratically
governed state must include all persons subject to the laws of that state except transients
and persons proved to be incapable of caring for themselves” (Dahl 1971, 122).8 It
should be stressed that this is a minimal condition; that is, from a normative stance
states must include at least all of those actually subject to the laws for any considerable
period, but it is not necessarily true that any extension of the right to vote beyond
this is unjustiﬁable. Countries that are large exporters of labor might appropriately
extend the right to vote to those who reside outside the country. That this generates the
possibility of manipulation—the instrumental extension of the vote to a diaspora that
is not directly subject to the laws of the state but that might nonetheless have strong
preferences, possibly against those of a majority of the resident population—might be
grounds for suspicion. But this is true of all voting arrangements, and the fact that a
given arrangement might have been a manipulation of the electoral law to secure party
advantage does not necessarily make it illegitimate.
It is certainly thinkable and not obviously impractical to have a near perfect corre8

This is similar to the “polities of presence” ideal argued for by Jamin B. Raskin: “communities governed
by all adults living within them” (Raskin 1992, 1392). Rainer Bauböck objects that such a territorial
conception of political community “is not plausible in a world where large numbers of people move
across international borders and settle abroad. It would imply that emigrants should automatically lose
their citizenship of origin once they have become permanent residents abroad, and that immigrants
should automatically acquire the citizenship of their country of residence without being asked for their
consent” (Bauböck 2007, 2419). The problem with this argument is that Baubock unreﬂectively re-aﬃrms
not just the centrality of voting to citizenship, but the centrality of citizenship to voting. A territorial
rooted conception of the right to vote need not include every citizen nor need it include only citizens.
Citizens who have settled permanently abroad need not lose their citizenship status even if they lose their
right to vote in elections of their state of origin, nor should resident aliens—who should enjoy the right
to vote on the basis of being subject to the laws of the state—be forced to take citizenship without their
consent.
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spondence between the near-adult governed and the enfranchised. As a practical matter,
the state could impose some limitations based on a short residence period, or restrict the
right to vote of those whose extensive stay abroad has limited the capacity of the state
to govern them. Nonetheless, such a minimally exclusive state, following from the logic
of the normative standard outlined above, is certainly thinkable, in the sense that the
institutional arrangements required to realize it are not inherently contradictory. This
vision of a minimally exclusive state, however, has never been realized for any length of
time. To understand why democratic states exclude, and to understand why the lines of
disfranchisement are drawn where they are, the reasons why a vision of a near-wholly
inclusive democratic state has almost never had any broad political support needs to
be considered. These reasons suggest a preliminary answer to our question of who is
excluded and who is not.
Community and Exclusion
While ‘consent of the governed’ has long been part of the rhetorical repertoire of
democrats and democratizers, it has never been the sole or even the most important
claim. Rather, it has always been understood as qualiﬁed in some way, and some convergence of interests and attachment to a community has nearly always been seen as a
politically necessary—and normatively desirable—restriction of the consent of the governed. Kant for instance, claimed “the only qualiﬁcation for being a citizen is being ﬁt to
vote,” but limited this ﬁtness by presupposing it could only exist with “the independence
of someone who, as one of the people, wants to be not just a part of the commonwealth but also a member of it.”9 Montesquieu noted that in “‘Athens a stranger who
intermeddled in the assemblies of the people was punished with death’. . . because such
a man usurped the rights of sovereignty,” which were necessarily tied to a ‘people.’10 As
one critic of democracy argued, “these rights of man are, in part, political rights, rights
which can only be exercised in community with others. Their content is participation in
the community, and speciﬁcally in the political community, in the life of the state” (Marx
2008, 43).11
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Community, however, is a concept with exclusionary tendencies, suggesting a relation
between persons that is more than the mere coincidence of “living in the same place.”12
That is, it suggests a meaningful political identity that binds some people together. While
it is not necessary as a matter of deﬁnition that democracies be constructed around a
Staatsvolk community—a people around which a state is organized (O’Leary 2001)—it
is often argued as an empirical and theoretical matter that a common identity is a requirement for a democratic regime. Most scholars of democratization, however, treat a
common identity as a prerequisite of democracy, rather than as a potential product of
democracy. So Charles Taylor treats popular sovereignty as the “basic mode of legitimation of democratic states,” and argues that “for the people to be sovereign, it needs
to form an entity and have a personality,” in short, a common identity (Taylor 1998,
143). Dankwart A. Rustow claimed that there was only one necessary precondition for
democratic governance, that “the vast majority of citizens. . . have no doubt or mental
reservations as to which political community they belong” (Rustow 1970, 350). Echoing
Rustow, Anthony Marx argues that “national unity is a precondition to democracy, for
it establishes the boundaries of the community to which citizenship and rights are then
accorded, without which democracy is impossible” (2003, 31; Bosniak 2008, 97). Starting
from this premise, many scholars of democratization see it as a relatively benign (and
often static) factor, and neglect that “the practice of ensuring the ‘belonging’ and ‘unity’
of the nation’s members simultaneously and inevitably signals the existence of a sharp
divide between insiders and outsiders to the nation” (Bosniak 2008, 98).13 The emphasis on national unity as a prerequisite conceals the ways in which nationality was itself
constructed through both democratization and exclusion, and encourages an ahistorical
treatment of exclusions as separate from a country’s experience with democratization.
Democratization in some countries created inclusive nations; in others, it created or reinforced highly exclusive nations. In both cases, the resulting political community was
required as a belief among the people, suggesting this is especially needed where this population is given
inﬂuence over political decision-making.
12
Even the moderate deﬁnition of nation oﬀered by Leopold Bloom—“the same people living in the same
place. . . or other places”—suggests a commonality that is not achieved by being of a diﬀerent people
living in the same place ( Joyce 1922, ep.12, 1419-31).
13
Seen in this light, the “muscular liberalism” espoused by British P.M. David Cameron, is itself imbued
with ethnic and nationally speciﬁc resonances, and its insistence on a single mode of citizenship intentionally excludes not only other modes of citizenship but subtly reaﬃrms the ethnic and national
demarcation of peoplehood that it claims to disavow. See Cameron’s speech in Munich on February
5th, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference, accessed
May 5th, 2013.
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less a static ‘given’ than a contested and relatively malleable product.
Moreover, many of the assumptions of the importance of shared identity to democratic governance rely on functionalist arguments founded on empirically uncertain
claims about the ‘needs’ of a democratic state for an exceptionally strong form of collective identity. Charles Taylor, for instance, has argued that democratic exclusion is
“a by-product of the need, in self-governing societies, of a high degree of cohesion,”
which can only be achieved through the creation of a “‘people with a strong collective
identity” (Taylor 1998, 143-44). Expanding on this logic, Rebecca Kook has argued that
“democratic regimes always exclude groups or individuals. . . [in order to] to maintain
the exclusivity necessary for the identity to function as an eﬃcient mechanism of cooperation” (Kook 2003, 34). These accounts argue democracies generate exclusionary
identities because democracies need such identities to function. The political construction of exclusionary identities, then, is simply an appropriate form of statesmanship,
an eﬀort by state elite to secure the “high degree of cohesion” that democracies are
supposed to require. For one, it is not entirely clear whether, as an empirical matter,
democracies do require an inordinate level of trust (Mueller 1996: 117-18l; Uslaner 1999,
140-144).
Certainly there are democracies that function, however imperfect state services might
be, in low-trust environments. But it is also unclear why we would expect political leaders to formulate policies geared toward ensuring “eﬃcient mechanisms of cooperation”—
given that these mechanisms might easily be turned against them—or for achieving the
optimally eﬃcient democratic government. As with Kook, I argue that political elite are
especially important in constructing exclusionary identities, and that they are motivated
by what they consider to be statesmanship. But rather than assume political leaders
build exclusionary identities for the purposes of a functioning democracy, as Kook does,
I argue they do so for the purpose of reconciling core constituencies in order to build
broad support for a governing coalition. Exclusions might be necessary for the high
degree of political cohesion democracies might require. But for this to translate into political outcomes, it needs to be embedded in the understandings of political leaders. And
this takes us away from the functionalist proposition that democracy requires exclusion,
to the political question of what motivates any given exclusion.
This is why I characterize the minimally exclusive state as a political loser. Insofar
as democratic states exclude beyond the minimum outlined above, it is a function of
politics rather than of theoretical necessity or functional convenience. In practice, it is
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almost always the case that debates over the franchise refer back to membership in either
an already existing community or a community understood to be in the process of being
created. If persons engaged in political contestation ﬁnd that they get more traction by
drawing on resonant understandings of community, then there is the potential that this
very resonance will impose greater burdens on those seeking political rights for those
placed outside this imagined community. Insofar as this is the case, there is a constant
potential for the institutional arrangements of the franchise to fall short—and in many
contexts, fall well short—of implicit democratic ideals.
***
This project shares a family resemblance to claims about the “dark side of democracy” and works that have emphasized the exclusionary potential of democratic regimes.
In its various forms, this literature argues that “the institutions of citizenship, democracy, and welfare are tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion” (Mann 2005, 3;
Wimmer 2002). Some scholars have sought to explain ethnic expulsions and genocides
as resulting from dynamics inherent to democracy, namely the tendency to deﬁne the
demos—the people that are sovereign—in terms of the ethnos (Mann 2005, 3). While the
claims about democracy’s murderous propensities have been incisively critiqued, Mann
rightfully identiﬁes the problematic equation between the ‘people’ who should govern
and a more exclusively deﬁned political community as a central tension to democracy
(see Laitin 2006).
But this equation is neither inevitable nor everywhere the same. Anthony Marx has
called attention to the need to reconﬁgure “the image of the nation-state as an inclusive
‘imagined community’ ” to take into account the possibility of a “distinctive and divisive
route to nation-state building” (1998, 25). And Marx and others have argued that even
the most seemingly benign forms of civic, as opposed to ethnic, nationalism, obscure the
degree to which they are reliant on a “strong sense of separate peoplehood” (Brubaker
1999, 61). But rather than posit a simple equation between the demos and the ethnos
as a recurring tension in of democracy, Marx emphasizes the political exigencies that
lead political leaders to construct exclusionary ideas and institutions of peoplehood, and
describes the process of a “state-imposed exclusion of a speciﬁed internal group, used
to reinforce the allegiance and unity of a core constituency,” which he suggests might be
part of a “more pervasive pattern” (1998, 25). The project advanced here takes seriously
Anthony Marx’s claim that democratic “nation-states have often been based on such
exclusion, not only according to race, but also ethnicity, class, and other cleavages,” and
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that scholarship accordingly needs to explore the “more widespread historical pattern of
nation-state building through exclusion” (1998, 25).
There are at least two diﬀerent perspectives that can be taken on democratic exclusion. The ﬁrst places the emphasis on the state, and moves from the observation that
states exclude, that democracies are a particular form of state, and that consequently
democratic exclusion is an instance of the broader category of state exclusion. The second suggests that there is a sort of double movement in democracies, that “[t]here is a
drive in modern democracy toward inclusion. . . [and] alongside this, there is a standing
temptation to exclude” (Taylor 1998, 146). In this meaning, the “democratic” is not simply a sub-category, but a marker that this is a process more or less unique to democratic
societies.
We should not exaggerate the distinction. Nonetheless, they suggest diﬀerent lines of
research. The ﬁrst begins with the establishment of political order and then moves to the
question of exclusion. Only as a subsidiary does it address the question of whether and
how speciﬁcally democratic regime types alter this dynamic. The second begins with
democratic regime types, and asks what exigencies speciﬁc to these might generate exclusionary impulses. The advantage of the ﬁrst is that we do not begin from the premise
that it must be something speciﬁc to democracies that generates exclusion, a premise
that often leads theorists of democratic exclusion to assume a priori that it is the speciﬁc
need of democratic societies for a high degree of trust that generates exclusionary politics. The advantage of the second is that there are processes that are relatively unique to
democratic regimes and that by treating all exclusions as resulting from state exigencies
we fail to address the particular circumstances of democratic exclusion. I try to draw
on the advantages of both perspectives. Exclusion does not result from abstract state
or abstract democratic exigencies alone; these are always mediated through political
contestation, which can, in the end, determine the outcome.

Democratic Exclusion and Democratization
Much of the literature on democratization argues that once representative institutions
have been established and consolidated, the subsequent history of the country will reﬂect
a democratic development path, in which a political logic of enfranchisement works to
gradually expand the size of the electorate until it is “approximately equal to the total
population of (adult) citizens” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005, 49). This leaves exclusion
as a residual: the disfranchised are those to whom the logic of enfranchisement has not
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yet arrived. This has generated an oversight of the importance of exclusions, impairing
political science theory-building and testing.
The Logic of Progressive Enfranchisement
The vision of a democratic development path characterized by a logic of progressive
enfranchisement is an old one. For Tocqueville, the “gradual development of the principle of democracy is. . . , a Providential fact,” driven by the general and persistent bias of
social developments toward a diﬀusion of wealth and an equalization of social relations.
“When a nation begins to modify the elective qualiﬁcation, it may easily be
foreseen that, sooner or later, that qualiﬁcation will be entirely abolished.
There is no more invariable rule in the history of society: the further electoral rights are extended, the greater is the need of extending them; for after
each concession the strength of the democracy increases, and its demands
increase with its strength. The ambition of those who are below the appointed rate is irritated in exact proportion to the great number of those
who are above it. The exception at last becomes the rule, concession follows
concession, and no stop can be made short of universal suﬀrage” (1863, 71).
John Adams wrote that “it is dangerous to open So fruitfull a Source of Controversy and
Altercation, as would be opened by attempting to alter the Qualiﬁcations of Voters.”
The reason was the same as Tocqueville’s, that “There will be no End of it. New Claims
will arise. Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will think their Rights not
enough attended to, and every Man, who has not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice
with any other in all Acts of State.”14 The French philosopher of the Third Republic,
Alfred Fouillée, claimed that “universal suﬀrage is the inevitable form of democracy,
and democracy is the inevitable form of modern societies” (1884, 103). What unites
these thinkers is the belief that there was embedded in representative institutions a logic
of progressive enfranchisement that would eventually result in democratic and nearuniversal suﬀrage.
While Tocqueville expressed this logic in terms of pressure from below—from the
“irritated” located just below the threshold—others located the logic of enfranchisement
in the competition between organized political factions. E.E. Schattschneider insisted
that “in the search for new segments of the populace that might be exploited proﬁtably,
the parties have kept the movement to liberalize the franchise well ahead of the demand” (1948, 48, 1960, 98-99). This line of theorizing argues that the establishment
14

The Founders Constitution (Kurland and Lerner 1987 vol.1, chapt.13, doc.10).
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of elected representative institutions generates a logic of progressive enfranchisement
through electoral competition. In order to secure oﬃce, even non-democrats often ﬁnd it
in their interest to expand the electorate. Barrington Moore’s highly inﬂuential account
of the origins of democracy and dictatorship likewise shares a presumption of progressive enfranchisement. Once the conﬂict between the peasantry and the landed nobility
had been neutralized in England, the United States, and France, the countries’ developmental paths brought them gradually toward democracy. In the United Kingdom,
the principle of “parliamentary democracy” is said to have “triumphed” in the seventeenth century with the Glorious Revolution, a political settlement whose constitutive
feature was the exclusion and repression of Catholics (Moore 1966, 20). The problem of
“incorporate[ing] the industrial worker into the democratic consensus” arose later, but
for Moore it was a rather unproblematic articulation of what the Civil War and Glorious Revolution had already achieved (1966, 39). France’s “ﬁnal political outcome,” for
Moore, was democracy, but again this was the result of a developmental path secured by
the Revolution (1966, 41). And the United States’ path toward democracy was conﬁrmed
with the Civil War—a capitalist revolution that created the conditions for the politics
that would eventually enfranchise African Americans in the 1960s.15
This narrative of progressive enfranchisement continues to structure theorizing about
democratization, with contemporary theorists implicitly or explicitly arguing for the
existence of a democratic development path, one that is rooted in economic factor
endowments, in initial institutional arrangements, in the strategic incentives operatives
on elites confronted with a threat from below, or in having crossed a certain threshold
of economic development (Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 2005; North, Wallis, and Weingast
2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). While some
of these scholars do provide an account of disfranchisements and enduring exclusions,
they all treat the extension of the suﬀrage as the working through of an underlying
logic rooted in the particular factors—structural or institutional—that place a country
on a virtuous democratic path. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson falsely claim
that “the United States experienced a gradual movement toward democracy with no
reverses” (2006, xi). The United States, Britain, and France post-1877 are treated as
exemplars of a political development path “that leads from nondemocracy gradually but
15

The enfranchisement of African Americans is by no means conﬁrmed in Moore’s account, and he
does recognize the importance of contemporary politics to whether the United States becomes a full
democracy (1966, 155). But the treatment is largely of a development that will happen, sooner or later,
and contemporary politics will only determine the timing.
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inexorably to democracy” (2006, 1). Douglass North, John J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast
argue the progression of democracy in “open access social orders” is one in which the
“incorporation of citizens encompasses diﬀerent groups at diﬀerent times” (2009, 118),
but is nonetheless characterized by a progressive expansion of the suﬀrage to “everlarger sets of groups” (2009, 144). With more restraint, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and
co-authors note that “politics appears to be evolving so that the selectorate, roughly the
citizenry, gradually expands to take in more and more members, thereby reducing the
size of the disenfranchised group” (2005, xi, 40, 403).
The Neglect of Exclusion and its Theoretical Importance
Accounts that focus on democratic developmental paths treat exclusion as a residual
and implicitly or explicitly prioritize the male working class, most often of the Staatsvolk
segment of the population. Because exclusion is residual, it does not require explanation. And because debates over democratization have in many ways been over the
incorporation of the industrial and rural working classes, the exclusions that are treated
as residual are primarily the disfranchisement of women, ethnic, racial, and religious
minorities. When these do receive attention from this line of scholarship, they are explained in two somewhat divergent ways. Either the speciﬁc exclusion is constitutive of
working class disfranchisement, and thus of little additional theoretical relevance, or it
is the product of un-theorized ideological commitments on the part of relevant political agens to racial, religious, ethnic, or male supremacy, commitments that are invoked
ad-hoc and which are tangential to the primary theory.
This neglect of exclusion and the corresponding prioritization of male working class
enfranchisement impair our theory-building in multiple ways. While this literature rejects ideational accounts, its participants nonetheless rely on un-theorized ideological
commitments to explain disfranchisements. Because they neglect often sizeable exclusions, they do not satisfactorily relate their operationalized standard of democracy to
broader comparative questions about the relation between democratic institutions and
outcomes of interest. And because they neglect exclusions that cut across class lines and
are based on other social and political categories, they fail to fully explore the patterns
of political coalition-building underlying democratization, examining primarily the activities of the working class. Below I document some of the neglect of exclusion in this
literature and demonstrate how this impairs our understandings of democratization.
Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloﬀ’s (2005) updating of Tocqueville’s and Fred19

erick Jackson Turner’s (1920) arguments about the unique structural conditions prevailing
in certain regions of the New World is a clear instance of a democratic developmental
path: abundance of land and shortage of labor in leads eventually to democratic outcomes. They recognize, however, that the factors encouraging the extension of the
suﬀrage did not operate equally across categories of persons. The constraining factor
on the frontier’s democratizing logic, however, is an ideological one, namely the commitment of white men to racial and gender supremacy. While white males may have
come to believe that “diﬀerentiation on the basis of wealth was unfair, unreasonable,
or inconsistent with basic rights... [they] remained comfortable supporting the exclusion
of groups that were, in their view, obviously distinctive and unsuitable for participating in
community decisions: blacks, women, children, Native Americans, the mentally incompetent, those with criminal records, and those (immigrants as well as native born) who
had not long been resident in the county or state” (2005, 903 emphasis added). The
democratizing logic was channeled by existing beliefs about membership in a political
community, suggesting that we need to look at the content of these beliefs in order
to understand patterns of exclusion and inclusion. Engerman and Sokoloﬀ leave unexplained why ideological commitments to white male supremacy were suﬃcient to impede
democratization, but earlier beliefs in the appropriateness of wealth diﬀerentiation were
not.
The same pattern of ad-hoc reliance on ideological commitments can be found in
the work of Acemoglu and Robinson. Consider their treatment of two types of disfranchisement that have characterized representative regimes, gender and racial exclusions.
They begin by deﬁning full democracy as “universal adult suﬀrage.” Immediately after,
however, they discuss a few examples of its achievement, except they are now discussing
“universal adult male suﬀrage” (2006, 17).16 They concede that “we have less to say on
the extension of the suﬀrage to women,” but while they insist on the limited importance
of identities and the irrelevance of ideology, their explanation for their exclusion of
women’s suﬀrage is premised upon the ideological commitment to patriarchy during the
periods under analysis: “In almost all European countries, voting rights were ﬁrst given
to adult men and subsequently extended to women. This reﬂected the then-accepted gender
roles” (2006, 18).17 Moreover, they argue that women’s suﬀrage is not a comparative case
16

“We begin by simply considering a move from nondemocracy to full democracy (universal adult suffrage). . . . [I]n Argentina, universal male suﬀrage was introduced by the constitution of 1853. . . . In the
case of Britain, the reforms of 1867 greatly extended voting rights, but universal male suﬀrage was not
conceded until 1919” (2006, 17).
17
The achievement of women’s suﬀrage is phrased in passive terms, the product of women becoming
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of democratization, and thus does outside the scope of their argument, because it was
not accompanied by a revolutionary threat. Given that they argue that democratization
is the result of such a threat, they are in eﬀect arguing that women’s suﬀrage is not a
relevant case because it does not support their theory.
Their treatment of racial exclusions is similarly parenthetical. While they do discuss
the potential relevance of what they term “alternative political identities,” they are explicit in noting that whatever relevance these might have they does not alter their basic
story. Rather, they deal with racial disfranchisements by reducing these to labor and
class: while “there have also been racial restrictions on voting. . . the racial groups disenfranchised have always been poor” (2006, 119). Acemoglu and Robinson thereby exempt
themselves from having to explain why the racially exclusionary states in the pre-15th
Amendment U.S. disqualiﬁed all blacks and not just poor blacks; or why southern states
in the early twentieth century disfranchised almost all blacks, disproportionately poor to
be sure and kept that way by disfranchisement, while often including measures to ensure
that large numbers of poor whites were enfranchised (Naidu 2012).18
This same pattern of side-stepping gender and reducing race to class can be found
in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens’ Capitalist Development and Democracy. Rueschemeyer et al. deﬁne democracy as requiring “regular, free
and fair elections of representatives with universal adult suﬀrage” (1992, 43). Nonetheless, they explicitly exclude women’s suﬀrage on the grounds that it was “far less important” than the achievement of working class enfranchisement, which they buttress by a
further claim that women’s suﬀrage did not result in mass violence nor generate eﬀorts
for their re-exclusion (1992, 48). As with Acemoglu and Robinson, they have deﬁned as
unimportant those cases of democratization that run clearly counter to their argument
laborers and the consequent breakdown in established gender norms: “when the roles began to change,
as women entered the workforce, women also obtained voting rights. It is likely, therefore, that the
mechanisms that we propose better describe the creation of male suﬀrage than the extension of voting
rights to women” (2006, 18). Still, there is nothing theoretically distinct about women’s exclusion: it is
reﬂective of their exclusion from the labor market and so is reducible to the exclusion of the working
classes.
18
While “grandfather clauses” are the most egregious and most discussed form by which this was achieved,
they were overturned in Guinn v. United States (238 U.S. 347 [1915]). The most important means of enfranchising working class whites was through local discretion. Various forms of grandfather clauses were
imposed in Alabama (1901), Georgia (1907), Louisiana (1898), North Carolina (1900), Oklahoma (1910),
Virginia (1902), as well as in Maryland at the municipal level through the Annapolis Ordinance. Oklahoma immediately after the decision in Guinn changed its registration laws to permanently disfranchise
those who were qualiﬁed to vote in 1916 but who had failed to register between April 30 and May 11,
1916, excepting those who had voted in 1914. Other states with grandfather clauses did similarly. This
was struck down in Lane v. Wilson (307 U.S. 268 [1939]).
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(Paxton 2000, 107 fn.13).19
As with Acemoglu and Robinson, their explanation of racial disfranchisement relies
on the reduction of race to class, in that racial categories are relevant only insofar as they
reinforce class cleavages (1992, 49). This maneuver enables them to sidestep the tighter
ﬁt between race and disfranchisement than class and disfranchisement and obscures the
variation in politics around the right to vote. Before the 15th Amendment in the United
States, race was a constitutionally legitimate basis for exclusion. After the Amendment,
eﬀorts to exclude African Americans necessarily proceeded by targeting the working
classes in the southern cities, towns, and countryside. The point is not that the former
or the latter pattern of disfranchisement is primary or more closely reﬂective of the fundamental concerns motivating exclusion. Rather, it is that the political opportunities for
coalition building are radically diﬀerent, leading to distinct patterns of enfranchisement
and disfranchisement. So the ability to extend the vote to working class whites and
deny it to blacks on the basis of their race may have resulted in greater inﬂuence for the
white laborers, mechanics, and farmers against the propertied classes in the antebellum
period. The passage of the 15th Amendment, perversely, weakened the relative inﬂuence
of the white laboring classes and necessitated a broad, cross-racial coalition that was
diﬃcult to achieve and sustain precisely because of resonant ideological commitments
to white supremacy (Woodward 1955).
Mainstream scholarship on democratization has not been entirely blind to the disfranchisements that have accompanied it, but attention has been residual and the explanations tend to invoke ideological commitments the causal functioning of which is left
un-theorized. An additional problem with this inattention is that it potentially biases
analyses of the causes and consequences of democracy. Pamela Paxton (2000) has argued that attention to disfranchisement is necessary in order to accurately code whether
a country is democratic or not. Take for example the Polity IV dataset, one of the central
indices of democratic development in use in comparative politics and public policy analysis. Polity IV codes the United States as a fully institutionalized democracy (the highest
coding) from 1845 onward, excepting a twenty-year period between 1850 and 1870 when
it was coded as either an 8 or a 9. As a measure of comparison, France has been coded
19

Their central claim is that the role of the working class has to be prioritized in accounts of democratization, and that this class won enfranchisement for themselves and others through organization and threats.
By excluding from their analyses of democratization eﬀorts to extend the suﬀrage along non-class lines,
and justifying this exclusion by (mistakenly) claiming that these eﬀorts did not involve violence or threats
of disruption, they limit their cases to those that most closely conﬁrm their argument.
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an 8 or a 9 since 1969, despite the United States’ disfranchisement of women, blacks,
and considerable segments of the white male working class for the bulk of this period.20
Paxton surveys inﬂuential works on democratization and notes that their measurement decisions about which countries are democratic do not correspond with their theoretical or operational deﬁnitions.21 As Paxton highlights, Rueschemeyer and co-authors
code Switzerland as a democracy from 1848 and the United States as a democracy from
1965: “This diﬀerence in coding means that Rueschemeyer et al. are willing to deny the
U.S. full democracy on the basis of the disenfranchisement of a very small percentage of
the American population, while they accept the exclusion of 50 percent of Switzerland’s
population for 123 years” (Paxton 2000, 102). This decision only makes sense given that
Rueschemeyer and co-authors have already decided to exclude cases that do not ﬁt their
argument.
Is this consequential for statistical analyses that rely on these codings? Ultimately
that depends on the speciﬁc research question and what particular feature of “democracy” is hypothesized to be relevant. Analyses of the relationship between democracy
and economic development might theorize that respect for private property is the core
contribution of the former to the latter. In this case, the extent of the franchise might
matter somewhat less than an independent judiciary or a responsible legislature. Alternatively, others might theorize this association is a function of democratic states being
relatively more likely to engage in programmatic rather than clientelistic politics. In this
case the exclusiveness of the franchise might be of central importance. The point is not
that the association of male Staatsvolk citizen enfranchisement with democracy neces20

“Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions
and procedures through which citizens can expresse eﬀective preferences about alternative policies and
leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive.
Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances,
freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or speciﬁc manifestations of, these general principles”
(Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011, 14).
21
So Samuel Huntington deﬁnes societies with male-only electorates as undemocratic, but operationalizes
democracies as requiring “50 percent of adult males [to be] eligible to vote” (Paxton 2000, 95). Edward Muller likewise deﬁnes democracy as requiring institutions that provide “all citizens with. . . the
opportunity to participate in the governing process, as manifested by universal adult suﬀrage” (Muller
1988, 65; Paxton 2000, 94). But his operationalization is that “at least approximately a majority of the
adult population has the right to vote” (1988, 54). There is no magical value to “50%” or “a majority”
other than that it is more than some other amount. This is obviously very useful for comparisons and
decision making, but it is less useful for classiﬁcation. It seems unlikely that a country with 48% adult
enfranchisement would be excluded from their analyses, and more likely that “50%” was chosen as an
artful way to side-step women’s suﬀrage.
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sarily undermines the conﬁdence in macro analyses of democracy and its correlates. Nor
is the solution necessarily to code the United States as democratic from 1965 onwards
and Switzerland as democratic from 1971. Rather, it is to more clearly articulate exactly
what dimensions of democracy are theoretically or normatively relevant for the analysis.
The most important problem, however, is that the neglect of sustained exclusion obscures patterns of coalition building that are central to understanding the genesis and the
contours of a given suﬀrage change. Teri Caraway has noted that the political decision
to include a category of persons entails a simultaneous choice to not include another
(2004). This was not usually an oversight. The exact terms of the voting qualiﬁcations
were frequently heatedly debated precisely because some desired to maintain or construct a category of exclusion whose validity or desirability others denied. Moreover,
it has often been the case that an inclusive choice has been coupled with the articulation of a new category of exclusion, thereby disfranchising existing voters. The neglect
of disfranchisement not only obscures the mutual implication of inclusion and exclusion. It also limits our ability to understand the politics and coalitions that underlay the
formulation of the electoral qualiﬁcations.
Consider Ruth Berins Collier’s Paths Toward Democracy (1999). Berins Collier treats
the question of “the extent of inclusion or enfranchisement required” to code a country
as democratic as “a particularly thorny issue”: “On one level, of course, one would like
to say that nothing short of universal suﬀrage can pass as democratic, but this criterion
would exclude virtually the entire experience of Europe in the nineteenth century, the
locus classicus of debates on the working class and democracy” (1999, 26). She argues,
however, that “if the analyst is willing to stop short of women’s suﬀrage, only a few
cases are problematic” (1999, 27). In a footnote she accurately remarks that an “unrestricted suﬀrage, of course, does not exist, insofar as, at a minimum, citizenship and age
qualiﬁcations exist everywhere, and other ‘minor’ qualiﬁcations are typically ignored by
analysts” (1999, 27, fn.15), but does not expand upon this.22
Berins Collier emphasizes the fact that political calculations regarding the suﬀrage
were not always straightforward and obvious, but reﬂected the speciﬁc assessments
classes had of their strength and interests. Yet by limiting her analysis to voting rights
for the bulk of the male working class, she fails to fully explore the diverse forms of
22

Berins Collier poses two questions for coding a country as democratic: “does the extent of enfranchisement reach at least most of the working class (a central question for the present inquiry), and what
percentage of the potential electorate remain excluded?” (1999, 27). Note the equation of the working
class and the male working class.

24

inclusionary and exclusionary coalitions underlying democratization. Consider, for instance, the case of Ireland and the United States. In the former, the extension of political
rights to Catholics was paired with the disfranchisement of poor farmers, largely Irish
Catholic. In the latter, the enfranchisement of the white working class was associated
with the disfranchisement of free blacks. The disenfranchisement of free blacks, however,
was a core objective of the coalitions seeking the removal of property qualiﬁcations. By
contrast, the disenfranchisement of the Irish small farmers was a compromise measure
intended to assuage the Anglo-Irish landlords. Only by paying attention to how enfranchisement and exclusion are implicated, in particular historical and national contexts,
can we understand the strategic decisions made by the relevant political actors.

Conclusion
Democratic exclusion is an important and under-studied phenomenon. It has been
closely implicated in democratization processes historically, with the expansion of the
vote being paired with simultaneous contraction. In contrast to the claim made by Taylor
in the epigram that opened this chapter, these were not unspoken restrictions. They were
codiﬁed into law, and they were defended by reference to understandings of an ideal
community or the proper basis for political inclusion. Attention to democratic exclusion
unsettles standard narratives of progressive enfranchisement, narratives that continue to
structure theorizing of democratization. Instead of a broad trajectory toward inclusion,
the history of the suﬀrage reveals numerous reversals and disfranchising trends.
The literature on democratization fails to integrate democratic exclusion into its theorizing. Insofar as it is explained, it is primarily by reliance on ad-hoc reference to
ideological commitments. This project aims to integrate an analysis of these ideological commitments into our understanding of democratizing and exclusionary processes.
Ideas of political belonging are both the product of politics as well as a crucial set of
parameters structuring democratizing processes. The contours of peoplehood are never
uncontested. These are politically projected communities, and as such there will always
be political entrepreneurs whose projects require—or at least would be facilitated by—a
reconﬁguration of public belonging. And while these entrepreneurs are perhaps most
likely to succeed in reconﬁguring the projected community during periods in which the
authority of the state is contested and unsettled, gradual reconﬁgurations of political
peoplehood are possible.
I continue the discussion of democratic exclusion in Chapter 2, where I outline a
25

theory of how ideas—in this case, understandings of political belonging—both structure
and are the product of political contestation. I then turn to the individual case studies.
These are structured into three chapters each, beginning with an overview of the patterns
of exclusion, in which the basic argument of the case is introduced. This is followed by
two chapters that examine the role of ideas of political community during critical shifts
in governing authority and during the subsequent long-run periods of political order,
respectively. Chapters 3 through 5 look at the trajectories and politics of democratic
exclusion in the antebellum United States; Chapters 6 through 8 in nineteenth century
United Kingdom; and Chapters 9 through 12 in Third Republic France. I conclude by
considering the continuing relevance of ideas of community in determining the allocation
of political rights.

26

Chapter 2
Explaining Democratic Exclusion

“On the one hand, while the political process itself is. . . characterized by indeterminacy, at the same time it demands determinacy from those involved in it—
determinacy of objectives, of alignment, of identity, of loyalty. So the political
process opens up new spaces and new conﬁgurations, often rapidly and unexpectedly; and then confronts its participants with the pressing need to renegotiate
their positions vis-á-vis these new conﬁgurations.” —Dror Warhman (1995, 10)

Introduction
Democratization and exclusion can happen during periods of extraordinary politics, in
which there is a heightened capacity for well-situated activists to reconstitute governing authority. But they can also happen during periods of ‘normal’ politics, in which
the basic contours of political order are neither the subject of serious contestation nor
particularly vulnerable to being recast. The expansion of the franchise in the UK in
1867-68 and in 1884; the exclusion of African Americans during the antebellum period
and the simultaneous removal of property qualiﬁcations for white men; the expansion of
political rights to women in American states before WWI, all occurred within a context
of politics as usual. They were the product of legislative negotiations, electoral appeals,
and political calculations. Ideas—and especially ideas of political community—shape
outcomes of democracy and exclusion in both cases. The purpose of this chapter is to
provide a theoretical framework for understanding why democracy can be—but is not
always—associated with disfranchisement, why some exclusions are highly resilient to
democratization while others are not. In short, I will outline a framework for understanding the patterns of institutional change and political behavior that I will document
and explain in the remainder of this project.
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I begin by revisiting the central claim advanced in the last chapter, that broadly
resonant ideas of peoplehood structure the political processes associated with democratization, resulting in resilient forms of exclusion and sometimes the disfranchisement of
certain classes. I juxtapose the claim that ideas structure politics against the argument
that the ideas of democracy or of a particular political community are the motivating
cause of inclusion and exclusion. I am sympathetic to the latter argument, but it is not
the argument I am advancing in this project. Rather than seeing ideas of membership
propelling democratization, we should see these as structuring the political processes that
determine institutional changes. Agents draw on and reconﬁgure ideas of political community in order to constitute and articulate their interests and objectives. These ideas
can facilitate collective action, and insofar as they become embedded in the expectations of political operatives, they can condition behavior, encouraging an investment
in certain political projects rather than others. I sketch out the general sequence of a
critical juncture followed by a relatively stable political order, and specify my prediction
for how ideas will structure political outcomes in both periods. I conclude by specifying
a research strategy that will allow me to test whether the expected patterns can be observed, one that treats both institutional changes and accompanying patterns of political
behavior as the outcomes of interest.

Ideas as Structure
Changes to the right to vote are the product of political contestation and calculation
of advantage.23 The dynamics of these political processes, however, are structured by
commonly held ideas about who is, and who is not, a member of the political community.
This argument does not deny instrumentalism or conﬂict. It is nonetheless an ideational
claim and largely disavowed or ignored in the literature on democratization.

The Epiphenomenal Claim
Nobody denies that principled and reasoned arguments are ubiquitous in ﬁghts over
democratization and exclusion. But there is, in political science, a general presumption
that these ideas did not determine outcomes, but simply provided a rhetorical screen
to what was really going on, namely the advancement or defense of material interests.
23

I include here both successful revolutions and the bargaining model of revolutionary threats under the
term political contestation.
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The ‘mass’ was not convinced to demand their rights, nor were the ‘elite’ convinced to
concede them, by following the reasoning of a universalist logic embedded in democratic
theory (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 46).24
Even if one does not believe the adoption of democratic or anti-democratic ideas
to be mere rhetorical cover, this does not mean that ideas were causally important.
Changes to the law arise because of some underlying factors or processes that make
decision makers more likely to support a given change: electoral competition, the threat
of a revolutionary expropriation, the danger of progressive taxation, the need to secure
loyalty and mobilization during wartime, an increasingly egalitarian social structure decreasing the possible costs of democracy to the elite, to name a few processes prominent
in the democratization literature. Either because of motivated reasoning or because some
underlying social process changes perceptions, the ideas that support the independently
incentivized change will be more likely to resonate with the interested parties.25 And so
the undeniable spread of the diﬀerent strands of democratic theory—in rhetoric, in print,
and in other media—at best reﬂects the same underlying factors or political processes
that actually cause democratization; ideas, in this reading, are merely epiphenomenal.
The democratization literature does not consider the ideas of political community
to be particularly important. On occasion, however, ‘culture’ is given a role in accounts
of democratization, and especially of democratic consolidation. Barry Weingast, for instance, has argued that “cultural values” can crystalize around an elite pact, such as a
constitution or bill of rights. If the terms embedded in the elite pact relative to the constraints on governments forged are broadly disseminated into ‘culture,’ then the citizenry
will have a “focal point” to assist in the collective action necessary to resist government
overreach (Weingast 1997). I am sympathetic to this argument, although it is largely an
exception in the democratization literature and is concerned with consolidating restrictions on government rather than allocating political rights.
But Weingast does not oﬀer an account of how the terms of the pact become embedded in cultural values. Nor does he grapple with the complications posed by the
24

Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens do not dismiss ideas entirely, and insofar as they recognize
their relevance, they see these as a potential constraint on certain forms of suﬀrage change. So, for
instance, they note that the “triumph” of the “democratic ideal. . . has made it more diﬃcult to limit the
suﬀrage openly by class, race, or gender,” and while they argue this limitation is eﬀectively a rhetorical
one, unlikely to ultimately inﬂuence developments, they do suggest that it has an eﬀect. The problem,
however, is that this remains un-theorized in their account.
25
And, in what Alexander Keyssar (2000) has called the endgame dynamic, once a change appears likely,
the anticipated re-composition of the electorate makes political elites even more likely to embrace
rhetoric that aligns with this change, leading to the greater production of such discourse.
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fact that the cultural values need not be indissolubly tied to the interests that were important for the pact itself. For instance, in one of Weingast’s formulation the elite pact
was concerned with the protection of slavery (Mittal and Weingast 2011). If a cultural
commitment to states’ rights was meant to provide a focal point around the terms of this
pact, then would it still serve the same function in facilitating collective action if it was
applied to an issue not related to slavery, or even opposed to slavery? If anybody can
invoke states’ rights, including those opposed to slavery, then what good is it as a focal
point for coordinating the defense of slavery? Why not just say ‘our material interest in
slavery is threatened’? I will consider the questions of dissemination and the fact that
ideas can be adopted beyond the domain in which they were most immediately tied to
political institutions and interests below. For the moment, however, it is enough to point
out some of the diﬃculties in integrating ideas into political analyses in such a way that
the content of the ideas themselves matter.
If political processes have an independent eﬀect on both the production of discourse
and the likelihood that political operatives support institutional change, then why should
we prioritize the discourse in our theoretical model?26 The empirical problem is a
diﬃculty that confronts almost all ideational accounts, namely that of specifying an
empirical test given the likelihood of a high degree of correlation between material and
political interests with ideational discourse. If the ideas and interests are implicated,
how can we identify the independent eﬀect of each? If they are both important, and
their eﬀect is in the same direction, why should we not rely exclusively on the interest
account?27 The standard methodological suggestion is to highlight instances in which the
material interest and ideological position diverge: if an agents’ material interest suggests
one course of action, and instead they take that which their ideology recommends, then
26

The production of discourse is one of the most straightforward means of assessing the dissemination
and prevalence of an idea.
27
The bias in political science is toward interest and institutional based accounts. For example, evidence of
party leaders calculating the relative beneﬁts of diﬀerent franchise changes would be taken as relatively
persuasive evidence that a franchise change was motivated by political interest, while speeches by the
same leaders invoking ﬁrst principles or moral obligation would be given considerably less weight as
evidence. Instead, it is more likely to be dismissed as theater, necessitated by powerful norms against
“naked appeals to interest or prejudice” but nonetheless an eﬀort to disguise the underlying motivation
(Elster 1998, 104). This is not inappropriate skepticism, and certainly the claim that interests motivate
action to a greater extent than principled commitments, and that the latter are subject to motivated
reasoning while the former might have more stability, has evidence to support it. But the resulting bias
in political science’s priors—the weight it assigns to new information based on its assessment of previous
information—does often amount to an ontological claim that interests are primary, which is, of course,
the claim that ideational arguments are often attempting to question.
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we can be reasonably conﬁdent that the ideologies were causally important.28 Such
instances are important, and in the case studies to follow I will highlight a number of
such occasions; but there is good theoretical reason that we not rely upon them too
heavily.

Unit Heterogeneity
The theoretical argument of this project is that that the processes of democratization
and exclusion are structured by ideas of political community. This argument requires a
framework that can identify the causal eﬀect of ideas, and predict where and when they
should be of importance, and suggest a strategy for disentangling and in some sense
measuring this eﬀect.
What does it mean to say that “politics is structured” by ideas of political community?
Insofar as it relates to voting rights, it means that depending on how a category of
persons is situated relative to the ideas of political community, the various processes
associated with suﬀrage extensions will operate with diﬀerent eﬀects. This builds on a
growing recognition in political science that the assumption of unit homogeneity does
not always hold, and that failure to account for the speciﬁc ways in which a causal process
unfolds across cases and in diﬀerent contexts might lead to faulty inferences (Falleti and
Lynch 2009; Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). For a given relationship between X and Y,
the size and even the direction of the coeﬃcient Îš might change depending on whether
the category of persons under consideration is considered as part of the community or
alien to it. For instance, renting a small tenement for the cost of $3,200 a year might
be suﬃcient evidence for elites that a given category of persons would not threaten their
privileges; a freehold property valued at $160,000 a year might be required of another
category of persons.29 Political competition might lead to the enfranchisement of one
28

Of course it is possible that one’s ideology led them to believe their material interest would be best
served by a particular course of action, which was against their principled commitments, and that this
belief was entirely mistaken. Were the agent to follow their ideological beliefs about material interest
against their ideological commitments about principled behavior, this would be a conﬁrmatory case for
the proposition that human behavior is motivated by material interest but perhaps a more compelling
conﬁrmation that ideas are causally important in social science.
29
The example comes from the case of New York State in 1821. The $96 is the approximate value, in
current dollars, of the state’s tenement franchise, while the $160,000 is the approximate value of the
property required of African American men to gain the franchise. For both estimates I used the income
index of the per-capita GDP. Other examples would include Earl Grey’s proposed franchise qualiﬁcations
in New Zealand that would have extended the right to vote to all persons with a relatively modest
property requirement. But this was supplemented by an English literacy test to ensure that the Maori
would have a much greater diﬃculty—over and above the restrictions implicit in a property qualiﬁcation
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class, but the disfranchisement of another.
In short, there is unit heterogeneity across diﬀerent categories of persons. How do
ideas create heterogeneity across “units”? I argue that ideas of political community generate expectations among political operatives that violating the strictures of an ideal of
peoplehood will entail negative consequences, in terms of party advancement, electoral
prospects, or their ability to build broader coalitions in support of some desired project.
Material incentives are important, but these reinforce the ideas of political community
as much as the other way around, if not more so.

Theoretical Framework
Ideas structure political processes by constituting the interests and institutions that directly condition political behavior. Political coalitions that reconﬁgure governing authority during critical periods in a country’s political development advance particular
ideas of membership in a political community. The purpose of these ideas is to align
the interests of the coalition members and give the population a compelling reason to
give allegiance. They also oﬀer prescriptions for discursive and legislative behavior, and
insofar as the coalition is successful, the prescribed behavior can be incentivized in an
increasing set of situations. As a result, the ideas become embedded in expectations, as
well as formally institutionalized in law, and accordingly generate the behavioral patterns
they prescribe. The causal importance of ideas in politics lies in their role in constituting
interests and constituting institutions, and thereby embedding certain understandings,
beliefs, and prescriptive schemas into the rules of the game, the object of the game, and
the strategies by which the game is played.

Constituting Interests
Ideas constitute interests insofar as they enable the relevant agents to determine what
these might be and provide a prescriptive schema for how to achieve realize them. To
that required individual property ownership—in accessing the franchise. And supplementing this was
a certiﬁcate system, by which the governor could allow certain Maori who other met the property
qualiﬁcation to vote regardless of whether they were literate in English. The concern was not that
they would “swamp” the settlers, as the system was proposed to be limited to areas where Maori were
very few in numbers. And given the requirement of individual property ownership, it would only have
concerned a very small number of Maori already integrated into settler society. Rather, it was premised
on the belief that more was required of the Maori to demonstrate their soundness for political rights
than English settlers.
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say you have an interest in something suggests a series of related meanings: that a given
situation or arrangement will have an impact on you if changed, as you have a stake
or involvement in it; and that this impact will be suﬃciently consequential to engage
your attention and possibly your action. A more speciﬁc use of the term builds from
these meanings: an organized group that has a common concern and has engaged in
collective action around this particular end. To say the working class “had a strong
interest in eﬀecting its political inclusion” is to say that gaining the right to vote would
impact this class in a positive way, that this impact was suﬃciently large to engage its
attention and action, and that in some sense it constituted itself as a group for this
purpose (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 8).
Ideas constitute interests in each of these three meanings, by determining the nature
of one’s interest, by prescribing strategies for pursuing it, and by enabling collective action for this purpose. As has long been recognized, for interests to be causally important
in accounts of political behavior they almost always need to be perceived, a process
that is necessarily mediated through analytical categories and that is usually constructed
within discursive communities. The working class may or may not believe they have an
interest in securing their own enfranchisement; they might be right or wrong, but there is
likely to be little sustained support for agitating for the right to vote unless they believe it
to be worthwhile. Ideas constitute interests by shaping agents’ understandings of them,
by providing a framework by which the eﬀects of possible changes can be predicted and
assessed relative to the agents’ own sense of well-being.
Once an interest is constituted, a strategy needs to be formulated for its achievement. Stable institutional arrangements facilitate this process considerably, but they are
not always suﬃcient. Should reformers seek to work entirely within the system, or should
they supplement this with extra-institutional action, possibly including violence? This
might encourage concession, but it might just as easily provoke a backlash. If the understandings of politics in a given setting see extra-institutional politics as an important
and legitimate means of claims-making, engaging in these might be an eﬀective means
of calling attention to an issue and even generating popular sympathy. If the political
culture of the time and place see all forms of popular politics, such as the ‘monster meetings’ of the 19th century, as preludes to revolution, the result might be very diﬀerent.30
30

As will be emphasized in the discussion of the English Reform Act of 1832 (Chapter 7), similarly situated elites who diﬀered in their understanding of the relationship between agitation and statesmanship
reacted very diﬀerently to the outbreak of violence. Those who believed that agitation an important
indicator of popular support became more likely to support reform, while those who believed agitation
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A prescriptive schema that identiﬁes, or claims to identify, the best means of pursuing
a desired outcome, is essential to political action. So is coalition building, and insofar as
ideas shape our perception of interests they can facilitate collective action by helping to
align potentially divergent interests. There is no intrinsic need for coalitions to be stable
or long-lasting formations across multiple issues, but there are some obvious advantages
to not having to rebuild a political coalition for new issue.31 But whatever the reason for
building a more enduring coalition, the challenge for their architects is to persuade the
diﬀerent factions involved that there is some long-run alignment between their interests.
This is frequently accomplished through the articulation of a set of principles that
in their exposition seem to suggest policy implications that will advance, or at least not
undermine, the agendas of the respective coalition partners. As we shall see in Chapter
7, the language of liberal opposition to monopoly was interpreted to mean support for
free trade; for Church reform; for the civil and political rights of non-Anglicans; for
an extension of the right to vote to the working class, to natives, to freed slaves, to
women; and even support for land reform in Ireland. The repeatedly invoked phrase
‘the cause of civil and religious liberty’ meant diﬀerent things to diﬀerent factions of a
Liberal coalition; but the underlying idea helped make varied, and potentially divergent,
policies seem to have a deeper aﬃnity and therefore to be aligned in the long-run.
The principles articulated to facilitate coalition building and maintenance do not
need to be limited so as to include only a minimal winning coalition (cf. Riker 1962).
Coalition builders might aim for a coalition large enough to be pivotal, but not so large
as to compromise core constituency interests. In such a situation, the ideational rationale
for the coalition need not have broad appeal and might be little more than a concise
articulation of the interests of the few groups in the coalition. Alternatively, if they are
aiming to be a governing coalition, and especially if they are aiming to reconstruct the
bases of political authority, they would likely articulate principles that will have broad
to be a revolutionary threat became more adamantly opposed to any reform. The decision of whether to
democratize or repress was not simply a calculation of cost, but was mediated through understandings
as to the meaning of the events.
31
Various institutional settings—including legislatures—incentivize the formation of more durable coalitions. These can provide order to the sequence in which issues are considered, thereby limiting issue
cycling and biasing preferences in a desired direction. Durable coalitions also have the ability to not
only pass or block legislation but also to oversee its implementation. If implementation is lacking, or
policy drift necessitates further action to maintain a status quo, durable coalitions remain available for
action without having to reconstitute the original alliance. The prospect of a durable coalition, then, is
one way to signal a commitment to the interested coalitional components that a given policy will not be
abandoned post-passage.
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appeal. This is in large part because they want a broader base of support for their
governing authority than a bare majority.32 But it might also reﬂect the fact that largerthan-minimal majorities creates the possibility of reconstructing the policy positions of
their opponents, so that even in the event of a defeat their core interests might be
protected.33

Constituting Institutions
Ideas not only constitute interests; they constitute the institutions within which interests
have a stable and identiﬁable meaning. They do so by informing the purposive design of
formal institutional arrangements, thereby creating the context in which certain behavior is incentivized; and by establishing norms that can function as informal institutional
arrangements. Analyses of institutions are often divided between those who deﬁne these
as “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” and those who consider them to be
“rules of the game” that constrain behavior and generate recurring and stable patterns
(Huntington 2006 [1968], 12; North 1990). The distinction is of theoretical consequence,
with the ﬁrst tending to explain behavior as the result of individual agent’s expectations
of other agents’ behavior—which when in equilibrium results in stable, ‘institutionalized’ patterns (Greif and Kingston 2011—and the second tending to explain behavior
as the result of rules that allow for the narrowing of information and a consequently
greater ability to decide on a course of action (North 1990). Usually accompanying the
‘institutions-as-rules’ perspective is an emphasis on third party enforcement, which is
not considered to be necessary in a model of institutions as an equilibrium resulting
from the interaction of expectations.34
These approaches are not incompatible, however, and the decision of which conceptualization to rely upon should reﬂect the particular problem at hand. An institution is a
rule or stricture—either formally established or more colloquially recognized—that has,
for whatever reason, become manifested in a stable pattern of behavior. An increase in
behavioral predictability is, therefore, a key metric of what is meant by the term ‘institu32

That is, they want to be able to reduce the costs of securing compliance from a much larger group than
the minimal number required to win.
33
If, for example, a party wins several successive elections with 70% of the popular vote and this consistently translates into a supermajority-proof legislature, it is likely that their opponents will adopt at least
some of the policies that they believe underlie this popularity.
34
That is, the institutions-as-equilibria perspective tends to focus on institutions that are self-enforcing, in
which conformity with the institutionalized behavior occurs because it is in every agent’s self-interest,
given their expectations of other agent’s behavior.
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tionalization.’ The possibility remains open that this behavior is an emergent equilibrium
resulting from agents’ expectations of others’ behavior, but this is one possible mechanism rather than the deﬁnition of an institution itself.35 A self-enforcing institution is
one in which an agent’s best response conforms to the institutional rule, but additionally some institutions are enforced because of the expectation—and often enough, the
actual imposition—of some exogenously imposed cost.36 As the likelihood and severity
of external enforcement increases, so does the probability that the desired behavior will
be ‘self-enforced,’ i.e., that external enforcement will not actually be required.
Under conditions of institutional stability, the role of ideas in determining interests
and strategies might be relatively limited (Blyth 2002). Institutions limit, but do not extinguish, the independent role of ideas precisely because they narrow the possible range
of interests and strategies by creating conditions of stable behavior. In these contexts,
the calculation of advantage is relatively straightforward, as the costs of violating the institution’s strictures are known and the response of other agents is relatively predictable.
The institutions are themselves, however, partly the product of purposive design; insofar
as this is the case they are likely to reﬂect the designers’ beliefs as to what behavior
was desired as well as their theories about how to incentivize it. Under conditions of
institutional stability the role of ideas might be diminished precisely because other ideas
are already embedded in the institutional design. Ideas, in short, deﬁne the “motives
that persist within institutions” (Skowronek 1995, 94).
But ideas constitute institutions in another way as well: they can be institutionalized
in the sense of prescribing behavior that becomes manifested in stable and predictable
patterns. Ideas can function as institutions—informal ones, in Douglass North’s well35

Greif and Kingston’s deﬁnition of institutions, I suggest, builds the theory of institutional compliance
into the deﬁnition itself (2011; Greif 2006). An institution, for them, is a stable pattern of behavior that
results from the aggregate expectations of the agents within the relevant situation. Any stable pattern
that results from another mechanism, then, is by deﬁnition not an institution. The mere existence of a
rule does not mean that it eﬀectively conditions behavior, and therefore does not meet our deﬁnition
of an institution. Greif and Kingston rightly point out that we want to make the question why some
rules are “rules-in-use” while others remain “rules-in-form” (Ostrom 2005) answerable within rather
than outside our analytical framework. But this is done through a theory of institutions, rather than
a deﬁnition of institutions. A theory of institutions speciﬁes why some rules are ‘institutionalized’ and
others are not, but does not logically equate the deﬁnition of institutions with a causal claim about what
makes some rules institutions and others not.
36
To describe a situation in which a political operative conforms to the strictures of a given narrative of
political community because they expect to be expelled from the party if they do not self-enforcing is
to stretch the term beyond a useful meaning. But the distinction is always ambiguous, and a political
operative acting in conformity to these strictures because they believe it will help them advance within
the party might very appropriately be considered self-enforcing.
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known distinction (1990)—insofar as there is an expectation that behavior in accordance
with an idea’s prescriptions is in some sense beneﬁcial. If an idea is believed to be popular with some relevant constituency—an electorate, party leaders, inﬂuential newspaper
owners, the members of important interest groups—than the accompanying expectation of the beneﬁts and costs associated with conformity or deviation from the idea
will encourage, but not mandate, conformity to its prescriptions. The institution might
be enforced exogenously—electoral defeat or being expelled from the political party—
but the greater likelihood and severity of this will encourage conformity without relying
primarily on enforcement.

Critical Junctures and Political Order
The last component of our theoretical framework is an account of how ideas relate to
both the critical junctures and stable political orders within which democratization and
exclusion occur. As Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Keleman note, critical junctures are
often considered essential to historical institutionalist arguments, and yet most theorizing has focused on the post-juncture period in which a new political order is consolidated
and reproduced (2007, 343). As a result we have a proliferation of ‘path dependency’
arguments, in which the institutional arrangements that emerge from a critical juncture
“can be almost impossible to reverse” absent the punctuation of a critical juncture (Pierson 2000, 251; Collier and Collier 1991, 27).37 But the questions of whether there is
anything unique to the critical period itself and how it relates to the antecedent and
subsequent periods are often left unaddressed.
Following Capoccia and Kelemen, critical junctures are treated here as “relatively
short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that
agents’ choices will aﬀect the outcome of interest” (2007, 348). The occurrence of a
critical juncture does not need to be unanticipated or unpredictable (cf. Mahoney 2000,
527). Nor need it be attributable to an “exogenous shock,” although we should also
not presume that all critical junctures were determined by endogenous change (Pierson
2000, 266). Rather, they are periods in which the question of who will govern, and
through what institutional arrangements they will govern, are not only undecided but
contingent to a much greater degree than otherwise on the speciﬁc choices made by
37

As has been remarked by various scholars, the emphasis on stability is a feature of institutional analyses
more broadly, a feature shared by works advocating a greater emphasis on the role of ideas (Greif and
Laitin 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Lieberman 2002, 698).

37

well-situated agents at critical moments.38 Their cause and their consequences are left
out of the deﬁnition.
Not all developmental junctures—in which a particular path is taken rather than
some possible alternatives—are critical junctures. Some ‘junctures’ might be important
because they place a country on a diﬀerent developmental path, for some relevant dimension, than had heretofore been the case. And yet there might not have been anything
distinctive about the politics of this juncture that requires independent explanation. This
can even be the case in instances of what Orren and Skowronek deﬁne as “political development,” namely “durable shif[s] in governing authority,” in which the institutional
arrangements of the state are reconﬁgured in such a way that there is a “new distribution of authority among persons or organizations within the polity at large” (Orren and
Skowronek 2004, 123).
I distinguish, then, between critical junctures and shifts in governing authority. The
latter are necessarily identiﬁed post-hoc, as a new political order takes shape and can
be contrasted with the antecedent order. The former, however, can often be identiﬁed
by contemporaries and the participants themselves, who recognize that the predictable
constraints and opportunities that characterized the antecedent period are no longer so
important. Critical junctures are usually, but not always, shifts in governing authority
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007, 348). The American Revolution was a critical juncture;
the election of Thomas Jeﬀerson brought with it a shift in governing authority. The importance of shifts in governing authority that fall short of being critical junctures should
not be underestimated. But the politics of these occasions might not merit separate explanation from those of the broader political order in which they occurred, depending
on the question under consideration.39
What is the role of ideas in each period? Ideas constitute interests, by providing a prescriptive schema for political behavior and facilitating collective action. They
38

I emphasize critical agents rather than the “powerful political actors” speciﬁed by Capoccia and Kelemen (2007, 343) because a potential feature of critical junctures is that the question of who is and is
not a powerful political actor is not as clearly determined as before. Certainly, the former “powerful
political actors” are likely to be important, but the rapidity with which new, formerly irrelevant, agents
become centrally important is one of the characteristic, but not deﬁning, features of critical junctures.
Neither Alexandre Ledru-Rollin nor Louis Blanc were unknown in 1848, but their prominence during
the Revolution was in large part a function of their being well-situated to take advantage of the fall of
the monarchy.
39
That is to say that just because a policy is passed during periods of ‘normal’ politics that it does not
invite more detailed explanation than a general theory of policymaking that is formulated with an entire
political order in mind.
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constitute interests both during and outside of critical junctures, but the decline in institutional determinacy means that this particular causal role of ideas is likely to be
more important during the critical juncture. That is, we should expect ideas to be especially important during critical junctures in identifying political and material interests,
in prescribing strategies for their realization, and in aligning the interests of a potential
governing coalition. Ideas also constitute institutions, both through institutional design
and through their being embedded in the expectations of political operatives. These
roles likewise occur inside and outside of critical junctures. But ideas-as-institutions are
especially important in constituting a particular political order, and so we should expect
this role to be most important in conditioning the behavior of political operatives during
the periods of ‘normal’ politics.
The distinction between the critical juncture and a stable political order should not
be exaggerated. ‘Normal’ politics does not cease during a critical juncture, nor is agency
irrelevant during periods of stability. Some coalitions are hastily cobbled together during
critical junctures, but more commonly they were formerly minority parties that had been
slowly built up during a period of political stability. The ideas of the antecedent period
often constrain the options of agents trying to dislodge this order, as they are faced
with the dilemma of trying to build political support while not violating the ideological premises of a regime they oppose.40 Accordingly, these agents often accommodate
themselves to the ideological strictures of characteristic of a particular period, while attempting to reformulate these in a way that works to their advantage. When a critical
juncture occurs, for whatever reason, they will not be able to entirely abandon the commitments reﬂected in their ideological accommodations. The result is that even when
there is a critical juncture, the formative ideologies of the new order often draw on and
replicate the ideologies of the old.
What, then, is the relationship between political order and critical junctures? Critical
junctures provide the opportunity to recast governing institutions according to particular
ideas, which in turn are reﬂective of the ideologies and interests of a successful coalition.
Both directly and indirectly, a successful coalition coming out of a critical juncture will be
well placed to encourage the broad dissemination of ideas constitutive of this coalition.
In doing so, as discussed above, the coalition might be able to reconstruct the policy
40

There are multiple strategies that can be pursued by oppositional parties, including accommodation
and outright rejection. The latter might enable a party to enter a critical juncture without ties to what
may now be considered an illegitimate regime. But critical junctures do not always occur, in which case
accommodative engagement might appear to be the more eﬀective option.
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positions of their opponents and more ﬁrmly entrench their commitments by making
threats to these commitments politically unpopular. The ideas are deeply implicated in
the new political order, and so we need to understand not only why they condition political behavior—discussed above—but how they come to be relevant outside the initial
domain in which they were formulated. How do ideas that were initially deployed for the
purpose of building a political coalition become “public philosophies,” broadly adhered
to understandings as to the purpose of government, the strictures of which electors will
demand some level of adherence (Mehta 2011)?
Scholars agree that ideas are not chained to a particular context: they can be learned,
embraced (strategically or genuinely), and their behavioral prescriptions emulated across
diﬀerent situations and for diﬀerent purposes. But they worry that this makes them “freeﬂoating bits of knowledge and conjecture, detached from considerations of structure and
power” (Lieberman 2002, 700). As Karen Orren phrased it in an article highly critical
of ideational research, “how loosely attached can ideas be to institutional developments
and remain politically viable” (Orren 1995, 98)? As ideas travel, do they carry with them
their political viability, or is this necessarily tied to the particular domain in which their
implication with institutions was most important? To answer this question, it is useful
to think in terms of the situations in which institutions and ideas will be self-enforcing
and resonant. The self-enforceability of an institution is dependent upon the context—
the parameter set—in which the behavior takes place. In some contexts the gains that
accompany an institutions’ constraints might be worth conforming to the behavioral
prescription, and in others they might not be. A given ideology might resonate or be
useful to its adherents in some context—for understanding the world or for advancing
politically—while in others it might fall on deaf ears.
In Avner Greif and David Laitin’s account of endogenous institutional change, the
context in which an institution exists is, over the long-run, altered by the processes generated by the institution itself (2004). Endogenous institutional change occurs when the
consequences of a given institution change the context in which this institution operates:
an institution is self-reinforcing if the outcomes generated by the institution—economic
growth induced by secured property rights, for instance—change the context—the value
of the parameters—so that the institution is self-enforcing in an increasing number of
situations. It is self-undermining if the outcomes or processes generated by the institution result in the institution being self-enforcing in a smaller number of situations.41 It
41

Following the work of Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, some scholars have explained changes in
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is less that the operation of the institution itself changes than that the range in which
the institution operates either increases or decrease: a broadening or narrowing of the
institution’s applicability.
This account of endogenous change allows us to understand the stability of ideas and
their capacity to condition behavior independently of other interests. Insofar as certain
ideas resonate in a given situation, and insofar as the adoption of these ideas in this
situation further increases the number of situations in which it is resonant, then the speciﬁc ideas will have value beyond the area of their initial formulation. The more broadly
the idea is adopted—a function of the number of situations in which it resonates—
the more its strictures impinge on agents’ behavior. The behavioral prescriptions of
the idea—the ideas-as-institution—can be incentivized in diﬀerent situations, making
them transportable, imitable, and yet constitutive of interests and institutions and not
something that exists apart from these.
Consider for instance the adoption of republican discourse in revolutionary and postrevolution America. The idea of republicanism was self-reinforcing, being adopted in
an increasing number of situations because it resonated with Americans and enabled
them to make sense of their experience and facilitated the achievement of particular
political ends.42 But from a very early point, republican discourse was applied to the
situation of being held in slavery. The adoption of the ideas embedded in republican
discourse was strongly incentivized in yet another situation, one in which few expected
it to occur.43 Its adoption in this particular situation, however, threatened existing
political orders as a result of the “intercurrence” of diﬀerent ideological and institutional orders (1994,
2004; Skowronek 1995; Lieberman 2002). In this account the behavior of individuals is simultaneously conditioned by multiple institutions, not all of them complementary. Paradoxically, this model
of institutional change is premised upon their stability, upon the intercurrence of overlapping, but individually stable, institutions that incentivize contradictory forms of behavior. When institutional signals
are aligned—and the incentivized behavior is the same or complementary—then we can expect considerable institutional stability. When they are misaligned, the resulting “friction”—the uncertainty of
agents as to which incentives they should follow—creates a situation for entrepreneurs to reformulate
the understandings of interest and to oﬀer new institutions that might bring the diﬀerent incentives into
alignment. I do not deny that intercurrence might be an important aspect in explaining institutional
change in many situations. It is less useful, however, in explaining the dissemination of institutions and
ideologies across society—that is, it is less useful in explaining an institution’s breadth across multiple
domains.
42
As we shall see in Chapter 4, republican ideology quickly served to legitimate the revolutionary and
post-revolutionary claims making of groups that had been more excluded than before.
43
An alternative way to describe this is in terms of what Jon Elster has called the “imperfection constraint”
(1998, 104). When elaborating a principled reasoning in pursuit of a given interest, the principle will
rarely be so narrow as to support only that interest and no others. As a result, ideas developed and
deployed in one domain are available for use in other domains and by other actors. Insofar as there is
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material and ideological investments, and political leaders sought to reconﬁgure the
content of republicanism to limit its application on racial lines. In part because this new
formulation preserved key aspects of the status quo while accommodating the now deeply
held commitment to republican equality, white republicanism became self-reinforcing as
well and its rhetorical and policy prescriptions were adopted in situations such as ﬁghts
over slavery, over black suﬀrage, in labor conﬂict, and in eﬀorts to secure the integration
of newly arrived immigrants.
This framework also, then, allows us to identify an important role for agency. The
formulation and reformulation of ideas, including the articulation and dissemination of
the language of the ‘white male republic,’ are political projects. It is certainly not unconstrained agency, and political entrepreneurs operating in situations in which certain
ideas have been widely adopted will likely need to accommodate their behavior in such a
way as to not incur the cost of perceived violations. Those whose interests or principled
commitments are not reﬂected in the dominant ideas can aim to displace these ideas,
but their ability to do so will be constrained by the need to build support against a
resonant ideal.
But because there can be more or fewer situations in which an idea is resonant, there
is always space for the formulation and dissemination of counter ideas. We are rarely in
the world of an ideological hegemony of “untouchable assumptions” where questioning
and contesting the dominant narratives will not ﬁnd some receptive audience (Mehta
2011). Each generation of antebellum Americans saw men and women who rejected the
accommodation between republicanism and slavery: some opposed this in language that
reﬂected, and in many ways reaﬃrmed the principles of the white male republic, but
others instead articulated a narrative of political community that drew on and claimed
a legacy with the early republican egalitarianism. And if over time there is a declining
number of situations in which the dominant ideas resonate, entrepreneurs advancing
counter or alternative projects might ﬁnd traction. They might even be able to provoke
a crisis and take advantage of a critical juncture.
As has been implicit in the discussion so far, governing institutions and political parties are especially relevant to the argument advanced here. Ideas are of central importance in building political coalitions, and the organizational infrastructure established
to sustain these coalitions will likely reﬂect these ideological commitments, for instance
any “consistency constraint,” in which political operatives are relatively tethered to the principles they
have articulated earlier (1998, 104), this creates the possibility of tension between those who originally
formulated the principle and those who are now deploying it in other areas.
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by constructing recruitment networks in which creative and articulate defenders of these
commitments can be identiﬁed and promoted.
And the purpose of most political parties is to win oﬃce. To a greater extent than
any other institution in society, governing institutions are able to “change the rules of
the game.” They are accordingly an especially important means by which the ideas of
political community can be encouraged across new situations. When a party is dominant
for an extended period of time it has a heightened ability to reconstruct the preferences
of the electorate and the opposition. Success encourages emulation, precisely because
the challengers come to expect that certain positions that break with the dominant
party’s public philosophy will carry electoral costs.
This, then, is the basic framework that I employ throughout this project. In order to build stable coalitions capable of governing, political entrepreneurs fashion new
understandings of political community.44 During critical junctures, some parties will
be uniquely well-situated to recast the ideologies and institutions of political order. If
successful, their narrative of political community might be adopted in a greater set of situations, consolidating the regime while ensuring that a greater portion of pivotal agents’
behavior will be conditioned by the expectation of a cost to violating this narrative’s
strictures. So long as the ideas and institutions of political community structure political
behavior in a greater set of situations than other counter-arrangements, the general trend
in policy changes should reﬂect the particular strictures of the dominant narrative. That
is, there will be a bias toward changes that reinforce these ideas of political membership.

Explaining Democratic Exclusion
The last section outlined a framework for understanding how ideas constitute interests
and institutions and how these relate to political order and critical junctures. This
section employs this framework to explain democratic exclusion—the disfranchisement
or sustained exclusion of categories of persons alongside democratizing processes; and to
explain why changes in enfranchisement and disfranchisement tend toward a systematic
bias over distinct periods. I begin by brieﬂy discussing what is unique about ideas
of political community that make them essential in structuring democratization and
exclusion. I then sketch out the basic argument and sequence that will be applied in
44

These are rarely entirely novel, but rather always weave together diﬀerent strands of extant narratives
in the country’s own tradition, as well as borrowing from successful parties in other countries that the
entrepreneur might seek to emulate.
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each of the three case studies.

Ideas of Political Community
Democratization is structured by dominant ideas of political community or peoplehood,
the belief that a certain category of persons are tied together by something—be it descent, choice, providential fate or contingent history—in such a way that their association
is experienced by its participants as meaningful and political (Smith 2003).45 The beliefs about a particular political people, like Renan’s ‘nation,’ contain prescriptions for
a shared “program to realize” in the present and future. This is not accidental. Rather
it reﬂects the fact that a political people is an ongoing ideological project—never under
the control of any one group and never articulated ex nihilo—whose proponents “aim to
construct communities that are also enduring structures of political power” (Smith 2003,
41).
Projects of political community, the construction of narratives, stories, and the assertion of constitutive principles, are instrumental. The “stories” are crafted—out of an
existing pool of culturally resonant resources—by aspiring rulers aiming to secure the
support of a constituency and stitch together a coalition capable of governing. Some
might be content to govern from within existing institutional arrangements while others’ ambitions might lead them to displace these and construct new ones. Regardless,
the ideas of political community are meant to constitute the interests of potential constituents and coalition partners by identifying what should be valued and associating
this with the continued rule of the particular coalition.
Perhaps most importantly for our purposes, ideas of political community are inherently exclusionary. However broad a particular understanding of peoplehood might be,
however large the pale of inclusion intended and porous the boundaries, all peoplebuilding coalitions will require some form of exclusion and some form of border main45

John Lie deﬁnes modern peoplehood as “an inclusionary and involuntary group identity with a putatively
shared history and distinct way of life. It is inclusionary because everyone in the group, regardless of
status, gender, or moral worth, belongs” (Lie 2004, 1). Burke would have disagreed: “I have often
endeavored to compute and to class those who, in any political view, are to be called the people.... In
England and Scotland, I compute that those of adult age, not declining in life, of tolerable leisure for
such discussions, and of some means of information more or less and who are above menial dependence,
(or what virtually is such) may amount to about four hundred thousand” (Burke 1881, 284). Bagehot’s
position on the inclusionary nature of peoplehood was slightly more ambiguous: “The working classes
contribute almost nothing to our corporate public opinion, and therefore, the fact of their want of
inﬂuence in Parliament does not impair the coincidence of Parliament with public opinion. They are left
out in the representation, and also in the thing represented” (Bagehot 1866, 276).
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tenance (Smith 2003, 56). So long as democracy is bounded by ideas of belonging—
what constitutes a political people, and who is included accordingly—the prospects for
democracy in this sense will be bounded as well.

Democratic Exclusion
Democratization is structured by political orders of peoplehood insofar as enfranchisement or disfranchisement of a category of persons is (1) seen as violating the strictures
of the ideal of peoplehood, and (2) this violation carries costs even for those who might,
from the perspective of simple estimates of electoral gain, be best situated to beneﬁt.
These costs make it more diﬃcult for the disfranchised to ﬁnd allies among the enfranchised, who might lose political support for making common cause with persons outside
the “projected” community.
Certain categories of persons are systematically excluded from otherwise representative regimes because the institutional and coalitional arrangements that structure politics
in a given place and time reﬂect and reinforce particular understandings of community—
the ideational organizing of a particular set of persons into a ‘people’ and the proper
forms in which this people should be governed. The speciﬁcs of who is disfranchised are
determined in large part by the political ideas of membership, which are reﬂective of the
contingent political exigencies that shaped the formative coalition-building.
But the initial interests alone do not explain the extent of disfranchisement or its
endurance. Rather, the ideas that were articulated at the outset have constituted new
interests—or reconﬁgured understandings of prior interests—and have informed the
design of new institutions. Accordingly, they have an impact beyond the original material
interests for which they may have been designed. In the United Kingdom, ‘no Popery’
remained a more resonant cry in England and Scotland than the material interests
at stake would suggest.46 By the end of the antebellum period in the United States,
considerably more people believed they had a stake in white supremacy than southern
slaveholders: even in areas where there were very few African Americans, there was
broad support for black exclusion. Even when not concerned directly with free black
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In Ireland there was a strong material interest for Protestants, landlords and otherwise, in maintaining
the Protestant Constitution. English landlords with property in Ireland likewise had a strong material
interests, as did the Church of England. All of these sought to encourage an ideological commitment
among English and Scots who were not directly implicated in maintaining the settlement of Ireland.
And ‘no Popery’ by all accounts had broad public support outside of Catholic Ireland, precisely because
it had been encouraged and understood to refer to a broader set of interests than the speciﬁc material
interests of landlords or the Church.
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suﬀrage, many Americans had come to associate this with abolitionism and thus with
disunion, an ideological association that invoked profound material and psychological
interests.
What makes ideas of peoplehood distinctive and more relevant for our analysis? For
one, the ideas of peoplehood are especially relevant for the design of the institutions of
citizenship, ranging from the demarcation of citizen as a legal relationship between an
individual and a state through to the demarcation of citizen as one with full rights in a
community. That is they are more likely to impinge on the organization of political authority, including rules of citizenship, suﬀrage, and representative institutions, and so are
especially relevant for analyzing the eﬀect of ideas on enfranchisement and disfranchisement from the right to vote. Additionally, they are likely to be crafted with a broader
appeal and resonance in mind than what might be necessary to achieve a minimum
winning coalition. And perhaps most importantly, ideas of political community must
necessarily draw some boundary of exclusion. And the history of democratization, from
the French Republic’s denial of citizenship to the privileged orders, to the aggressive
ideology of laicité in countries such as Turkey and France, suggests that the boundary is
often drawn within already existing communities—an ideological partition—rather than
circumscribing these by including all resident within a territory or with longstanding ties
to a territorial community.

Sequence
Ideas matter in distinctive ways across diﬀerent stages in a historical sequence. I do not
want to suggest that this sequence will everywhere be the same; nonetheless, I believe
certain features will be generalizable, largely because it rests on an iterative succession
between stable political orders and shifts in governing authority—sometimes amounting
to critical junctures.
It makes sense to begin with the shift in governing authority, although analyses will
need to look backward beyond this for the purpose of establishing a baseline and for understanding what caused the shift. As discussed above, shifts in governing authority refer
to those periods in which the developmental trajectory of a country, along some relevant
dimension, was durably altered. These may or may not amount to critical junctures—
relatively brief periods in which highly consequential political outcomes are especially
sensitive to agency and idiosyncratic choices. But the more they approximate critical
junctures, the less important are the antecedent ideas and institutions in conditioning
46

political behavior and determining policy outcomes, and the greater the role of contingency and individual idiosyncrasy. During these periods either newly constituted or
pre-existing coalitions compete to gain control over governing institutions, recognizing
that in doing so they will be uniquely situated to recast the institutional and ideological
bases of governing authority. These coalitions advance new or importantly reconﬁgured
understandings of political peoplehood for the purpose of reconciling their divergent
factions, and the importance of these narratives in constituting the coalition’s interests,
strategies, and sense of purpose are especially important. As Stephen Hanson has shown
in the case of the French critical juncture of 1870-1877, the greater the investment in ideological purpose, the more a party was able to coordinate its adherents, giving the most
ideologically developed coalitions—the Legitimists and the Republicans—an outsized
inﬂuence in shaping events (2010).47
The next stage is the period in which the speciﬁc ideas of peoplehood are consolidated, both behaviorally—in discourse and position taking—as well as through formal
institutional design. The critical juncture sees a marked diminution in the predictability
of others’ behavior—reﬂecting a abruptly declining importance of existing institutional
arrangements and therefore a greater diﬃculty in generating stable expectations of others’ preferences and strategies. The consolidation period sees is the gradual working
out of new expectations about behavior as the new institutional environment is explored
and understood.
The third stage is the period of reinforcement, in which the ideas of peoplehood
advanced by the coalition are relatively dominant and politics and policy largely reﬂects
the constraints that they impose. This is not a static period, as there are likely to be
processes of self-reinforcement and self-undermining occurring alongside each other. It
is nonetheless more predictable in the bias of policy changes and the likely coalitions
that form around the right to vote than during the critical juncture. As this period draws
to a close, the processes of self-undermining become more prominent, and the cycle
begins anew.
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Seven years might be stretching the concept of a critical juncture too far. It is more accurate to say
that (1) the remarkable slowness of the National Assembly in writing a constitution (which they never
fully accomplished) made the entire period something of an exceptional outlier in how long a critical
juncture might be, and (2) there was a succession of critical junctures between 1870 and 1877, from the
Government of National Defense to the Seize Mai Crisis.
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Research Design
The theoretical framework developed above identifying a causal importance to ideas
of political community implies that we need to be looking at the relationship between
political behavior and the content of these ideas. It is not enough to simply integrate
the ideas as a focal point facilitating collective action, but rather we must map out the
arguments and implications of these ideas and assess whether political operatives were
attentive to perceived violations of their strictures.

Political Representation and Legislative Behavior
The framework suggests not only the importance of analyzing the content of ideas of
political community, but also suggests a research strategy for assessing their causal relevance. The following analyses focus on parties-in-legislatures and especially legislators’
discursive rationales and voting behavior. This approach stems from the growing recognition that the literature on democratization has largely neglected empirical engagement
with the micro-foundations of behavior. As a result, the literature has generated robust
correlational analyses with little conﬁdence in the causal processes assumed to generate
the relation (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). The theory developed here connects the behavior of legislators and political leaders to patterns of institutional change. But there
is another important reason to focus primarily on legislative behavior, rather than the
behind-the-scenes activity that characterize many accounts of democracy and exclusion. In addition to their obvious importance in drafting and approving laws, legislative
assemblies have provided a platform for legislators to communicate with national and
constituency audiences as well as a venue for coalition building and maintenance, a
clearinghouse for the varied and changing concerns to which party leaders must be
responsive in order to maintain the active support of their members.
Vivien Schmidt distinguishes between coordinative and communicative discourses,
the ﬁrst occurring primarily among “individuals and groups at the center of policy
construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and justiﬁcation of policy
and programmatic ideas,” and the second occurring in the “political sphere. . . [among]
the individuals and groups involved in the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation
of political ideas to the general public” (Schmidt 2008, 310). The distinction is useful
insofar as it highlights the variation in discourse—in the mode of argument, in the
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tone of discussion, in the appropriate vernaculars—across diﬀerent discursive settings.48
The diﬀerence, however, is not necessarily in the discursive style but in the visibility of
the discussion and in the assumptions about the participants. Coordinative discourse,
in Schmidt’s telling, takes place among a small number of actors sharing (relatively)
common assumptions and technical expertise, and it takes place in private or in relatively
closed contexts. Communicative discourse takes place in public, and occurs between
actors who are unable to assume a shared technical language or theoretical assumptions.
It might be the simple communication of policy to a passive audience, but it might also
entail a rejection of this policy and an insistence on modiﬁcations and the incorporation
of other concerns.
Representative institutions can, but do not always, integrate these two discourses.
It has become customary to treat all legislative rhetoric as position-taking, as signaling
solicitude to some constituency. And this is certainly one of its central functions. But
it has also been a site for debate, although this has varied considerably across time and
institutions. Legislators’ posture that they are speaking to their assembled colleagues has
often been genuine. In his study of the Scots Reform Act of 1832, for instance, Gordon
Pentland notes that reformers emphasized diﬀerent claims in the House of Commons
than in the ‘Fox dinners,’ local gatherings of Whigs that provided one of the main
organizational venues in the period before the organization of a more coherent party
structure. In the ‘dinners’ they were addressing like-minded fellow partisans, while in
parliament they “had to answer strong and coherent anti-reform arguments and, as
such, developed strategies with which to counter these positions” (Pentland 2008, 22).
Parliamentary debate was not always intended to persuade opponents, but to reassure
cautious supporters that they would be able to have strong responses to criticisms that
they would face from opponents in their districts. And as such the legislative assembly
was an important site for policy coordination among partisans—especially before the
organization of eﬀective caucus or party apparatuses.
But this was coordinative discourse that would often be reprinted in newspapers, in
pamphlets, and in the case of especially good speeches in the French Third Republic,
could be ordered printed and posted in every city hall in the country. If the discourse vio48

A given epistemic community–such as experts on health policy—will have its norms of communication
and persuasion, which they are likely to recognize as operative only within a limited range of settings.
Insofar as political operatives—or the policy experts acting as political operatives—pick up these ideas,
they are likely to reformulate them to conform to styles of argument and persuasion that have broader
appeal.
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lates the strictures of resonant narratives of political community, or any other popularly
resonant ideology, then the legislator will possibly be called to account by their constituents. But if the discourse deviates too markedly from other coordinative discourse
that takes privately, then wavering partisans might worry that they will lack a response
suitable for public consumption in the event that their opponents criticize them for their
policy.
While the theory is concerned with identifying the role of ideas, the discussion above
has been concerned with discourse. The reason for this is in part methodological: the
degree to which a belief is held is only inferable from repeated observations of actions
and the relevant agent’s explanation for their actions, and even this does not allow us
to conﬁdently infer that the belief was sincere but rather that the performance of the
belief’s implications and the invocation of it were consistent. Observed behavior—and
especially discourse, the communicated arguments and explanation of beliefs—are all
we have access to, and even this is subject to manipulation.49
The theory outlined above does not work primarily through sincere beliefs. Rather,
it works through the ability to persuade possible coalition members that there is an
alignment of interests and through the expectation of costs and beneﬁts being attached
to public behavior. The theory of ideas’ causal importance is based on processes that
are, if not always public, at least always social. The reliance on discourse and behavior,
then, is suited to the theoretical framework.
But there are additional advantages to emphasizing discourse. For one, the language of discourse highlights the degree to which the ‘ideas’ of political community
are not a perfectly stable and well-understood set of talking points drafted by a small
number of people. Rather, the ideas are themselves constituted in discursive networks,
with particular ideas gaining prominence—and thus leading to a greater production of
discourse—insofar as the participants in these networks found them compelling, useful,
clever. And these participants then repeat and reformulate the ideas themselves. That
is, the advantage of ‘discourse’ over ‘ideas’ is not simply the possibility of capturing the
processes in some observable and quantiﬁable capacity, but in underscoring the degree
to which the action of discussing or articulating an idea works to constitute the idea
itself. What is important is not “simply that which was thought or said per se, ‘but all
the discursive rules and categories that were a priori, assumed as a constituent part of
49

A note passed from one minister to another in a Cabinet meeting might appear to be a more genuine
reﬂection of their beliefs than a public statement, but in reality we cannot know this unless we know
why they passed the note. Private correspondence is not necessarily more truthful than public rhetoric.

50

discourse and therefore of knowledge”’ (Hook 2001, 522; citing Young 1981). The context
of discourse shapes the ideas that are formulated.
That said, it is important to insist that this is a theory of ideas’ causal relevance,
which while implicated in the relevance of discourse is not reducible to this. Ideas were
communicated in diﬀerent formulations across diﬀerent discursive settings, and it was
through communication, arguments, debate, that these ideas were formulated and modiﬁed. But what was being communicated was relatively stable across discursive contexts.
As we shall see in the UK case study, the terms of the Liberal vision of progressive
Britain were forged in private communication, in books, and—perhaps especially—in
public meetings and dinners, where ideological principles were expressed in the form of
easily repeated toasts that helped constitute a party identity. But while the expression
of these principles—in their tone and style of reasoning—varied across discursive and
institutional contexts, the principles and their implications remained remarkably consistent.50 The discursive process shaped and reshaped these ideas, but they nonetheless
were intelligible and relatively stable ideas that were being communicated.
The theory predicts certain behavioral patterns, especially in the discourse of activists and party leaders, with diﬀerent patterns expected to predominate—but not to
the exclusion of the other—during and outside of critical junctures:
1. Party leaders and activists will seek to encourage understandings of political community that they believe will reconcile potentially divergent factions and support
their claim to govern. The ideas of political belonging were initially developed for
coalitional purposes, and they especially important in the interests of divergent
factions. We should accordingly see in the period antecedent to a critical juncture,
as well as during the juncture itself, an eﬀort by political entrepreneurs to ensure
coalitional stability by formulating ideas meant to reconcile their interests and
strategies.
2. Both during and after the critical juncture, support or opposition to franchise
changes will be framed in terms of the narrative of political community strongly
associated with a given political coalition. During periods of political stability, the
ideas serve as benchmarks against which the behavior of coalition members can
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The one major exception was Ireland, where private and public discourse (among Liberals) varied
considerably. In private they often called for the country to be treated as a Crown Colony, ruled as a
temporary dictatorship until the people had become ﬁt for Liberal citizenship. In public they adamantly
rejected such discourse, and claimed that it was characteristic of the Conservatives. In policy, they split
the diﬀerence, combining coercion with reform measures, the former of which found broad support in
parliament while the latter were supported by the majority of the Liberal party, which was not always
suﬃcient for passage through the Commons and Lords.
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be assessed. And so we should expect that legislator behavior will reﬂect an eﬀort
to signal their continued adherence, or to question the adherence of others, to the
understandings of political belonging around which the coalition has organized.
3. Legislators will reveal in their rhetoric a belief that there are costs associated with
violating the strictures of the ideal of peoplehood. Legislators and party operatives
will reveal trepidation in taking positions that are understood to be violations of
the strictures of the given idea of peoplehood. Such a violation might be supporting the enfranchisement of a class against the dominant ideas of belonging, or it
might be supporting the disfranchisement of a class that is considered to be within
the pale of political community. This trepidation can be evaluated by noting behavioral patterns: disclaiming questionable aﬃnities or antagonisms, seeking to
avoid having their positions attributed to them, and in general seeking to downplay the signiﬁcance of positions that seemingly violate the ideas’ strictures. The
opposite is also true, and we can infer that a position is seen as costly through the
actions of rivals in publicizing the deviant behavior. Additionally, organizations
and constituencies who have invested in a given narrative of political community
will have a stake in opposing deviations from these as potentially undermining
their own position.51
4. Finally, strategies to alter the political order need to be both accommodative of the
existing political order as well as seek to transform it. Those seeking the enfranchisement of a class seen as outside the political people will attempt to reinterpret
the existing order of peoplehood in an eﬀort to assert that they are not violating the strictures of peoplehood properly understood. One possible consequence
of this is that such transformative eﬀorts might achieve medium-term success but
longer term stymying of their objectives, as their accommodative accepting of an
the exclusionary political order makes it diﬃcult to fully secure its transformation.
Alternatively, a coalition might reject the resonant beliefs in political community
altogether. In doing so, they are likely to gain in ideological consistency and a
motivated sense of purpose, but lose popular appeal or political resonance. This
strategy, however, can quickly pay dividends if the party is well-placed to take
advantage of the highly ﬂuid dynamics within a critical juncture.
More generally, I need to show two patterns in each case: that political entrepreneurs
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Ideas of political belonging are probably not necessary to explain the opposition of Southern planters
to black suﬀrage or Ulster settlers’ opposition to the enfranchisement of Irish Catholics. But they do
help explain why there was considerable hostility to these enfranchisements well beyond the situations
in which there was an obvious material interest. The hostility was in part based in the fact that other
groups had invested in the particular ideas of peoplehood, so even though their interests were not
obviously at stake from enfranchisement, they believed they were. This, for instance, helps explain why
so many northern whites so far removed from slavery or from any likelihood of a large free or freed
black community were so adamantly opposed to black suﬀrage: they believed it meant the break-up of a
Union in which their material and psychological well-being was deeply invested.
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sought to secure governing authority and build coalitions by advancing new or reconﬁgured understandings of peoplehood, and that concern with violating the strictures of
these ideas conditioned behavior in ways that resulted in the patterns of democratic
exclusion discussed in the introductory chapter.
The model of ideas’ causal importance outlined above suggests that the eﬀect of these
ideas will vary depending on the degree to which they are constitutive of institutional
arrangements and understandings of political interest. This in turn will depend on the
degree to which the party system is capable of coordinate its membership around their
constitutive understandings: the more a party can impose disciplinary punishments
for violating the strictures of this party’s narrative of political purpose, the more we
should expect legislators to conform. But it will also depend on the degree to which the
representational system is organized to generate costs and beneﬁts to political actors who
violate or aﬃrm the constitutive ideas. Where a legislature meets in private—or where
there are no published accounts of their speeches—they are likely to be less responsive
to public opinion.52 These sources of potential variation in the eﬀect of ideas of political
community will be discussed in the framework chapter preceding each case study.
The focus on legislative behavior and party coordination is in contrast to most works
in democratization, which tend to focus on the interplay between organized social movements and the calculations of party and state leadership or on macro-level statistical
analyses. This is frequently an appropriate research strategy. But we should also be
attentive to the degree to which democratization can occur as the result of ‘normal’
politics, which in turn means we cannot simply ignore political institutions, such as legislative assemblies. As the exponent of ‘high politics,’ Maurice Cowling noted that in
52

Isaac Butt, an early leader of the Home Rule party, noted the importance of publicity on member
behavior and representation in 1877. He was calling for an oﬃcial journal of Parliamentary proceedings,
rather than the unoﬃcial Hansard: “There was a time when it was a breach of privilege to report the
proceedings of this House. All that is changed now, and this House was forced, many years ago, by
the gradual progress of public opinion to submit to unauthorized reports of its proceedings being given
to the public. . . . [E]very Member who now speaks to this House is no longer speaking as the Member
of a private assembly irresponsible to public opinion, but that for his speech and even for his acts he
is responsible to his constituents, and that the public have a right to be informed as to the nature of
those speeches and of those acts. . . . But, still, I think it is an unfortunate thing that our debates should
lose their control over public opinion. . . . I am sure, for myself, that I should be glad if what I say on
many occasions were not reported, or, at any rate, that it were put into better shape by the reporters;
but, still, I think my constituents have a right to know what is the exact position which I take in this
House. They have a right to know if I talk good English, or if I am in the habit of disgracing them by
idle Amendments.” “I am afaid,” he concluded, “that our debates in general, instead of guiding public
opinion, are but the register of public opinion formed outside.” Butt, House of Commons, Hansard, 3rd
Series, vol.233, cc.1629-31.
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passing the 1867 Reform Act Parliament “was not afraid of public agitation: nor was its
action determined by it. . . . It is in Parliament, and in light of Parliament’s view of public
feeling, that the centre of explanation will be found” (Cowling1967, 2-3). Legislative
behavior constitutes the “micro-foundations” of democratization, and its centrality to
the theory advanced here invites us to move beyond macro-analyses of democratization
or historical analyses of “transitions.” Instead, we combine attention to the macro-level
patterns with historical analyses of the actions and motivations of political agents during
critical junctures and across relatively discrete periods.

Historical Approach
This project contributes to the “historical turn” in democratization studies by re-examining
the processes of democratization in the paradigmatic cases of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France. The historical turn entails a closer analysis of the different episodes in a country’s development during which “democratic institutions were
created or substantially reshaped” (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010, 934). The purpose of this
re-examination of the historical development of democracy is that it “allows us to highlight key empirical regularities that would otherwise be simply overlooked”—in this case
the patterns of exclusion and disfranchisement that have accompanied democratizing
processes (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010, 934). Much of the literature on democratization
is divided into works looking at transition and those that focus on “the ‘grand sweep’
of. . . democratic development and its retrospectively identiﬁed ‘trajectories,”’ (Capoccia
and Ziblatt 2010, 934).
By contrast, my approach aims to integrate a focus on the historical episodes—some
of which constituted critical junctures, but many which did not—in which the right
to vote was debated and institutionally altered with an explanation of the trajectories
that seem to characterize distinct periods. The methods employed in this project draw
heavily on those developed in historical institutionalism and in analyses of legislative
behavior. Each case is divided into two chapters, the ﬁrst tracing the process of coalition
building and the instrumental articulation of ideas for this purpose and the second
looking at how these ideas conditioned the behavior of political agents and parties in
legislative assemblies. The ﬁrst chapter accordingly adopts the methods of historical
institutionalism—notably drawing on archival research to trace the relevant processes,
while the second adopts methods more familiar to analyses of legislative dynamics,
including ideal point estimation and discourse analysis.
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Comparative Case Selection
The objectives of this project are to demonstrate the importance of democratic exclusion, to highlight the ways its oversight impedes theorization, and to oﬀer a theoretical
framework that allows us to incorporate the insights of extant theories while attending
to the exclusions and disfranchisements that have often accompanied democratization.
For this reason, the selection of cases was geared toward revision and re-interpretation.
The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were chosen in part because, since
at least Barrington Moore, they have been the paradigmatic cases of democratization
for scholars. And long before that, people around the world looked to these cases as
exemplary and worthy of emulation. While these may not be “typical” cases in the sense
of being the most representative of the diversity of “paths toward democracy,” they are
nonetheless “typical” insofar as they closely approximate the conditions many of the
dominant theories of democratization suggest are crucial (Gerring 2008, 91-97).
This is not coincidental. The narratives of democratization for each country have
been highly inﬂuential in theory building, and so it should be no surprise that these theories ﬁnd support in these cases. By revisiting these histories, I aim to persuade the reader
that democratic exclusion was an important phenomenon in the paradigmatic cases and
that theories formulated in large part to explain these cases require re-formulation. An
important way in which the neglect of democratic exclusion limits theorization is by
encouraging the analyst to treat diﬀerent classes of persons as comparable “units,” with
the processes associated with democratization having a similar eﬀect across these units.
The ﬁrst part of the argument advanced in this chapter is that categories of persons are
diﬀerentially situated and that there is accordingly “unit heterogeneity.”
There is a problem with using the language of unit heterogeneity, however. We are
methodologically accustomed to seek comparisons of like with like, and so when confronted by heterogeneity we seek to limit the analysis to those sub-clusters of cases that
are appropriately comparable. In the case of democratization, at least, this is mistaken.
The reason is that by trying to limit the focus to those cases that are alike—working class
enfranchisement, women’s enfranchisement, the extension of the vote to ethnic, religious,
or racial subordinated populations—we obscure the interrelationship and even identity
between the processes associated with each. We cannot understand the enfranchisement
of the white working class in the United States without an examination of why it was
so often paired with black disfranchisement; or the trajectories of enfranchisements and
disfranchisements in 19th century United Kingdom without examining why these issues
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were ﬁrst separated out across the nations before being treated altogether; or the debates
over the “re-organization” and “extensions of universal suﬀrage” in the French Third Republic without examining the patterns of coalition building across the issue areas of
women’s suﬀrage, military suﬀrage, proportional representation, or Algerian suﬀrage.
Accordingly, the proper approach is not to compare the politics of the right to vote
for one category across diﬀerent countries, or even across diﬀerent categories within one
country. Rather, it is to focus on the relational dimension: how the politics of the right to
vote played out diﬀerently across categories, how these intersected, and the ideological
and institutional context that structured these politics.
This is the overarching theoretical ambition of the project: to suggest to the reader
that not only is democratic exclusion an important phenomenon, but that in order to
explain it we need to look at the speciﬁc ideological and political context in which
democratizing processes are operating. The comparison, then, is not simply between
diﬀerent countries, but between diﬀerent ideological contexts. The purpose of focusing
on this context is to identify common mechanisms by which ideas structure politics. I am
not arguing that if elites adhere to republican ideals the franchise will expand. Rather,
I am arguing that the speciﬁc content of the ideas held by pivotal actors will condition
their behavior in ways that alter the ability of the disfranchised to secure their inclusion,
that incentivize “strange bedfellow” coalitions of enfranchisers and disfranchisers, and
that make actors more likely to support the exclusion of some rather than others.
But there is another reason to select these cases beyond their inﬂuence on theory.
Barrington Moore’s claim that democratization was only of theoretical interest in those
countries of geopolitical importance is wrong. But these cases were inﬂuential elsewhere. The processes of democratization in the United States informed democrats—and
authoritarians—elsewhere. The particular understandings of political rights that were
characteristic of the Liberal vision of progressive Britain, and of the French Third Republic, were disseminated throughout their empire, with lasting eﬀect on institutional
design (Blais, Massicotte, and Yoshinaka 2001). While we should not expect that the
ideological commitments were continued after colonial rule, or even that they were ever
transplanted to the colonies without considerable reinterpretation, by exploring the formulation and operation of these ideologies in the US, the UK, and in France, we might be
able to better understand patterns within the countries that emerged from imperialism
after WWII.
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Conclusion
Political entrepreneurs who seek to build a governing coalition oﬀer narratives of political
belonging, with the intent of aligning the potentially divergent interests of their coalition
members. These ideas are necessarily exclusionary to some degree, in that they outline
the proper basis for membership and thus the proper basis for exclusion from the community. As these are embedded in expectations, they function as a constraint on certain
forms of political behavior. The result is a political order of peoplehood, the context for
calculations by political operatives as to whether the costs of violating the ideas’ strictures outweigh the beneﬁts. These ideas are not ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ manifestations of
underlying structural realities. They are the product of speciﬁc political choices made at
critical moments. Nor are these ideas uncontested or hegemonic. Political entrepreneurs
sought to advance projects within their parameters, but when this impeded their success
they would advance new ideas of belonging that were more amenable to their aims.
Even then, however, these entrepreneurs would be constrained by the anticipated costs
of violating the strictures, and for the most part sought to reconﬁgure extent ideas rather
than articulate entirely new understandings of belonging.
The implications of this theory are that we need to pay attention to the speciﬁc
content of ideas of political belonging: the genealogy of these ideas, their variations,
their political deployment, their resonance, and how they condition behavior. This
is true both for historical and post hoc explanations. But it is also true as a matter
of contemporary analysis and prediction. Ideas—like institutions—are the product of
politics. They are mutable and can be reformulated in ways that are responsive to
changes in how persons perceive their advantage. Understanding the “battle of ideas” is
an important dimension to predicting future political and institutional developments.
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Chapter 3
Democratization in America

“The principles of Jeﬀerson are the deﬁnitions and axioms of free society. And
yet they are denied and evaded. . . insidiously argue[d] that they apply only to
‘superior races.”’ —Abraham Lincoln, 185953

Introduction
American understandings of the country’s democratization have long been structured
by a teleological narrative in which the suﬀrage is gradually extended to include an
increasingly large proportion of the population.54 Religious distinctions were supposedly removed during the Revolution and early Republic. The antebellum era saw the
removal of most class-based distinctions such as property or taxpaying qualiﬁcations.
The wake of the Civil War brought the enfranchisement of African Americans, itself
the culmination of a progressive succession of amendments to the Constitution: the 13th
prohibiting slavery and emancipating the remaining slaves, the 14th extending civil rights
to the freed, ultimately concluding in the 15th amendment’s extension of equal political
rights. When this achievement was secured, more or less, there followed a successful
struggle for women’s suﬀrage, culminating in the 19th amendment. And ﬁnally, at the
end of a long but steady road, the 26th amendment extended the right to vote to those
between the ages of 18 and 21.
There are countless examples of this narrative. An introductory textbook on American government in 1922 considered the period 1815 to the Civil War a “general triumph
53
54

“Letter to Henry L. Pierce, & others,” Springﬁeld, Il. April 6th , 1859.
Christopher Malone argues that until the appearance of recent revisionist scholarship, “a consensus had
more or less formed around the history of the right to vote in the United States,” which sees a gradual
extension to diﬀerent categories of the population (Malone 2008, 4).
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of democratic principles” as “property qualiﬁcations were relaxed and ﬁnally abandoned,
tax-paying requirements were given up in all but a few states, religious tests were entirely
abolished, and in many states the suﬀrage was extended to aliens immediately upon declaration of intention to be naturalized.” And the process continued after the Civil War,
when “the suﬀrage has been broadened mainly by the enfranchisement of negroes, including the freedmen, and by the conferring of the ballot upon women.” The authors
noted that the spirit, if not the letter, of the 15th amendment’s enfranchisement of blacks
was violated in the South. But “the initial mistake was made when the freedmen were
enfranchised en masse sixty years ago” (Ogg and Ray 1922, 199-206). Admittedly not
uninterrupted progress, but the major interruption was the premature enfranchisement
of blacks. A school textbook on The Teaching of Citizenship in Our American Democracy,
treated the history of changes to the suﬀrage as “a deﬁnite current in the steady rush of
political events. The elimination of property qualiﬁcations for the voter, Negro suﬀrage,
woman suﬀrage, and use of initiative, referendum, and recall are the best known examples of this trend” (Saint Louis Dept. of Instruction 1942, 39). Or, as a contributor to the
Encyclopedia Americana put it in 1905, “when Topsy said of herself, ‘I ’spects I growed,”
she announced without knowing it the law of existence of universal suﬀrage in America”
(Hale 1905).55
Perhaps it is unnecessary to belabor the obvious: the narrative of straightforward
progressive enfranchisement is false, concealing much that requires explanation and
systematically obscuring the exclusionary implications of political processes central to
democratization. African Americans were forcibly ejected from the franchise in the
decades after Reconstruction; but African Americans had also been purged from the
electorate during the Jacksonian age of democracy. Aliens who had once had the vote
were disfranchised in the early 20th century. On only two occasions were women voters
removed from the electorate—in New Jersey in 1807 and Utah Territory in 1887—but
their exclusion was successfully resisted against organized demands for enfranchisement
for almost 70 years. Native Americans, enfranchised with the extension of citizenship in
1924, were eﬀectively denied the vote until the 1970s in many western states (McCool,
Olson, and J. L. Robinson 2007). Mormons were disfranchised on religious grounds in
55

The reference is to Topsy, the “savage” child slave in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The contributor was Edward
Everett Hale, author of ‘The Man Without a Country’ and a liberal chaplain. The line used by Hale
in the Encyclopedia comes from Eliza Cook’s antislavery poem, ‘Little Topsy’s Song’: “Topsy never was
born, never had a moder, spects I growed a n— brat, just like any oder. . . . This is Topsy’s savage
song—Topsy cute and clever—Hurrah then for the White Man’s right, ‘Slavery for ever!’ ”
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some western territories in the late 19th century. And “Orientals” were excluded from the
franchise in a few western states, despite the 15th amendment’s ban on explicit racial discrimination. Even the 26th amendment was passed only after provisions in the renewed
Voting Rights Act requiring the registration of 18 to 21 year olds was overturned by the
Supreme Court.56 And few of the triumphalist accounts of democratic progress in the
United States acknowledge that prior to the renewal of federal attention to voting rights
in the mid-twentieth century even white male citizens would often have less likelihood of
being able to cast a ballot in their state than they did in 1840. Since the bitterly disputed
2000 election and the wave of voter identiﬁcation laws passed after 2002, many scholars
and political activists have concluded that the massive scale of criminal disfranchisement
and discriminatory eﬀect of identiﬁcation laws threaten to roll back the real advances
made since the 1950s.
But perhaps it is worth belaboring the point. Even if, after a few generations of
revisionist scholarship, these exclusionary and disfranchising patterns are less surprising
to academic audiences, the narrative of progressive enfranchisement continues to structure much theorizing of democratization in America. For example, Daron Acemoglu
and James Robinson claim that “the United States experienced a gradual movement toward democracy with no reverses” (2006, xi). They are certainly aware of the major
disfranchisements in American history, but this rarely informs the theoretical analysis.
And there is good reason that these disfranchisements and exclusions should inform
our theorizing. Not only are extrusions from the electorate by otherwise liberal democracies theoretically puzzling in a literature in which suﬀrage expansions are generally taken
to be ‘locked-in’ absent regime change; but the particular coalitional patterns underlying
American suﬀrage trajectories suggest a much more complicated narrative than the elite
and mass conﬂict or party competition accounts oﬀer. Take, for example, the disfranchisement of African American voters—free blacks in the North and South—during the
Jacksonian expansion of democracy. The political operatives demanding black disfranchisement, or continued exclusion, were often those most active in trying to expand the
vote to white men. The Democratic coalition was the party supportive of the removal
of property qualiﬁcations but viciously opposed to black voting rights. Importantly, this
pattern was much less prominent in the early republic; it would be less prominent as
well in the post-Reconstruction, as especially the post-WWII republic. Racial exclusion
is not intrinsic to American democracy; rather the association between the two is the
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product of particular institutional and ideological contexts, and it has varied as these
contexts have changed.
Abraham Lincoln famously insisted on “all honor to Jeﬀerson,” for placing the selfevident truth that all men are created equal in the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln’s invocation of Jeﬀerson was part of a political project, to legitimate the new Republican Party as the principled if not lineal political descendants of the Jeﬀersonian
coalition.57 My argument is somewhat diﬀerent. Some, but certainly not all, of the honor
and the blame lies with Jeﬀerson, or rather, with the political coalition that was built
around him. The election of Jeﬀerson to the presidency in the “revolution of 1800”
was of central importance in encouraging a democratizing developmental path in the
antebellum United States. And ﬁttingly, given that his election was facilitated by the
over-representation of slaveholders, few events were as crucial to the deﬁnition of the
antebellum United States as a republic for the white man.
The United States case study focuses on the antebellum period, during which racial
exclusion was closely aligned with democratizing politics. I argue that this association was the result of the ideological and partisan context of the period, one that was
dominated by a narrative of political community that had its origins in the eﬀort to
build and sustain the Jeﬀersonian coalition. The purpose of this chapter is to document
the disfranchisements and exclusions that accompanied American democratization, and
to outline the institutional and partisan context that encouraged the antebellum era’s
conjoining of democratizing and exclusionary politics. The purpose of the subsequent
chapter will be to demonstrate the origin of the ‘white male republic’ in the Jeﬀersonian
Democratic-Republican coalition. The purpose of the ﬁnal American chapter will be to
demonstrate how this narrative of peoplehood became embedded in the expectations
and ultimately conditioned the behavior of political operatives, through its centrality to
the Democratic Party and its broad resonance among the electorate.
The chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by distinguishing my argument relative to
two alternatives, both of which have considerable merit but which fail to capture important patterns in American democratization and exclusion. I then turn to an empirical
overview of the trajectories of franchise change in the United States, paying close at57

Lincoln recognizes the Republican Party to be “supposed to descend politically from the party opposed
to Jeﬀerson,” but notes that “the two [parties] have changed hands as to the principle upon which they
were originally supposed to be divided.” That principle was the appropriate balance between the rights
of the person and the rights of property: “The democracy of to-day hold the liberty of one man to be
absolutely nothing, when in conﬂict with another man’s right of property. Republicans, on the contrary,
are for both the man and the dollar; but in cases of conﬂict, the man before the dollar.”
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tention to the relationship between enfranchisement with disfranchisement. This is the
empirical core of this chapter, and outlines the patterns to be explained in Chapters 4
and 5. I conclude by outlining the institutional and partisan context of the antebellum
United States. The election of Jeﬀerson in 1800 was a critical juncture, and the subsequent decades saw the emergence of the Democratic-Republicans as the ascendant party
in the country. The ideological context that the Jeﬀersonians helped create set the basic
parameters of democratization in the U.S., generating the patterns of democratic reform
alongside racial disfranchisements.

Settler Colonialism and Jacksonian Democracy
It is worth distinguishing my argument as it relates to two alternatives: one that focuses
on underlying and relatively stable structural conditions, the other that locates the origins of the ‘white male republic’ at a later date in the antebellum period. The ﬁrst implies
that the responsibility I attribute to the Jeﬀersonians is unnecessary: no one was directly
responsible, and both democracy and racial exclusion were intrinsic to the conditions
under which America was established. The second accepts the importance of political
contingency but argues that it was the later Jacksonian Democratic coalition that is to
blame. There is considerable truth to both of these arguments, but they fail to account
for important patterns of variation and continuity. I consider each in turn.
One alternative to an emphasis on the Jeﬀersonian coalition is that it was all but
preordained that the pairing of democracy and exclusion would be a central feature of
American political culture. Aziz Rana, for instance, presents a compelling case that
American culture emerged from the particular conditions of settler colonialism (2010).
In this culture, liberty and equality had meaning primarily through their relation to the
subjugation of others. As this was a broadly shared political culture that pre-dated the
Revolution, the particular struggle between Federalism and Jeﬀersonian Republicanism
is less important in explaining subsequent democratic and exclusionary developments.
Rana does not deny political contingency, stressing that at various times Americans have
re-imagined the understandings of liberty and equality to divorce these from imperial
and exclusionary commitments (2010, 14). But the agency invoked by Rana tends toward
egalitarianism, as eﬀorts to overcome exclusions that are presented as primarily the
unfolding of a logic deeply embedded in American culture.58
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For Rana, American culture had at its core an internal tension between the simultaneous vision of an
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The conditions of a frontier settler society are important, and they need to be integrated into any overarching account of democracy and exclusion in the United States.
But we cannot leave it at that: these conditions were channeled through institutions
whose arrangement was the product of political contingency and human agency. As has
long been recognized by economists, frontier conditions, and especially the abundance
of ‘open’ land, are likely to lead to either the small-scale, dispersed farming settlements
that are conducive to democracy, or the large-scale, concentrated agriculture largely reliant on coerced labor that are not (Domar 1970; Engerman and Sokoloﬀ 2005, 916;
Turner 1920; Dahl 1971).59 The structural opportunities of the New World provided for a
range of possible outcomes, and both diﬀuse ownership of property and a coercive labor
regime reliant on African slavery developed in America.
Slavery and the process of land expropriation encouraged ideologies and institutions
of exclusion and domination, and the gradual shift in the coercive labor strategy toward
the use of enslaved Africans was accompanied by conscious eﬀorts at establishing and
policing boundaries between the settlers and the slaves (Morgan 1975, 316–337).60 And
an abundance of land to be expropriated did provide for the more egalitarian social
conditions that early theorists emphasized to be the foundation of American democracy.
But there is little reason to think that the speciﬁc terms of the antebellum ‘white male
republic’—that only white men were capable of self-government, that the United States
was providentially set aside for the white man, and that free blacks could not legitimately
claim membership within its political community—was the optimal, let alone the most
likely, institutional and ideological arrangement that could have accommodated these
“unchecked imperial right” of expansion and domination with that of an internal state authority “constrained by a vision of freedom as self-rule” (2010, 105). This was an “inescapable duality, present before
independence” and the “structure for an independent settler empire and—eventually—a straightjacket”
for more egalitarian visions of republican liberty (2010, 105). And so when confronted by economic
security and threats to settler authority structures, white male Americans defended their status by consolidating the exclusion and domination of women, blacks, and indigenous peoples (2010, 162-72).
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The “abundance of natural resources,” however, was not an unmediated fact of American settlement.
It reﬂected political decisions and the ability of the colonial state to police the settlers. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763 was the most ambitious and well-known eﬀort to restrict the “abundance” of
land. The result was that prior to 1790, New England and other colonies were characterized less by an
abundance of land than by a growing scarcity, with an increasing population of landless agricultural and
urban workers the result (Lockridge 1968).
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This is also a central feature of settler rule more broadly. The Statutes of Kilkenny are an excellent
example of border maintenance. Passed in 1366, they punished English settlers for the use of Irish
customs or for not speaking English. See also Ronald Weitzer (1990) and Pierre Van den Berghe (1967,
1969). A situation approximating this existed in some of the American states, although the subjugated
population included both the natives and African slaves.
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incentives. Treating the institutional arrangements of the antebellum period as the product of overwhelming structural incentives ignores the fact that there were alternatives,
that these alternatives were recognized by contemporaries, and that these alternatives
often only narrowly lost out.
Consider the disfranchisement of free blacks in the northern United States. Most
political science accounts of democratization in America stress the pattern of regional
segmentation. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, for instance, argue that a full
democracy had been established in the North and West of the United States by the
Jacksonian period, while the South remained a constitutional oligarchy or a restricted
democracy into the 1960s (1992, 122; see also Gibson 2013, 35–72). But throughout
the antebellum period, the northern and western states moved to disfranchise black
voters, despite very small numbers of free blacks within many of these states.61 There
was no obvious structural requirement that free blacks be excluded. Nor was there an
overwhelming cultural consensus against free black voting, as in almost every instance
the disfranchisement of blacks was a bitterly contested issue.62
So why did black disfranchisement become so thoroughly nationalized? The answer
lies in considerable part in the United States Constitution. The Constitution’s arrangement of representation aimed for a rough sectional balance in the House, Senate, and
Electoral College, and had been consciously designed to ensure that governing institutions would be responsive to interests North and South by incentivizing the formation by
political entrepreneurs of a cross-sectional coalition. This was most enduringly achieved
by the Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republicans, who were able to unite southern slaveholders with small farmers and urban laboring classes in the North. As we shall see in
Chapters 4 and 5, what southerners wanted was increasingly not only a commitment to
protecting slavery but what they came to see as a necessary corollary—white supremacy.
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Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens recognize that free blacks were excluded from the electorate in
most north and western states, but note that “given the relatively small black population of the North at
this time, the political system of this section of the country and its social base can be characterized as
an agrarian democracy” (1992, 125). They do not oﬀer an explanation as to why blacks were excluded in
the north.
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Even in the South there was no intrinsic need for free black disfranchisement. While it was the southern
colonies which pioneered explicit racial disfranchisements during the early 18th century, by 1799 free
blacks were allowed to vote in Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and in Tennessee; they would have
the right to vote in the Orleans territory until 1811. They would continue to have the right to vote in
North Carolina and Tennessee until the 1830s, and the right of free black men to vote was passionately
defended in both states. As late as 1845, a respected delegate to the Louisiana constitutional convention
proposed a limited measure of enfranchisement for free blacks, arguing that it would give the free black
community an investment in defending slavery.
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And the Jeﬀersonian party would actively coordinate its members around this standard,
and institutionalize at the federal and territorial level.
But the question remains: given these powerful incentives, was the Jeﬀersonian coalition all that important? Would not some other coalition have come to the same basic
conclusion, that there was more to be gained by a cross-sectional coalition with slaveholders than in defending the voting rights of free black? Two counterfactual alternatives
suggest that the ultimate emergence of the ‘white male republic’ in the antebellum period
was not inevitable: a ‘Jeﬀersonian’ coalition in which northern Democratic-Republicans
played a more central role, and a Federalist coalition that maintained its early capacity
to bridge the sectional divide. The Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republican party was dominated by Virginians, but it was not exclusively a Virginia or southern party nor was this
dominance inevitable. And northern Democratic-Republicans were often openly hostile
to slavery, and willing to defend black voting rights in their states and in the new American territories. Northern Jeﬀersonians were not initially committed to the vision of a
white male republic. Had they been more inﬂuential within their own party in the early
Republic, it is conceivable that black voting rights might have been spared.
Northern Federalists were also opposed to the white male republic, especially after
the collapse of support for their party in the South. Federalists in New York in 1821
provided a sustained and vigorous defense of black voting rights alongside their opposition to the removal of property qualiﬁcations. Federalists in Congress took increasingly
anti-slavery stances after 1800. But the Federalists’ emergence as a party hostile to slavery was in part contingent on the collapse of southern Federalism. Had they sustained
their cross-sectional coalition they likely would have tempered their positions, and we
should not assume that a nationally viable Federalism would have been the 1821 New
York Federalists writ large. But both northern and southern Federalists were more likely
to oppose to the removal of property and taxpaying qualiﬁcation. And if the locus of
Democratic-Republicanism was in Virginia, it is likely that the locus of a viable antebellum Federalist Party would have been in Massachusetts or New York. It is certainly
conceivable that had they not been defeated in the early 19th century that they would
have sustained a national coalition that was less-egalitarian in relation to class, but more
egalitarian in regards to race.
Ultimately the prospects for equal black citizenship were not very good in the antebellum era; the prospects for white male democracy were much better. This was a consequence of structural conditions—diﬀused property ownership combined with racialized
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slavery—but also of the incentives for bisectional coalition-building embedded in the
Constitution. Nonetheless, neither the disfranchisement of free blacks nor the considerable expansion of the electorates to propertyless white men were preordained, but were
the product of particular political coalitions that were able to win power and restructure
governing institutions.
But placing the blame on Jeﬀerson and his party also means that I am locating the
origins of the ‘white male republic’ as an understanding of American political community at an earlier date than its full rhetorical development during the Jacksonian
period. Alexander Saxton, for instance, argues that a belief in racial and class hierarchy underpinned the Jeﬀersonian Republican ‘thesis,’ that the Whig Party represented
a dominant established order, and that the Jacksonian Democracy was a “revolt from
outside,” one that articulated a new understanding of egalitarianism premised upon
whiteness and employed to justify “the problematic empathy developing between urban
egalitarians and planter oligarchs in the South” (1990, 24, 127). In Saxton’s telling, the
Jeﬀersonian Republicans and the subsequent Whig Party, while certainly capable of tactical applications of “hard” racism, were better characterized by a “soft” or paternalistic
racism.63 But beginning in the 1830s, northern class-egalitarians became dependent
upon the Democratic Party for their political inﬂuence, and perceived “the main danger to their expectations. . . not from traditional Whig projects like internal improvements
and protective tariﬀs, but from anti-slavery agitation emanating in part (but by no means
entirely) from whiggish sources” (1990, 151). To maintain their own party’s unity, Democratic ideological entrepreneurs fastened on the idea of the white republic. In what
Saxton treats as “an oﬃcial statement of the northern Democratic position on slavery
and anti-slavery,” James K. Paulding’s (1836) Slavery in the United States—published to
aid the Van Buren presidential campaign—asserted that “‘The government of the United
States, its institutions and its privileges. . . belong of right wholly and exclusively to white
men. . . ’. Tapping the subtreasury of American racism, Paulding had put together formulations appropriate to a particular constituency [of urban workers, especially Irish
Catholics]. Other Democratic politicians did likewise” (1990, 151-52).64
I agree with Saxton to a considerable extent, notably with his treatment of ideolo63

Saxton argued that these two sides of racism were mutually reinforcing, as they were both equally part
of a uniﬁed premise underlying all racial doctrine in the United States (1990, 149-50).
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Paulding had integrated into his account of the white male republic an attack on the British as having
instituted slavery in the Americas, and argued that the Irish lived under a more galling slavery and
oppression than slaves in America.
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gies of white egalitarianism and racial supremacy being strategically reformulated from
a broader and older set of racial ideologies and tactically deployed in order to assist in
building cross-sectional coalitions. But while I concur with his treatment of the coalitional tensions of the Jacksonian Democracy, and the eﬀorts of partisan ideologists to
reconcile these tension, this was by no means a tension unique or novel to the Jacksonian Democratic party. Perhaps the strongest evidence in favor of a later origin date for
the white male republic is that while the claim that the United States was established
as a republic for the white man, with black citizenship rights an illegitimate and unintended development, is loudly and repeatedly exclaimed by the 1830s and afterward,
it is less common as an explicit rhetorical invocation in the early decades of the 19th
century. Padraig Riley, for instance, notes that “to interpret the Jeﬀersonian coalition as
held together by a psychic and political investment in whiteness invites anachronism,”
and argues that “in the Jeﬀersonian period, racial formation was simply at a premature
stage” (2007, 23).
That ideologies of racial diﬀerence and inequality were less developed at the turn
of the century than they were by 1860 is certainly true. But if the rhetorical invocation
of the white male republic was most pronounced in the decades after Andrew Jackson’s
presidency, the political dilemma had been a central feature of the Jeﬀersonian coalition
in the early 1800s: “being a Jeﬀersonian paid obvious dividends in the early republic,
and many northern Democratic-Republicans beneﬁted, or hoped to beneﬁt, from political patronage,” but the success of the Democratic-Republicans “depended heavily on
substantial northern commitment to a party and an ideology that protected slavery, when
it did not defend it outright” (Riley 2007, 18-20).
The Jacksonian Democratic Party was not identical to the Jeﬀersonian DemocraticRepublicans. But in the components of the coalition, the tensions that this generated,
and the mechanisms for reconciling these, the Jacksonian party shared considerable
continuities with the Jeﬀersonian. Rather than seeing the later ﬂowery development of
‘white male republic’ as a unique creation of the Democratic Party, we should see this
as an aggressive articulation of ideologies developed by Jeﬀersonian activists seeking to
“come to terms with the contradictory political reality of their time” (Riley 2007, 35).
This solution was never stable, and it always treated with ambiguity the question of
slavery: as shown by various factions of the Free Soil party, the white man’s republic
could be turned against slavery. But in its essence, the idea of the ‘white male republic’
as advanced by the Jeﬀersonians and aggressively defended by the Jacksonians held that
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the Union enabled republican government and democracy, and that the incorporation
of blacks as citizens, whatever “nice metaphysical subtilties [sic] or abstract dogmas of
fanaticism” might suggest, could not be practically realized (Paulding 1836, 8).

Trajectories of the Franchise in the United States, 1776-1945
I begin by examining the pre-Revolution franchise in the American colonies. While all
colonies had some form of property qualiﬁcation, the impact of these was in general less
exclusionary than the pre-1832 franchise in the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, the enfranchisement rate was likely declining, most institutional changes were in the direction
of a higher franchise, and there was no democratizing dynamic. I then trace out the
enfranchising and disfranchising trends in the United States. The Revolution marks a
radical change, after which the proportion of states with property or taxpaying qualiﬁcations declines until the Civil War. As the Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republican Party came
to power in state legislatures—or organized new states or territories in Congress—most
property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations were repealed. But alongside this democratizing
process is another, with which it is deeply implicated: the antebellum disfranchisement
of black voters through explicit racial criteria.

The Colonial Franchise
The primary institutional means by which the suﬀrage was restricted during the colonial
period was through gender, property, racial, subjecthood, and religious qualiﬁcations.
As in the pre-1832 Great Britain, the exclusion of women from the franchise was not
always explicit.65 Only three colonies explicitly restricted on the basis of race prior to the
Revolution, all of them in the South, but slaves and indentured servants were everywhere
excluded. And while many colonies did exclude Catholics and/or non-Christians from
oﬃce-holding and suﬀrage, the exclusion of Protestants from a non-established church
had largely ceased by the time of the Revolution.
For free adult males property ownership was the primary basis of exclusion. Table 3.1
lists the main qualiﬁcations for the franchise in the thirteen American colonies. The top
65

In some Massachusetts towns and New York counties propertied widows did legally vote (Keyssar 2001,
5), as did propertied independent women in English vestry elections. But in general they were excluded
from the franchise, especially for colony wide elections, regardless of whether there was an explicit
gender qualiﬁcation.
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two panels lists the qualiﬁcations for the ﬁve colonies that required ownership of freehold property of a suﬃcient value or acreage; the bottom panel lists the seven colonies
allowing some form of personal property ownership as an alternative to freehold real
estate. Rhode Island and Connecticut additionally required that the voters be ‘freemen’:
full members of the corporation or town, for which the qualiﬁcations were “maturity in
years, quiet and peaceable behavior, a civil conversation, and forty shillings freehold”
(Ratcliﬀe 2013, 226).66
The colonies varied in their admission of immigrants to the franchise. All colonies
enfranchised natural born subjects of the British monarch, and some, such as Georgia,
enfranchised non-naturalized immigrants.67 Even where there was not explicit subjecthood requirement, the English common law held that non-naturalized aliens could not
vote (McKinley 1905, 475). The individual colonies did develop their own naturalization laws, but these did not extend beyond their borders; if one was naturalized a
British subject in Virginia, they would still be an alien in New Jersey (Carpenter 1904,
297). Delaware was unique in that, while it required a voter to be either natural born
or naturalized, this naturalization could have taken place in England, Delaware, or in
Pennsylvania.
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Joel Cohen has suggested that this be considered akin to a registration requirement and that those who
were eligible but did not take the oath were eﬀectively opting out rather than disfranchised (Cohen 1970,
5; cited in Ratcliﬀe 2013, 226). The same can be said of most poll taxes. In reality, this is a form of
disfranchisement achieved by raising the cost of voting, a cost that is understood to impinge more on
the laboring classes of the community. The freemanship was also an alternative qualiﬁcation for the
franchise in New York City and Albany, although it was not a requirement in either.
67
Georgia had an explicit enfranchisement of aliens possessed of 50 acres (Hoyt 1952, 250, fn. 9).
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Real Estate
Freehold 50 acres
Freehold 50 acres

Freehold 50 acres
if vacant; 25 acres
with house and
plantation; 12sq ft.
town lot and house.
Worth £50

Freehold £40
Freehold £40
or yields 40s
annual income
Yields 40s
annual income

State

Georgia

North Carolina

Virginia

New
Hampshire

New York

Rhode Island

Connecticut

—

Catholics and NonChristians excluded

Catholics and NonChristians excluded

Value
“not vicious in life”

Catholics excluded

Belief in a Christian
God (Oﬃce)

Acres

Religion/Moral

Real Estate with Alternative
£40 personal
“peaceble and
estate
honest conversation”

—

—

—

—

—

—

Alternative

—

—

—

—

No free negro,
mulatto, or Indian
whatsoever (1723)

—

—

3 month county
residence

Natural-born or
naturalized in
colony or England

—

Natural-born or
naturalized in
colony or England,
resident 6mths.

6 month residence
in colony

Subjecthood
& Residence

Continued on next page

Restriction to ‘whites’
added in 1715,
dropped in 1793

Every free white
man and no other

Race

Table 3.1: Suﬀrage Restrictions at the End of the Colonial Period
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Paid tax of 10s.
proclamation
money

Personal estate
in money, goods,
chattel of
£50 sterling

Worth £50
lawful money,
clear estate

Estate worth
£40 sterling

Visible personal
estate £40
sterling

Worth £40
‘lawful money’

Catholics and NonChristians excluded

Catholics excluded
(Oﬃce)

Belief in a
Christian God
(Oﬃce)

Catholics excluded
24 yrs. of age for
“non-vicious”
non-churchmen

Catholics excluded

—

Resident of colony
for 1 year

Resident of county
city, or town

Natural-born or
naturalized in
DE, PA, Eng.,
resident 2 years

—

—

Continued from previous page
Natural-born or
naturalized in
DE, PA, Eng.,
resident 6mths.

Every white man,
and no other
(1716)

—

—

—

—

—

Adapted from Porter (1971, 12).
Sources: McKinley (1905), Keyssar (2001, 306-07), Williamson (1960), Beeman (2005, 293-94), Bishop (1893), and Porter (1971).

Freehold 100 acres
on which taxes are
paid; town house
on lot woth £60
on which taxes paid

Freehold 50 acres

Pennsylvania

South Carolina

Yields 40s.
annual income

Massachusetts

Freehold 100 acres

Freehold 50 acres

Maryland

New Jersey

Freehold 50 acres
(12 cleared)

Delaware

The exclusion of free blacks was pioneered in Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia
in the 18th century, coinciding with a harshening of the colonial slave codes (Wiecek
1977). North Carolina was the ﬁrst to exclude free blacks from the suﬀrage in 1715,
but the province dropped the exclusion in 1734 (McKinley 1905, 92). In 1716 South
Carolina inserted the word ‘white’ into its suﬀrage provisions, and Virginia followed
shortly thereafter in 1723 in response to an attempted insurrection (McKinley 1905, 151,
36). Virginia had in 1705 excluded blacks and Indians from holding any civil, military,
or ecclesiastical oﬃce, an act that also prohibited white former convicts from holding
oﬃce (Higginbotham and Bosworth 1991, 25; McKinley 1905, 36).68 Georgia excluded
free blacks from the franchise in 1761, shortly after the colony’s trustees acquiesced to
the introduction of slavery (McKinley 1905, 474).69 Free blacks were not excluded from
the franchise in Maryland, Delaware, or in North Carolina (from 1734), and they were
never legally excluded from any of the northern colonies during the colonial period,
including those such as New Jersey and New York where slavery was an important part
of the economy.
There is a considerable volume of literature on the extent of the franchise in the
colonial era. Historians in the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, characterizing American development in terms of a long-run pattern of class conﬂict, argued that the colonial elite
disfranchised the bulk of the adult male population (Becker 1920, 35–36; Schlesinger
1922, 74). This perspective was contested in the post-WWII period by claims that colonial American society was “middle-class” in its distribution of wealth, and that the
institutions the progressives had highlighted as exclusionary, the suﬀrage in particular,
were considerably less so in their application. In the mid-1950s, Robert E. Brown and
B. Katherine Brown published a series of works, drawing on probate records and tax
lists, contesting the “widely accepted view that the society which produced the American Revolution was undemocratic” (Brown 1952, 291). Richard P. McCormick (1953),
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While this change was accepted by the governor, the English attorney of the Board of Trade questioned
its merits: “I cannot see why one freeman should be used worse than another, merely on account of his
complexion. . . . It cannot be right to strip all persons of a black complexion for those rights which are
so justly valuable to any freeman” (McKinley 1905, 37).
69
The colony as initially established had banned the importation of slaves, a ban which the trustees
sought to enforce for several decades. Importation continued, however, and popular demand for slaves
eventually led to a change in policy (Wax 1984). As noted by Keyssar “Georgia’s 1777 constitution
explicitly limited the franchise to whites, but the constitutions of 1789 and 1798 did not. All secondary
sources agree that blacks could not vote, but a very extensive research eﬀort has not turned up a
clear legal basis for that exclusion—although there are indications that only whites could become state
citizens,” which was a requirement from 1789 onward (Keyssar 2001, 319, fn.5).
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Charles S. Sydnor (1952), Milton Klein (1959) and others followed, claiming the property
restrictions during the colonial period were marginal in their impact, excluding at most
10-15% of free white males from the suﬀrage. The general consensus of this literature was
that almost all of the male population was eligible to vote, even if most of them did not
actually exercise this right (Pole 1962).70
More recent estimates put the enfranchisement rate somewhere in between the levels
of 85-90% free adult male enfranchisement claimed by Robert Brown and the 30-50%
claimed by the Progressive historians. While Charles Sydnor claimed that fewer than
50% of free adult males could vote in colonial Virginia, more recent estimates place this
at around two-thirds (Kolp 1998, 38–49). This would place Virginia roughly in line with
the estimates by Robert Dinkin, who suggested an enfranchisement rate generally in the
range of 50-75% across the colonies (1977, 28–49), and with Alexander Keyssar’s ﬁgure
of 60% overall colonial adult white male enfranchisement (2001, 7). These numbers are
largely endorsed by the most recent overview of the suﬀrage and enfranchisement rates
in the late colonial period and early Republic (Ratcliﬀe 2013, 221-22).
Estimating the size of the colonial electorate is a notoriously diﬃcult enterprise, and
the data sources that have survived vary considerably in their representativeness and
quality.71 Contemporaries disagreed on the exclusiveness of the franchise, with Thomas
Jeﬀerson claiming “the majority of the men in [Virginia], who pay and ﬁght for its support,
are unrepresented in the legislature” (1787, 192) and the colonial Governor that “most of
the people” did have the right to vote (Dinkin 1977, 40-41). A rough estimate, however,
can be generated by aggregating across the range of secondary sources. This provides
an aggregated estimate for the proportion of eligible adult white men in each colony,
which, while imperfect, provides a frame of reference.72
In general, the frontier colonies of Georgia, South Carolina, and New Hampshire saw
70

The literature’s tallying of enfranchisement rates are always limited to free, or more often to white, adult
men.
71
Probate records are likely to bias the estimates upwards, as wills were left disproportionately by wealthier
men (Cary 1963, 259). It is often not clear whether the tax lists are in sterling or in lawful money: “if we
assume that the list is in lawful money, we ﬁnd that only 53 adult men [in a sampled town] had estates of
at least £53.40, and were qualiﬁed voters. . . . If the list is in sterling, 75 men had estates of £40 and 84
men would have been unable to meet the property qualiﬁcations” (Cary 1963, 261). As noted by Dinkin,
“the relative scarcity of tax lists and census reports in certain colonies makes any deﬁnitive statement
impossible” (Dinkin 1977, 40).
72
Estimates were included only if they were based on empirical assessments, such as those that relied on
colonial property and landholding patterns. This excludes much of the earlier literature that argued that
the suﬀrage was signiﬁcantly restricted, likely leading to upwardly biased results and inﬂated projections
of the eligible population.
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the greatest proportion of adult white men included in the franchise. Maryland had the
lowest rate of enfranchisement, followed by New York.73 Overall, these estimates suggest
that the proportion who could vote in legislative elections during the colonial period was
between half- and three-quarters of free adult males.74
This understates the extent of disfranchisement in a number of ways. Most obviously,
it takes as the denominator free white adult men. Using these enfranchisement estimates
and the 1790 census’ population ﬁgures, we are able to get a rough approximation of how
the American colonies compared when we consider diﬀerent population bases, such as
all adult males, all free males, and the total population.75 Figure 3.1 compares the rates of
enfranchisement according to diﬀerent denominators. As would be expected, the main
basis for divergence in enfranchisement rates across denominators is the presence of
slavery and whether women are included. Table 3.2 lists the same information using free
white adult men, the total free population, and the total population as the denominators.
A total enfranchisement rate, for all persons in the colonies other than Indians not
taxed, would be approximately 9.7%. This compares favorably with the contemporary
73

Dinkins notes that relative to New York City, which had a freemanship requirement that was relatively
easy to attain, “the degree of eligibility was much smaller in the outlying regions where large landholdings and tenantry ﬂourished” (Dinkins 1977, p.44). Suﬀolk County had only 24.4 percent enfranchisement,
while Dutchess County had 23.9 percent in 1740. Less than 22 percent of men in Westchester were likely
able to meet the qualiﬁcations.
74
The most recent analysis of the franchise suggests that between 60-90% of the adult white male population could vote, with an overall rate of 80% across the country. This ﬁnding, however, is almost
exclusively reliant on Dinkin’s estimates—especially at the higher end—while acknowledging but seemingly rejecting the ﬁndings of others (2013, 230). The analysis presented here includes each of Dinkin’s
reported enfranchisement rates, as well as those from Brown (1952, 1955, 1964), Kolp (1998), Sydnor
(1952), and Williamson (1960).
75
The census of 1790 diﬀerentiated between whites under and over the age of 16. Neither free blacks
nor slaves were diﬀerentiated on the basis of age. To estimate the number of white persons over the
age of 21, I relied on the numbers provided in A Century of Population Growth, published by the U.S.
Census Oﬃce (1909, 103). The number of white persons between the ages of 16 and 21 was estimated at
372,560, or about one quarter the size of the white population under 16. An estimate of the 16-21 white
population was generated for each state, and this was subtracted from the number of white persons
aged 16 and above. Similar calculations were performed to estimate the proportion of the free black and
enslaved population that was male and above 21. For this I used the 1820 Census, which did diﬀerentiate
the black population according to age. For each state, I used the point estimate of the adult white
male enfranchisement rate to estimate the number of electors, given the estimate of white males aged
21 and above. This provided the numerator for the diﬀerent estimates of enfranchisement rates across
diﬀerent population bases. The same analysis was done using a number of diﬀerent assumptions, and the
results were generally consistent. While the ultimate estimates of enfranchisement rates across diﬀerent
population bases are certainly imprecise, they are primarily determined not by assumptions about the
age structure of the diﬀerent population categories, but by the initial estimate of the enfranchisement
rate among adult white men. The reported ﬁgures are the reasonable implication of the bulk of the
secondary literature on enfranchisement rates among white men.
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Figure 3.1: Enfranchisement Rates using Diﬀerent Denominators, Pre-Revolution

enfranchisement rate in England, which was in the range of 4% and would not reach
comparable levels until the Second Reform Act of 1867. The English enfranchisement
rate, however, was depressed considerably by the small electorates of the counties, and
the enfranchisement rate across the American colonies is similar to the medium and
large English borough constituencies. But in neither case had democracy arrived, even
among the restricted category of adult white men.
There are a few important points worth noting: the trend over the course of the 18th
century had largely been toward raising the qualiﬁcation, either to restrict the electorate
or to prevent unintended extensions; these qualiﬁcations were not always impediments
to voting, as there was a considerable amount of ambiguity and contestation over who
exactly had the right to vote; and an extensive electorate did not in fact mean broad
participation in politics. Most accounts note that in many of the colonies the rate of
landownership was falling and the number of people with personal property below the
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Table 3.2: Estimated Enfranchisement Rates, Colonial America
Colony
Maryland
Virginia
South Carolina
Georgia
North Carolina
New York
Delaware
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
New Hampshire
United State
Source: Author’s

% Adult While Male
Electors
51.9%
63.8%
73.4%
71.4%
67.4%
54.8%
73.3%
63.6%
62.8%
65.5%
64.6%
67.5%
68.2%
63.8%
calculations.

% Free Population
Electors
10.4%
11.6%
13.7%
13.0%
11.8%
11.2%
12.9%
11.5%
12.7%
13.4%
12.8%
13.2%
13.3%
11.8%

% Total Population
Electors
7.1%
7.1%
7.8%
8.4%
8.8%
10.5%
11.0%
11.3%
12.5%
12.6%
12.7%
13.2%
13.3%
9.7%

franchise qualiﬁcations was increasing (Dinkin 1977, 46; Kulikoﬀ 2000, 132-33; Lockridge
1968).76
But the declining proportion of enfranchised white adult men at the end of the
colonial period reﬂected not only growing inequality and decline of landholding, but
deliberate policy choices made throughout the 17th and early 18th centuries to restrict
the franchise. Of the twenty-three changes to the property qualiﬁcations in the colonies
between 1700 and 1776, fourteen of these were aimed at restricting the suﬀrage while
only nine were aimed at its expansion. Even if we exclude Rhode Island, where many of
the restrictive changes to the suﬀrage were designed to accommodate the suﬀrage qualiﬁcations to the rapidly devaluation in the colonial currency, we still see ten restrictive
changes versus eight expansive ones. The trend toward restricting the franchise began
in the 17th century, and occurred in both the northern and southern colonies (McKinley
1905, 27–28, 31, 77, 161–62, 379).77 And in 1767, the British government issued instruc76

Dinkin notes that “many regions, especially parts of Maryland and New England, saw the number of
property holders, thus voters, declining toward the end of the period” (Dinkin 1977, 46), while Allan
Kulikoﬀ notes that “the land supply in coastal Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina fell more rapidly
than plantation size” resulting in rising prices and decreasing landownership, “exacerbated in Virginia
by the amount of land (as much as half in older counties) rich men entailed (a legal form that required
all land be given to one son, in perpetuity), thus keeping it oﬀ land markets” (Kulikoﬀ 2000, 132-33).
77
Commenting on the 17th century Plymouth Colony, George Langdon remarked that “the trend seems to
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tions to royal governors prohibiting them from “chang[ing] the qualiﬁcation of electors”
or changing the number of representatives in the assembly.78 Despite a relatively favorable social structure, democratization was not an important political dynamic in the
colonial period.
And even among those who could vote, very few did. As noted by Richard Beeman,
“the fact of widespread nonparticipation in the political process in eighteenth-century
America. . . remains the greatest unresolved mystery” of the colonial period (2005, 335).
And non-participation worked to reinforce patterns of colonial oﬃce-holding in which
the “overwhelming majority of the representatives belong[ed] to that ten per cent” who
have property valued above £2000 (Main 1966, 393). Colonial America was not as much
an aristocracy as many of its elite would have liked; but nor was it the middle-class
democracy that some historians have insisted upon.

Religious, Property, and Taxpaying Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise
This is where the franchise stood at the time of the Revolution: a fairly broad franchise relative to England, but certainly not democratic, and an ongoing eﬀort by the
colonial elite to guard against any further expansion of the electorate. The Revolution
was a watershed. The story of progressive enfranchisement usually begins with the removal of religious qualiﬁcations. Figure 3.2 tracks the proportion of states excluding
adherents of various religions from voting and oﬃce-holding. The excluded were most
often Catholics; but Jews were also frequent targets of exclusion, and Massachusetts required that non-Congregationalists be “non-vicious in life.” To some extent, Figure 3.2
understates the extent of religious disfranchisement in the American colonies, as even
where Catholics were not barred from the franchise explicitly they were often barred
on account of prohibitions on Catholic naturalization. Nonetheless, all explicit religious
qualiﬁcations for the franchise had been removed before 1800, although the Federal government imposed what amounted to a religious qualiﬁcation in the Utah Territory in
1887, and several territories and the state of Idaho had provisions excluding not only
the practitioners of polygamy but those who were married in a Mormon temple or who
preached or believed in “celestial marriage.”79 Religious qualiﬁcations for oﬃce-holding
have been away from, rather than towards, political democracy” (Langdon 1963, 513).
Cited in Williamson (1960, 89).
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While this was often portrayed as an eﬀort to disfranchise those advocating criminal behavior—namely
polygamy—it extended beyond practitioners and advocates to include any member in an organization
that advocated polygamy. As Fred Dubois, the Idaho territorial representative to Congress, told a Senate
78

77

were more resilient, and many states today continue to have such provisions in their
constitutions, although these were rendered inpoerative by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Torcaso v. Watkins (367 U.S. 488 [1961]).
Figure 3.2: Religious Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1700-1935

Figure 3.3 illustrates one of the central trajectories of democracy in America, the
removal of pecuniary and property qualiﬁcations for the franchise. The ﬁgure plots the
proportion of states that require either a property or the payment of a tax in order to
vote. There is an additional category of ‘eﬀective property’ qualiﬁcation, which reﬂects
the fact that some states had residence, or later literacy alternatives to property ownership. Also included is an indicator for whether the state constitution included a property
qualiﬁcation at the municipal level or for local bond elections. The basic trajectory is
Committee considering the disfranchising clause in 1890, “there is no desire on my part to deny the fact
that this law was intended to disfranchise the Mormons, that is the plain intention of the law” (Groberg
1976, 405; see also Wells 1955). Only one House member cast a vote against the new constitution, while
67 abstained, mostly southern Democrats.
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of an extended period of stability until the Revolution, when states quickly began to liberalize the qualiﬁcations for the franchise. Expansions of the franchise continued until
the Civil War, when the pattern of progressive enfranchisement stalled and then was
reversed. Much of this was the result of the re-imposition of white supremacy in the
South; but not all, and both the property qualiﬁcations for local elections as well as the
pecuniary qualiﬁcations for state and Federal elections extended beyond the South.
Figure 3.3: Property Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1700-1935

The property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations did have an important impact on the size
of the electorate, and through this, on politics. In 1957 J.R. Pole argued the property and
taxpaying qualiﬁcations of the early republic “did little to prevent the exercise of the suffrage franchise by almost any member of the adult male population,” a position recently
endorsed by Donald Ratcliﬀe (1957, 561; Ratcliﬀe 2013, 242). This is a considerable
overstatement, and property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations were disfranchising.
One way to show this is to look at the state censuses conducted in New York, which
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included a tally of the number of voters enfranchised under diﬀerent qualiﬁcations. Table
3.3 lists the percentage of adult free men enfranchised under the £100, £20, tenement,
and freemen voter qualiﬁcations from 1790-1821.80 After the franchise qualiﬁcations
were lowered in 1777, between 70-80% of the adult male population could vote. After
the franchise was again changed in 1821, removing the property qualiﬁcations for all but
free blacks and establishing a set of taxpayer, militia, and highway labor qualiﬁcations,
approximately 90% of the free adult male population was enfranchised. In 1821, 19.2%
of the adult male population qualiﬁed under the new taxpaying qualiﬁcations; most of
these would have been otherwise excluded.81
Table 3.3: New York State Census, % of Free Adult Males Enfranchised
Year

£100
Electors
1790
26.4%
1795
39.2%
1801
42.0%
1807
43.1%
1814
39.9%
1821
34.0%
1825
—
1835
—
1845
—

£20
Electors
31.9%
5.3%
4.3%
3.6%
2.5%
3.0%
—
—
—

Tenement
Electors
19.9%
24.4%
23.0%
26.8%
31.2%
31.4%
—
—
—

Taxpaying
Electors
—
—
—
—
—
19.2%
—
—
—

Freemen
Electors
0.19%
0.26%
0.05%
0.05%
0.01%
0.00%
—
—
—

Total
Electors
78.4%
69.1%
69.3%
73.5%
72.3%
87.5%
85.9%
94.7%
90.7%

Source: New York State Censuses, 1807, 1814, 1821, 1855. See also McCormick (1959, 405).

New York’s census is rare for its early tallying of voters. But there are other methods
of assessing the exclusionary impact of property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations. Both New
York and North Carolina required diﬀerent qualiﬁcations across diﬀerent oﬃces, while
holding the elections simultaneously. Accordingly, we can examine the drop-oﬀ in votes
cast for an oﬃce with a more liberal to one with a more restrictive qualiﬁcation. This
allows us to assess the proportion of electors disfranchised by the higher qualiﬁcation.82
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The freemanship qualiﬁed persons for the franchise only in New York and Albany
Ratcliﬀe suggests that the subsequent removal in 1826 of the contributory qualiﬁcations and the establishment of a residence franchise for adult white male citizens was associated with only a 1% increase in
the electorate (2013, 245). As we see from table 3.3 the removal of the taxpaying qualiﬁcation was associated with an increase from 85.9% to 94.7% adult male enfranchisement, although the 10 year interval
between censuses obscures the degree to which this was an immediate or gradual change.
82
This analysis was performed by McCormick to assess whether there was a class structure to antebellum
politics. His ﬁnding was that there was little partisan diﬀerence between fully and only partially included
electors. I have replicated and extended McCormick’s analysis, drawing on Philip Lampi’s New Nation
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In North Carolina, Senators were elected under a more restrictive franchise than members of the House of Commons; after 1835, Governors were elected under the same more
liberal franchise provisions of the House. Table 3.4 shows the average number of votes
cast per county in Senate, gubernatorial, and House races, including only those races
from each that were contested. The right-most column shows the percentage decline
in the number of votes cast, as a proportion of the total number of votes cast for the
more popularly elected oﬃce. There was a persistent and growing drop-oﬀ in votes
cast, at simultaneous and contested elections, suggesting that between 30% to 50% of the
otherwise qualiﬁed were excluded by the higher franchise required of Senate elections.
Table 3.4: Drop oﬀ in Voting in North Carolina Elections
Period
or Year

# of Counties Average Votes
Average Votes
Drop oﬀ as
included
Cast Per County Cast Per County % of House or
included
(Senate)
(House; Gov.)
Governor
1790-1810
46
661
974
31.0%
1810-1830
131
704
1034
30.4%
1835-1836
26
713
1272
44.0%
1840
46
679
1249
45.6%
1844
22
691
1431
51.7%
1856
46
657
1368
52.0%
Source: pre-1830 Lampi (2007); post-1830 McCormick (1959, Table I).
Figure 3.4 graphs the same information for the pre-1830 period, but including the
percent decline for each county for which we have data. This allows for a quick assessment of the county variation. There is a clear and consistent diﬀerence between
the number of votes cast for House and Governor races relative to those cast for the
Senate, with the electorate declining 30% to 50% as the franchise changed from a taxpaying to a freehold property qualiﬁcation. While there was an occasional election that
saw a higher number of votes cast for the Senate relative to the House, the pattern is
remarkably consistent in favor of the interpretation that the property qualiﬁcations were
disfranchising.
McCormick, ﬁnding a very high level of participation in gubernatorial races, argues
that the taxpaying qualiﬁcation was not a serious limitation on the franchise, although
he notes that this was largely the result of the state imposing a poll tax on every male
Votes series (American Antiquarian Society 2007). I accordingly have both a larger pool of elections
from which to draw, and a diﬀerent time period for North Carolina.

81

Figure 3.4: County Level Drop Oﬀ in North Carolina Elections, 1790-1824

between the ages of 21 and 45. But the property qualiﬁcation was restrictive. Diﬀerent
franchise qualiﬁcations were also used in elections for Assembly and Governor in New
York State until 1821. Property qualiﬁcations were required to vote for either oﬃce,
but a more onerous one was needed to vote for Governor. Figure 3.5 shows the same
information as presented for North Carolina, but also includes data after franchises
were standardized. Again, in elections to Governor there were consistently fewer votes
cast than in the simultaneous elections to the Assembly. This diﬀerence disappeared,
however, after 1821, ﬁrst in the Lieutenant-Governor’s race in 1822 and then more clearly
in the 1824 gubernatorial race.
We can also check to see whether this pattern holds more broadly. While we are unable to compare simultaneous elections of the same electorate across diﬀerent franchises,
as we did in North Carolina and New York, we can compare turnout to congressional
elections between states with and without property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations. The ef-
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Figure 3.5: County Level Drop Oﬀ in New York Elections, 1790-1824

fect of such qualiﬁcations likely changed over time; they may have impinged only slightly
on participation during the colonial period, when turnout was consistently far below eligibility, but may have become important obstacles to participation as mass politics began
to develop in the 19th century. Figure 3.6 reports the eﬀect of a pecuniary—property or
taxpaying—qualiﬁcation as it varied across time. A standard OLS regression was run
for every year in the dataset, with an estimated eﬀect coeﬃcient and 95% conﬁdence
interval reported for each.83 The further the line is below zero, the more the pecuniary
qualiﬁcation is estimated to have reduced turnout. The considerable variation in the ini83

A ﬁxed year and state eﬀects time series regression was also run, helping to control for the possibility
that the reduced turnout in high-qualiﬁcation states was the result of some unobserved factor, such as a
generally less democratic or less competitive political culture that might explain both the lower rates of
turnout and the persistence of property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations. The ﬁxed-eﬀect model controls for
this by assuming that there are ﬁxed aspects of a state’s political culture that impact turnout regardless
of the franchise. The results of this analysis, not included, largely replicate the information displayed
in Figure 3.6. The coeﬃcient is reported, rather than the marginal eﬀect, to control for the fact that
congressional district sizes increased considerably over this period.
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tial years reﬂects in part the limited number of observations and possibly overall lower
levels of voter turnout.
Figure 3.6: Eﬀect of pecuniary restriction on turnout in U.S. Congressional race, 17901932

If property or taxpaying qualiﬁcations did disfranchise some non-trivial portion of
the population, we would expect to see reduced turnout for congressional elections. And
indeed this is what we see. While far from deﬁnitive, the evidence that property and
taxpaying qualiﬁcations did reduce political participation is compelling. In the antebellum period, this translates into an average reduction of approximately 600 voters
in the mean congressional district, or approximately 4% of the adult male population.
To be clear, this is the estimated reduction in turnout and not the estimated level of
disfranchisement. Nonetheless, we should not exaggerate the impact of property and
taxpaying qualiﬁcations. At no point in the post-Revolutionary period did they disfranchise the majority of free adult men, and taxpaying qualiﬁcations especially had only a
slight impact on the electorate. Their removal did have a modest but signiﬁcant impact
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on turnout in state and federal elections, and so it remains appropriate to consider the
antebellum period a democratizing one for white men. The same cannot be said of other
categories of persons in the American population.

Gender and Racial Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise
By far the most important axes along which Americans have been excluded from the
electorate, apart from age, are race and gender. Figure 3.7 tracks the proportion of states
with an explicit or customary gender qualiﬁcation. Also included is the percentage of
states and territories that enabled some women to vote for some oﬃces, but did not
have a general enfranchisement of women. New Jersey was the only state to enfranchise
women in the antebellum period, and while this was ostensibly on the same terms as
for men, most adult women were excluded through coverture, the legal doctrine that
women ceased to be independent persons upon marriage. Female enfranchisement was
ended in 1807 and the ﬁrst American jurisdiction to re-establish it was the Wyoming
territorial legislature in 1869. After this, a number of territories and western states
extended the franchise to women, although the U.S. Congress intervened to overturn the
enfranchisement of women in Utah territory in 1887.
If women’s disfranchisement was the longest and most extensive form of exclusion
in American history, the disfranchisement of African Americans has been the most turbulent and bitterly contested. Figure 3.8 tracks the proportion of states with a racial
qualiﬁcation for the franchise. Every state but Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Vermont had either a blanket disfranchisement or discriminatory higher qualiﬁcation for free black voters at some point prior to the Civil War. And while racial
disqualiﬁcations were pioneered in the South and adopted by a number of state legislatures and conventions, the major contributor to their spread was the Federal government:
after 1805, almost every franchise provision passed by Congress for new territories or
enabling a constitutional convention included a racial qualiﬁcation.
The impact of these qualiﬁcations was of great importance to free black communities,
North and South. Figure 3.9 shows the likely percentage of free blacks in the United
States who were entitled to vote. After 1865, the ﬁgure is of the entire black population.
The proportion of free blacks who were enfranchised declined steadily over the course
of the antebellum period.84 While between 5% and 10% of free blacks (all ages, male and
84

The ﬁgures are calculated by excluding all enslaved blacks, by excluding all free blacks living in a
state with a racial qualiﬁcation for the franchise, by reducing the number of black voters whenever
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Figure 3.7: Gender Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1760-1935

female) were entitled to vote in the early Republic, much fewer likely availed themselves
of this right, a consequence in part of local discriminatory practices.85
After passage of the 15th Amendment, explicit racial qualiﬁcations were no longer
constitutional, although that did not stop California from including a prohibition on nonthere is a taxpaying or property qualiﬁcation, and by reducing, but not elimination, the number of
black voters wherever there was a post-Reconstruction arrangement of white supremacy. The reduction
from property qualiﬁcations is based on estimates of the number of free blacks excluded by New York’s
post-1821 property qualiﬁcation of $250 as a proportion of whites who had been excluded by a similar
qualiﬁcation pre-1821. The speciﬁc $250 (£100) qualiﬁcation disfranchised about 40% of the adult white
male population, but excluded around 90% of the free black adult male population. The number of
free black voters and non-voters was included in the 1835 and 1845 New York State censuses: only 1.3%
and 2.3% of free blacks could vote in each census, respectively, about 5% and 8% of the free black adult
male population. This is the high end of property qualiﬁcations, and so it is assumed that a property
qualiﬁcation excluded 70% of the otherwise enfranchised population and tax payment about 35%.
85
For instance, while free blacks were entitled to vote in Pennsylvania, most accounts suggest that they
were eﬀectively denied this right in Philadelphia, but not in other counties.
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Figure 3.8: Racial Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1700-1935

American born Chinese persons from voting in 1879, or Idaho doing the same in 1890.86
But beginning in the 1880s, southern states began to circumvent the 15th Amendment
and federal voting rights laws through aggressive use of property, taxpaying, literacy,
and residence requirements, alongside the use of private and public intimidation and
violence. This reduced the proportion of free blacks—now calculated as the entirety
of the African American population—to the rate of enfranchisement seen in the early
Republic.
There is another way to look at this which points to the remarkable transformation
in the American electorate that occurred with passage of the 15th Amendment and with
86

In both cases they were enabled to do so by limiting the disfranchisement to Chinese and “persons of
Mongolian descent” not born in the United States. As Chinese were ineligible for naturalization, these
provisions reinforced a citizenship qualiﬁcation. Possible reasons for what might otherwise be redundant
provisions are that they provided some protection against Chinese voting if Congress allowed for their
naturalization, that they allowed the state to change their franchise laws to allow declarant alien voting,
and to provide a strong signal, in addition to an array of civil disabilities, that Chinese were unwelcome.
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Figure 3.9: Enfranchisement Rate among Free Blacks, 1790-1935

its eventual defeat. Figure 3.10 tracks the state average of the proportion of the total
electorate that was black. These are unweighted state level averages, treating states with
very few blacks and states with majority black populations equally: when the analysis
looks only at southern states, the Reconstruction-era range is around 30-50%.
It is worth highlighting the degree to which the late 19th and early to mid-20th century
exclusion of African Americans diﬀered both from the previous and contemporaneous
disfranchisements of white Americans. While black disfranchisement was ostensibly
achieved through mechanisms that had earlier disfranchised white men, and through
literacy and taxpaying qualiﬁcations that were used throughout the northern states in
the late 19th and 20th centuries, the impact of these mechanisms declined enormously
outside of the South. Figure 3.11 shows the post-1880 impact of pecuniary restrictions on
turnout, showing the average decline in electoral turnout across all states. The impact
dwarfs the estimates for the antebellum period shown in ﬁgure 3.6, and the remarkably
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Figure 3.10: Black Voters as % of State Total, State-level Averages

low levels of turnout led to a number of southern congressmen being dubbed the “one
percenters” for having been returned to oﬃce with only 1% of the population in their
districts voting in their favor (Brewer 1944, 272). Figure 3.12 shows the same information,
but looks only at the impact on turnout from pecuniary qualiﬁcations in the northern
and western states. Pecuniary qualiﬁcations in the post-Civil War North had a greater
impact than they had in the antebellum period, but they were of declining importance
in politics with only Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire having taxpaying
qualiﬁcations after 1910.
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Figure 3.11: Disfranchising Impact of Pecuniary Restrictions, 1875-1935
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Figure 3.12: Disfranchising Impact of Pecuniary Restrictions outside the South, 1875-1935
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Other Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise
Although pecuniary qualiﬁcations became less important as a means of restricting the
non-southern electorate, these were not the only means by which the franchise was
restricted along lines of economic class. The most important non-pecuniary qualiﬁcation
was the residency requirement, which generally converged on 1 year in state and 6
months in the county or district where the vote was to be cast. These were understood as
limiting the vote from “the vicious vagrant, the wandering Arabs, the Tartar hordes” (Agg
1837, v.1 487), and the in-state length reached 2 years in post-Reconstruction Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as in Rhode Island
(1888-1895), Kentucky (1792-1890), and Pennsylvania (1790-1836).
Figure 3.13: Residence Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1700-1935

Other restrictions on working class participation were the literacy and pauper qualiﬁcations. Robert Steinfeld (1989) has highlighted the growing importance in the antebellum period of pauper exclusions, and has argued that these reveal a changing basis
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for full membership in the community. Literacy tests were initially used in New England in order to disfranchise segments of both the naturalized and native-born laboring
classes. By the 20th century, they had been adopted in approximately 35% of states,
including California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.87 By contrast, other states including Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, and New York between 1896 and 1921 mandated assistance to illiterates
in voting.
Literacy tests were intentionally designed to restrict the suﬀrage along lines of ethnicity, race, and class.88 And they had this eﬀect. Of the 1,980,611 voting age illiterate males
and females counted by the 1920 census and living in states requiring literacy tests, only
23.6% were native born whites, compared to 57.5% African Americans, and 17% foreign
born whites. This was approximately 22% of the voting age population in these states,
and 6% of the voting age population of the entire U.S. And as recent scholarship has
emphasized, most also excluded persons who had been convicted of a variety of crimes.
These were especially severe in the South, where they included a much broader category
of crimes than elsewhere and tended to be permanent disqualiﬁcations (Behrens, Uggen,
and Manza 2003).
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This ﬁgure does not include those states such as North Dakota and Florida that allowed the legislature
to require a literacy test, or that directed the legislature to impose one, if this was not actually done.
88
The literacy test of Connecticut was amended in 1896 to require that the elector read the state constitution in English, and most stipulated that English-language literacy was required.
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Figure 3.14: Literacy, Felon, and Pauper Exclusions, 1760-1935

Relationship of the Diﬀerent Trajectories
When we look at these paths in tandem an additional feature becomes evident. Figure
3.15 provides the 4-year moving average of the net change in suﬀrage qualiﬁcations along
class and racial lines. Each change to the suﬀrage is coded as either an inclusionary or
exclusionary change on a class or racial dimension. The net change for a given year
is found by subtracting the number of states that impose exclusionary restrictions from
the number of states that open the suﬀrage in a more inclusive direction.89 What we see
is that the trajectories of suﬀrage along race and class dimensions were ﬁrst inversely
related, before becoming aligned after the Civil War.90
The strong association between class enfranchisement and black disfranchisement
89

These changes include changes to the property threshold, changes to the types of tax that are counted
for purposes of enfranchisement, the removal or imposition of pecuniary qualiﬁcations, the imposition
of requirements that black men show a certiﬁcate of freedom before voting, and the imposition and
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Figure 3.15: Racial Qualiﬁcations for the Franchise, 1760-1935

in the antebellum period has long been recognized by historians (Litwack 1961, 74-76).91
But it is rarely the subject of theoretical consideration, and insofar as it is discussed
abolition of categorical racial exclusion, amongst others.
As much as was possible, the post-1870 changes were separated out on the grounds of whether they
were primarily targeting the working classes as a class or as a race. So whenever there were signiﬁcant
provisions in southern white supremacy suﬀrage clauses that were intended to and in practice known
to achieve black disfranchisement while maintaining most working class whites in the electorate, that
is coded as a racial exclusion and not a class exclusion. When these provisions were absent, and
the resulting disfranchisement fell on both whites and blacks, it was coded as both a racial and class
exclusion. And where a restriction on class lines occurred outside of the South and is not understood
by historians to have been a proxy for racial disfranchisement, it is coded as a class exclusion and not a
race exclusion. While there is some overlap in the coding post-1870, the same pattern of a contraction
on the class dimension holds outside the South as well, suggesting that this was not solely a proxy for
racial disfranchisement.
91
Leon Litwack argued that “Negroes did not share in the expansion of political democracy in the ﬁrst
half of the nineteenth century; indeed, such expansion frequently came at the expense of their rights
and privileges. . . . In several states the adoption of white manhood suﬀrage led directly to the political
disfranchisement of the Negro” (1961, 74-76).
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the explanations tend to emphasize economic competition between free blacks and the
urban white working class and the partisan interests of the Democratic Party (Malone
2008). This does not explain why support for black disfranchisement was high in both
urban and rural regions, or why it had broad support even where there were very few
African Americans—free or enslaved—to be either an economic competitor or an electoral threat.
The coincidence of black disfranchisement and the removal of property qualiﬁcations
was not accidental, but reﬂected the underlying coalitions that pushed the diﬀerent measures through state constitutional conventions. Figure 3.16 shows the correlation between
the estimated ideal points of delegates to the Pennsylvania constitutional convention in
1837-38 on the issues of black suﬀrage and the removal of a taxpaying qualiﬁcation.
The higher the ideal point, the more inclusive the delegate’s position. Democrats were
strongly in favor of black disfranchisement and more likely to support the removal of
the taxpaying qualiﬁcation, although only the former was successfully passed by the
convention. The opposite was the case for the Whigs and Anti-Masons. By the 1820s
this pattern was present in state conventions across the country, regardless of whether
there was a free black population large enough to incentivize their disfranchisement for
reasons of electoral competition.
Importantly, this pattern of inverse positions on voting rights for free blacks and
laboring class whites emerged gradually over the course of the antebellum period. Figure
3.17 shows the relation between positions on black suﬀrage and non-suﬀrage issues in
the Ohio constitutional convention of 1802.92 While Federalists in Ohio were more likely
to support than oppose black suﬀrage, the Jeﬀersonians were deeply divided on the
issue. And the correlation between support for black suﬀrage and support for removing
the taxpayer qualiﬁcation was a positive and statistically signiﬁcant 0.629 (Pearson’s R).
While black suﬀrage would eventually come to be closely related to partisan aﬃliation
and by preferences on other issues, this pattern was less present in the early Republic.
These ﬁgures allow us to identify and characterize distinct developmental paths for
diﬀerent periods of American history. In the early Republic, the positions of political
operatives for suﬀrage changes on racial and class lines were poorly correlated. By the
1820s, however, they had become strongly and negative correlated, consistent across
almost all states. This pattern would again be reversed after 1870, when the 15th Amendment ensured that most racially motivated exclusions would be framed in class terms
92

There were insuﬃcient votes on the taxpaying qualiﬁcation to estimate ideal points.
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Figure 3.16: Scatterplot of Delegate Ideal Points on Black Disfranchisement and Tax
Qualiﬁcation, PA 1837-38

and would excluded a considerable number of working class whites. The focus of this
project will be on the period from the early years of the 19th century through to the Civil
War, when the advance of democracy and the disfranchisement of blacks were most
closely related.
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Figure 3.17: Scatterplot of Delegate Ideal Points on Black Disfranchisement and Other
Issues, OH 1802

Institutional and Partisan Context
Partisan Dominance and Competition
The politics and ideologies of the antebellum period developed within a particular institutional and partisan context, one whose overriding purpose was to maintain a bisectional coalition and thereby secure the Union. Among the most important institutional
factors shaping antebellum politics were the representational rules for national oﬃce established by the Constitution. These strongly incentivized the formation of bisectional
coalitions, which in turn required parties be able to coordinate their members and campaign expenditures. And the most successful of these was the Jeﬀersonian DemocraticRepublican Party, organized in the 1790s and eﬀectively clearing the ﬁeld of contenders
by the 1820s. Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the proportion of seats held in Congress by
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the Democratic-Republicans, and then Democratic party, during the antebellum period.
The jump in the ‘Federalist/Whig’ share in the late 1820s reﬂects the return to party
coherence as the Democratic-Republican party fragmented into Democrats and Whigs.
Figure 3.18: Partisan Balance, Senate 1790-1860

Democratic-Republican dominance extended to the states (Figure 3.20). Even the reemergence of a coherent and stable two-party system in the 1830s only underscores the
importance of the Jeﬀersonian coalition: while Democrats and even many Whigs treated
the Whig Party as the inheritor of the Federalists, it was at least as much a descendant
of the Jeﬀersonians.
It was the Democratic-Republican party that set the terms for the two most important
series of changes to the right to vote in the antebellum period, the removal of property
and taxpaying qualiﬁcations and the addition of racial exclusion. Of eleven of the state
legislatures or constitutional convention in which constrictions on the franchise on racial
grounds were passed and for which the composition of the relevant chamber is known,
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Figure 3.19: Partisan Balance, House 1790-1860

all were organized by Democratic-Republicans or Democrats except Connecticut in 1814.
Similarly, of the twelve cases of class enfranchisement for which partisan composition is
known, all but two were organized by the Democratic-Republican or Democratic Party
(Burnham 1980; Dubin 2007).93
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One of the exceptions was Rhode Island in 1842, which was governed by the Whig Law and Order party
but which expanded the franchise only under severe pressure.
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Figure 3.20: Party Control of State Legislatures, 1800-1850

Democratic Political Culture and State Conventions
The antebellum period had very high levels of political participation, supported by partisan organizations concentrated on coordinating around winning national oﬃce (Aldrich
1995; Burnham 1986). What has only more recently come to be appreciated, however,
was that the high rates of turnout in the era of Jacksonian democracy was a return
and elaboration on trends that had begun under Jeﬀerson (Ratcliﬀe 2013; Lampi 2007).
The ﬁrst decade of the new republic saw a rapidly changing political culture, with an
increased number of newspapers, and these being substantially more likely to publish
election returns, and a signiﬁcant increase in turnout relative to the often moribund elections of the colonial or immediate post-Revolutionary period: “Nationwide, the trends
show that the revolution in voting was as much a legacy of Jeﬀerson’s election (and its
attendant state-level conﬂicts) as a cause of it” (Pasley 2002, 127, 129).
Figures 3.21 and 3.22 show the antebellum turnout rate for gubernatorial and pres101

idential elections, both of which were increasingly chosen by direct state-wide elections
(Ratcliﬀe 2013, 241, fn.45). After 1800, American politics at both the national and state
level was “overwhelmingly and increasingly driven by popular voting, as even bastions
of oligarchy. . . and formerly independent institutions such as the judiciary and municipal
government fell to the majority principle” (Pasley 2002, 124; Boydston 2002, 241).
Figure 3.21: Antebellum Turnout, Governor 1790-1860

And a core part of this increased political activity was the regular re-writing and
amending of state constitutions. This is especially important for our purposes, because
it was in constitutional conventions that debates over the franchise were most likely to
result in institutional changes. Figure 3.23 shows the percentage of states that tried to
amend or draft a new constitution during the antebellum period. The dashed line shows
the percentage that attempted change via amendment, the dotted line the percentage that
attempted change via a constitution convention, including conventions that proposed
amendments, and the solid line a moving average of all attempts at constitutional change.
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Figure 3.22: Antebellum Turnout, President 1790-1860

Within any given 5-year period between 5% and 20% of states had sustained movements
to rewrite or alter their constitutions.
The conventions themselves were important periods of political activity, often lasting for months and in the case of Pennsylvania almost a year. They were among the
most important sites for the construction of political order, a fact which has been recognized in much recent scholarship. Laura Scalia, for instance, examines patterns of
antebellum state constitution-making to argue that while national level discourse can
be best characterized as prioritizing liberal rights and economic freedoms. . . at the state
level there remained a much more robust commitment to a Jeﬀersonian understanding
of popular sovereignty, in which participation in political life is “an integral component
of their commitment to rights” (Scalia 1999, xvii). In a similar vein, Emily Zackin has
found that state constitutions and the political debate that surrounds their drafting, have
maintained a robust tradition of positive liberty, in contrast to the negative liberty that
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Figure 3.23: State Constitutional Politics, 1780-1860

is usually claimed to be the core of the American constitutional tradition (Zackin 2013).
The conventions are unique in the context of this project’s three case studies, and
given the mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2 by which ideas of political community become embedded in agents’ expectations, a key question is whether these conventions
were sites of important partisan activity. Laura Scalia argues that, at least so far as it
concerned questions over the suﬀrage, partisan position was less important than ideological commitments. Scalia downplays the importance of political party and rarely
provides party labels, a conscious decision on her part which she claims is “perfectly
consistent with convention practices” (Scalia 1999, 20).
“State records generally ignored most participant characteristics, listing only
names and regional aﬃliation. . . . [W]hen delegates disagreed with their colleagues regarding how to interpret speciﬁc constitutional principles or general American values, they did not group themselves with others of similar
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stature or merely accord with their fellow partisans.... For the most part,
members interacted as peers who had joined together to debate the merits
of electoral reform. They echoed the views of those on the same side of the
electoral divide, not of those sharing stature of party aﬃnities” (Scalia 1999,
20).
Scalia’s characterization of member behavior and state records is correct. Her claim that
delegates did not group themselves into partisan factions, however, is more accurate for
some conventions and times than others. I gathered roll call votes for every antebellum
state constitutional convention that result in a published journal, either on the franchise
alone or across all issues. Where there were a suﬃcient number of votes, ideal point
estimates were generated. Partisan information, Scalia correctly notes, was not oﬃcially
recorded. But this information often does exist, as local newspapers closely watched
the electoral returns and categorized delegates into partisan camps. Where newspaper
records were unavailable, there were also historical monographs, local histories, and
biographical data available for those delegates who would enter Congress.94
And contrary to Scalia’s claim, delegates clearly grouped themselves into party blocs
and this was almost everywhere the most important factor shaping positions on the
suﬀrage. These blocs were not perfectly coherent, but in no case was there a nonstatistically signiﬁcant relationship between party identiﬁcation and delegate ideal point.
There was not always a strong relationship between party and positions on black suffrage, but there was everywhere and at all periods a strong relationship between party
and positions on taxpaying or property qualiﬁcation. Certainly there were individual exceptions, but the basis structure of conﬂict in the conventions and voting on the suﬀrage
tended to be closely related to party aﬃliation. Delegates voted with their party, and they
very often invoked party principles and labels in debates. They were very often elected
oﬃcials in the state legislature—sometimes sitting in the convention as a function of
their elected oﬃce. There were no re-election campaigns to the convention, but there
were electoral campaigns on the horizon, sometimes for the very oﬃces established by
94

I was not able to get information about partisan aﬃliation for all delegates and conventions, and there
are almost certainly some coding errors. Nonetheless, where possible I consider the partisan aﬃliation
of the delegate in order to get a better sense of the role of party in structuring preferences on the
suﬀrage. As a general rule, I used partisan identiﬁcations that came from a contemporary time period.
For instance, a delegate who could be identiﬁed as a National Republican or a supporter of Adams in
the late 1820s would not have been automatically coded as a Whig in the late 1830s, even though this is a
likely trajectory of such a delegate’s political aﬃliation. So while it considerably increases the amount of
missing data for party aﬃliation, I have attempted to eschew inferences based on diﬀerent time periods.
The one exception are party labels for the 1785 New York State legislature, when such labels would have
been anachronistic.
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the new constitution. And as early as 1802 there was sustained coordination between
members of national and local coalitions in the constitutional conventions.

Conclusion
The ‘white male republic’ came into being sometime in the early 19th century; it was attacked during the Civil War and Reconstruction, its explicit invocation in law made constitutionally problematic by the 13th , 14th , and 15th Amendments. In 1896, John Goadby
Gregory, the associate editor of ‘The Evening Wisconsin,’ wrote a short history of the
black suﬀrage in Wisconsin. Goadby was clearly proud that Wisconsin had been the
second state to re-enfranchise black men, and the ﬁrst to do so by referendum, but he
ended on a note of despair for the current state of opinion in the country.95 “The day
has gone by,” he wrote, “when suﬀrage was glowingly regarded as an end. . . . There are
among us intelligent people who grumble at the results—or what they conceive to be
the results—of universal manhood suﬀrage in the United States. Did our fathers blunder
when by extending the franchise they sought to expand the limits of human freedom?”
He, however, insisted that he would not succumb to the changing tide: “It is a fact, I
take it, that the liberal suﬀrage provisions of our law are a noble monument to a glorious
faith in the approximate perfectibility of humanity” (1896).
A decade later, something like the ‘white male republic’ had been established: African
Americans in the South were nearly entirely disfranchised, immigration laws were being
re-written to allow a narrower ﬁeld of persons, deﬁned by race, into the country; and
once-radical Republicans were apologizing for having tried the experiment of genuine
democracy. But because of persistent legacies of the radical period after 1865, this would
be its own diﬀerent political order: blacks could vote in northern states, and the literacy
and taxpaying qualiﬁcations that came in vogue were targeted not only against blacks
in the south, but against a broad array of persons considered unﬁt for participation in
political rights.
This chapter has introduced the basic argument of the US case study, has situated it
relative to alternatives, and has documented the patterns of disfranchisements and exclusions that accompanied American democracy. It has also outlined the basic institutional
and partisan context in which democratization and exclusion were generated in the an95

While the referendum was won by the supporters of black suﬀrage, turnout did not meet the required
level and so the vote was invalidated. A decade later, a Wisconsin court overturned this invalidation.
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tebellum period, stressing the importance of the Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republicans
and their eﬀorts to capitalize on the possibilities implicit in the Constitution.
The next chapter will look at the period from the Revolution to the Missouri Crisis, emphasizing how egalitarian ideas that gained resonance in the critical juncture
of 1776 and after threatened the understandings and institutions of American political
community. To hold together a bisectional coalition, Democratic-Republicans paired
the rhetorical and institutional advance of democracy with a persistent political support
for slavery. The narrative of political community that they elaborated would become
embedded in the institutions and expectations of antebellum American politics.
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Chapter 4
Democratic Republicanism and Slavery

“The Indians are driven into the society of savage beasts, and we glory in the
equal rights of men, provided that we white men can enjoy the whole of them.”—
Abraham Bishop, 1791.96
“What is the man in his country who is neither a slave nor an alien? In mine he is
a citizen.”—Morrill, Democratic-Republican Senator from New Hampshire,
182097

Introduction
In November of 1820, Nathan Sanford, the Democratic-Republican Senator for New
York, communicated to his congressional colleagues the resolutions passed by the New
York State Legislature: the state’s Senators were instructed and its Representatives requested to “use their utmost exertions to prevent the acceptance and conﬁrmation of
any. . . constitution” that would deny to the citizens of existing states the privileges and
immunities of the new state.98 At issue in what became known as the Second Missouri
Crisis was a clause in the proposed Missouri constitution that barred the entrance of
free blacks into the new state, and the debate turned on the question of whether free
blacks were citizens of the United States.99 The Second Crisis was ultimately resolved
by an ambiguous compromise, in which Missouri had to assent by a “solemn act” to not
pass any law that would deny any citizen the enjoyment of any privilege or immunities
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to which they were entitled under the U.S. Constitution.100
Ten months later, during the New York State constitutional convention, Federalist
Peter Jay objected to an eﬀort to disfranchise free black voters by invoking the Privileges
and Immunities clause. “No longer ago than last November,” he reminded the delegates,
“the legislature of this state almost unanimously resolved” to oppose any constitution
that denied to any citizens the privileges and immunities of the new state. “Now, sir, is
not the right of suﬀrage a privileged? And can you deny it to a citizen of Pennsylvania
who comes here and complies with your laws, merely because he is not six feet high, or
he is of a dark complexion?” New York State, he argued, “has taken high ground against
slavery, and all its degrading consequences and accompaniments. There are gentlemen
on this ﬂoor, who, to their immortal honour, have defended the cause of this oppressed
people in congress, and I trust you will not desert now them.”101 The Convention ultimately decided, against sustained opposition from Federalists and a faction of former
Democratic-Republicans, to exclude all but a tiny prosperous minority of free male
African Americans. “The truth is,” claimed John Ross, a Democratic-Republican from
Genesee County, “this exclusion invades no inherent rights, nor has it any connection at
all with the question of slavery.”102
Alongside this decision the convention voted to remove the property qualiﬁcations
for white men, with some of the most vocal advocates of black disfranchisement being
the most committed proponents of removing property qualiﬁcations from white men.
And from 1821 until the Civil War, the behavior of political operatives in Congress and
in state constitutional conventions displayed a stable pattern of correlated support for
class enfranchisement and racial disfranchisement. As Leon Litwack recognized in 1961,
free blacks in the antebellum United States “did not share in the expansion of political
democracy. . . ; indeed, such expansion frequently came at the expense of their rights
and privileges” (Litwack 1961, 74-76).
This is the pattern of democratization and exclusion that I set out to explain in this
case study. I argue that this was not the inevitable product of structural conditions,
or American political culture, or of the particular institutions of the U.S. Constitution,
although each of these is implicated in the explanation. Rather, the exclusionary pattern
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of American democratization was the product of strategic decisions by the Jeﬀersonian
coalition as they sought to capture the possible gains implicit in the new constitutional
order. As with the French and UK cases, the American case study hinges on a critical juncture, namely the American Revolution and the corresponding reformulation of
political community. But following the Revolution were two additional important shifts
in governing authority, both of which were important in structuring the subsequent political order: the drafting and ratiﬁcation of the U.S. Constitution and the election of
Thomas Jeﬀerson in 1800. The Revolution unsettled existing interpretations of political
community, while helping to consolidate new ones with a revolutionary potential of their
own; the Constitution created a self-reinforcing institutional context in which there were
signiﬁcant gains to political entrepreneurs capable of building a bisectional coalition;
and the election of Jeﬀerson helped ensure that the new Republic would develop along
lines that reﬂected more the preferences and priorities of one coalition than another.
The Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republicans built a coalition capable of winning national oﬃce by uniting a strident, but beleaguered, northern democratic movement with
southern slaveholders. The coalition was always factious, and the party initially lacked
strong means of disciplining its members at the state or national level. But the political prospects of northern democrats were increasingly bound up with the national
coalition. The party’s ability to win national oﬃce helped sustain an infrastructure of
northern oﬃceholders and newspapers, and positions taken at the national level changed
the political environment in which local politicians operated. In building this coalition,
the Jeﬀersonians found it necessary to articulate an understanding of American identity,
one that would reinforce already existing beliefs about the racial boundaries of political
community while limiting the terms of republican equality to white men.
I begin by detailing the understandings of political community as they existed before
the Revolution. I emphasize the ways in which formerly excluded groups began to press
for their own freedom and political inclusion during and after the Revolution, reformulating the meaning of American political community and republican citizenship. I then
discuss the struggle to establish a new political order, and the eﬀorts by the Jeﬀersonian Democratic-Republicans, responding to incentives embedded in the Constitution,
to build a bisectional coalition and tying the fate of the democratic movement in the
north to the slaveholders of the south. In order to reconcile this coalition, DemocraticRepublicans began emphasizing a belief—already extant—that only white men could be
equal under a republican form of government. The result, which emerged gradually over
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the course of the ﬁrst two decades of the 19th century, was the ‘white male republic’ and
the particularly American form of democratic exclusion.

Political Community in Colonial America
Understandings of American political community were profoundly transformed during
the Revolution, a point often understated by scholars stressing a democratic or exclusionary consistency across the divide of 1776. Colonial understandings reﬂected English
ideological heritages, modiﬁed by transplantation to a settler colony and by the implications of a distinctly ‘New World’ form of chattel slavery. While there was a greater
degree of social and political equality among settlers than existed in England, American
understandings of political community similarly undergirded expectations that governing would be an intra-elite aﬀair and that insofar as the lower orders could engage
politically their posture would be one of deference.
American understandings of political community emphasized the importance of dependency as determining the scope of inclusion into the body politic: the dependent
or dominated, including property-less men, wage laborers, women, and slaves, lacked
the capacity for independent political judgment. During the English Civil War and
Commonwealth, political thinkers and activists had emphasized property, necessary for
independent judgment and the actual basis of political power, as the appropriate basis
upon which a political community should be founded. This was not a novel conception,
but in turning to classical writers English thinkers were able to fashion an understanding
of political community that could both defend parliamentary authority against the King
as well as to head oﬀ demands of the more radical factions of the New Model Army
(Skinner 2002).
Algernon Sidney, for instance, emphasized “the diﬀerence between Civis and Servus,”
arguing that this distinction “is irreconcilable; and no man, whilst he is a Servant,
can be a Member of the Commonwealth; for he that is not in his own power, cannot
have a part in the Government of others” (Sidney 1704, 69). James Harrington divided
the people into “Freeman or Citizens, and Servants,” with the “nature of Servitude”
being self-evidently “inconsistent with Freedom, or participation of Government in a
Commonwealth.” Freemen were supposedly “men of property, or Persons that are able
to live of themselves,” excluding those who did not own property or who were subject
to the master-servant law that governed wage laborers (Cress 1984, 25; Reeve 1816,
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339). This understanding of the boundaries of political community was reiterated in
the writings of William Blackstone and Montesquieu, the two most inﬂuential political
thinkers in the colonies: “the true reason of requiring any qualiﬁcation with regard to
property in voters is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they
are esteemed to have no will of their own” (Blackstone 1771, 171).103 This was a near
consensus view among colonial American elites (Williamson 1953).104
As we shall see in the discussion of the United Kingdom, the English emphasis on
independence was hardly adhered to in practice in Great Britain or Ireland. Freemanship
in the boroughs was extended less on the basis of property ownership or an independent
standing in the community than on the exigencies of winning local political contests. The
economic position of freeholders was hardly such as to guarantee their independence,
and ‘freeholds’ were legally interpreted to include various forms of leaseholds, with
tenants subject to various forms of intimidation by the landlords. As an ideological
matter, ‘independence’ was desirable. But so too was an appropriate inﬂuence from
one’s social superiors, and what was stressed was not so much an abstract independence
but rather the source of potential inﬂuence.
But if the ideological signiﬁcance of independence was toned down in Great Britain,
it was if anything exaggerated in America (Rana 2010, 50). The structural conditions
discussed in Chapter 3 enabled the possibility of a broadly based freeholder society and
as well as more coercive and domineering legal arrangements than existed in England,
and the demarcation of the independent from the dependent was in many ways starker in
the colonies than it was in England. The expropriation of the indigenous population provided an opportunity for broad based land ownership and the creation of non-laboring
class, if coercive labor discipline and mobility restrictions could be imposed. And the
American legislative assemblies obliged, demarcating a category of persons on the basis
of origin and descent as property whose mobility and interaction with other classes were
restricted (Goodell 1968; Greene 1942, 129; Sirmans 1962).105
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The slave codes and other statutes often did not distinguish between free and enslaved blacks; and where they did, both legislation and social practice sustained a “system of racial etiquette, with a detailed catalogue of penalties for both blacks and whites
who transgressed it” (Wiecek 1977, 265). In many of the colonies, free blacks were prohibited from testifying against whites in court, and were usually barred from serving
on juries or in the militias, unless there was a signiﬁcant security threat (Greene 1942;
Hening 1823, 127; Quarles 1959, 643). In the Carolinas and Virginia, free blacks were at
various points required to leave the province ( Jordan 1969, 123-24). The combined eﬀect
of the slave codes and their assimilation of subordination to race was to establish nearabsolute domination as the extreme end of non-independence in the American colonies,
and to associate this status with racial diﬀerence as the demarcation of an increasingly
rigid community boundary.
The exclusion of blacks from the political community was assumed by most Americans. However, when outlining political principles, as often occurred in the run-up to the
Revolution, there was occasionally an acknowledgment of the possibility of black civil
and political rights. In 1764 James Otis defended the rights of the British colonies by
diﬀerentiating the West Indian islands from the northern colonies, which were “well settled, not as the common people of England foolishly imagine, with a compound mongrel
mixture of English, Indian and Negro, but with freeborn British white subjects, whose loyalty has never yet been suspected” (1764 36-7). Still, Otis, denounced slavery and argued
that “the Colonists are by the law of nature free born, as indeed all men are, white or
black,” and that as British subjects, they were all, “black and white, born here. . . entitled
to all the essential civil rights of such” (1764, 43, 56). This was a manifest truth of the
British constitution, the common law, the provincial charters, and of natural right.
In short, the development of a form of slavery allocated by origin and descent ensured
that the costs of sustaining a non-laboring class were not imposed on European settlers.
The conditions of American settlement enabled greater independence in the economic
and legal relations among non-enslaved settlers, although not so much as to justify
Rana’s claim that they enjoyed “egalitarian internal relationship” (2010, 48).106 And as
a result, arguments for political rights based on economic and legal independence were
attractive to a broader segment of colonists than they were among the English, as they
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had the potential to enfranchise a larger portion of the population.107
While the meaning of dependency was starkly deﬁned, it was not the only basis for
exclusion. Allegiance and communion were also of considerable importance, similarly
drawing on English heritage but modiﬁed in the colonial context. As will be discussed
in Chapter 7 , the dominant conception of political community in pre-1829 Great Britain
and Ireland was what contemporaries called the Protestant Constitution: only Protestantism was compatible with liberty, and the purpose of the constitutional monarchy was
to maintain, through the Established Churches, the Protestant character of the country.
The glory of Britain was that she enjoyed “the best civil constitution. . . [and] the best
religious establishment in the world” (Morgan 1766, 30).
But for colonial Americans, it was the fact that Britain had transplanted and defended
Protestantism that was the country’s greatest accomplishment:
“Heaven has yet glorious purposes to serve thro’ America. Civil liberty,
the Protestant Religion, the principles of Toleration. . . [were under Great
Britain’s] auspices. . . transplanted into America; where they have got ﬁrm
root, and are ﬂourishing into immense growth and will bring such an accretion of strength to the general cause of Liberty and Protestantism, that
we trust no power on earth shall ever be able to prevail against their united
strength” (Smith 1766, 11).
The Protestant Constitution in England imposed a variety of civil disabilities on nonAnglicans. Similar exclusions were justiﬁed in the American context, but these varied
across colonies and were modiﬁed to reﬂect the diﬀerent sectarian communities. For
instance, in his A Discourse about Civil Government in a New Plantation Whose Design
is Religion, John Cotton, the most inﬂuential New England theologian, argued “that
form of government [in which] the power of civil administration is denied unto unbelievers and [is] committed to the saints is the best form of government in a Christian
Commonwealth” (1663). Cotton was advocating the exclusion of non-Congregationalists,
including members of the Church of England. But the conditions of American settlement
tended to de-emphasize the distinctions between Protestants and reinforce the exclusion
of Catholics. Not only were many of the American colonists drawn from Protestant and
non-conforming sects, but the major geopolitical rivals to colonial expansion were the
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Catholic powers of France and Spain. As in Great Britain and Ireland, the Catholic
presence was anxiously attended to by Protestants who believed that liberty was always
threatened by Papal absolutism: “the government of the Spanish and French settlements
is in every respect despotic” (Otis 1764, 41). They not only lacked independence, always
subject to the inﬂuence of the clergy, but their allegiance could never be trusted, as they
always owed a concurrent allegiance to the Pope (Rana 2010, 58-61). In Great Britain
and Ireland, Dissenters were seen as the unwitting enablers of Catholic absolutism by
calling the Church Establishment into question. By contrast, the greater role of Dissenters in American political life, and the fact that some colonies had non-conforming
church establishments or no establishment, helped consolidate a greater emphasis on
Protestantism rather than Anglicanism. Several states excluded Catholics from the franchise or from oﬃce-holding, including Maryland which had initially been established
as a Catholic colony. The naturalization procedures established by the British parliament excluded Catholics as did the colonial naturalization procedures, although there
are indications that it continued after 1688 in some colonies (Hoyt 1952, 257, fn.27).

The Revolution in American Political Community
These understandings of political community would be unsettled by the Revolution, as
assertions of natural right and contribution were made by groups whose experience and
interests diﬀered considerably from the old elite, but whose active support was needed
to win the war. Farmers and property-less laborers organized in revolutionary committees and militias, which would provide an organizational base to press for the expansion
of the suﬀrage. Black slaves would ﬂee in massive numbers, thousands enlisting in the
revolutionary and British forces, promised freedom in exchange for service. The emphasis on ‘independence’ was not displaced entirely, but it became less important relative
to claims of contribution. And ‘independence’ was subtly reinterpreted by many—by
no means all—who now insisted that the form of independent judgment required of a
republican regime was to be found especially in the poor laboring classes.
In both the war itself and the political crisis which preceded it, the political elite—
both Tory and Whig—sought to secure the support of the disfranchised classes. In
Georgia, Loyalists extended the suﬀrage to owners of town lots equal in value to a 50 acre
freehold.108 The South Carolina Provincial Congress moved to provide representation
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to the back country, long a source of conﬂict. This action was motivated by the desire
to secure the inhabitants loyalty, to “the better to unite them with the lower country”
and provide a means by “which their constituents might be better informed about the
nature of the dispute with Great Britain and America” (Douglass 1955, 37). In most
areas of the country, however, there was substantial support for independence amongst
the disfranchised, and it was those who were pushing for independence that were most
likely to extend suﬀrage (Douglass 1955, 36-7; Williamson 1960, 89).
Pre-emptive eﬀorts to secure loyalty were important in some places, but their aggregate impact was small relative to the changes achieved by the mobilization of excluded
groups in political and military organizations. The committees that would emerge during the crisis were often composed of “citizens noted for both economic prominence
and. . . ideological zeal” (Ryerson 1974, 568). As the crisis progressed, however, they
tended to expand in size and become more diverse in their composition, as “new men,
more radical and more organized than their predecessors” began to take on a more
prominent role, notably in organizing the militia for political action (Olton 1975, 74;
Douglass 1955, 38). The Wilmington Committee of Safety, for instance, “owed its initial
existence to the freeholders who chose the members and who presumably held them
accountable for their decisions.” But faced with the task of organizing broad support
for various economic and military measures, the Committee soon ordered new elections
and expanded the franchise to “all the inhabitants qualiﬁed to vote for members of the
Assembly” so that “the people may have an opportunity of conﬁrming or annulling their
former choice” (Breen 2010, 189). In Philadelphia, the German associations “called for
all taxable to have the right to vote” and allied themselves with the Presbyterian Irish and
Philadelphia artisans in committees designed to enforce the non-importation agreements
(Bradburn 2009, 32).
The militias were especially important in mobilizing support for suﬀrage reform:
it was the “militia experience which mobilized, politicized, and disciplined the lower
classes” and the elected leaders of the militias consistently pressed for an expansion of
political rights (Rosswurm 1979, 110; Williamson 1960, 108; Douglass 1955, 49-50). When
the Maryland provincial convention decided to support independence, under popular
hibited the assent of the governors to any bill that sought to change the qualiﬁcations for suﬀrage
(Williamson 1960, 89). The eﬀorts of Loyalists to secure the loyalty of the population in the run-up to
the war were important, but their immediate impact in the structuring of colonial suﬀrage laws was in
part impeded by the fact that the royal instructions to the colonial governors in 1767 had prohibited
the assent of the governors to any bill that sought to change the qualiﬁcations for suﬀrage (Williamson
1960, 89).
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pressure, it called a constitutional convention on the basis of the existing property qualiﬁcations. Members of the militia, of which the “whole company was not worth 40
pound sterling,” protested and insisted that “that every taxable bearing arms, had an
undoubted right to vote for representatives at this time of public calamity.” When local
judges insisted that the suﬀrage qualiﬁcations be adhered to, some of the militia leaders
were heard to say that the men should lay down their arms; the judges of Prince George
County were simply replaced by the community with new judges who disregarded the
suﬀrage qualiﬁcations (Douglass 1955, 49-50; Williamson 1960, 108).
Militias often pressed symbolically important egalitarian claims, such as rejecting
distinct uniforms for oﬃcers in place of hunting shirts that would “level all distinctions”
(Rosswurm 1979, 112). Especially common were proposals to allow for the election of
oﬃcers by the militiamen themselves. In those colonies where this prevailed, the militias
became especially radical in their demands. For instance, the Committee of Privates in
Pennsylvania was organized in order to coordinate the activities of the militia associators,
and generally sought to represent a constituency amongst the poor and disfranchised.
The Committee of Privates provided the leadership for the militias, who in turn were “the
united power defending the extremely democratic constitution framed by Pennsylvania”
(Link 1942, 26; Rosswurm 1979, 149, 162-63). The growing radicalism of the militias and
committees caused considerable anxiety among the colonial elite. Fear of an internal
revolution “made Robert R. Livingston hesitate long on the brink of independence,”
while his mother prayed for “Peace and Independence and deliverance from the persecutions of the Lower Class who I forsee will be as dispotic as any Prince (if not more
so) in Europe.” There were increasingly demands for conﬁscating Loyalist property, and
many believed this would soon be extended to the “tenanted estates” (Lynd 1961, 331).
As the crisis deepened, the mobilization of “ordinary people in small farm communities”
gave political voice to segments of the population that had largely been shut out from
political participation (Breen 2010, 52). The politically activated communities began to
articulate new bases for political rights that would become increasingly important in the
antebellum period. In demanding an expansion of the suﬀrage, the “associators had
moved far beyond the traditional Whig position on the suﬀrage” and were seeking to
break the link between property and participation in political governance (Rosswurm
1979, 211). The militias of Philadelphia were the most-eﬀectively organized for political
action, but in Massachusetts and other colonies the Revolution saw a push for suﬀrage
expansion that was premised on understandings of citizenship that emphasized contri117

butions, especially in war, over property: “shall these poor polls who have gone for us
into the greatest perils and undergone inﬁnite fatigues in the present war. . . shall they
now be treated by us like villains” (Keyssar 2001, 12)?
The Revolution did not witness a wholesale dismantling of property qualiﬁcations
for voting. Nonetheless, there were a number of important changes to the suﬀrage, most
of them instituted as states wrote their new republican constitutions. Georgia changed
its suﬀrage qualiﬁcations in 1777 from white males owning ﬁfty acres of land in their own
right to all male white inhabitants possessed of £10 and liable to pay tax in the state, or
any mechanic resident six months in the state. New Hampshire moved from a real estate
to a poll tax in 1784, North Carolina kept the old requirement of 50 acres freehold for
the Senate, but enfranchised all freemen who had paid taxes and been resident one year.
New Jersey, Maryland, South Carolina also reduced the franchise during the Revolution,
although Massachusetts responded to increased demands for enfranchisement by raising
the property qualiﬁcations.
The most important changes came in Vermont and Pennsylvania, where the militias
and radical factions were able to either seize control of the state or found a new state
themselves (Wood 1998, 85). Vermont, established by the Green Mountain Boys militia in
the 1770s, provided that “all freemen, having a suﬃcient evident common Interest with,
and Attachment to the Community,” resident one year and of “a quiet and peaceable
Behaviour” were entitled to vote and be elected to any oﬃce. In Pennsylvania, the militias
seized control over the state-level Conference of Committees and organized elections to
a constitutional convention with a reduced franchise. The convention, presided over
by Benjamin Franklin, was largely organized by Pennsylvania’s radical faction, and the
resulting constitution established a unicameral legislature elected by “every Freeman”
resident one year and having paid public—state, county, municipal—taxes, with voting
by ballot and the right of citizens to reject legislation before it went into eﬀect.The
Pennsylvania constitution was highly inﬂuential, and would inﬂuence the radical factions
in Vermont and Georgia, the other colonies where the Revolution “was accompanied by
an internal revolution comparable to that of Pennsylvania” (Douglass 1955, 340; Williams
1988). The lower classes in Georgia—in the words of Governor Wright, “a parcel of
the lowest people, chieﬂy carpenters, shoemakers, blacksmiths”—were the core of the
radical movement, and upon seizing control of the Congress they extended the vote to
all taxpayers and reapportioned the representation (Douglass 1955, 344).
The Pennsylvania constitution survived until 1790, when it was replaced by a consti118

tution providing for a bicameral legislature with no opportunity for citizen disapproval
of legislation. The Pennsylvania constitution did not re-impose a property qualiﬁcation,
but it did raise the residency period from one year to two and limit the qualifying taxes
to those imposed by the state or county, which now had to be assessed at least six
months before. Despite its short life, however, the Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 considerably inﬂuenced the politics of the period, feeding elite fears of leveling that would
become part of the broader eﬀort to curtail some of the democratic ‘excesses’ of the
Revolutionary period.
Before the Revolution, the most common justiﬁcation for political rights was one’s
legal and economic independence. This had never been the only justiﬁcation, however.
Since at least the Putney Debates in the English Civil War, there had been counter traditions emphasizing the importance of contributions or having a material stake in the
community as the appropriate basis for political rights (Russell-Smith 1914, 24). The
language of contribution stressed military service, but it also emphasized contributions
through the payment of taxes, which of course had been a central theme during the
pre-war crisis. In the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the American Declaration of
Independence, the claim of no taxation without representation would be extended to
require the consent of the governed to authorize government authority.109 These had
largely meant that government must be founded on popular representation, without any
speciﬁc claim as to who should be enfranchised. Groups organized during the Revolution, however, insisted on a more expansive interpretation of the principle. The
language of contribution, which itself was not new but had risen considerably in prominence, would be picked up by Thomas Jeﬀerson in Notes on the State of Virginia, who
denounced the fact the electors’ list did not include “the half of those on the roll of the
militia, or of the tax-gatherers” (1787, 192).
These claims were now being articulated by formerly excluded groups—and political operatives seeking to represent these groups. These understanding were not starkly
opposed to those of colonial elites supportive of independence, but reﬂected an appro109

During the antebellum period the Virginia declaration would be invoked to emphasize the equal interest
of the poor and the rich in society. Moreover, it was tied to a standard of ‘consent of the governed’
that had potentially much more radically inclusive implications. “That elections of members to serve as
representatives of the people, in assembly ought to be free; and that all men, having suﬃcient evidence
of permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suﬀrage and
cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their
representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not, in like manner, assembled for
the public good.” Section 6, Virginia Declaration of Rights.
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priation of elite rhetoric to press for a broader inclusion than the revolutionary elite were
prepared to oﬀer. The radicals during and after the Revolution would also appropriate
and transform the language of independence, suggesting it had a new meaning in a republican context. Only the laboring classes could be trusted to maintain the egalitarian
commitments central to a republic: “great and over-grown rich Men will be improper to
be trusted, they will be too apt to be framing Distinctions in Society, because they will
reap the Beneﬁts of all such Distinctions. . . . Let no man represent you. . . who would be
disposed to form any Rank above that of Freeman” (Williams 1989, 553).
The free laboring classes organized for Revolution and pressed for democratization
of the political institutions. Many of these eﬀorts were successful, but even where the
success was considerably more limited, the militias and committees of safety functioned
as crucibles in which understandings of citizenship were reshaped (Breen 2010, 12). The
institutional changes brought about by the insurgents extended well beyond the suffrage, ending old manorial laws and usages, the payment of quitrents to the King and
provincial proprietors, and entail and primogeniture ( Jameson 1926).110 They unsettled
expectations of lower class deference that the previous understandings of political community had undergirded—the laboring classes had overthrown the colonial government
of Pennsylvania and established a radically democratic constitution, they exploited wartime emergencies to press for their political inclusion in most of the colonies, and they
were increasingly asserting claims to political power.
While the free laboring classes were demanding political inclusion, slaves were seizing
their freedom. Securing the quiescence of the slave population was deemed crucial to the
war eﬀort, and was often accomplished by removing slaves away from the coast and the
frontlines of the war. The war and breakdown in local authority structures, provided the
context for “the largest slave uprising” in pre-Civil War American history, with tens of
thousands of slaves ﬂeeing behind British lines or beyond the areas of settlement (Nash
1990, 57).111 While this uprising was concentrated in the southern colonies, it occurred
wherever there were slaves and a suﬃcient degree of ﬁghting or breakdown of local
authority structures (Gronowicz 1998, 16-17).
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There is considerable variation in the estimates of the number and proportion of slaves that were able to
successfully ﬂee. Conservative estimates suggest that 5,000 slaves from Virginia and Maryland reached
British lines, did as many as 13,000 slaves from South Carolina. Jeﬀerson himself claimed much higher
numbers, writing that 30,000 slaves were able to escape in 1778 alone. The conservative estimate is that
5% of southern slaves were able to escape, while others have argued that the proportion is closer 20% of
the total population (Dillon 1990; Kulikoﬀ 1986, 144; Nash 1986).
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As the war progressed, however, quiescence was not enough. In 1775 the Royal
Governor of Virginia, Lord Dunmore, organized an insurgent campaign and called on
slaves to join his forces in exchange for their freedom (Klinkner and Smith 1999, 18).
Colonial leaders were initially more hesitant in recruiting slaves into the ranks of the
Continental Army, but by 1779 the Continental Congress explicitly recommended the
enlistment of slaves (Gronowicz 1998, 16-17). By war’s end, between 5,000 and 8,000
blacks soldiers had served in the revolutionary army, with additional numbers serving
in the British army and serving in non-military laboring roles, many of which provided
access to occupational roles that were normally foreclosed to slaves (Klinkner and Smith
1999, 19).
The Revolution’s immediate contributions to checking slavery were in the opportunity it provided for slaves to escape, in the freedom granted to those who served in the
military, and in the disruption of those economic sectors that sustained slavery outside
the South (Melish 2000, 56-7). The post-war years saw some additional, albeit limited,
progress. In the South, some religious groups had small amounts of success in encouraging individual manumissions of slaves, although little headway was made in promoting
a general emancipation policy (Wolf 2006; but see Nash 1990). In the North, however,
the end of the war saw considerable changes to the institution of slavery, ultimately
resulting in immediate or gradual emancipation. Even gradual emancipation, however
delayed, eﬀectively stopped the progress of what was up until then a growing institution
in northern states, eﬀectively leading to its extinction in every state but New York and
New Jersey by 1820.112
Along with the ﬂight of thousands of slaves, the practice of granting freedom to soldiers contributed to a growing free black population, especially in the cities of the Middle
Atlantic. And as with the white laboring classes, free blacks and slaves appropriated the
language of the revolutionaries to assert their own claims to freedom and equality (Reed
1994). In 1773 a groups of slaves petitioned the Massachusetts legislature to abolish slavery, framing their request in terms of the colonists’ desire for liberty (Zilmersmit 1967,
616-17). The former slave Caesar Sarter asked the readers of his “Essay on Slavery,” who
were suﬀering “great anxiety and distress. . . on account of the infringement not only of
your Charter rights; but of the natural rights and privileges of freeborn men,” to “per112

In most northern states, the number of slaves continued to increase until it became clear that an
emancipation bill would pass in the near future. The slave population of Massachusetts was already
rapidly falling in Massachusetts by the time of emancipation in 1783. In only began to decline modestly
in New York after the initial defeat of a gradual emancipation bill in the 1780s.
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mit a poor, though freeborn, African. . . to tell you. . . from experience, that as Slavery is
the greatest, and consequently most to be dreaded, of all temporal calamities: So its
opposite, Liberty, is the greatest temporal good, with which you can be blest!”113
Sarter was invoking the stark juxtaposition between freedom and slavery that underlined American conceptions of political community, both in the run up to the Revolution
and afterwards. But he was invoking the colonists’ own narrative of political history
and their interpretation of their current struggle, and insisting upon a broader application of the principle.114 Benjamin Banneker would similarly invoke the Declaration of
Independence in a letter to Thomas Jeﬀerson, asking him to
“recall to your mind that time, in which the arms and tyranny of the British
crown were exerted, with every powerful eﬀort, in order to reduce you to
a state of servitude. . . . [Y]our abhorrence thereof was so excited, that you
publicly held forth this true and invaluable doctrine, which is worthy to be
recorded and remembered in all succeeding ages : ‘We hold these truths to
be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”’ (Newkirk 2009, 93).
The rhetoric of natural rights was increasingly resonant during the Revolution, as it had
provided a coherent justiﬁcation for the settlers’ revolt, and African Americans “not only
employed the ideas of the Revolution but also its very language” (Berlin 1998, 232). This
was a strategic invocation, and was often paired with religious language, a technique
employed by white abolitionists as well, in recognition of Christianity’s broad resonance
and ambivalence toward ideologies of inherent racial diﬀerence. But by employing the
language of the Revolution, free and enslaved blacks were transforming it, by extending
it beyond the domain for which it had been initially developed. “The spirit of liberty,”
noted Thomas Hutchinson, “spread where it was not intended” (Fischer 2005, 24).
The inclusive and emancipatory potential of republican rhetoric was suggested by
the opposition to the 1778 draft constitution of Massachusetts, which would have paired
emancipation with the disfranchisement of “negroes, Indians, and mulattoes.” Bradburn notes that “numerous towns protested this limitation on citizenship, considering
it a direct violation of the principles of natural equality,” and the disfranchisement was
dropped from the 1780 constitution (2009, 245). In New York in 1785, a gradual eman113
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He referenced the colonists’ political history as having ﬂed from tyranny: “Your fore fathers, as I have
been often informed, left their native country, together with many dear friends, and came into this
country, then a howling wilderness inhabited, only, by savages, rather choosing, under the protection of
their God, to risk their lives, among those merciless wretches, than submit to tyranny at home.”
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cipation bill was similarly saddled with a disfranchising provision. Here, however, a
sustained commitment to black exclusion helped defeat the bill. The Senate twice refused to pass a bill with black disfranchisement, and the Assembly, by a vote of 27-18,
twice refused to pass a bill without it. When the Senate ﬁnally conceded, the Council of Revision—composed of the Governor and the state Chancellor—rejected the bill
precisely because it violated republican commitments:
“[T]he bill having in other instances placed the children that shall be born
of slaves in the ranks of citizens. . . , they are as such entitled to all the privileges of citizens, nor can they be deprived of these essential rights without
shocking those principles of equal liberty which every page in that Constitution labors to enforce. [The Bill] holds up a doctrine which is repugnant to
the principles on which the United States justify their separation from Great
Britain. . . [and creates] an order of citizens who are to have no legislative or
representative share in the government.”115
In the 1778 debates over the Articles of Confederation, a South Carolina delegate moved
to amend the privileges and immunities article, by adding the word ‘white’ to ‘free
inhabitants of each of these States.’ The amendment received the support of only two
states, one state was divided, and eight voted against. As a result, the Articles implicitly
suggested the rights of citizenship for free blacks (Bradburn 2009, 246).
The experience of the Revolution helped cohere a new sense of a republican political community, in which sovereignty rested with the people. What popular sovereignty
meant, however, remained contested. The increasing number of free blacks undermined
an earlier association between blackness and slavery, and the post-Revolutionary generation would be engaged in recurring political controversies over the status of free blacks.
The Revolution saw democratic assertions from unanticipated quarters, from classes
who had not been integrated into political institutions until they took the opportunity
provided by military mobilization. Accordingly, there could be no simple transfer of
sovereignty—a new political order had to be established.
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Establishing a Republican Political Order
The Constitution and Political Order
The Revolution had forged a republican consensus. Many of those opposed to republicanism left, heading to Canada, where they would be equally unhappy, or to Britain.
Those who remained withdrew from active political life. But while there was broad agreement that the new country should be a republic there was considerably less agreement
as to the form and character of this republicanism. Newly organized groups were making
demands, aspiring to political power, and articulating understandings of republicanism
that were increasingly ‘democratic.’ This activity was seen by many as threatening the
republican project, and political leaders sought to channel or even reverse trends toward
democracy.
The drafting of the U.S. Constitution was deeply informed by these concerns. Ultimately, however, the institutions that it established were perhaps less important for their
insulation of government from popular politics than in their extension of popular politics
to the national level. By empowering the federal government, the Constitution invited
political entrepreneurs to compete for national oﬃce. And by carefully limiting these
powers, the government was enabled to build a commercial empire without threatening
local investments, notably in human captives. But most importantly, the arrangement
of representative institutions ensured that winning national oﬃce would require building
a bisectional coalition. Political ambition would be realized by constructing national
organizations that could selectively pressure its members and organize compromises to
ensure, if not necessarily the letter, the spirit of the constitutional arrangement. Responsibility for holding the Union together, in short, was extended from the domain of
constitutional text to the domain of political parties. This is the second of the shifts
in governing authority: the establishment of a new political order that quickly became
self-reinforcing as political entrepreneurs sought to realize the gains implicit in building
a bisectional political coalition.
The plight of debtors and the local challenges they mounted against state governments had aggravated a concern that the Articles of Confederation were insuﬃcient
in providing order and stability. The lack of a central power to regulate and expand
commerce, and to suppress populist action against creditors, was going to hurt the international ﬁnancial position of the United States. It might even result in its squandering the
opportunity to conquer a continent. The politics of exclusion had been undermined, with
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previously excluded segments of the population organizing politically to press demands
speciﬁc to their self-deﬁned interests (Countryman 1981, 293). The ‘mob’ actions—what
Benjamin Rush referred to as the “peculiar species of extempore conduct” that were a
legacy of the Revolution—were seen by many as vindicating republican worries of the
lower orders being under the domination of their patrons, and anti-Federalist rioters
were described as “needy and starving adventurers, whose precarious freedom depends
on the nod of their numerous creditors” (Frank 2009, 45; 2010, 94).
There was little suggestion that the commitment to popular sovereignty forged during
the Revolutionary crisis should be abandoned. But there was a growing concern that
the exercise of this sovereignty needed to be channeled into institutional arrangements
that could secure political order. The vaunted claim to represent the people by local
insurrections and public demonstrations simply asserted a truncated crowd for popular
sovereignty, an arrogant presumption that many rejected: “By ‘The People’ is meant THE
WHOLE PEOPLE. . . it is the res publica or common-weal, which no man, or no body
of men, except such as be constitutionally appointed. . . can have a right exclusively to
consult, act upon, or direct.”116 Popular sovereignty, accordingly, had to be conﬁned to
the moment of election; furthermore, it should be tempered through indirectly elected
institutions—possibly with higher property and age requirements—in order to discern
the signal of the ‘people’ from the noise of elections.
During the Philadelphia convention, the question of a national freehold suﬀrage
qualiﬁcation was raised, with those in favor arguing that the restriction to freeholders
was “a necessary defence against the dangerous inﬂuence of those multitudes without
property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound”
(Hunt 1900, 118). Gouverneur Morris worried that a non-freehold qualiﬁcation would
lead to the establishment of an aristocracy, as those without property lacked a will of
their own. Most of the delegates, however, rejected the idea of a national freehold
restriction on the grounds that the proper extent of the suﬀrage should be “that every
man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society
ought to share in all its rights & privileges.” Benjamin Franklin argued that the exclusion
of the common man from the suﬀrage enabled legislatures to subject him to “peculiar
labors and hardships,” thereby undermining the attachment of the people to the state,
while Rutledge of South Carolina believed that a freehold qualiﬁcation “would create
division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded” (Hunt
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1900, 118, 127).
Ultimately the Constitution would not greatly limit popular politics. The states remained the locus of political activity, although there was now a competing source of
authority. The suﬀrage qualiﬁcations were left to the states, with a requirement that
these be based on the qualiﬁcations to the larger chamber. Given the trends since the
Revolution toward more inclusionary suﬀrage qualiﬁcations, this cannot be coded as a
restrictive measure. The electoral college certainly could have been a genuinely exclusive
institution, as we shall see when we consider the French case. But again, the question of
whether electors would be named by the legislature or popularly elected was left to the
states to decide.117
The key reason for the Constitution’s medium-term success was that it provided
political operatives with an ongoing incentive to seek national oﬃce, and thereby to participate in the construction and maintenance of bisectional coalitions that could manage
the expansion of the republic and the creation of a commercial market without threatening slavery. By the election of 1796, the electoral college was divided 73-66 in favor of
states north of the Mason-Dixon line, but it was widely believed that this balance would
shift in favor of the South (Graber 2006). Moreover, the Constitution’s three-ﬁfths clause
increased Southern representation in the House of Representative, from 38 percent under the Articles of Confederation to 47 percent in the 1800 elections. The Senate was
likewise divided relatively evenly across sectional lines, with 16 Senators chosen from the
South and 18 chosen from the North. This sectional balance was consciously designed to
ensure that the institutions of national governance would be responsive to interests North
and South.118 This arrangement of the institutions of representation generated an incentive to political entrepreneurs to build a cross-sectional coalition, ﬁrst achieved by the
Federalists and subsequently—and more enduringly—by the Jeﬀersonian Republicans.
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And in any case, no individual state would have nearly enough electors to ensure that the voting at
this level was in any way an independent decision: second or third stage electorates in France typically
had 50,000 electors, whereas the election of 1792 had only 132 electors, with Virginia having the largest
number of electors at 21. This made monitoring the electors votes considerably easier, and ultimately
ensured that they would be active partisan pledged to a candidate.
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In the constitutional convention, Madison opposed the representation by States in the Senate because
of the supposed “perpetuity it would give to the preponderance of the Northn, agst. the Southn,” and
opposed allowing the Senate to select Federal Justices as this would “throw the appointments entirely
into the hands of ye Nthern States.” Hugh Williamson of North Carolina insisted upon the electoral
college against a popular vote because “slaves will have no suﬀrage” and therefore Southerners would
be outvoted (Graber 2006, 103).
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American Citizenship and the Building of a National Coalition
The coalitions that would eventually coalesce in the Democratic-Republican and Federalist parties were constructed over the course of the 1790s, as political entrepreneurs
sought to bring diﬀerent local, sectoral, and sectional interests into a winning coalition. Diﬀerent understandings of American political community—deﬁned now in terms
of republican citizenship—were central to this process of coalition building. Increased
geopolitical tensions, the radical turn of the French Revolution, the suppression of liberties in Great Britain, the defeat of an insurrection in Ireland, and the uprising in St.
Domingo provided the backdrop for heightened anxieties across America. Federalists
increasingly appealed to some constituencies by invoking the threat of slave rebellions
and the implications of renewed immigration on American culture and the republican
experiment. Their opponents, increasingly organized into what they called ‘the republican party,’ appealed to others by suggesting the Federalists were motivated by a desire to
restore a monarchy. These appeals, and the understandings of political community that
they implied, reﬂected both sincere anxieties and an attempt to build local and national
coalitions capable of winning oﬃce.
In December of 1787, a Federalist celebration of Pennsylvania’s recent ratiﬁcation
of the U.S. Constitution degenerated into a riot between the Constitution’s supporters
and opponents. Shortly after, a Federalist under the name ‘Old Man’ wrote that the
rioters were men who “have come to this country within these two years—men perfectly
unknown, and whose characters were too obscure to attract the notice of the inhabitants of this place” (Frank 2010, 94). In 1783, Federalist preacher William Linn wrote
that “inﬁdelity and dangerous ideas, will have a more rapid growth in this country than
[before the Revolution]. . . . They will be imported from abroad, with other things injurious to our interest and happiness” (Linn 1796, 188; Anderson 1977, 388). Immigrant
societies, representing particular national constituencies, had long been a feature of
the colonial landscape, largely organized around mutual assistance and charity. In the
post-Revolutionary period, however, these organizations became increasingly political
and partisan in their activities (Bradburn 2009, 212). The ﬁrst of what would come to
be known as the Democratic-Republican societies was organized in Philadelphia as the
German Republican Society (Link 1942, 6). The Hibernian Society split from the more
apolitical Society of the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick’s, celebrating the French Republic,
the Volunteers in Ireland, and the rights of man (Bradburn 2009, 209).
Federalists saw in the increased political activism both a threat to the ostensible
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homogeneity of the nation—John Jay’s “one united people. . . descended from the same
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion” (Ball 2003, 6)—and
a threat to the republican experiment itself. Fights over the Naturalization Acts were in
many ways concerned with securing the republican character of new citizens, with antiadministration representatives requiring applicants have two witnesses attesting to their
attachment “to a Republican form of government.”119 Federalist representatives opposed
this, arguing “the word Republican implied so much, that nobody could tell where to
limit it. . . . Many call themselves Republican, who, by this word, mean, pulling down
every establishment: they were mere Anarchists.”120
The Democratic-Republican societies in particular provoked Federalist anxieties.
The societies embraced the Fourth of July as an opportunity to assert equality and
the rights of man as the critical legacies of the Revolution. They were closely associated
with the local militias, and they were seen with trepidation as potentially recreating the
Revolutionary committees that had asserted an extra-legal governing authority.121 The
societies created a space for the re-articulation and dissemination of political currents
that had emerged during the Revolution, insisting on a more democratic basis for citizenship. For the most part, the understandings articulated within the societies were
radical, egalitarian, and emancipatory relative to contemporary discourse. The societies
not only rejected understandings of citizenship that rooted this in property, but like some
of the radicals of the Revolution inverted the moral hierarchy to insist that, in a republic, “it must be the mechanics and farmers, or the poorer class of people (as they are
generally called) that must support the freedom of America” (Link 1942, 94).
They societies were part of a broader trend, predating but spurred on by the Revolution, of self-organization by laboring classes, with leadership drawn from their own
ranks and formulating their own understanding of their interests (Simon Middleton 2006;
Olton 1975; Rock 1979). In the early 1790s, writers to Greenleaf’s New York Journal and Pa119
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propose the requirement that any applicant renounce any titles of nobility, saying that “if we did
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This was considered a foundational right for many, one that had been fought for and often won in the
Revolutionary struggles. For instance, “the Franklin Society of Pendleton, South Carolina, defended the
democratic character of the citizen army [and] resolved: ‘That it is the inherent right of every free man
to vote and elect the oﬃcers who are to command them in a military character,”’ and claiming that
opposition to such this was a measure of treasonous feudalism (Link 1942, 181-82).

120

128

triotic Register warned that “those who assume the airs of ‘the well born’ should be made
to know that the mechanics. . . have equal rights with the merchants and that they are as
important a set of men as any in the community.... Who will deny that a republican government is founded on democratic principles?... That the manufacturing interest, from
its nature is, and ever will remain of the democratic denomination, none can deny.”122
The labor organizations and Democratic-Republican societies were distinct, but during
the 1790s they increasingly participated in a shared discourse of stressing democracy,
the cause of republicanism, and the rights of man.
Together, these diﬀerent associations threatened to broaden the scope of citizenship
even further than had been achieved during the Revolution. Of the society constitutions
that have survived, almost all declared that “all men are naturally free, and possess
equal rights” and emphasized the Declaration of Independence; many forcefully called
for the abolition of slavery (Schoenbachler 1998, 251). One Democratic-Republican and
labor organization, the Society of Master Sailmakers in New York, was known for being “ultra-democratic,” toasting the “Fourth of July, a free press, freedom for African
slaves, and. . . ‘the societies of America as nurseries of Republicanism”’ (Link 1942, 9596). William Duane, the Democratic-Republican editor of the Philadelphia Aurora, and
an outspoken supporter of Jeﬀerson, attacked Washington for still being “possessed of
FIVE HUNDRED of the HUMAN SPECIES IN SLAVERY” even “twenty years after the
establishment of the Republic.”123 After the Haitian Revolution commenced, the Connecticut Democratic-Republican Abraham Bishop wrote “The Rights of Black Men,” in
which he implored his fellow Americans to show that “we have no been hypocrites in the
cause of freedom, that we dare, upon all occasions, to testify our respect for the rights
of man, our humanity for the oppressed. . . . My assertion, that they are entitled to freedom, is founded on the American Declaration of Independence:— Upon the language
of our petitions to the English court, at the commencement of the late war:. . . Upon
Paine’s Common Sense:—Upon the articles of our liberating societies.”124 Bishop, whose
appointment by Jeﬀerson to the position of Collector of Customs in 1803 scandalized
New Haven, was at the extreme end of democratic sentiment regarding Haiti (Dexter
1905, 196; Riley 2007, 77-88; Matthewson 1982, 148). But in his antislavery he was far
from unique amongst early Democratic-Republicans (Riley 2007).
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The attacks on slavery did not necessarily mean that Americans organized in the
democratic-republican societies were committed to full citizenship for free blacks. Most
probably were not, although the lack of an explicit position suggests that they had not
given it much thought. Many of the political operatives aligned with the societies were
willing, however, to defend black voting rights, as we discuss below. Nonetheless, while
there were numerous prominent abolitionists within the ranks of the northern societies,
“antislavery views were decidedly inconspicuous among Democratic-Republican planters
and farmers in Virginia and states southward,” and a few argued that slavery was a
healthy reminder for free men to strive to preserve their rights and liberties, “that they
might keep above the servant level” (Wilentz 2006, 62; Link 1942, 97). But the societies
also needed to insulate themselves from the Federalist charge that through the constant
invocation of the rights of man they were fomenting insurrection.
Slave revolts increased considerably during the 1790s, and the Federalists sought to
impugn the societies and strengthen their position in the south by emphasizing that
“democracy and insurrection were blood brothers” (Carroll 2004, 41-45; Link 1942, 184).
Federalists, and southerners in general, worried that slaves were learning that “equality is
the natural condition of man,” an argument “highly detrimental to the welfare and policy
of [slave] state[s].” (Link 1942, 185-86). When a petition from free blacks—organized by
Absalom Jones—complaining of the Fugitive Slave Act was presented before Congress,
it provided an occasion for Federalists to attack the spread of radical rhetoric. “Already,”
warned John Rutledge, a Federalist congressman from South Carolina, “had too much
of this new-fangled French philosophy of liberty and equality found its way and was too
apparent among these gentlemen in the Southern States.”125 A Democratic-Republican
representative, John Smilie, was surprised at Rutledge’s position, and remarked that “he
must consider [the free black petitioners] as a part of the human species, equally capable
of suﬀering and enjoying with others, and equally objects of attention, and therefore
they had a claim to be heard.” Still, Smilie expressed “a contrary impulse” against
speaking on the matter, “from motives of prudence.” Federalist Harrison Gray Otis of
Massachusetts believed the measure to be “dangerous”, as it would “teach them the art of
assembling together, debating, and the like, and would soon, if encouraged, extend from
one end of the Union to the other.” Robert Harper, another South Carolina Federalist,
asked the House whether “a temper of revolt was not more perceptible in that quarter?”
125

It is unclear whether Rutledge recognized a distinction between free blacks and slaves, as he mocked
their contention that they “are sent to the Southern States. Who can prevent that? Persons possessing
slaves have a right to send them there if they choose.”
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It was, he insisted, and it was the fault of abolitionists.126
It was taken as a given by Federalists that the Democratic-Republican language of
natural rights, was encouraging slaves to insurrection. A northern Federalist paper,
cheering on the revolution in St. Domingo, assumed that the American government
would not be “backward in acknowledging [its] independence,” but suggested it “might
be worth while. . . to bestow some consideration on the question [of] how far the attention
bestowed on these people, might embolden the black citizens of our southern states to
attempt erecting a democratical republic, after the moddle [sic] of Mr. Jeﬀerson, and
other friends to the rights of Negro Men.”127 In 1800 South Carolinian Federalist Henry
William de Saussure, warned his fellow citizens against electing Jeﬀerson because “he
is a philosophe in the modern French sense of that word,” and thus “entertains opinions
unfriendly to the property, which forms the eﬃcient labor of a great part of the southern
states.” For Saussure, Jeﬀerson’s writings indicated that he “wishes the 500,000 blacks
in America should be emancipated—he wishes their condition, both of body and mind
raised,” an outcome that would certainly lead to the civil war of St. Domingo (1800,
15-16). The revelation that Gabriel’s plot, an intended slave revolt that caused panic
north and south, intended to spare Frenchmen, Quakers, and Methodists was only taken
as conﬁrmation of the dangerous impact of radical rhetoric (Aptheker 1937, 521).
Federalist anxieties over political radicalism ultimately culminated in the Alien and
Sedition Acts. The Naturalization Act of 1798 extended the length of residence required
to become a citizen from ﬁve to fourteen years, with South Carolina Federalist Robert
Harper declaring that it was “high time we should recover from the mistake which this
country fell into when it ﬁrst began to form its constitutions, of admitting foreigners
to citizenship.”128 The two Alien Acts enabled the president to deport aliens who were
considered dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States or who were citizens
of a country at war with the United States. The Sedition Act was directed at the Re126
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publican press, and criminalized “false, scandalous, and malicious” writings against the
government. The combined purpose of the acts was to secure what Federalists believed
to be the necessary basis for republicanism: a strong government, drawing its support
from a broadly homogenous and middle class people.129
It was on these matters especially that Republican and Federalist understandings
of citizenship diﬀered, and they provoked intense opposition among the political activists associated with the Jeﬀersonian Republican party, networks which included the
Democratic-Republican societies, immigrant groups, and old anti-federalists. And it
was on these matters that the election of 1800 was largely fought. The election of Jeﬀerson created the opportunity for a durable shift in governing authority; federal institutions
were only slowly being established, and the relationship between the federal government
and the states remained undeﬁned. The Federalists had been constructing their state;
the election of Jeﬀerson and a Democratic-Republican House and Senate gave them the
opportunity to reconﬁgure these and establish new ones on their own design. They
would subsequently hold both chambers and the presidency, until the disappearance of
the Federalists and the fragmenting of the party in the 1820s. This uninterrupted ascendancy at a formative period ensured that the party would have a greater opportunity for
establishing the basic parameters of the American state than perhaps any other governing regime. But the election itself was not a critical juncture, and it very much reﬂected
‘normal’ politics operating within the parameters of the U.S. Constitution. The central
question was which of the two coalitions would be able to win a suﬃcient amount of
support outside of their respective sections.
The Jeﬀerson victory was premised on Republican eﬀorts throughout the 1790s in organizing an opposition to the Federalist administrations. They had very early on secured
the support of most of the South, the protection of whose “interest” Jeﬀerson himself had
described as his “sole object” (Sharp 1986).130 To win New York and Pennsylvania, they
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needed to appeal to the networks of labor associations, namely the urban mechanics that
had been strongly Federalist in 1789, and the small farmers who had been the core of
the militias, anti-federalism, and Democratic-Republican societies (Wilentz 1984, 38-39;
Baumann 1982, 4; Young 1964, 259). The Jeﬀersonians drew on the rhetoric developed
in the networks of societies and labor associations, and they disseminated this through
a growing network of newspapers. These were crucial to their victory, both in national
and local elections (Pasley 2002, 138). But so too was a coordinated
The victory in the New York state elections depended heavily on the support from
laboring class wards, and the Democratic-Republicans had been careful to direct their
appeals to artisans and mechanics and to the growing population of immigrants, a
formerly Federalist constituency (Carter II 1970; Wilentz 2006, 87).131 But the Federalists
were performing well in the other Middle Atlantic states, and the Republicans had
failed to make a breakthrough in New England. The possibility that the Pennsylvania
legislature would be deadlocked placed South Carolina at the center of the electoral
struggle. But Democratic-Republican support in the state faltered after the discovery of
Gabriel’s conspiracy, an extensive plot for a slave insurrection, and James Monroe had
to reassure the state’s political leadership that white men had not been engaged in the
plot, remarks that “calmed but could not completely quell suspicions that teh Republican
appeal to equality was too dangerous in a slave society” (Wilentz 2006, 92).132
The eight electoral college votes of South Carolina tipped the election to the DemocraticRepublicans, although a tie between Jeﬀerson and his running mate Aaron Burr provided
an opportunity for intrigue and created considerable uncertainty for several months.
Baptist preacher John Leland of Cheshire, Massachusetts, described the election at a
Fourth of July parade as being “as radical in its tendency, as that which took place in
1776” (Greene 1845, 263, 255). In later years, conservatives would see the election as a
transformative moment, establishing a government that may have been “republican in
form, but democratic in fact” where “the rising element of democracy has been con131

Republicans organized the ‘Society for the Assistance of Persons Emigrating from Foreign Countries.’
Their newspapers, like the Democratic-Republican toasts before them, often carried news of the struggles for liberty of the Irish, Scots and French, and they highlighted the eﬀorts by Republican legislators
in opposing the Acts (Young 1964, 264). Republican organizations among the new immigrants included
the United Irishmen of New York, the Hibernian Provident Society, the Hibernian Militia Volunteers, the
Caledonian Society, and a number of others (Young 1964, 269; Carter II 1970, 333-34).
132
Monroe, then governor of Virginia, was lying: two French émigrés had been involved, a fact which
Monroe knew and suppressed. Had this been revealed, it would have only encouraged further Federalist
attacks that the “seducing theories about equality” were at fault (Wilentz 2006, 89). Monroe to John
Draton, October 21st 1800 (Hamilton 1900, 217).
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stantly increasing in power and eﬃciency” (Peterson 1960, 89). In 1804, Jeﬀerson won
the electoral votes of every state save Delaware and Connecticut.133 The elections of 1800
and 1804 were not won on the basis of the ‘white male republic’ as an understanding of
political community invoked during the campaign or within the party networks. Rather,
the republican idea that held the coalition together stressed opposition to a federal state
that was too willing to ‘consolidate’ power and too willing to abuse it. But the result
was an increasingly stable political alliance, with an increasing investment by activists
and organizations in the success of the Democratic-Republican party. New York saw the
development of “a clear mechanics interest. . . in league with [Democratic-Republican]
politicians” (Wilentz 1984, 71). In Philadelphia, William Duane constructed an Irish political machine, in coalition with the Germans statewide; across the country, the Hibernian
Society provided an organizational apparatus for “connect[ing] the poor immigrant Irish
and the radical Irish émigrés to the local and national Republican elite” (Bradburn 2009,
226, 232). But the Jeﬀersonian coalition “was still commanded by Virginia gentry slaveholders” (Wilentz 2006, 97-98). Despite connecting “the fate of American equality to the
political well-being of the middling classes,” the northern Democratic-Republicans were
“partners in an increasingly Negrophobic national political coalition” (Wilentz 1984, 74).
The coalition’s success and its underlying tensions would provide the context in which
an ideology of white republicanism would be increasingly useful and resonant.

Toward the White Republic
Edmund Morgan helped draw the attention of scholars to a persistent strand in American political thought: that republican equality necessitated the subordination of others.
For Morgan, racialized slavery provided a structural and ideological solution to a longstanding problem in republican philosophy, namely the possibility of a dependent pauper
class subverting republican institutions. Slavery created an opportunity for whites to be
relatively equal and independent, thus entitled to entry into republican citizenship. “The
most ardent American republicans,” argued Morgan, “were Virginians, and their ardor
was not unrelated to their power over the men and women they held in bondage. . . .
Virginians could outdo English republicans as well as New England ones, partly because
they had solved the problem [of the poor]: they had achieved a society in which the most
133

John Quincy Adams would refer to it as the completion of a revolution in Massachusetts’ politics
(Wilentz 2006, 116).
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of the poor were enslaved” (Morgan 1975, 381).
But America was not Virginia writ large.134 After the Revolution the language of republican citizenship—North and South—was much more democratic than it had been.
Activists were now increasingly insisting upon inclusion as a right stemming from membership in the community, from contributions in taxes or military (or militia) service
rather than a privilege that could only be safely given to the economically independent.135 The language of independence persisted, but it was increasingly displaced by
other, potentially more inclusive understandings. And many political activists were beginning to see in these understandings emancipatory and more radically egalitarian
implications.
But how far in the direction of equality were they willing to go? Douglas Bradburn has
argued that by “Jeﬀerson’s second term as president, political equality for blacks in the
United States was psychologically impossible for the vast majority of whites to imagine,
[and] politically impossible in a federal system that insisted upon local control over the
municipal arrangements of the citizenry” (Bradburn 2009, 271). This overstates the case.
Throughout the early Republic there were Americans, including political activists and
many politically important ﬁgures, who could imagine the extension of these claims to
include African Americans, and who could thus conceive of black citizenship.136 And it
was the federal government, under Democratic-Republican control, that more than any
other institution determined that free blacks were to be denied political equality.
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Nor, for that matter, did Virginia accomplish democracy for white men. The state continued to have
the most onerous property qualiﬁcations in the United States until the 1850s.
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In Jeﬀerson’s 1776 draft for a Virginia constitution, he proposed a property requirement of half a quarteracre freehold land ( Jeﬀerson 1893, 14). In the coming years he would increasingly embrace contributory
understandings of citizenship. In his draft Virginia constitution of 1783, he oﬀered two alternatives to
property: residence of one year in the county, or enrollment in the militia. In 1814, Jeﬀerson praised the
provision in the new Spanish constitution requiring a literacy test (Foley 1900, 841). But this is also a
break from the requirement of being an independent property owner.
136
Among the more radical was Abraham Bishop’s “The Rights of Black Men,” published in 1791. More
common was the paternalism expressed by Benjamin Franklin’s 1789 “Plan for Improving the Condition
of Free Blacks,” which emphasized the importance of education and assistance in procuring employing
(Franklin 1809, 248). It was nonetheless premised upon the belief that free blacks could and should
be made ready for citizenship. When a “democratic” candidate Elisha Gordon for the Pennsylvania
legislature expressed concern with free blacks having the franchise, he was mocked by the Philadelphia
Federalist newspaper ‘The Tickler,’ and called an “idiot” for thinking this to be a problem. “The French
Tory Ticket,” in The Tickler. Philadelphia, October 5th , 1808, 1(34): 2
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Democratic-Republicans and Black Suﬀrage
In New York in 1785 a proposed gradual emancipation bill failed to pass the state legislature, despite broad support across the diﬀerent factions of New York politics.137 The bill
would have disfranchised freed blacks, and this would be the main point of disagreement
between the Assembly, the Senate, and the Council of Revision. The bill passed the Assembly and was sent to the Senate, which rejected three provisions denying free blacks’
right to give testimony, imposing penalties for intermarriage, and disfranchising freed
blacks. The Assembly would eventually concede on the issue of black testimony and the
prohibition of inter-racial marriage, but by votes of 27-18 and 27-15 voted to maintain
the disfranchisement clause. The Senate conceded and the bill was sent to the Council
of Revision. The Council, composed of future Democratic-Republicans George Clinton
and Robert Livingston rejected the bill on the grounds that it discriminated against free
blacks, and the Assembly failed to muster the two-thirds majority required to override
the veto.
Opposition to the possibility of civil, political, and social rights for free blacks undermined the prospects for emancipation. But on none of the questions of the rights of
free or freed blacks was there a consensus. An analysis of voting patterns in the Assembly shows that, despite the lack of a stable party organization, a considerable degree
of partisan coherence had already emerged, with future Democratic-Republicans being
more likely to vote with each other than with future Federalists, and vice-versa. But
Democratic-Republicans were not more likely to support disfranchisement than future
Federalists. Rather, there was broad, albeit insuﬃcient, support across the ideological
spectrum for receding from black disfranchisement. And insofar as there was a concentration of support, it was among future Democratic-Republicans rather than among
Federalists.138 While the Assembly did insist on black disfranchisement, there was a
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Any party labels applied to 1780s New York politics are anachronistic; but they helpfully capture some
of the factional organization of the New York State legislature prior to the ratiﬁcation debates. More
importantly, despite some sorting, there was a great degree of continuity between Antifederalists and
future Democratic-Republicans
138
Information on all the legislators is not available. However, ideal points were estimated for all members. The correlation between the second vote to allow black suﬀrage and ideal point location is positive
0.332, signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. This suggests that regardless of one’s own future partisan identiﬁcation, the more one voted with the future Democratic-Republicans the more likely they were to support
black suﬀrage. Another factor that seems to have been important was the percentage of the population
held in slavery, which ranged from 32.6% in Kings County to 0.33% in Washington County (state average
of 6.23%). The representatives of the slaveholding counties were strongly opposed to this bill, having
voted to not begin debate, and were more likely to be vote against to black suﬀrage. This suggests that
few of the pro-black suﬀrage votes were insincere, as it was understood that the most likely way to have
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sizeable and persistent minority, composed primarily of future Democratic-Republicans,
who were at least willing to accept black suﬀrage in order to secure an emancipation
bill.139 And when gradual emancipation eventually passed in 1799, “no attempt was
made by any of the lawmakers to hedge emancipation with political or social restrictions” (McManus 1966, 175).
There was also persistent minority support for retaining limited voting rights for
blacks in Maryland, largely cutting across party lines.140 In 1800 an extension of the
suﬀrage to property-less white males was proposed in the House of Delegates. When
a delegate moved to strike the word “white,” a quarter of the legislature voted to do
so, with 32% of voting Democratic-Republicans supporting an equal franchise to 16%
of Federalists.141 Again, we see bipartisan support with Democratic-Republicans more
likely to support an equal franchise. The proposal to drop the word ‘white’ was defeated
49-16, strong evidence that the prospect of black citizenship was unappealing in a slave
state whose free black population, as a proportion of the total, was the second highest
in the country. The Senate included a taxpaying provision that the House rejected, and
the bill was defeated. The suﬀrage bill was central to the campaign of 1801, and after
a strong Democratic-Republican victory, it was passed in both chambers with a black
disfranchisement provision.
***
Paul Finkelman and others have argued that the Federalists were consistently more
egalitarian than Democratic-Republicans on issues of black citizenship, noting for instance that in 1808 “New York Republicans attacked Federalists with a campaign song
the bill rejected by the Council of Revision or Senate was to disfranchise blacks.
This includes Republicans William Goforth, Aaron Burr, Matthew Adgate, John Smith, Edward Savage, Ebenezer Purdy and others were willing to accept black suﬀrage in order to secure an abolition
bill. (Kaminski et al. 2008, 1511, 1637) Goforth’s son, William Goforth Jr., was a zealous DemocraticRepublican who moved to Ohio in 1799. He would be elected to the Ohio constitutional convention
in 1802 and would support black civil and political rights. He would subsequently move to Lafourche
Parish in Orleans Territory, where he would be elected as a delegate to that territory’s constitutional
convention (Milligan 2003, 64).
140
Maryland legislators had already disfranchised blacks freed after a certain date (Bogen 1990, 386). Free
blacks were still allowed to vote, but newly freed blacks and their descendants would be denied the
suﬀrage. In 1797 Federalist Michael Taney introduced a bill in the House of Delegates to remove the
property qualiﬁcations for voting, but would have also liberalized the franchise for free blacks, securing
the vote to “all free born men above the age of twenty-one years”, thereby limiting the disfranchisement
of blacks to those born in slavery after 1783. The immediate consequences of this bill would have
been small, but over the long run they would have secured the right to vote to an increasing free black
population.
141
Votes and Proceedings of the House of Delegates (1800, 51)
139
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that included the verse, ‘Federalists with blacks unite”’ (Finkelman 1998, 148; Malone
2008). Federalists did attack northern Democratic-Republicans for their alliance with
southern slavery; but they were also more than willing to engage in race-baiting of their
own (Gellman 2006, 148). After 1800 it became a standard complaint of Federalists
that the Jeﬀerson and other Democratic-Republicans won only because of ‘Negro Votes,’
the language intentionally invoking the possibility of blacks voting to deny the legitimacy of the 3/5 clause.142 “To such a low pitch of degradation have the democrats of
New-Hampshire fallen,” remarked on paper, “that at their late St. Jeﬀerson’s festival,
they toasted ‘Negro Voters.’ A toast very ﬁt and proper for such an occasion.”143 The
Revolution had not led to a wholesale reconceptualization of the place of blacks in American political and social life, and both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists invoked
presumptions of racial diﬀerence and blacks’ inappropriateness for political inclusion.
The claim of greater Federalist egalitarianism is, however, broadly true but only
with important caveats: it was reﬂective of the Democratic-Republican Party’s national
leadership to a greater extent than of its operatives in northern states; it became more the
case with local political operatives over time; and the Federalists’ were able to engage
in somewhat more egalitarian discourse as their national coalition collapsed, taking
advantage of and contributing to a growing stigma to slavery in the north to attack
the administration. In the early Republic, there was very little association between
support for black disfranchisement and party identiﬁcation; and insofar as there was
an association, the Democratic-Republicans tended to be more supportive of free black
voting rights. By 1820, however, there was a clear, strong, and persistent association
between being a Democratic-Republican and opposing black suﬀrage, and between black
disfranchisement and support for the enfranchisement of white men without tax or
property qualiﬁcations.

Slavery and the Suﬀrage in the Democratic-Republican Party
The emergence of such a pattern was not a straightforward product of the structure
of the American economy or of political culture. Rather, it was the product of the
national Democratic-Republican coalition, which took increasingly strong stances in de142

“Political,” in Balance and Columbian Repository, July 17th , 1804, 3(29): 229. “Political. More of Negro
Votes,” Columbian Centinel & Massachusetts Federalist, July 4th , 1804, 41(37): 2. The claim was sometimes, but much less frequently, framed in terms of ‘slaves votes,’ either by replacing ‘negro’ with ‘slave’
or by claiming Adams had won majority of ‘freemen’ votes.
143
“Editor’s Closet: Bribery” in Balance and Columbian Repository April 2nd , 1805 4(14): 107.
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fense of slavery, creating dilemmas for northern political operatives (Riley 2007, 27);
which manipulated the context of territorial government in favor of an extended suﬀrage
for white men and the disfranchisement of blacks; and which gradually developed and
disseminated an explicit vision of America as a space reserved for, and its republican
government limited, to the white race.
As in New York and Maryland, the voting patterns of delegates to Ohio’s territorial
convention are suggestive of a persistent, minority, and bipartisan willingness to take
positions in favor of black citizenship. But Ohio also reveals a pattern of DemocraticRepublican eﬀorts to coordinate its members around a white male standard, undertaken
by the national party or by factions actively supported by the national party. After the
suﬀrage committee of the Ohio convention reported a clause that limited the vote to
“white male inhabitants,” delegates moved to strike the word ‘white.’ This was defeated
14-19, with 35% of Democratic-Republicans and 71% of Federalists in favor. Supporters
then sought to remove one of the main objections to black suﬀrage—that the suggestion of racial equality would encourage escaped blacks to come into the state.144 An
amendment retaining the suﬀrage for those blacks currently residing within Ohio passed
19-15.
All ﬁve delegates who opposed striking the word ‘white’ but supported existing black
voting rights, were Democratic-Republicans. Three of these continued to support limited
black voting rights in the next roll call, which would have secured the right of suﬀrage
to the male descendants of blacks currently in Ohio. This was defeated 16-17. Even very
limited voting rights for blacks, however, would shortly after be overturned. DemocraticRepublicans James Grubb, Darlinton, and John Smith would switch from supporting to
opposing limited suﬀrage—with the Democratic-Republican president of the convention,
Edward Tiﬃn, breaking a tie in favor of exclusion.145 A sizeable component of the
Democratic-Republicans opposed black disfranchisement, and over 50% of DemocraticRepublicans supported some form of black suﬀrage. The convention voted more on
144

The biographer of Edward Tiﬃn, who cast the deciding vote against resident suﬀrage, gives the reason
for his vote “that the immediate neighborhood of two slave-holding States made it impolitic to oﬀer such
an inducement for the inﬂux of an undesirable class to the new State” (cited in Terzian 2004, 49). This
is not a fully coherent explanation, as the whole point of the provision was that it would only secure the
suﬀrage to blacks resident in Ohio at the time of the convention. This could be faulty recollection on
the part of Tiﬃn, faulty inference on the part of the biographer, or, alternatively, a suggestion that the
mere hint of black political participation would make Ohio a magnet state for blacks.
145
Additionally, eight Democratic-Republicans (30%) and no Federalists supported removing the taxpaying
qualiﬁcation, and twenty-one (78%) supported treating service on the highways as a tax for electoral
purposes.
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black civil and political rights than any other issue, again underscoring the degree to
which there were persistent eﬀorts to secure some form of black citizenship.
The primary basis of the division among Republicans on black suﬀrage was regional.146 The center of Republican organization in the territory was in the Virginia
Military District (VMD), a district set aside by Virginia for land grants for revolutionary
war service.147 Ross County, in the VMD, was home to the dominant party faction, the
Chillicothe Junta, led by Edward Tiﬃn, Thomas Worthington, Nathaniel Massie, and
nicknamed the “Virginia party” for their origins and strong ties to the southern leadership of the Democratic-Republicans.148 All but three of the ten delegates from the
VMD voted at every turn to reject black political or civil rights; the Junta consistently
opposed black citizenship rights. By contrast, Hamilton county Republicans were largely
pro-black civil and political rights: they split 6-4 in favor of striking ‘white,’ 9-1 in favor
of black resident suﬀrage, 8-2 in favor of black legacy voting, and 7-3 against restricting
black civil rights.
Hamilton county Democratic-Republican committees had “recommended that voters
elect delegates who were willing to grant suﬀrage to every male inhabitant of Ohio,
including blacks” (Middleton 2005, 28).149 There had been a heated campaign for the
convention, with opposition to slavery and support for black civil and political rights
interwoven in candidates’ and committees’ rhetoric. Slavery was denounced in terms of
natural and political rights, as against “republican sentiment.”150 And the recollection
of delegates suggests that they saw the issue of rights for blacks as intrinsically linked to
slavery.151
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The small Federalist contingent was primarily from Washington County and centered on Marietta
County, whose constituencies were primarily settlers from New England and Quakers from North Carolina who had left the state due to their opposition to slavery (Brown 1982, 262).
147
This included Ross, Clermont, Adams, and Fairﬁeld counties.
148
See Thurston (1972, 29). The junta also had support of Samuel Huntington, who had been a Federalist
in Connecticut, but began to identify as a Democratic-Republican in the 1790s. He became a political
leader in Trumbull County, covering the Western Reserve and largely Federalist in persuasion. After
being associated with the Federalist governor, he surprised Federalists by voting with the Republicans
in the convention—possibly a result of being promised a judgeship by the Republicans (Milligan 2003,
252).
149
Even some Ross County Democratic-Republicans, however, placed a high priority on black civil rights,
with a Republican committee insisting the “Constitution... set the natural rights of the meanest African
and the most abject beggar, upon an equal footing with those citizens of the greatest wealth and
equipage”’ (Middleton 2005, 29).
150
Scioto Gazette, September 11, 1802. Cited in Thurston (1972, 24, fn.21).
151
See Ephraim Cutler’s conﬂation of black citizenship and slavery in Thurston (1972, 29; Terzian 2004,
80, fn.49).
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Four Republican delegates changed their vote and provided the necessary margin
for total black exclusion from the suﬀrage. Most historians of the convention conclude
that the switch in voting was the result of pressure from the Junta, which had developed
an aggressive system of party control.152 As one historian put it, “there must have been
some vigorous work done” after the resident-black suﬀrage amendment passed (Massie
1896, 86). In 1803 two Democratic-Republicans who had supported black suﬀrage were
rejected by Democratic-Republican activists in elections to the State Senate. A member
of the Chillicothe Junta wrote that their loss was due to having “lost much credit” due to
their “negro votes.”153
The debates in Ohio did not simply reﬂect local preferences. The political dynamics were structured in part by a Democratic-Republican controlled Congress, which had
redrawn the territorial boundaries and established voting qualiﬁcations for the convention to the advantage of the Chillicothe faction. The Junta and national DemocraticRepublicans were in a sustained dialogue over organizing the party and the territory
(Terzian 2004, 41, 43). After the elections to the convention, a local leader reported to
Jeﬀerson that “the republican ticket has succeed [sic] beyond my most sanguine expectations” (Terzian 2004, 43). The convention’s proceedings were followed with interest in the
capital, and Worthington reported to other Junta members that he was optimistic about
the prospects of congressional passage: “Our friends appear highly pleased with the
proceedings in our quarter & so far appear heartily disposed to render every attention
to our aﬀairs . . . . Our friends here are generally well pleased with our constitution.”154
The possibility that Congress might ﬁnd a constitution repugnant if it denied blacks
civil rights or excluded them from the territory entirely was an ongoing worry among
territorial delegates to constitutional conventions, and for a period a potential brake on
more drastic exclusion. In this case, the silence from Washington over the exclusion of
free blacks from the franchise can be understood as encouraging further “testing [of] the
152

Worthington was especially noted for developing a “degree of party discipline far more thoroughgoing
than anything later conceived by Martin Van Buren” (Ratcliﬀe 2005, 37). One analysis of the committee structure in the convention demonstrates “what an iron grip [the Chillicotheans] had upon” the
convention (Massie 1896, 88).
153
Cited in Thurston (1972, 24 fn.21). The election of Darlinton, who had taken a less pro-black suﬀrage
position, was close and ultimately contested. The initial returns were reported as 309-302, but the
Senate would subsequently resolve that the initial winner Beasley should vacate the seat for Darlinton.
Journal of the Senate of the state of Ohio (1803, 19).
154
Worthington to Nathaniel Massie, December 25, 1802 (Massie 1896, 220). Nathaniel Macon of North
Carolina and a key ﬁgure among Democratic-Republicans in Congress oﬀered Worthington advice on
the proper arrangement of a republican constitution (Smith 1882, 591).
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attitude of the federal government regarding territorial legislation against free Negroes”
(Berwanger 1967, 22). The territory of Indiana denied free blacks the right to testify in
court in cases involving a white person in 1803, excluded them from the militia in 1807,
and passed three bills between 1813 and 1815 bills providing for the absolute exclusion
of blacks from the territory. These restrictions did not provoke federal scrutiny.
Congress and the national Democratic-Republican coalition were actively choosing
between competing preferences, and they structured enabling acts and territorial legislation to favor one coalition and vision of citizenship over another. Had they signaled
opposition to black disfranchisement or other discriminatory acts, it is likely that many
territories would not have pursued these. Instead, Congress did the opposite, and ultimately would do more to disfranchise free blacks in the United States than any other
institution of American government.155
But the southern-controlled congressional leadership of the Democratic-Republican
party also pushed for changes that linked black disfranchisement with an extension of the
vote to white males, by removing property and tax qualiﬁcations, and with the introduction of slavery into the northern territories. In 1803 a petition from Indiana requesting
the introduction of slavery and a franchise extension was considered, but rejected by a
sectional and partisan balanced committee (Dunn 1894, 21, 24).156 The requests were
considered again in the subsequent three Congresses, with all the committee members
being Democratic-Republicans and coming primarily from slaveholding states. In 1804
the committee recommended the introduction of slaves, born within the United States,
who would be emancipated after a given age. They joined to this a recommendation
to extend the right to vote, stressing the “the vital principle of a free Government. . . ,
that taxation and representation should go together.” For the ﬁrst time in the American
territories, the committee suggested limiting the suﬀrage to “every white free man” who
met the requirements.157
155

By 1860, 14 of the 27 states that disfranchised free blacks had the initial disfranchisement imposed by
Congress. This does not include California or Texas, states that entered into the Union without having
been a territory. All of the territories that were organized in 1860 had black disfranchisement provision,
established by Congress. And the national Democratic party leadership in Congress had played an
active role in the disfranchisement of Pennsylvania blacks in 1837-38 (Wood 2011).
156
John Randolph reported back a series of resolutions that held it inexpedient to introduce slavery as well
as inexpedient to alter the existing suﬀrage qualiﬁcations. The reason provided for the latter decision
was that “in a country abounding in new and unsettled lands, it is presumed that every individual may
become proprietor of the soil.” Report No. 76, March 2, 1803, American State Papers, Public Lands,
Vol.1, p.146.
157
Report No. 173, February 17, 1804. American State Papers, Miscellaneous, Vol.1, p.387.
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This did not advance in the House, and again in the 9th Congress the requests
were considered by a committee composed exclusively of Democratic-Republican (Dunn
1894, 34).158 Reﬂecting the changing language of citizenship, a new Indiana petition
requested a franchise extension and denounced the existing property qualiﬁcation as
an “invidious” distinction, unjust and “in no instance a test of merit or virtue” (Dunn
1894, 35). The select committee agreed, and again recommended the extension of the
suﬀrage to “every white freeman” and the introduction of slavery. They went further in
two directions, however: the committee rejected a taxpaying qualiﬁcation and dropped
the gradual emancipation provision proposed in the previous Congress.159
The territorial franchise would ultimately be changed in 1808, in both Indiana and
Mississippi. In order for them to advance in the House, however, the franchise had
to be separated from the introduction of slavery.160 Ultimately, the committee reported
a bill extending the suﬀrage to “every free white male person. . . having been a citizen
of the United States” resident one year and having paid a county or territorial tax,
and while the House supported this on multiple votes—with Democratic-Republicans
arguing that “the House should pass no law permitting the contraction of the principle
of universal suﬀrage”—opposition from the Senate led to a more limited extension for
both territories.161
Throughout the ﬁrst decade of the 19th century, then, there was an active eﬀort by the
Democratic-Republican party leadership to support a franchise extension, defended in
the newly dominant language of contribution and personal merit. But this was repeatedly
and intentionally linked to the disfranchisement of blacks and the introduction of slavery
into the Northwest. This linkage was strongly encouraged by the joining of separate
letters and memorials on slavery and the suﬀrage, and by the persistent pattern of over158

There was greater sectional balance, however, James Garnett (D-R, VA), John Hamilton (D-R, PA),
Jeremiah Morrow (D-R, OH), O’Brien Smith (D-R, SC), Matthew Walton (D-R, KY), and Philip Van
Cortlandt (D-R, NY). Hamilton, however, was from Washington county in Pennsylvania, a southwestern
county that had long been claimed by Virginia, had a high percentage of southern-born inhabitants,
and where “as late as 1799 residents. . . were attempting to claim as slaves blacks who had gained their
freedom under the state’s gradual emancipation act of 1780” (Finkelman 1996, 216 n.27). Finkelman
notes that the “proslavery bias of the committee is suggested by the fact that the report ignored a
petition from settlers opposed to slavery in Dearborn County, Indiana” (1996, 216 n.28).
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Report No.203, February 14, 1806, American State Papers, Miscellaneous, Vol.1, p.450.
160
The 8th Congress had also considered a memorial from the Mississippi legislature complaining about the
50-acre property qualiﬁcation. The select committee recommended removing the property qualiﬁcation
altogether, a more liberal stance than had been requested by the legislature. Annals of Congress, 8th
Congress, 2nd Session, 1012.
161
Annals, 10th Congress, 1st Session, p.1359, January 1808.
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representing southern Democratic-Republicans on the committees.
The Indiana and Mississippi suﬀrage acts of 1808 were the ﬁrst instances of federal
legislation that imposed a racial qualiﬁcation for the right to vote. While the changes
to the property qualiﬁcation were extensively debated, we have no such evidence of
opposition to the racial restriction. The same cannot be said for the Louisiana Enabling
Act in the following Congress. The enabling act, which set the terms for the territory to
elect a constitutional convention, was referred to a bipartisan committee who reported an
amendment stating that only “white male citizens” should have the right to form a new
state. At issue was the presence of a large free black population in the Orleans territory,
one that had enjoyed considerable rights under the French and Spanish governments
and which conceivably was covered by the Treaty of Paris’ stipulation that “the people
of Orleans Territory. . . , shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and
admitted. . . , to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens.”162
If there was any dissension on the committee, it was not revealed in the vote on
the Senate ﬂoor, where all the committee members and 19 other Senators supported
adding the word “white.” Eight Democratic-Republican Senators, ﬁve northern and
three southern, voted against this provision, while all voting Federalists supported the
racial qualiﬁcation, including the ﬁve New England Senators.163 The bill was then sent
to the House, where the question of black voting was considered for the ﬁrst time.
Representatives were hesitant to involve the Federal government in questions of black
citizenship. Pennsylvania Democratic-Republican John Smilie, for instance, noted that
“so delicate was the Convention which framed the [United States] Constitution, on this
point, that it had used only the word ‘persons”’ and suggested that “the amendment
could answer no good purpose, and an agreement to it would not be very honorable to
the House.”164
The House rejected the amendment, 49-60. The majority of Democratic-Republicans
voted against a racial qualiﬁcation, 50-26 (66%), while the majority of Federalists voted
in favor, 23-10 (70%). There was a clear sectional dimension to the vote, with only two
of the thirty-ﬁve Democratic-Republican representatives from outside the South voting
to exclude free blacks. Half of northern, and all southern Federalists, supported the
162

The words are those of Rhea (R TN), who argued that the eﬀorts to exclude Orleans Territory on the
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of the land. Annals, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, 498.
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disfranchisement. Moreover, a large minority of southern Democratic-Republicans voted
in support of black suﬀrage, 17-24 (41%). There was broad northern and considerable
southern support for black voting rights among Democratic-Republicans. This would
quickly change.
With the rejection of the ‘white’ amendment, the bill was returned to the Senate.
A southern Democratic-Republican, Charles Tait, proposed the Senate recede from the
amendment. This time there was more support for an equal franchise, although the vote
to recede was defeated 11-19. All of the six switchers, who prioritized statehood over
disfranchisement, were Democratic-Republicans.165 However, when the bill was returned
to the House all but two of the southern Democratic-Republicans who had supported
black suﬀrage changed their vote. And of the 33 northern Democratic-Republicans who
had supported black voting rights, only 19 (47.5% of the northern total) did so on the
second vote. Eight northern Federalists who had initially supported exclusion switched
their vote to opposing a racial qualiﬁcation, so that 90% of northern Federalists now
opposed disfranchisement. If we deﬁne a party vote as one in which more than 50%
of one party opposes more than 50% of the other, then both roll calls were party votes.
However, where the ﬁrst vote was a party vote with Democratic-Republicans supporting
an equal franchise qualiﬁcation and Federalists supporting black exclusion, the opposite
was the case for the second. Republicans North and South aligned their votes behind a
white supremacist standard, while northern Federalists were willing on the second vote
to abandon their coalition partners in the south and oppose black exclusion.
***
The Jeﬀersonian administration and congressional leadership sought to expand slavery in the territories; imposed a crippling and explicitly racially motivated embargo
against Haiti, instituted black disfranchisement; imposed an embargo of American shipping that was seen as more accommodating to the economy of the South than the North,
and that crippled one of the few industrial sectors in which free blacks had a foothold;
and relied on the inﬂated representation of slaves for its political ascendency.166 Jefferson’s successor would ﬁght a war cheered on by much of the south and absolutely
opposed to the economic and security interests of the north. All of these factors helped
change the context in which northern Democratic-Republicans operated.
165
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For one, the tendency of free black voters to support Federalists became much
stronger and consistent.167 In the ﬁrst decade of the 19th century Democratic-Republicans
actively competed for free black support. The Republican press actively courted blacks
for their votes in 1807, and carried the proceedings of meetings of black Republicans,
who insisted that “Republican principles are favorable to the equal rights of mankind,
and to the preservation of Life, Liberty, and Property” (Polgar 2011, 7). New Jersey Republicans likewise courted the votes of free blacks, following their passage of the Act for
the Gradual Abolition of Slavery with “a campaign designed to capture the black vote”
(Klinghoﬀer and Elkins 1992, 186).168
But the policies of the national administration and party strongly discouraged free
blacks from supporting Democratic-Republicans, and they gradually became a nearly
unanimous Federalist constituency. As a result, the Democratic-Republicans in the state
began to have an incentive to disfranchise free black voters through voter identiﬁcation
laws. In 1811, the state Democratic-Republicans proposed a bill that would extend the
franchise on class grounds, while requiring black voters to obtain certiﬁcates proving
that they were free men.169 The votes in the state legislature were on straight party lines,
with all Federalists opposing the voter ID and all Democratic-Republicans in favor. The
bill was rejected by the Council of Revision, composed of Democratic-Republicans and
Federalists, because the bill imposed onerous requirements solely on the basis of race
(Street 1859, 362-364). Democratic-Republicans tried again in 1814 and 1815 to pass a
free black voter identiﬁcation law, the latter year’s eﬀort limited to New York City. Again,
voting patterns were on nearly perfect party line. In 1815 the bill was passed over the
Council’s veto (Polgar 2011, 11).
The partisan context created by national Democratic-Republicans’ defense of slavery created a local incentive for black disfranchisement. In addition, at both the na167

The tendency of free blacks to vote Federalist is explained by Christopher Malone as the result of having
been raised in, and often still working in, Federalist homes (2008). Polgar suggests that, in the case of
New York, the tendency “can be traced to the founding of the New York Manumission Society in 1785,”
one of several “genteel” and predominantly Federalist societies that may have been more likely to see
black citizenship as acceptable within a traditional patron-client and hierarchical framework (Polgar
2011, 3).
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In 1807 liberal Republicans in a debate with moderates who desired the maintenance of property
qualiﬁcations insisted that “‘a widow’s mite is property’ as was the life and liberty of any ‘black, white,
red or yellow’ individual of ‘exotic or domestic birth”’ and that each was “a member of the community,
and has an undoubted right to vote for public oﬃce” (Klinghoﬀer and Elkins 1992, 187).
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The 2nd section of the 1811 would have applied to the 7th section of an 1801 act for regulating elections,
treating highway labor as payment of a tax for the requirements (additional to property) for being an
elector for the Assembly.
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tional and local level there was an increasingly sophisticated system of party discipline
and party patronage, the latter being especially important for northern DemocraticRepublicans (Cunningham 1963; Riley 2007, 18). As a result, party leaders were increasingly able to ensure that “anti-Negro prejudice. . . became a test of party regularity” for
the Democratic-Republican Party, in New York and elsewhere (McManus 1966, 187). But
previous disfranchisement eﬀorts had faltered on the claim that republicanism did not
allow for invidious distinctions between free men. And Federalists were increasingly attacking the Democratic-Republicans as the party of slavery, a largely unpopular position
in the northern early Republic. What was needed was a discursive framework that could
enable political operatives to rebut the charges of republicanism hypocrisy and to justify
their support of seemingly pro-slavery measures.

Imagining the White Male Republic
In 1792, James Madison published “A Candid State of Parties,” in which he matter-offactly stated that “the republican party. . . conscious that the mass of people in every
part of the union, in every state, and of every occupation must at bottom be with them,
both in interest and sentiment, will naturally ﬁnd their account in burying all antecedent
questions, in banishing every other distinction than that between enemies and friends to
republic government, and in promoting a general harmony among the latter, wherever
residing or however employed” (Ketcham 2006, 227). The central division within “the
republican party” was over slavery, but the party was controlled and largely supported
by southerners deeply invested in human bondage. “Slaveholders made their political
claims through the Jeﬀersonian Republican party, not against it,” and as a result the
national party repeatedly required its members to take positions in favor of slavery,
which increasingly included a denial of black citizenship (Riley 2007, 31). There was
some “burying” of antecedent questions, but this was demanded of and performed more
by northern Democratic-Republicans.
From the early emergence of a national coalition, Democratic-Republican operatives
in the north had been subject to attacks by Federalists for their reliance on a coalition with slaveholders. As the English Radical William Cobbett, writing as a Federalist
pamphleteer in Philadelphia, remarked, “American Union presents, at this moment, a
spectacle that startles the eye of reason. We see a kind of political land-mark, on one
side of which, Order walks hand in hand with the most perfect liberty; and, on the other,
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Anarchy revels, surrounded with its den of slaves” (Cobbett 1795, 44).170 Federalists had
never developed the ideological unity of the Democratic-Republicans, and so had always
been less constrained by the need to maintain what was a looser national coalition. As
this coalition broke down, Federalists were freed from any consideration of bisectional
unity to temper their attacks on Democratic-Republicans for their hypocritical alliance
with slavery.
Evangelical preacher, Federalist, and president of Rutgers University William Linn
took direct aim at Jeﬀerson’s racial thought, invoking broadly shared Christian and evangelical doctrines to cast Jeﬀerson’s writing as heretical and “directly opposite to divine
revelation.” “Every doubt” as to Jeﬀerson’s deism would be removed, argued Linn, “when
we consider what he asserts more plainly respecting the negroes.” Linn examined Jeﬀerson’s arguments in Notes and highlights as particularly egregious the denial “that their
inferiority is the eﬀect merely of their condition of life.” This alone would be a serious
Christian heresy. But Jeﬀerson compounds his heresy by “betray[ing], like a true inﬁdel,
an inconsistency with himself. Having laboured to point out physical and moral diﬀerences between the Whites and the Blacks, he advances it at last ‘as a suspicion only’. . . .
Would a man who believes in a divine revelation even hint a suspicion of this kind?”
Linn admitted, “in justice to Mr. Jeﬀerson” that he had advocated for the emancipation
of slaves. But he incisively and correctly noted that Jeﬀerson had “raised one of the
greatest obstacles [to emancipation], by denying them to be the same species as whites”
(Linn 1800, 11-14).
‘Christianus’ mixed both a religious and secular appeal to “Friends and Methodists”
to vote against Jeﬀerson. Attacking the Republican James Sloan—a Quaker by birth
who later would break with the Republicans over the dominance of the southerners—
‘Christianus’ reminded his readers that in “the ancient dominion” of the “mild and amiable democrat [Jeﬀerson]” there were between 300,000 and 400,000 “miserable negro
slaves.” An even greater indictment was that Jeﬀerson suggested “the idea of their being
a race of beings inferior to the whites.” This was oﬀensive to Christianity, which professed that all persons were “of the same ﬂesh and blood.” But it was deeply hypocritical
as well, an oﬀense against the claimed republicanism of Virginia and the Jeﬀersonian
170

He then quoted from a republican newspaper and its series of toasts: “1. The Democratic Societies
throughout the world—may they ever be the watchful guardians of Liberty. 2. Citizen Maddison [sic]
and the Republican party in Congress. 3. Citizen Genet [the French Ambassador]. . . . 11. The courageous
and virtuous mountain, may it crush the moderates, the traitors, the federalists and all aristocrats, under
what ever denomination they may be disguised. . . . 14. Henry Grattan, and the Opposition of Ireland. . . .
16. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity—may they pervade the Universe”
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party: slaves were “held in a more wretched state of bondage, by their republican taskmasters, than ever the children of Israel were, by the hosts of Pharoh [sic]. . . . [T]hat these
things, in a land where the inhabitants profess such superior regard to liberty, equality
and the rights of man, exhibit a MONSTROUS SPECTACLE: This is the ‘powerful state’
in the union. . . remarked for an inﬂexible adherence to the genuine principles of our independence, the declaration of which commences with asserting it to be self-evident that
‘all men are created equal”’ (Christianus 1801, 16).
A ‘Citizen of New England’ attacked “Citizen James Monroe,” as “born and educated in that favorite spot of Freedom and Jacobinism, in which the shades of Liberty
and Slavery are as nicely interwoven as the colours of its inhabitants” (1797, 59). The
‘Citizen’ then related the various Federalist critiques of the Democratic-Republicans to
the “propitious circumstance” by which the Virginians had “the uncommon means of
realizing and relishing the blessings of True Liberty, by observing the curses of Slavery,
and by exercising the severe power of unlimited despotism” (1797, 59).171 An appeal to
New York electors from the Federal Young Men of the City of Albany in 1809 insisted on
the republican credentials of the New England Federalists—“who were the men that ﬁrst
set kings, lords, and commons at deﬁance?... who fought the battles of Lexington and
Bunker Hill?”—and attacked the hypocrisy of “drivers of negro slaves” for claiming to be
“the exclusive republicans of the day.” It was the “democracy” of the Jeﬀersonians that
was at fault, and the author claimed republicanism for the Federalists: “compare, fellow
citizens, all that you dreaded from federalism, with the suﬀerings you have experienced
from democracy” (Boyd 1809, 1, 6).
Given these circumstances, many northern Democratic-Republicans were drawn to
arguments that stressed the importance of the Union above all, that while slavery might
be distasteful the true injustice would be the abandonment of the national project. And
so they sought to associate overt criticism of slavery as hostile to the union, by calling
attention, for instance, to Federalist placards calling for the separation of the northern
states, “the Potomac the boundary—the Negro States by themselves” (Niles 1809, 50).172
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“To this cause, I presume, we may attribute that burning zeal, which has distinguished the character
of yourself and the Virginia delegation, and which has kept Congress in a perpetual irritation. . . . The
same hatred of restraint and love of Liberty unqualiﬁed, has no doubt occasioned your antipathy to
the Federal Government, and rendered the compulsory means of enforcing the payment of bonds so
peculiarly obnoxious to you. Hence also arose your sudden and violent admiration of the happy freedom
and equality of the modern French, so nearly approaching that unshackled state of nature which your
negroes formerly enjoyed and which they, no doubt, have feelingly described to you” (1797, 59).
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These appeared in Philadelphia in 1809, and Hezekiah Niles insisted that they were part of a broader
Federalist plot to reject the Union on the grounds of slavery.
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Democratic-Republican members of Congress repeatedly stressed the delicacy of any
discussion involving slavery or free blacks, deﬂecting the need to take a potentially
unpopular position at the same time as they asserted the primacy of the Union.173
But they also began emphasizing and developing arguments that distinct races could
not peacefully and equally live under the same government or in the same community,
that blacks were not ﬁt for republican government, and that they did not and must
not form part of the political community. Slavery might be an evil, but DemocraticRepublicans increasingly argued that the consequences of blacks continuing to reside
in a ‘white’ community after emancipation would be horriﬁc: “the naturalization of the
blacks, in unavoidably connected with the degradation of the whites. . . . [T]he blacks
[would] confederate[] for the purpose of vindicating their political and natural rights,
and when that was accomplished of subjugating the whites” (Branagan 1805, 125).
Democratic-Republicans drew explicitly on the writings of Jeﬀerson, who in Notes
on the State of Virginia had proposed emancipation and colonization (Branagan 1805,
120; Tucker 1796, 77). Jeﬀerson asked “why not retain and incorporate the blacks into
the state, and thus save the expense of supplying, by importation of white settlers, the
vacancies they will leave” ( Jeﬀerson 1787, 265). His answer would be among the most
inﬂuential passages in American history,
“Deep rooted prejudices entertained by the whites; ten thousand recollections, by the blacks, of the injuries they have sustained; new provocations;
the real distinctions which nature has made; and many other circumstances,
will divide us into parties, and produce convulsions which will probably
never end but in the extermination of the one or the other race.”
But to these objections, Jeﬀerson added others. The distinction of color, he believed,
would persist as whites would not associate with a people they found repulsive. Moreover,
blacks were not the equal of whites, in memory, reason, or imagination. As a result,
“when freed, [the slave] is to be removed beyond the reach of mixture” ( Jeﬀerson 1787,
265-271).174
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Smilie, Annals of Congress, House of Representatives, 11th Congress, 3rd Session, c.937; Smilie, Annals of
Congress, House of Representatives, 6th Congress, 1st Session, January 2nd , 1800, cc.229-232
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Jeﬀerson had given thought to removal as well. In his work with the committee to revise the laws
of Virginia, Jeﬀerson drafted a bill abolishing the slave trade which worked out the implications of
free blacks: “Sect. II. Negroes and mulattoes. . . [who do not] depart the commonwealth within one year
thereafter they shall be out of the protection of the laws. Sect. III. Those which shall come into this
commonwealth of their own accord shall be out of the protection of the laws. . . . Sect. IV. . . . And if such
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Ferdinando Fairfax, a Virginia planter, published a plan for the abolition of slavery
in 1790, one that would be gradual, compensated, and voluntary (on the part of the
slaveholder). A crucial problem, however, was what to do with the freed blacks: “it is
equally agreed that if emancipated, it would never do to allow them all the privileges of
citizens,” and so Fairfax supported the removal of blacks to Africa (Bradburn 2009, 258).
The reason for not including free blacks as citizens was not their natural inferiority, but
the claim that white prejudice would be an insurmountable barrier to their inclusion. St.
George Tucker would likewise suggest that free blacks needed to leave but believed this
could be achieved voluntarily if they were denied the rights of citizenship. And Tucker,
like Fairfax, argued that the reason why blacks could not be included was the prejudices
of white society: “whoever proposes any plan for the abolition of slavery, will ﬁnd that
he must either encounter, or accommodate himself to prejudice” (Bradburn 2009, 259;
Tucker 1796). It was the “habitual arrogance and assumption of superiority, among the
whites” that made equality impossible (Tucker 1796, 77).
It was in this context that ‘diﬀusion’ and colonization could be presented as means
of reconciling slavery and republicanism. ‘Diﬀusion’ was the argument that the only way
slavery could be abolished was by expanding its coverage over the continent and thereby
ensuring that blacks would everywhere be a small community, one that could be freed
and controlled with ease. The idea of diﬀusing the slave population was a favorite of
Jeﬀerson’s and the Virginia leadership of the Democratic-Republicans had signaled their
responsiveness to it (Onuf 2001, 186). It was well-summarized by one of the Indiana
petitions requesting the introduction of slavery:
“The slaves that are possessed south of the Potomac render the future peace
and tranquility of [the South] highly problematic. Their numbers are too
great to eﬀect either an immediate or a gradual simultaneous emancipation.
They. . . wish that the invidious distinction between freemen and slaves was
obliterated from the United States. But however repugnant it may be to their
feelings, or to the principles of a republican form of Government, it was
entailed upon them by those over whose conduct they had no control. . . .
They do not conceive that the greatest inﬂux of emigrants would increase the
number of blacks to such a degree as to render them in the least dangerous to
slave, so emancipated, shall not within one year thereafter, depart the commonwealth, he shall be out of the
protection of the laws. . . Sect. V. If any white woman shall have a child by a negro or mulatto, she and
her child shall depart the commonwealth within one year thereafter. If they shall fail so to do, the woman
shall be out of the protection of the laws” ( Jeﬀerson 1893, 201-202). In short, if free blacks—or white
women who had a mixed-race child—did not leave the state they were liable for re-enslavement.
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the future interests of the Territory and with submission they would suggest
that dispersing them through the Western Territories is the only means by
which a gradual emancipation can ever be eﬀected” (Dunn 1894, 34).
Diﬀusion provided a rationale for extending slavery while at the same time encouraging
a belief that the American continent was providentially reserved for the white race (Binns
1854, 75).
Sharing the same underlying premises with ‘diﬀusion,’ but with diﬀerent policy conclusions, was the argument for colonization.175 Thomas Branagan, a passionate opponent
of slavery and committed Jeﬀersonian, proposed emancipation and colonization “in the
recently purchased territories of Louisiana, paralleling Jeﬀerson’s ‘civilization’ program
to use the Louisiana territory for Native Americans” as well as Jeﬀerson’s belief in the
importance of diﬀusion (Malone 2008, 89). What made abolition impossible, in the
short-term, was the danger posed by the possibility of free blacks living within a white
society. Colonization was required because “it is better for the blacks themselves to
be accommodated domestically, and settled politically independent by themselves, than
associate with the whites with whom they can never enjoy reciprocal rights, and political
privileges” (Branagan 1805, 36).
The danger was in part because of jealousies and racial diﬀerence would lead to
divided communities. But the danger was also that they would have to be citizens. “The
history of parties,” wrote John Taylor, “in its utmost malignancy is but a feint mirror
for reﬂecting the consequences of a white and a black party. . . . No doubt can exist of
the consequences of placing two nations of distinct colours and features on the same
theatre, to contend, not about signs and sounds, but for wealth and power” (Taylor 1813,
127). Here the problem was not simply the threat of racial conﬂict—although Taylor
did believe it would end in the extermination of one or the other—but that blacks were
“incapable of liberty” (1813, 128). The “early impressions of obedience and submission,
which slaves have received among us. . . [contribute] to unﬁt [the slaves] for freedom”
(Tucker 1796, 77).
All of these arguments reconciled republican principles with slavery, by casting
its continuation and even its expansion in expedient terms: securing the Union was
paramount, immediate emancipation would be disastrous for all, while expansion and
diﬀusion might hasten slavery’s end. But they also circumscribed the feasible boundaries
of political community, underscoring and reinforcing existing assumptions that blacks
175

Colonization suggested gradual emancipation, with the freed slaves being sent abroad. Diﬀusion implied
the further extension of slavery, with emancipation to occur only in the distant future.
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were not part of this community while limiting the egalitarian possibilities of democratic
republicanism: whether because of prejudice, racial distinctions, or racial inferiority
black Americans could not be incorporated into a republican community. “Nothing,”
wrote Jeﬀerson in the year after the Missouri Crisis, “is more certainly written in the
book of fate that these people are to be free. Nor is it less certain that the two races,
equally free, cannot live in the same government” (Randall 1994, 303).
In 1800, a congressman from Georgia considered with disgust the suggestion by
Absalom Jones that “those people (the slaves) ought to be represented ‘with us and the
rest of the citizens of the United States.”’176
“They speak of the Federal compact, in which they consider those people
as interested in common with others, under these words: ‘we, the people of
the United States of America,’ &c. I would ask gentlemen whether, with all
their philanthropy, they would wish to see those people sitting by their sides
deliberating in the councils of the nation? He presumed not.”177
The explicit claim that free blacks were not included in ‘we the people’ was developed
in response to insistent demands that they were. In 1820, during the Missouri Crisis, the
newly admitted Senator from the state of Maine argued that American citizenship meant
“hav[ing] an agency in the formation or administration of the laws.” The “perpetual
exclusion from this deprives [the free black] of the essential attributes of a citizen.” And
he reminded his colleagues that the act establishing a territorial legislature and enabling
Missouri to organize a constitutional convention had stated that “free blacks can neither
elect nor be elected.”178 It was Congress that had disfranchised free blacks, and it was
Congress that had accordingly denied the possibility of their being part of the political
community.

Conclusion
In an otherwise excellent account of the ‘denization’ of free blacks, Douglas Bradburn
suggests that Maryland simply “clariﬁed its regulations” against free black suﬀrage in
1809, implying consensus support for disfranchisement; that New Jersey “closed the
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gaping loopholes in its original constitution that permitted blacks, aliens, and women
to vote”; and that North Carolina “corrected the ‘oversight’ in its constitution of 1835”
(Bradburn 2009, 264). As we saw, there was a decent minority in favor of black suﬀrage
in Maryland, a state which had earlier limited and then liberalized black voting rights
(Bogen 1990). The New Jersey inclusion of women and free blacks was not a “loophole,”
but had been consistently re-aﬃrmed by the state legislature since 1776 (Klinghoﬀer and
Elkis 1992).179 While some delegates in North Carolina certainly insisted that free black
voting was an “oversight,” the disfranchisement amendment was heatedly and lengthily
debated, and alternatives allowing for some free blacks to vote were defeated by votes of
62-65, 59-63, and 55-64.180 In 1834,Tennessee disfranchised free blacks, but only after
a sustained eﬀort to maintain their voting rights failed 32-23 (Laughlin and Henderson
1834). These were not mere corrections of oversight: they were a sustained ﬁght over
principle in the heart of slavery’s empire.
It was never impossible, in the early Republic, to imagine more inclusive forms of
citizenship, and many were willing to take public positions in favor of black political and
civil rights. But the odds were never particularly good either. The revolutionary critical
juncture had seen the rapid dissemination of ideologies of natural rights, democratic
republicanism, and equality, but they did not entirely displace earlier commitments to
propertied independence and communities deﬁned in racial and religious terms. But in
the subsequent several decades equality-inspired activists had much greater success in
undermining and gaining ascendance over property and religious exclusions than over
racial, let alone gendered, exclusions. Diﬀerent activists, equally inspired by the revolutionary principles, found themselves in opposing camps, in near-total disagreement
about what the implications of American equality and republicanism.
The growing importance of this narrative, especially after 1820, encouraged its adoption by political operatives and interest groups, who saw in it a means to appeal to
the dominant political party of the period for professional advance or political support. As it was adopted in an increasing number of situations, the language of a re179

There is little evidence on the initial passage of the women’s suﬀrage provision, and it is possible that
the initial measure was unintended. But subsequent legislation ratiﬁed this, rather than doing as was
done in England, for example, and clarifying the qualiﬁcations in the direction of male suﬀrage.
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been convicted of an infamous oﬀense. Journal of the Convention to amend the Constitution (1835, 22,
73-75).
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public founded for white men became a central narrative of American understandings
of political community. This was not exclusively the responsibility of the Jeﬀersonian
Democratic-Republican party. But the party’s architects, in seeking to capture the potential gains embedded in the Constitution, emphasized certain policies over others, and
ultimately established the institutional space and coalitional basis in which the conjoining of American democracy and exclusion made sense. The institutions and ideology of
the white male republic would structure democratizing processes in America until the
Civil War, and beyond.
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Chapter 5
The White Male Republic, 1800-1860

“It is necessary to a proper understanding of this subject to enquire, ﬁrst, who
are the people, that according to correct republican principles should have a voice
and express their wishes, in the selection of representatives. The people, strictly
speaking, are all the white men, women and children, who are to be aﬀected by
the laws.”
—G. Mayo, Delegate to Louisiana State Constitutional Convention, 1845.

Introduction
The antebellum United States saw considerable activity in the fashioning and re-fashioning
of state constitutions. Reform movements would animate the politics of nearly every
state, with emerging political parties redrawing the rules of representation, suﬀrage,
and the organization of government in order to achieve electoral advantage and secure
desired policy. This chapter analyzes convention debates over the suﬀrage to demonstrate how these reﬂected Jeﬀersonian ideas of political belonging and how these understandings were embedded in coalitional and institutional arrangements that gave them
political weight. The core argument is that the Jeﬀersonian understanding of American identity—best encapsulated by the repeatedly invoked phrase of the ‘white male
republic’—structured the behavior of these political operative, providing them with a
framework for assessing policy toward diﬀerent population categories. The result was
a distinctive pattern of institutional change that paired the extension of the franchise
along class lines with its simultaneous restriction along racial lines.
The Jeﬀersonian Republicans, and after them the Democratic Party, articulated a
coherent narrative about belonging and the basis of citizenship, one that they would
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increasingly seek to embed in the institutions of state and national citizenship. The
behavior of political operatives—including legislators and delegates to constitutional
conventions—was shaped by their expectation that they would be penalized or rewarded
for taking positions that clashed or resonated with what they believed to be the popularly
held principles of republicanism, the ideal boundaries of the people, and commitments
to racial and gender hierarchies. The idea of the ‘white male republic’ was considered to
be central to the revolutionary settlement, a settlement that established the conditions
for stable political order and economic development. Constituencies ranging from Irish
dockworkers to southern planters were organized in defense of this settlement, and the
ideas of peoplehood served as a focal point in which the violation of its key principles
signaled a possible willingness to unsettle the political order.
The debates, both in convention and in the campaigns that preceded them, took
place within a shared framework of meaning. The conventions were what Jon Elster has
called a “deliberative setting,” in which the outcomes can be shaped independently of
the motives of the participants because of the institutional structure of the setting itself
(Elster 1998). The ‘white male republic’ established a set of normative principles that
delegates were hesitant to contest. Accordingly, delegates understood that the republican
principles they all claimed to share were embedded in a community circumscribed by
citizenship and race. The expectations of convention delegates about the popular resonance of ideological commitments to the ‘white male republic’ imposed costs to those
who sought to defend the suﬀrage rights of free blacks, as well as opportunities to those
who sought their exclusion. The same was true for those who would defend the exclusion
of the white laboring classes.
Those delegates who found it in their personal or party interest to support black
disfranchisement alongside laboring class enfranchisement could counter the charge of
hypocrisy and deploy republican principles in regard to white men, while denying their
applicability to black men. The former were included within the pale of the community
while the latter were without. By contrast, those defending black suﬀrage were forced to
answer to the charge that they sought to enfranchise a population outside the community,
or that they were supporting measures that would undermine the Union and the civic
status of laboring whites. The delegates were attentive to the fact that their positions
were being recorded and would be examined by a broader audience of political activists.
This made them responsive to expectations of public opinion and the preferences of
coalitional allies, creating a mechanism by which these norms were enforced through
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delegate concerns of the electoral or career consequences.
This chapter looks at how the ideas embedded in the ‘white male republic’ structured
the debates in conventions: how they informed the public positions of the delegates, how
they aﬀected the electoral calculus of the parties, and how the parties incentivized the
further deployment of these ideas in order to reconcile coalitional tensions. The factors
that motivated suﬀrage change were not entirely ideational. Rather, these principles
structured the preferences and positions of political agents, ultimately making support
for some changes more diﬃcult politically than others; became embedded in institutional
and organizational arrangements that generated their own constituency of stakeholders;
and provided a useful language for political operatives to signal threats to a coalition or
constituency interest.
I begin with a discussion of ‘white male republic,’ the constitutive idea of political belonging around which the Jeﬀersonian Republicans converged and which they
successfully disseminated throughout this period. This section explores how delegates
understood, invoked, and responded to the racial and republican components of Jeﬀersonian citizenship. The racial construction of American citizenship imposed rhetorical
obstacles to delegates seeking to achieve black suﬀrage, while at the same time gave
leverage to delegates seeking to expand the enfranchised proportion of the white male
population. This helps explain the central pattern of antebellum democratization, the
conjoined processes of white inclusion and black exclusion. I follow the discussion of
the racial boundary and hierarchy of citizenship by looking at the core republican commitments of the ‘white male republic,’ and show that each of these was embedded in an
idea of community in which the languages of race and equality made the exclusion of
free white men a rhetorically more diﬃcult position to maintain than the exclusion of
free blacks.
After discussing the ‘white male republic’ and its opportunities and obstacles for
rights claiming, I turn to a discussion of some of the mechanisms by which the delegates’
positions were structured. Most important of these was public opinion and the electoral
connection, which provided all but the most insulated delegates with an incentive to be
seen as not questioning the core principles of American citizenship. Additionally, the
ideas expressed in the convention could be used instrumentally to signal to partisan allies
and other political agents. I ﬁrst discuss the behavior of delegates and then the function
and calculation of parties, before concluding with a discussion of the importance of
the national parties themselves as organizations held together by the white male citizen
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republic as well as institutional spaces incentivizing its defense in policy.

The ‘White Male Republic’ and Convention Debates
This section looks at how the Jeﬀersonian ideas of belonging and republican citizenship
structured the debates in convention. I ﬁrst discuss the racial dimensions of the Jeﬀersonian understanding of American identity, which read blacks as outside the community—
and so far as they were present—subordinate to whites. I then discuss the republican
standards of consent and contribution that were used to legitimize suﬀrage changes,
showing how these were understood to be embedded in the community of equal citizens.
This made these standards more readily available to advocates for white enfranchisement
than for alien or black enfranchisement. These standards did not mandate inclusion, but
advocates for expanding suﬀrage on class lines could draw on the range of republican
standards. Black men and aliens, and their advocates in convention, drew upon these
standards, but to less success. Advocates for black suﬀrage had to contend with the
charge that blacks were outside the community, and failing that, with a popularly resonant claim that the enfranchisement of blacks would be a downward leveling of the civic
status of whites. Advocates of alien suﬀrage did not, for their part, seek the enfranchisement of all aliens, but limited their claims to declarant aliens, those who had already
declared their intention to become citizens. In doing so, these delegates sought to place
the declarant alien within the pale of citizens, thereby gaining access to the range of
republican standards.

Racial Citizenship and White Supremacy
The racial dimension of the Jeﬀersonian ideal of American citizenship had two aspects:
it ﬁxed a racial demarcation as the boundary of citizenship; and it ascribed a hierarchy
of civic and social status onto the population. The United States in this ideal was to be a
white man’s republic, in which the presence of non-whites was seen as anomalous or undesirable and in which those “non-whites” that were present were socially and politically
subordinate. The tension between white supremacy, republican equality, and popular
sovereignty was widely recognized. The ideal of the ‘white republic’ was motivated by
an attempt to reconcile this tension, and was often paired with anti-slavery: “we might
hope that our country would see the day, when slavery on her soil would be extinct—her
whole population white people, and this same government still enduring the glory of the
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world, and the fountain of inﬁnite happiness.”181
Few, however, believed that in the near future there was much likelihood of achieving
their ideal of a racially homogenous national space.182 More importantly, most southerners opposed the idea of a “white” space, and the consequences this would have on their
society. The growing recognition that blacks, slave and free, would not be removed to
any signiﬁcant degree was politically consequential. The continued and future presence
of blacks made some delegates unwilling to deny them political rights, as this would violate republican principles of consent of the governed. Delegates could denounce slavery,
regret the presence of blacks, and yet still feel constrained by what they saw as a legitimate claim of free blacks to participate on the basis of their sustained presence. Merrill
of Pennsylvania, for instance, would support limited voting rights for black males, but
insisted that “he had no prejudice in their favor” and was only willing to grant voting
rights because of what “republican principles teach us” and because “they are here, and
this question must be settled in some way.”183 And proponents of excluding free blacks
entirely from a state’s territory likewise justiﬁed this on the basis of republican principles. A delegate in the Indiana convention of 1851 took for granted that blacks could not
obtain political rights, and therefore desired their total exclusion in order to preserve republican principles: “They can never obtain political rights here. They can never obtain
social rights here. And for these reasons, I think, we ought not to have them amongst
us. We ought not to have in our midst a race, daily increasing, who must of necessity
remain disfranchised ; a class of people to be taxed without being represented; on whom
burdens are imposed, and who have no voice in deciding what these burdens shall be.”184
Some delegates would respond by appealing to the political nature of suﬀrage and
argue that expedience justiﬁed the exclusions of a number of diﬀerent subcategories,
including minors, women, criminals. More commonly, however, delegates would read
free blacks out of the community entirely and justifying disfranchisement because they
181

Woodward, Proceedings and debates of the convention of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, vol.9 (1838, 24)
Alternatively, the space onto which the ideal of a racially homogeneous polity was projected could be
limited to the state rather than the country, a tactic that allowed for the sidestepping of the question
of slavery within the nation: “Ohio was a state for white men. The negroes were intruders among us.”
Loudon, Report of the debates and proceedings of the Convention for the revision of the constitution of the
state of Ohio, 1850-51, vol.2 (1851, 553).
183
Merrill wanted blacks to be subject to naturalization procedures of residence, an oath of attachment,
and the oaths of two citizens to conﬁrm this attachment. Merrill, in Proceedings. . . Pennsylvania, vol.10
(1838, 4-7).
184
Owen, Report of the debates and proceedings of the convention for the revision of the constitution of the state
of Indiana, 1850, vol.1 (1851, 231).
182

160

were not part of the people in whom sovereignty was vested. In contrast to a racially
homogeneous space, a racially homogeneous republic, in which citizenship was limited
to whites, could be achieved by institutionally placing blacks outside of the rights of
republican citizenship: “this is a nation of white people—its oﬃces, honors, dignities
and privileges, are alone open to, and to be enjoyed by, white people.”185
The importance of denying blacks the status of citizens stemmed from the rhetorical
advantages of acknowledging a shared citizenship. The presence of blacks and their
being subject to the laws meant that their exclusion violated the principle of the consent
of the governed, unless they could be reconﬁgured as aliens—not really part of the governed, but sojourners. While some delegates sought to limit the strength of the argument
over the consent of the governed by exempting blacks from taxation, or disingenuously
claiming that they were exempt (rather than excluded) from militia duty, most stressed
the importance of being embedded in a community. As citizenship came to be the central marker of belonging, they denied the possibility that citizenship extended beyond
the white race.
In the states considering exclusion, however, there was often little constitutional
basis for the claim that they were not citizens.186 Defenders of black suﬀrage could
point to examples such as General Jackson’s invocation to Louisiana free blacks to join
their “fellow citizens” during the War of 1812,187 to the wording of the United States
constitution,188 and to the practical recognition of the rights of citizenship by the state
and federal government during the previous decades: “it seems that some gentlemen
entertain doubts whether any of our people of colour are in a legal sense citizens, but
those doubts were in his opinion unfounded. - We are precluded from denying their
citizenship, by our uniform recognition for more than forty years.”189
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The rhetorical invocation of white supremacy and the racial hierarchy was in part a
response to delegates who eﬀectively insisted upon black citizenship. Delegates were especially sensitive to the question of black oﬃce holding, with opponents of black suﬀrage
taking as self-evident a shared opposition to this. They would ask, and would rarely get
a response, how “it was possible to prevent the blacks being voted for, if they were permitted to vote.”190 Opponents would attempt to carry forward the logic of the expressed
republican commitments of the supporters of black suﬀrage to a conclusion that few
of the delegates were willing to accept, thereby demonstrating that these commitments
could only be secured within a racially demarcated polity:
“carry out the principle [of no distinction on color]; if they should be entitled to vote, place them in your jury box, elect them as members of your
Legislature, and to any and all of the oﬃces established by your laws;. . . .
[T]here would be true republicanism in witnessing upon the bench of your
Supreme Court the presiding Judge; the oﬀspring of Africa’s shores, sitting in
brotherly and religious companionship with his white brethren, deciding upon
your rights, your properties, and your lives. If you will not consent to carry
out the principle, but assert that it is impolitic to touch it, you cannot really
be their advocates.”191
Rhetorically, white supremacy served as a backstop for white citizenship, a relationship
succinctly expressed by Carson, of North Carolina: “they are not citizens; and if they
were, from their separate cast, they could not be respected as such.”192
As the antebellum period progressed, something resembling a sociological theory of
rights was articulated in which political and social equality were mutually implicated.
This theory deployed the fact of white supremacy’s popular resonance—“whether it
spring from the virtues or vices of our nature”—in order to claim that the “negro” was
not internal to the community, and that the denial of political rights was not a denial
of republican principles.193 The social devaluation of the “negro,” which predated the
Revolution, was conceptually linked to their political status. Delegates would frequently
the claim that blacks were understood as citizens: “he held in his hand a passport to travel in Europe,
granted by Mr. Forsyth, the secretary of state at Washington, to Peter Williams, a coloured preacher
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highlight the other side to Tocqueville’s claim that “to conceive of men remaining forever
unequal upon a single point, yet equal on all others, is impossible; they must come
in the end to be equal upon all” (1863, 67). While Tocqueville presented the causal
relation as moving from social equality to political equality, delegates to constitutional
conventions suggested that the causal arrow might also point the other way: “You must,
if you recognize them as citizens, place them on an equality with all other citizens, in
social as well as political relations.”194
The reasoning that underlay the association between social and political equality was
that it was unwise to admit a class of persons into full citizenship who were not fully
entitled to be an equal member of a community. To do so was seen as dangerous and
inexpedient, dangerous because the social subordination of blacks would make them
hostile to the institutions of white society, and inexpedient because they were cut oﬀ
from the social intercourse through which common interests were forged and discovered.
Hopkinson of Pennsylvania noted that he would “at once consent to remove the political”
barrier to full citizenship if social equality was granted and blacks were welcomed into
white society. This was a rhetorical strategy, of course, for he knew few if any in the
convention supported the extension of social equality to blacks. He continued, arguing
that “to take away the latter [political exclusion] and leave the former [social exclusion] in
full force, would be to bring an irritated and bitter enemy into the body politic, who could
never be reconciled by a vote for the insult to his feelings and pride, in his exclusion
from your society.”195 Delegate Woodward oﬀered a nuanced view of the processes by
which a community was constituted, one worth quoting in full.
“Now, sir, I submit to the gentlemen, whether these political rights, of which
we are speaking, do not depend, for their preservation and right exercise,
on social intercourse and equality. Not that every man, must associate with
every man in the community, but I hold there must be that free and unrestrained interchange of sentiments on public questions, which can only
attend a state of general equality, if we would properly prepare the mass
of men to exercise political suﬀrage. Every man, from the highest to the
lowest, has his sphere and his appropriate circle of friends, and in his daily
intercourse with them, both in the business and the pleasures of life, opinions become formed and matured, which when all men come out on terms
of exact equality to vote, manifest themselves and inﬂuence whatever decisions is to be made by the popular voice. And these separate circles or little
194
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societies which wealth or adventitious circumstances, and not our political
institutions, have made distinct, have connecting links that extend the opinions thus formed by the contact of minds, from and to the extremities of the
body politic, and keep up a sympathy between the whole and all its parts;
and here is the foundation of the system of universal suﬀrage. For suﬀrage
is only the expression of the opinions which are perpetually maturing under
the inﬂuence of social intercourse and equality.”196
This argument, which appeared in various forms across the antebellum period, placed
black exclusion squarely within the republican tradition of insisting upon community
attachment and common interest. It was not a naked appeal to prejudice, or even a
trope of regret that black enfranchisement was right but that popular prejudice made it
inexpedient. Rather, it was a claim that republicanism embedded the right of suﬀrage
in an actually existing community, and that the exclusion of blacks from this meant
that there was no republican obligation to extend political rights. The “negro” might be
present, he might even be a legal citizen, but he was not part of the community.
Importantly, this same understanding of the community legitimated white manhood
suﬀrage: the diﬀerent classes are joined by “connecting links that extend the opinions. . . and keep up a sympathy between the whole and all its parts; and here is the
foundation of the system of universal suﬀrage.” This was enabled because there was
recognition of a social equality among white men, which had been secured during and
after the Revolutionary unsettling of deference and consolidated in the language and
symbolism of the democratic-republicans and other societies allied with the Jeﬀersonians. Brown in Pennsylvania would insist that the laboring man had a deep interest in
the welfare of the commonwealth, because it was through republican governance that his
equality was assured: “Is it nothing to him that he stands among men a man, equal to
the highest and wealthiest?”197 Others would deploy the Jeﬀersonian rhetoric of equal
rights and equal privileges, which Jeﬀerson had triumphantly claimed at the end of his
life as being, along with the happiness of the individual, “now acknowledged to be the
only legitimate objects of government” (Foley 1900, 308). Dearborn of Massachusetts
would claim that “In the United States there is but one class of people. They are all
freemen and have equal rights.”198
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But the availability of this language of equal rights, which would become a constitutive motto of the Jacksonian Democrats, was limited to citizens. This returned the
question again to the appropriate boundaries of political community. A delegate in
Louisiana argued that the principle of “equal privileges and equal rights in the exercise
of the inestimable privilege of suﬀrage” required that “we should ﬁrst establish in the
constitution what is essential to entitle one to become a citizen.”199 As discussed above,
most delegates in the antebellum period denied the citizenship of blacks. Sawyer in
Ohio would refuse to support black suﬀrage “so long as I remember that we citizens are
white men and that we have acquired this country (whether by fair, or foul means) and
it belongs to us,” while at the same time insisting he adhered to the “motto of ‘equal
rights to all exclusive privileges to none,”’ a position he reconciled by advocating for
colonization.200
Advocates for black suﬀrage would denounce the racial bounding of equal rights
rhetoric: “it is all a mockery for you to boast of ‘equal rights and equal privileges’
and deny the exercise of elective franchise to them, while you extend it to those who
come to this from a foreign country.”201 But their unwillingness to defend social equality
undermined their claim to the political equality advanced by Jeﬀersonian republicanism.
Blacks were widely seen as the race “the farthest removed from us in sympathy and
relationship of all into which the human family was divided,” and this ostensible lack
of a sympathy was used rhetorically to place them outside of the scope of Jeﬀersonian
equal rights.202
“When the franchise was given to all white citizens, they gave it to a class of
men who were reached by the same common sympathies, who felt the same
general inﬂuences, who participated in the same private, public, and political
relations, and who had all the same general object. . . . [F]or that reasons they
could permit aliens to become naturalized and electors. Why? Because when
they become citizens their interests were the same in all the relations of life.
The great error to the preventing foreigners to become voters was that it
preserved amongst them a distinctive character, and so long as that was the
case they stood towards us in a false relation. . . . He was, therefore, in favor
of giving the utmost liberty to foreigners, that we might act with common
sympathies, for a common end and object—but was this so with regard to
199
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the colored man? Unfortunately, it was not. He must always be governed by
his social and not his political condition.”203
The racial ordering functioned to raise the costs for delegates of supporting the inclusion of blacks into the suﬀrage. Because so many of them were unwilling to question
the exclusion of free blacks from social equality, their exposition of republican principles was unconvincing, unable to overcome the rejoinder that the terms of the ‘white
male republic’ insisted upon an egalitarian republicanism only for those within a racially
demarcated community. Advocates questioned the racial demarcation, and accordingly
brought into question their commitment to the ‘white male republic’ and the constitutional settlement secured by the Jeﬀersonians. As we will see, this led to a pattern of
disclaiming any intent to do just that.
The racial ordering, however, also provided space for laboring whites and immigrants
to insist upon inclusion. Few of the delegates expressly based a claim to expanded
suﬀrage for the laboring classes on the grounds of their white skin alone. Whiteness did
not purchase equality. Instead, delegates made other claims to full citizenship, although
these were often implicitly or explicitly circumscribed by race. For instance, Cummin in
Pennsylvania argued that “that every white man that lived in Pennsylvania, who loved
his country, and was willing to turn out and hazard his life in defence of its rights,
had, or ought to have, the right to vote.”204 That is, he argued that the one should
be enfranchised based upon his contribution while attempting to limit the legitimacy of
this claim on racial and gender grounds. Republican equality was premised on other
considerations than mere whiteness; being white was necessary, but insuﬃcient.
Nonetheless, the racial ordering did give laboring whites and immigrants rhetorical
leverage to insist upon their right to vote. On the one hand, delegates argued that the
exclusion of whites from the suﬀrage lowered them to the level of free blacks, or even
to slaves. In doing so, they were able to appeal to popularly resonant commitments
of republican equality, whose substantive content was structured by reference to a white
supremacist ordering. Thompson in Virginia argued for the expansion of the right to vote
beyond the freeholding class, attacking those delegates who denied that non-freeholders
had been injured by exclusion from the right: “because the non-freeholders have not been
hung up without a Judge or Jury—because they have been allowed their civil rights, the
gentlemen say they have not been injured. Free negroes are allowed all their civil rights; the
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non-freeholders no more.”205 By denying the right to vote to non-freeholders, Virginia was
degrading these to the same social status as free blacks, both of whom enjoyed civil rights
and not political rights.206 On the other hand, delegates drew upon the racially bounded
understanding of community to suggest that the opponents of expanding suﬀrage on
class lines were preferential to black men. M’Cahen of Pennsylvania charged a delegate
with abandoning his race and giving preference to the “negro”: “it is not to be forgotten
that, on one occasion in this body, the gentleman was anxious to disfranchise a large
class of the white population of this state; not of the coloured population, sir, but of the
white population—his own peculiar race.”207

Consent, Contribution, and Equality
For the most part, however, advocates for expanding suﬀrage on class lines claimed the
right to vote based on their understanding of republican principles of contribution and
consent of the governed. Both of these, however, were premised upon an understanding
of belonging that most delegates recognized as bound by the institution of citizenship
and the category of race.
Consent and Community
A natural right to consent to the laws to which one is subject oﬀers perhaps the widest
scope for suﬀrage expansion. There were delegates who claimed the right to vote for
the disfranchised on the fact that they were governed, a claim prior to any contribution
and vested in their status as free men with natural rights: “we claim the right of suﬀrage
as freemen—we claim the right to choose our rulers—we will afterwards contribute.”208
However, the universal potential of this claim was highlighted by delegates supporting a
more restrictive suﬀrage, who argued that it would mandate the enfranchisement of all
persons. These delegates traced out the logic of the claim to a position that few of the
delegates were willing to support, as it would violate commitments to allegiance, white
supremacy, and patriarchy. Arguing against abolishing the freehold qualiﬁcation, Leigh
205

Emphasis added. Thompson, Proceedings and debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829-1830 (1830,
418).
206
This was likely a rhetorical ploy, as Thompson would be aware that free blacks did not enjoy full civil
rights in Virginia. But the decision to use this language suggests its broader resonance.
207
M’Cahen, Proceedings. . . Pennsylvania, vol.11 (1838, 53).
208
Woodward, Proceedings. . . Pennsylvania, vol.3 (1837, 118). See also Mayo, Proceedings. . . Louisiana (1846,
98); Wilson, Proceedings. . . Virginia (1830, 351); Leigh, Proceedings. . . Virginia (1830, 398-99).

167

of Virginia declared that “I am incapable of conceiving any natural right. . . which is not
common to every human being. . . . It is manifest, these rights belong not only to every
man who pays public taxes and bears arms, but also to every woman and child in the
community.”209 The implication was that the right to vote was not a natural right, with
the reference to women and children a frequent tactic emphasizing what for the delegates
was the evident absurdity of the position. Others would point to the exclusion of aliens,
of free blacks, of slaves, of criminals, as revealing the political rather than natural nature
of the right.
Precisely because of its potential universality, consent of the governed was understood in practice as a principle limited by community membership, with most delegates
agreeing that the right to vote “attached to the individual upon his becoming a member
of the community.”210 The Virginia Declaration of Rights from 1776 provides a good
example how the principle of consent of the governed was embedded within an understanding of community membership. Article 6 of the declaration reads “all men, having
suﬃcient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community have the right of suﬀrage and cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for
public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected, nor
bound by any law to which they have not, in like manner, assented, for the public good.”
The principle of consent is here limited to men with common interest and attachment
to the community, who alone are considered full members.
The language of common interest and attachment would recur throughout the conventions, and raised the question of what constituted evidence of ones interest and
attachment. Here advocates of more restrictive qualiﬁcations along class lines or less
restrictive qualiﬁcations on racial grounds were at a rhetorical disadvantage. The Jeffersonian tradition of praising the laboring classes and the small farmer meant that
delegates in favor of restrictive suﬀrage were hesitant to deny their membership in the
community, while their advocates in convention had the resonant languages of contribution and equality upon which to draw. But while white men were for the most part
read into the community as full members, they could be read out based upon their behavior, social standing, their residence, or the character of their putative class. Property
was one possible form of evidence of stake in society, and in New York and Virginia in
the 1820s this was deployed to argue that only the freeholder was bound to the soil in
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such a way that gave them suﬃcient stake in society to be trusted with its governance:
“to [the freehold farmer] belongs not only all the real property of the Commonwealth,
but almost all of the personal property also,. . . they are the class. . . who hold the greatest
stake in society; who are the only persons who have any stake that may not be withdrawn
at pleasure. . . who therefore have, and actually take, the deepest interest in the public
welfare.”211
Delegates in favor of expanding suﬀrage on class lines, however, had a powerful
retort, namely that the poor man had an equal interest in life and liberty and these were
conditioned upon the institutions of the state and its well-being:
“has the poor man no interest? Are his personal rights and safety nothing?
Is the sacred right of conscience nothing? Is it nothing to him that he
stands among men a man, equal to the highest and wealthiest? . . . Has he no
attachments to his home, though it may be another’s?. . . Government to the
poor man is his all! . . . All history proves that the poor man feels as great an
interest in the Government of his choice as the rich—nay, if he might make
a comparison he would say a greater.”212
Others would argue that even where attachment or common interest was lacking, enfranchisement would help to ensure that this attachment was generated: “One gentleman
(Mr. Quincy) had looked forward to our becoming a great manufacturing people. God
forbid. If it should happen, however, it was not to be expected, that this modicum of
property required would exclude the laborers in manufactories from voting. It was better
to let them vote—they would otherwise become the Lazzaroni of the country.”213 Advocates for suﬀrage reform argued that the laboring classes, blacks, and aliens would share
attachment and common interest once they were enfranchised. In the South this often
meant that laboring class whites would become committed to the defense of slavery.
“There is one other argument which ought to have some inﬂuence on this
question [suﬀrage]. It is one of delicacy. . . . We ﬁnd that all the slave-holding
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States South of us, deemed it of the utmost importance to make all the free
white men as free and independent, as Government could make them: and
why? Sir, it is known that all the slave-holding States are fast approaching
a crisis truly alarming: a time when freemen will be needed—when every
man must be at his post. . . . Is it not wise now, to call together at least every
free white human being, and unite them in the same common interest and
Government? Surely it is.” 214
Even when the issue of free black suﬀrage was raised in the South some delegates put it
in terms of securing their attachment to the state, and thereby securing slavery.215 Others
argued in favor of enfranchising aliens, as this would make them “feel and know that
they had a permanent interest to sustain—and the welfare of the country to subserve.”216
The delegates were debating membership in a community, whether it should rest on
property, on residence, or on an equal interest in the protection of life and liberty. The
important point, however, is that once this attachment and belonging were recognized,
the grounds for exclusion from the suﬀrage were considerably weakened by republican
commitments to equality and consent. For blacks, the categorical exclusion of the ‘white
male republic’ dominated delegate understandings and imposed additional costs on their
advocates than were imposed on disfranchised white men. A delegate to the North
Carolina convention of 1835 asked “if there is any solid ground for the belief that a
free mulatto can have any permanent interest with an attachment to this country?”217 A
delegate in Wisconsin in 1846 would reference this claim that free blacks could not have
a shared interest in white society, and would juxtapose his position on black suﬀrage
with alien suﬀrage: “I am in favor of withholding the elective franchise from the colored
man for the same reason that I would confer it upon the foreign population,” because
the foreign population had a capacity to be accepted as part of the community that the
racial ordering of citizenship denied to blacks.218
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Contribution to a Community
The republican emphasis on the principle of contribution, which Jeﬀerson had been
advocating in the late 18th century and which was deeply embedded in the Jeﬀersonian
understandings of American citizenship, was an especially important argument in the
conventions. It had the potential to be a limiting principle, and by the 1830s advocates of
maintaining a taxpaying qualiﬁcation were deploying Jeﬀersonian republican language
to this eﬀect: “the doctrine of taxation and representation was a republican doctrine.
The people were sovereign, but no man ought to exercise any right in a community he
did not assist to maintain. Every citizen, however, who contributed to the support of the
community, ought to be entitled to vote.”219
The Jeﬀersonian language of contribution, however, was especially powerful in supporting expansions of the suﬀrage. Not only did the language of equality and class virtue
that had been so strong in the democratic-republican societies have broad resonance,
calling into question the distinction between the contributor and non-contributor, but
the institutional arrangement of the militia likewise gave powerful rhetorical tools for the
securing of suﬀrage for the laboring classes. The language of class virtue and equality
before the law, key features of Jeﬀersonian understandings of citizenship, were deployed
to insist upon a leveling of contribution. Democrat and future vice-presidential candidate for the Liberty Party Thomas Earle would assert that the “poor laboring man”
contributed more to the community than the rich: “He works upon your highways, pays
a tax on nearly all he wears, on nearly all he eats, and on nearly all that his family wears,
and his tax is inﬁnitely greater than that of the wealthy man. He is, too, a producer in
the community and both the wealthy and his country are reaping an advantage from his
labor.”220
The language of class virtue would also be deployed to insist upon the community membership and contribution to society of the laboring classes. Cramer of New
York would assert that “more integrity and more patriotism are generally found in the
labouring class of the community than in the higher orders,”221 while Van Buren would
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describe “this class of men, composed of mechanics, professional men, and small landholders” as “constituting the bone, pith, and muscle of the population of the state.”222
The valorization of the laboring classes was very much part of the Jeﬀersonian language
of republican citizenship, and enabled a rhetorical leveling of contribution away from
taxation and services and to the broader sphere of participation in the market and labor
force.
A legacy of the Revolution was the development of a largely democratic militia. It
was democratic in that it was broadly constituted—every able-bodied free white male between the ages of 18 and 45 being required to participate, or purchase their exemption—
and in that many of the militias were democratically structured, with each level choosing
its immediate oﬃcers. The broad basis upon which the militias were founded meant that
this language, and especially the resonant language of sacriﬁce and service, was available not just to secure particularistic beneﬁts for speciﬁc individuals but to secure rights
for an entire class of persons.223 Because every able-bodied free white male citizen was
liable to do militia service, after a very limited period of residence, delegates in favor of
broader suﬀrage provisions were able to argue that this entire class of persons should be
enfranchised.
The claim of militia service as entailing a right to suﬀrage drew upon the language of
equality and working class virtue that had been so important in the early period of the
Jeﬀersonian regime, and it likewise entailed a veiled threat that were they excluded from
the right of suﬀrage their “ardor would be chilled.”224 As a claim to equal standing within
the community, militia service was especially important. Fuller in Pennsylvania argued
that “the poor man alone was called to do military duty in time of war, while the rich
man provided a substitute, instead of going in person.”225 Memorialists to the Virginia
convention of 1829 argued that the claim that non-freeholders were “too ignorant and
vicious” to enjoy the right of suﬀrage was not believed by the freeholders themselves:
“why, else, are arms placed in the hands of a body of disaﬀected citizens, so ignorant,
so depraved, and so numerous? In the hour of danger, they have drawn no invidious
distinctions between the sons of Virginia.”226 In New York in 1821, delegates opposing
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property qualiﬁcations for the Senate insisted that it was the poor and laboring classes
who bore the burdens of war most heavily, who contributed and sacriﬁced the most for
the country, and who should accordingly be recognized as equals with the propertied
and well-oﬀ: “how was the late war sustained. Who ﬁlled the ranks of your armies?”227
The claim of militia service was perhaps most resonant in regards to war, but even the
burden of regular musters and preparation was considered to be akin to a tax and an
important form of contribution to the community: “Young men of twenty one years old
were subject to a poll tax and to the obligation of performing military duty, which is a
heavy tax.”228
Legitimations founded on militia service, however, could also be deployed to justify exclusions. The barring of blacks and aliens from the militias gave delegates who
desired their exclusion an argument that resonated with Jeﬀersonian republicanism’s
contributory frame. This was most expressly put forward by Erastus Root in the New
York convention of 1821, who argued that the republican principles of contribution are
embedded in an understanding of the community as constituted by those who have an
interest in it and who owe it allegiance. Root articulated the principles of contribution as
demarcating the political family—“the social compact”—in which popular sovereignty
should be vested:
“‘In my judgment, every one who is taken into the bosom of that family
[the social compact], and made to contribute, either in property or personal
service, to the beneﬁt of that family, should have a voice in managing its
concerns. It cannot be denied that the preservation of property is a much
less consideration, than that of a security in our liberty and independence.
Every member of this political family who is worth to be one of its members,
will prize much higher the freedom of the country, than the preservation of
property.”229
This understanding of the community provided him with the rationale for extending the
suﬀrage to the laboring classes, especially in the countryside, as well as legitimating the
exclusion of aliens and blacks: “in case of an invasion or insurrection, neither the alien
nor black man is bound to defend your country. They are not called on, because it is
supposed there is no reliance to be placed in them, they might desert the standard and
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join your enemy—they have not an anchorage in your country which the government is
willing to trust.”230 Upon the initial failure of the New York convention to include the
word ‘white’ in the suﬀrage qualiﬁcations, he proposed an amendment that would have
excluded any person who “if an able bodied man, and within the proper age prescribed
by the laws of the United States” was not “liable to the performance of militia duty.” This
achieved the exclusion of aliens and blacks on a non-categorical basis. Root, however
much he may have been driven by racial animus, was at least consistent. He was willing
to allow their inclusion should Congress determine them liable for militia duty, and
indicated that he would also be willing to exclude white men who did not perform
militia service or were not liable for reasons of residence.231
It is important to distinguish between the militia and the regular army. Service in
the ﬁrst was invoked to include free white men, as a class, while excluding aliens and
blacks. It was seen, because of its democratic, egalitarian, and contributory character, as
a ﬁrm republican basis for inclusion within the suﬀrage, as a marker of attachment and
contribution to the community. The regular army, by contrast, was seen in a diﬀerent
light. This is at least partly evidenced by the pattern of suﬀrage qualiﬁcations relating
to each. At least 4 states had an explicit militia suﬀrage provision, in which those who
did service or were liable to do service in the militia were extended the right to vote.232
By contrast, a number of states had provisions that excluded non-oﬃcers serving in the
regular army or navy of the United States from voting, or from acquiring residence as a
function of being stationed in the state.233
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Debates in Louisiana in 1845 provide indications of the reasoning that underlay the
exclusion of soldiers. A resolution barring from the suﬀrage to “persons of unsound
mind, paupers, non-commissioned oﬃcers, soldiers, marines in the service of the United
States, and all persons convicted of any crimes deemed at law to be felony” was oﬀered
by delegate Voorhies, who claimed that soldiers and sailors in service of the United
States “could not be considered permanent citizens, and as having any real interest in
the aﬀairs of the State.”234 When another delegate protested that this might bar nativeborn Louisianans from the suﬀrage, Voorhies replied by invoking the claim that the
soldier was under the command of others: “for a native of Louisiana enrolling as a
soldier, and subject to be sent from one part of the country to the other, and to be under
the orders of his oﬃcers, ought just as much to loose [sic] the privilege of suﬀrage as any
other citizen.”235
A heated debate erupted when Mr. Taylor of Assumption parish argued that the
principle outlined by Voorhies would embrace commissioned oﬃcers as well: “the principle was the same, and should be applied equally. It may be said that a soldier is subject
to the orders of his oﬃcers, and is dependent upon their will; that he has contracted
for his services. But the same thing may be said of the oﬃcer. He, too, is subject to
the orders of his superior oﬃcer. There should be no discrimination between the oﬃcer
and the soldier, for the principle of excluding one applies equally to the exclusion of
the other.”236 Delegates who defended the inclusion of the oﬃcer rather than the soldier
pointed to their being “among the most gallant portion of our countrymen,” “distinguished commander[s]. . . and others who were fast ascending the ladder of fame.”237
They said that it would be an “invidious distinction” to exclude oﬃcers who were, even
when originating from other states, “essentially, in every respect, citizens of the State”
and “much identiﬁed in its prosperity and the prosperity of our common country.”238
organic laws drafted by Congress. One obvious pattern of these provisions is their sectional character:
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This last part is crucial. It was not only the class bias of the delegates in favor of the
oﬃcer, but the belief that this class was embedded in the community that merited their
inclusion. And it was upon this basis as well, more so than that of dependency, that
led Taylor to claim that oﬃcers as well as soldiers should be excluded: “it is not on the
ground of dependence that I think the exclusion should rest. It should be placed on the
broad ground, that persons in the militia service of the United States neither have, nor
can have a proper civil residence.”239
The army, in contrast to the militia, was potentially neither part of the ‘people’—
being composed of people who were not embedded in the community—nor was it suﬃciently republican and democratic in organization. Accordingly, the argument of sacriﬁce
and contribution was potentially less eﬀective for persons serving in the army or navy
rather than the militia.240
***
The republican principle of consent of the governed, while holding a potential universalism premised on being subject to the laws of a jurisdiction, was restricted to membership within a community. It did not apply in its practical deployment to those who did
not owe allegiance or were not recognized as full members. The Jeﬀersonian language
of contribution, and especially military service, initially oﬀered a powerful rhetoric in
support of inclusion. It too, however, was embedded in an understanding of community
that was racially restricted. The Jeﬀersonian ideal of citizenship’s emphasis on contribution and popular sovereignty did not mandate inclusion—and in fact gave powerful
rhetorical tools to those interested in maintaining an exclusionary suﬀrage qualiﬁcation. Nonetheless, on balance it provided those seeking an expansion of the suﬀrage
greater rhetorical leverage. But the degree to which it did was structured by the ideas
of political belonging. While the principles of consent of the governed and contribution were not necessarily predicated on the exclusion of ascriptively or institutionally
deﬁned categories of persons—blacks or aliens—they were embedded in an understanding of community and belonging in which citizenship and race were especially resonant,
thereby giving delegates the tools to rhetorically position certain groups as outside the
community.
This is not to say that all political agents shared these views, or that their implications and boundaries were uncontested. Rather, it is to say that delegates recognized,
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deployed, and in the process, reconstructed a language that was broadly resonant and
that appealed to an understanding of the proper basis for full inclusion within the rights
of citizenship. This understanding structured the debates in the conventions as well as
in broader political mobilizations, distributing the opportunities and constraints implicit
within it diﬀerentially across population categories. To be clear, I am not suggesting
that the dynamics inside the conventions were of sole or primary importance. In some
cases delegates had considerable leeway in determining what the qualiﬁcations would be,
while in others they represented a well-organized movement that had secured pledges
on the issue of the suﬀrage, backed up by the organizational apparatus of the parties. In
these cases, convention dynamics likely only mattered on the margins.241 However, the
dynamics identiﬁed in the conventions played out on the campaign trail as well. Parties
would be attacked for their positions on the suﬀrage, and votes taken in conventions
would be referenced for decades after. The rhetorical constraints of debate did matter,
but just as importantly, the ideas of the Jeﬀersonian citizenship structured politics in considerable part because they had become embedded in the expectations and calculations
of organized political coalitions.

Public Opinion, Signaling, and Parties
The most important aspect of the political context in which these debates took place
was that of elections, in which political coalitions sought to mobilize support among a
broadly enfranchised adult male electorate. Delegates were variously sensitive to constituent sentiment and public opinion, and sought to respond to their expectations about
these as well as rhetorically marshal them in support of desired policies. Public opinion
helped lock-in most of the enfranchisements of the antebellum period, with parties unwilling to risk alienating sizeable portions of the electorate by advocating their exclusion.
Despite this project’s emphasis on long-term exclusions from the right to vote, these factors were important in expanding the suﬀrage in the antebellum period. And despite
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the focus on the ideational component of belonging—the ideological demarcation of a
white republican people—the practical considerations of political agents competing for
power were always in play. We should not, however, think of these as exclusive phenomena, that an ideas-focused account must stand in stark contrast and opposition to
a party-based account. Nor should we rely on an analytical identiﬁcation strategy in
which the presence of one implies the other was not operative or important. Rather,
we need to assess the degree to which the political coalitions and the expectations and
calculations of political activists were key mechanisms by which the ideas of American
political identity structured politics.
I look ﬁrst at how delegates’ understandings of the popular resonance of the ideas
of political community structured their behavior, and how they used the ideas of Jeffersonian citizenship to signal commitments and threats to important constituencies. I
then extend this analysis to the level of the political party, showing that parties coordinated the positions of their members with a concern toward the popular resonance
of the ‘white male republic’ and with an eye to easing tensions with their coalitions. I
additionally focus on how the party served as an institutional space incentivizing the
defense of these ideas, thereby generating a positive feedback that helped embed the
‘white male republic’ in the political calculations of agents amid increasing sectional and
class discord.

Delegate Behavior: The Electoral Connection and Signaling
Almost all of the delegates were elected; most were political activists; many were elected
in closely fought campaigns, in which they were obliged to take positions, sign pledges,
and hear the preferences of their constituents. In every convention, most delegates
were concerned with not taking positions too far removed from the preferences of their
constituents. Additionally, they consciously recognized their positions—and the constitutions they were drafting—as signals for political agents. Some delegates sought to
mobilize popular opposition to black suﬀrage, for instance, by insisting that it would
degrade white labor. They used the issue of black suﬀrage to signal a threat to their own
constituency’s interests, a claim that only made sense within the white male republic’s
demarcation of class equality within a racially bounded community. This is less a matter
of the ‘wages of whiteness,’ although certainly a psychological wage was of some importance (Roediger 1991). While it was logically possible that racial political equality would
not mean the undermining or degradation of white labor, anti-black suﬀrage delegates
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sought to frame the motivations of pro-black suﬀrage delegates as being motivated by a
desire to subordinate white labor. This signaled a willingness to question the Jeﬀersonian
settlement, a settlement that had established the broad terms for the continuation of the
Union and the incorporation of the white working classes. The white working classes
had a stake in the success of this settlement, and they were being reminded of this in no
uncertain terms by the delegates in convention.
The most important signal, however, was over slavery. In various conventions, none
more so than Pennsylvania’s in 1838, the need to assuage southern fears of northern
abolitionist tendencies was an important motivation in barring blacks from the franchise. At the same time, abolitionist and anti-slavery delegates embraced the cause of
black suﬀrage in order to signal a broader opposition to the demands of the South. Disfranchised groups often need enfranchised allies to press their cause and to place their
disfranchisement on the political agenda. The abolitionist and anti-slavery movements
would provide allies to the free black communities in pressing for inclusion within the
suﬀrage. Both of the major political parties, albeit the Democrats more than the Whigs,
would react to these demands by attempting to defend black exclusion while not being
seen as overly sympathetic to an increasingly disliked southern slaveholding class.
Public Opinion
Public opinion or constituent instructions were frequently raised in discussions on suffrage, for blacks, aliens, and in debates over property and taxpaying qualiﬁcations.
These references sought to justify a given policy position by alluding to the importance
and tendency of public opinion, or by explaining that they had been instructed by their
constituents to take said position. Loudon in 1851 Ohio insisted that “there is a feeling. . . in the section of the country I come from, upon that one particular subject. . . that
outweighs perhaps, all other feelings. . . . A majority of the people of the county I represent, without regard. . . [to party] believe. . . that this should be a State for the white
man, and the white man only.”242 Shellito in Pennsylvania announced that “he had received some instructions [from his constituents],” whose substance was “against allowing
the blacks to vote.”243 Ratliﬀ in Louisiana argued that “the property qualiﬁcation was
odious with the people, and had been disregarded,” and that he himself opposed this
qualiﬁcation “because such is the declared wish of the people.”244
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Delegates drew upon public opinion to buttress their positions and, if they believed
their positions might be unpopular, sought to explain their motivations to their constituents. Marigny in Louisiana oﬀered a very limited black suﬀrage amendment in the
convention, which he withdrew after a few days. His explanation is telling in its suggestion of the importance of public opinion in structuring the positions that delegates were
willing to take, and in the lengths to which they would go to ensure that their motivations
were not misconstrued when they were found to be against popular opinion:
“a few days ago I laid upon the desk a section to be inserted under the
head of general provisions. The object of the section was to empower the
legislature to extend the right of citizenship to persons of colored origin,
whenever required by the public interest. But public opinion being against the
measure, and many of the members of the Convention who seemed to approve of it,
having since expressed themselves against it, I am now satisﬁed that it would be
rejected. I believe it is my duty to withdraw it. I trust that the members of the
Convention of the State at large will do me the justice to believe that my motives
were pure.”245
The importance of public opinion in structuring delegates’ behavior can be seen in the
strategies of disclaiming engaged in by delegates. Delegates were frequently concerned
with assuring their constituents that they did not have aﬀection or sympathy for blacks,
that they were not aristocratic in tendency, or that they did not harbor any ill will or
prejudice toward immigrants. Some delegates were careful to disclaim hostility against
blacks, although disclaiming sympathy was more common. A considerable number of
delegates who supported black suﬀrage rights would disclaim support for abolitionism,
just as those who opposed black suﬀrage would disclaim support for slavery.
Delegates opposed to removing property or pecuniary qualiﬁcations sought to ensure
that in supporting these they were not in favor of aristocratic governance or in denying the virtue of the laboring classes. Barbour in Virginia insisted that his position on
property qualiﬁcations for the suﬀrage was not aristocratic: “I am told to insist upon
connecting the Right of Suﬀrage, with an interest in the soil, is aristocracy; rank aristocracy. Sir, this is a grave charge, and I shall certainly be the last to advocate any measure,
against which such a charge will justly lie.”246 Barnett in Ohio sought to correct a belief
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that, he worried, “had gone abroad about the State, and among his constituents,” that
he was in favor of a property qualiﬁcation: “It had been said that he had been in favor
of a property qualiﬁcation. . . . There was no such thing.”247
In the early part of the antebellum period, delegates would disclaim support for
universal suﬀrage, which continued to suﬀer in some quarters from its association with
the ‘excesses’ of French republicanism: “he was not the advocate of universal suﬀrage.
That doctrine could not be sustained on any principle.”248 Subsequently, as the valence
of the term ‘universal suﬀrage’ became more positive, supporters of black and female
suﬀrage sought to expand its meaning to encompass these categories. Delegates who
supported universal suﬀrage as white manhood suﬀrage sought to assure the convention
that they did not embrace the new meaning. In Indiana a delegate debating a resolution
that called for universal suﬀrage, stated that “According to our general understanding
of the right of universal suﬀrage, I have no objection to the adoption of the resolution;
but if it be the intention of the mover of the resolution to extend the right of suﬀrage to
females and negroes I am against it. ‘All free white male citizens over the age of twenty
one years’— I understand this language to be the measure of universal suﬀrage: that
there shall be no property qualiﬁcations, no religious tests.”249
These strategies of disclaiming—of explaining a delegate’s motivation so as to avoid
being liable to the charge of violating understandings of white male citizenship—were
especially common in debates over black suﬀrage. Delegates were concerned with being
seen as sympathetic, or unnecessarily hostile, toward black men. Platt in New York
defended his position in favor of black suﬀrage by noting that “I am not disposed, sir, to
turn knight errant in favour of the men of colour.”250 Merrill, who supported a limited
enfranchisement of black Pennsylvanians, disclaimed sympathy as well as the question
of abolitionism: “he had no prejudice in their favor.”251 Biddle, in the same convention,
defended his support for black suﬀrage by saying that while he was willing to admit
them, they were “not a desirable species of the population” and he “should not prefer
them as a matter of choice.”252
I suggest that the pattern of disclaiming is revealing as to delegates reading of public
sentiment on these issues. They sought to disclaim sympathy for blacks, support for abo247
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lition, or support for black suﬀrage. By contrast, they sought to disclaim hostility toward
the laboring classes, support for aristocracy, or the charge of aristocratic upbringing. The
contrast is especially vivid with regard to immigrants and blacks. While many delegates
did seek to disclaim hostility toward blacks, suggesting that they took their positions not
from prejudice but from concerns for public policy, and regretted the conditions that
made black exclusion exigent, most disclaimed sympathy or aﬀection. By contrast, while
some delegates—and many in the associated nativist movements—attacked immigrants
as a class, it was primarily those who supported diﬀerential treatment of native and
naturalized citizens or opposed alien suﬀrage who disclaimed hostility or prejudice.
Many delegates in favor of restricted rights on aliens or naturalized citizens denied any common feeling or association with the diﬀerent nativist parties. A delegate
opposing an alien suﬀrage provision in the Wisconsin convention of 1846 denied any
association with the Native American party, saying that “he had no feelings in common
with that party.”253 A delegate in Louisiana supporting a provision that would restrict
access to the governorship to native-born citizens argued that an opposing delegate “is
mistaken, greatly in error, if he supposes that the section under consideration was ever
conceived or thought of, under what he pleases to term the doctrine of ‘nativism.”’254
Others wanted to make it clear that the positions they were taking were not motivated by
antipathy, lest they generate opposition to future campaigns among immigrant populations. Woodward in Pennsylvania wanted it to be “understood that I cherish no prejudice
against foreigners, I entertain no feeling of unkindness towards them, from whatever part
of the world they may come, nor would I do any thing which should have a tendency to
proscribe them from coming,” while Grymes in Louisiana insisted that “it must not be
conceived. . . that I am the enemy, or would, if I could, prevent our shores from being the
asylum of all those that choose to seek them.”255
The diﬀerent tendencies of disclaiming for black and immigrant suﬀrage suggests
that delegates who favored the former and those who opposed the latter were more
likely to be on the defensive, along with those who did not wish a further expansion
of the suﬀrage on class lines, rhetorically positioning themselves so as to not violate
popular standards or oﬀend enfranchised communities. This did not necessarily mean
that they always lost, but rather that delegates were aware of and sensitive to public
opinion on these issues, and that the desire to avoid violating the resonant ideals of the
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‘white male republic’ was a motivating factor in position taking. Strategies of disclaiming
reveal a concern among delegates with ensuring that their motivations and preferences
be known to their constituents.256
Delegate disclaiming and their broader attention to public opinion was motivated by
a concern that altering the terms of citizenship would hurt them electorally, reﬂecting
a belief on their part that the public was committed to this ideal. The tallies on black
suﬀrage referenda in the late antebellum period (Table 5.1) strongly suggest that they were
correct in this assessment. And while the low turnout in these votes relative to turnout
in comparison elections suggests that black suﬀrage was not an issue that motivated the
majority of the electorate, delegates did believe popular preferences on this matter were
quite intense. McQueen of North Carolina argued that the “current of public sentiment
sets strongly against their exercise of this right,”257 while others warned of riots and
bloodshed—of whites attacking black men who attempted to vote: “in the city of New
York, negroes would never be permitted to come up to the ballot boxes, or if they did
come, it would only to be bought and sold like cattle in the market. Riots and violence
would be the order of the day.”258
Delegates drew on what they claimed was a strong antipathy against blacks in order
to buttress their opposition to black voting rights. They were of course political agents
in a party system that actively made sympathy with blacks a campaign issue, and which
saw the local leaders of the Jeﬀersonian and Democratic coalitions encouraging violence
against blacks, and so their invocation of public hostility has a measure of chutzpah.
But the public disturbances that did occur on this issue, especially on the issue of
abolitionism, and the frequent deployment of race-baiting in political campaigns suggest
that commitments to white supremacy had a strong resonance with a constituency that
had intense preferences on this issue.
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Table 5.1: Referenda Results for Diﬀerent Suﬀrage Qualiﬁcations
State
Issue
For
Against Comparison
Turnout
(Year)
(%)
(% )
Election
(% of Comp.)
Massachusetts
Taxpaying
18,702 10,150
53,762
28,852
(1820)
Qualiﬁcation (64.8%) (35.2%)
(53.7%)
New York
Black
49,651 147,282
472,090
196,933
(1846)
Suﬀrage
(25.2%) (74.8%)
(41.7%)
Wisconsin
Black
7,664
15,505
34,350
23,169
(1846)
Suﬀrage
(33.1%) (66.9%)
(67.5%)
Connecticut
Black
4,769
17,453
64,182
22,222
(1847)
Suﬀrage
(21.5%) (78.5%)
(34.6%)
Wisconsin
Black
5,265
4,075
30,000
9,340
(1849)
Suﬀrage
(56.4%) (43.6%)
(31.1%)
Michigan
Black
12,840 32,026
45,602
44,866
(1850)
Suﬀrage
(28.6%) (71.4%)
(98.4%)
Connecticut
Literacy
17,275
12,518
64,534
29,793
(1855)
Test
(58.0%) (42.0%)
(46.2%)
Massachusetts
Literacy
23,833 13,746
130,582
37,579
(1857)
Test
(63.4%) (36.6%)
(28.8%)
Wisconsin
Black
24,000 36,000
89,000
60,000
(1857)
Suﬀrage
(40.0%) (60.0%)
(67.4%)
Iowa
Black
8,479
49,267
79,497
57,746
(1857)
Suﬀrage
(14.7%) (85.3%)
(72.6%)
Sources: Benson and Silbey (1984), Dykstra (2005), Finkleman (2006, 191), Field (1982),
Haynes (1898), Hartwell (1910), Renda (2002), Journal. . . Wisconsin (1849, 19),
Whig Almanac and United States Register, multiple years.
Comparison elections: MA 1820, gubernatorial election; NY 1846, gubernatorial election of 1844
WI 1846, vote on constitution; CT 1847, presidential election of 1844; WI 1849, gubernatorial election;
MI 1850, vote on constitution; CT 1855, gubernatorial election of 1857; MA 1857, gubernatorial election;
WI 1857, gubernatorial election; IA 1857, vote on constitution.
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Signaling and the ‘white male republic’: Working Class Whites
Explaining the popular resonance of the ‘white male republic’ is an important theme in
studies of American political development and historiography. There has been a considerable literature highlighting and seeking to explain the intensity of white supremacy
commitments and heightened conﬂict on racial lines among the working class, with a
variety of accounts advancing some form of ‘wages of whiteness’ claim, that the white
working class opposed black rights and embraced white supremacy as a compensation
for their own declining status (Roediger 1991).259 But in focusing their attention on the
violence and intensity of white supremacy among the white working classes, these works
often obscure the wide class distribution of these commitments. When Frederick Douglass walked arm-in-arm with two white women down Broadway, he recorded disgust
among both the “reﬁned” and the “vulgar.” When delegates asked whether anyone was
willing to invite the ‘negro’ to their table, very few responded in the aﬃrmative: “when
we saw ladies of the highest respectability met in grave assembly, and passing resolutions in favor of what they called their coloured brothers and sisters, while, at the same
time they would not associate, or intermarry with them, how could we believe that they
were in earnest when they talked as they did?”260 While economic and other factors
certainly exacerbated tensions between laboring class blacks and whites, this conﬂict
was premised upon an understanding of belonging that constructed race and citizenship
as the fundamental axes of membership in the community and that sustained a set of
in-group/out-group categories that was premised upon a racial demarcation between the
black and the white.
These understandings of belonging were associated with a set of institutional arrangements in which laboring, middle, and upper class whites had an important stake,
none more important than the Union itself. The idea of the ‘white male republic’ had political force because a considerable portion of the population, and a variety of organized
constituencies, believed that disrupting the ‘white male republic’ would undermine a
political settlement that had provided the context for the preservation and expansion of
the Union and the relatively stable incorporation of the laboring classes and immigrants
into political life. This is evident in the eﬀorts of delegates to oppose black suﬀrage by
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signaling to interested constituencies the supposed second-order eﬀects of black enfranchisement on the civic status of working class whites and on the stability of the Union
itself.
Delegates opposed to black suﬀrage, especially Democrats between the 1830s and
1850s, would argue that the inclusion of blacks into the suﬀrage would degrade the status of white laboring classes. Although the economic position of the laboring classes
had become in many ways more tenuous, as they had become more dependent on wage
labor in an increasingly national market, they had been actively incorporated into political life, primarily through the Democratic Party. Property qualiﬁcations for suﬀrage and
oﬃce-holding had been removed, as had taxpaying qualiﬁcations in a number of states.
And, importantly, their civic status as “virtuous mechanics,” embodying the principles of
republican independence, continued to resonate, despite the increase in labor mobility
and the changing composition of the laboring classes. In popular press and in political campaigns, the laboring classes were encouraged to compare their situation under
American republicanism to that which they would suﬀer under European aristocracy,
and there was an ongoing eﬀort to ensure that the laboring classes believed that their
civic status and economic welfare was secured through the institutions of American citizenship. By opposing black suﬀrage on the grounds that it would degrade the status of
white labor, delegates were signaling a threat to the understandings of American identity
upon which the civic status of white male workers was premised.
Racial equality, delegates claimed, threatened to undermine the arrangement of citizenship that had secured to the white male worker a measure of class equality. Russell
of New York hoped, in 1846, that “there was no class of men, in this body, or in the state,
who advocated negro suﬀrage, for the intended object of degrading our white laboring
classes to the same servile condition of that class in other countries.”261 Delegates in
Pennsylvania were especially likely to present black suﬀrage as the degradation of the
white laboring classes. Opponents of black suﬀrage argued that by disfranchising blacks
the state “will not then be the receptacle of fugitive slaves, or runaway negroes from slave
holding states, as she is now. . . to much and increasing disadvantage to the honest and
industrious mechanics and working classes of our society.”262 Brown in Pennsylvania
asked whether any man would “place the poorest white man, who goes to the polls with
the highest, and deposits his vote as fearlessly, on the same footing with the negro?”263
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M’Dowell attacked universal suﬀrage—as equal rights for blacks—on the grounds that
it would mean that “every negro in the State, worthy and worthless—degraded and
debased, as nine tenths of them are, will rush to the polls. . . The chimney sweep and
the boot black will eat the fruits of liberty with the virtuous mechanic, laboring man,
farmer, and merchant–the master and the man contend for victory at the same poll.”264
Brown of Ohio “considered that extending the right of suﬀrage to our coloured population would. . . have a tendency to degrade labor.”265 Shellito in Pennsylvania suggested
that enfranchisement was motivated by a desired to see a racial leveling: “if gentlemen
were desirous to see the negroes on a level with whites, give these negroes the right of
suﬀrage, and your sons and your daughters will, by and by, become waiters and cooks
for them. Yes! For these black gentry—that will be the result of it.”266 Stow in New York
pointedd out that black suﬀrage would suggest black equality with the white working
class: “who was to be aﬀected by [black suﬀrage]? Men of high condition? The men of
wealth, who were removed far from ordinary connection with labor, would feel it very
little. It would extend mainly to those who labor day by day; it would reach that class of
citizens and draw them down to give a doubtful elevation to another class.”267
As discussed above, antebellum political agents had developed a theory of rights that
saw political and social equality as necessarily linked. Whereas Tocqueville saw the direction going from social equality to political equality, political agents in the antebellum
period stressed the reverse. By successfully linking these spheres, delegates were able to
signal to the population that their social status, in addition to their economic well-being,
would be unsettled by the recognition of black citizenship rights, even if this might be
called for by their republican principles. I suggest that this is how the frequent invocation
of black suﬀrage degrading white labor, with the latter frequently (although not always)
framed to include immigrants, should be interpreted. These were not simply expressions
of political theory or the assessments of delegates about the potential consequences of
enfranchisement: these were eﬀorts by delegates to rhetorically construct these consequences and signal them to a broader constituency of the attentive white working class
and its organized activists, thereby mobilizing these in support of a measure that the
Democratic party found beneﬁcial for electoral and coalitional reasons.
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Signaling and the ‘white male republic’: Slavery and National Unity
The other area in which delegates sought to use the ideas of the ‘white male republic’ as
a signal was over the issue of slavery and national unity. Interestingly, this concern with
slavery and national unity cut in both directions. While most delegates who invoked
concerns with national unity and slavery argued against black suﬀrage, a number sought
to signal through their support for black voting their opposition to slavery and to southern demands. This reﬂected the fact that in “many of the key sectional struggles. . . the
question of free blacks, not of slaves, proved to be the principal battleground” (Forbes
2007, 112). Jay, in the New York convention of 1821, praised the state legislature and
the state’s congressional delegation for their actions in the Missouri crisis, and explicitly
noted that the exclusion of blacks would be a signal to the South that their demands
would be respected: “This state, Mr. Chairman, has taken high ground against slavery, and all its degrading consequences and accompaniments. . . . Adopt the amendment
now proposed [to insert the word ‘white’], and you will hear a shout of triumph and a
hiss of scorn from the southern party of the union, which I confess will mortify me—I
shall shrink at the sound, because I fear it will be deserved.”268 Of the several votes
on holding a referendum on black suﬀrage that were held in the Connecticut legislature
between 1838 and 1869, only those held in 1846 and 1847 received a majority of both
major parties, and both times the issue of slavery motivated member positions. In 1846
“the unorthodox manner in which Texas was admitted into the Union,” had “spurred
charges that slaveholders dominated the Democratic party,” while in 1847 “the major
parties were trying to outdo each other in proclaiming themselves the true opponents of
the expansion of slavery” (Renda 2002, 249).
The growing conﬂict over slavery both fed and was provoked by the rise of third
parties, who sought to tie the cause of black political rights to opposition to slavery and
southern expansion. For the most part, however, the antebellum period was characterized by successful exclusion of blacks, as northern political leaders sought to signal a
commitment to white supremacy to their sectional allies. Both New York and Rhode
Island would disfranchise black men in the wake of the Missouri crisis, as northern Republican leaders sought to secure their national political coalition while at the same time
highly sensitive to northern opinion in defense of restricting slavery. Martin Van Buren’s
opposition to manhood suﬀrage—opposing both a residential qualiﬁcation and black
suﬀrage—and his eﬀorts to centralize appointments of justices of the peace and ensure
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legislative selection of presidential electors (rather than popular election) have been presented as an eﬀort to “deliberately. . . restrict New Yorkers’ suﬀrage in order to ease the
way for a political strategy that employed as its cornerstone an unpopular coalition with
overtly sectionalist elements of the South” (Forbes 2007, 138).269
The Jeﬀersonian construction of the ‘negro’ as outside the American community became an increasingly important part of the coalitional strategy as conﬂict over slavery
increased. Even in the South the issue of black suﬀrage and slavery were intimately
entwined. The Tennessee and North Carolina conventions of 1834 and 1835 saw a considerable number of delegates defend black suﬀrage (the vote to include the word ‘white’
succeeded in Tennessee by a vote of 33 to 23), and by far the most important determinant of a delegate’s vote was the proportion of the population held in slavery in the
delegate’s county, with the vote cutting across party lines. In the northern conventions
opposition to black suﬀrage was seen by delegates as a way of signaling to the South that
they would defend the existing constitutional order; they would personally be opposed
to slavery, and possibly even oppose its extension, but through their support of exclusionary laws they would signal their opposition to abolitionism and their commitment
to the ‘white male republic’. In no convention was this more important than in Pennsylvania’s convention of 1837-38, at the height of the Gag Rule controversy. As noted by
Nicholas Wood, who convincingly argues that slavery and national unity concerns were
the primary motivation for black disfranchisement in this convention, “the issue of black
suﬀrage and abolitionism became inseparable” (Wood 2011, 75). Many delegates believed
that southerners would view support for black suﬀrage by the convention as “a sanction
given to the anti-American doctrines of the abolitionists,” with their votes “carried to
Congress to show how nearly this state was divided on the subject of abolition.”270
Wood argues that the changed position of Democrats between June 1837, when the
convention rejected black disfranchisement, and January 1838, when it supported it, reﬂects the fact that “delegates on both sides of the issue increasingly focused on the connection between black suﬀrage in Pennsylvania and concurrent debates on abolitionism
in the United States Congress” and that “it appears that the controversy in Congress, in
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which northern Democrats were pressured to ally with southern slaveholders, also tipped
the balance against black suﬀrage within Pennsylvania” (Wood 2011, 84). Meredith argued that the constitution mandated a measure of black disfranchisement as a corollary
to its protection of slavery: “[W]e are under a most solemn compact not to interfere in
the domestic aﬀairs of the people of the south—not to take any measure to release the
blacks from bondage. As long as the constitution of the United States remained in force,
we were bound rather to guard the rights of the south, than to do any thing to impair
them.”271 Brown was especially explicit in equating black suﬀrage with disunion, trusting
that delegates would oppose the former “if the right of the negroes to vote was to be put
in the scale against the union of these states,”272 and arguing that pro-suﬀrage delegates
“would have us put ourselves in an attitude of deﬁance to the southern states, instead
of doing all that lay in our power to quiet the apprehensions and alarm which the mad
schemes and conduct of northern abolitionists had created among them!. . . By arraying
one state against the other, the abolitionists might succeed in accomplishing their atrocious ends, and at the same time, the dissolution of the Union.”273 While debates over
slavery and national unity were especially prominent in Pennsylvania’s convention, they
were likewise expressed in conventions in Indiana, Ohio, New York, and Wisconsin. Cornell in New York in 1846 “believed it would be against the manifest spirit of the Federal
Constitution, to privilege the negro with any direct voice in our political aﬀairs, and that
it would be dangerous to our welfare, and to the union of the States.”274
Advocates of black suﬀrage recognized the eﬀorts by the opposition to both smear
them as uninterested in the fate of the Union and to signal a commitment to the South:
they sought to disclaim charges of the ﬁrst and to highlight the willingness of anti-suﬀrage
delegates to engage in the latter. Andrews in Ohio noted that “there is a sensitiveness
in this quarter upon every question that relates to the people of color of which I had
heretofore no conception. Every movement and even every throb of sympathy in their
behalf seems to be regarded as a direct or indirect attack upon the cherished institutions
of the South, and as indicating disaﬀection to the Union.”275 Reigart in Pennsylvania
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echoed Jay’s concerns in 1821, noting that “the vote we are about to give, will excite
great surprise every where. In the south, it will be celebrated almost with bonﬁres,
illumination, feasting, and every demonstration of joy. In it they will see the triumph of
southern principles in good old staid Pennsylvania; and we shall be obliged to witness
the galling spectacle of the triumph of the dark spirit of slavery in our native state.”276
Other delegates sought to disclaim any attachment to abolitionism, arguing instead that
the exclusion of blacks from the suﬀrage represented a violation of republicanism that
would be “the very foundation upon which the abolition party would be raised and other
parties distracted.”277
Regarding Pennsylvania, Wood argues that appeals to ideologies of racial inferiority
“were among the weaker in the repertoire of pro-disfranchisement delegates, indicating
that racial ideologies remained inchoate and in ﬂux during this period” and that appeals
to national unity were considerably more eﬀective (Wood 2011, 98). There is much truth
to this. What is equally important to note is that the race-based arguments that were
oﬀered stressed the dangers of amalgamation—the term used by the considerable majority of anti-black suﬀrage petitions—and thereby highlighted the violation of popular
Jeﬀersonian understandings of belonging. At the same time, the strong inverse association between preferences on black suﬀrage and white suﬀrage, in this convention and
elsewhere, should not be excluded from the analysis. It was in Pennsylvania more than
elsewhere that the argument that black suﬀrage degraded white labor was oﬀered most
consistently, with delegates arguing that black suﬀrage equaled amalgamation which in
turn necessitated social equality and economic competition. Both the national unity
claim and the amalgamation claim, then, suggested that black suﬀrage was in itself, or
by association with abolitionism, a violation of the constitutional settlement that had
secured the incorporation of laboring whites into American politics and the stability of
the Union. The invocation of these ideas was a signal to southerners, to party leaders,
and to organized constituencies of the working classes that their respective interests were
being defended.278
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Party Calculus: Partisan Competition and Coalition Maintenance
Ideas of the ‘white male republic’ shaped parties’ electoral calculus and motivated their
readiness to take certain position on inclusion and exclusion in at least two ways. First,
the belief that it had broad popular resonance made Democrats more likely to campaign
against black suﬀrage than a simple attention to electoral beneﬁts would predict, and at
the same time made Whigs more hesitant to support black suﬀrage, despite recognizing
that they would be the primary beneﬁciaries from doing so. At the same time, it made
them more likely to be divided over the question of alien voting. This in turn likely
enhanced the resonance of the Jeﬀersonian understanding of belonging, as voters took
their cues from the parties.
Second, they provided a language through which the parties could actively seek to
preserve their national coalitions. This is one of the primary ways by which ideas matter
in politics: the idea of the ‘white male republic’ had helped to consolidate the Jeﬀersonian coalition, and the creation of a broad national party provided the institutional arena
in which articulate expressions of this idea and defenses of it in policy were incentivized
in the form of party inﬂuence, prestige, and patronage. Parties sought to enforce allegiance among their members behind diﬀering conceptions of American citizenship, and
the height of the second party system saw two national parties attempting to reconcile
their coalitions through allegiance—in policy and rhetoric—to the ‘white male republic’,
providing considerable organizational muscle to the ideas of belonging that had been
worked out in the ﬁrst decades of the 19th century.
The logic of enfranchisement resulting from partisan competition, as sketched out
in earlier chapters and prominent in the literature, is that political parties will seek to
alter suﬀrage qualiﬁcations in order to maximize their own share of the vote. There
are likely limits on the ability to disfranchise previously excluded votes, most versions
of this model implicitly assume, and so parties seek to expand the franchise along
certain dimensions that are seen as disproportionately favorable to them. A problem
with these models that is rarely speciﬁed, is that it can often be the case that the beneﬁts
of given suﬀrage change are themselves uncertain. While uncertainty has been invoked
to explain why certain parties have pursued suﬀrage expansions that are subsequently
revealed to be opposed to their electoral interests, it has been less discussed with regard
to the possible trade-oﬀ of lost support among one population category that might
results from enfranchising another. In short, the beliefs held by political agents about
popular commitments to the ‘white male republic’—in its white supremacist and white
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exclusionary dimensions—generated expectations about the potential costs of diﬀerent
positions on black enfranchisement that informed their political calculus.
The incentives of the Democratic Party—as with the Jeﬀersonian Republicans before
them—were especially aligned with the ideas of the ‘white male republic’. Democrats
were unlikely to receive much support amongst free blacks, in part because they were
seen as the more southern oriented of the two parties and in part because the greater
strength of the Whigs in cultural regions and classes where vitriolic defenses of white
supremacy were less common made them a softer and quieter party when it came to
race hatred. Their defense of the ‘white male republic’, then, was more impassioned and
it is diﬃcult to separately identify the role of the expectations of popular attitudes and
beliefs and the purely partisan interests. However, even where there were very limited
gains to be made by excluding black voters—such as in 1802 Ohio, where there were
fewer than 500 blacks in the territory and the main debate in the convention was over
whether currently resident black men would have the vote—the Jeﬀersonian Republicans
and later the Democrats were much more likely to support black exclusion.
With the Whigs, however, the misalignment of their partisan interest in enfranchising
black men with their expectation that being seen as violating the ‘white male republic’
would hurt them electorally among white men led to considerable vacillation on this
issue. In New York City in the 1840s, Whigs were reluctant to follow the advice of
Horace Greeley, who was working to include an equal manhood suﬀrage plank in the
party platform for the 1845 elections. The same hesitation on the issue and refusal to
endorse black suﬀrage occurred in numerous conventions across the state, especially
those where the Liberty Party had not made signiﬁcant inroads. The Whig party had
good reason for its trepidation on this issue, and even Greeley conceded that “Whigs
lost several delegates because of the Nigger yell” (Field 1982, 50).
The Whig Party in Rhode Island, which during the Dorr War would be largely encompassed in the Law and Order Party, originally sought to secure opposition to Dorr’s
constitution by highlighting the fact that blacks had voted in the referendum supporting
it. That is, they sought to highlight the violation of white citizenship in order to garner national and state sympathy for their continued support of the old charter and its
property qualiﬁcation. Only as the Dorr party moved to exclude blacks, and as black
residents were mobilized for public security and defense of the established order, did the
Law and Order party change position and support black inclusion in the franchise (Malone 2008, 129-138). This vacillation extended to the Republican Party after its formation
193

in 1854, although there were important constitutive elements of the Republican coalition
committed to black suﬀrage. The Republicans in the Iowa convention of 1857 “used the
referendum issue only to determine the political solidarity of the Republican delegation,”
and party leaders insisted that they were not interested in securing the right to vote for
black men (Berwanger 1967, 41). In the Wisconsin referendum of 1857, the party refused
to “support the issue in order to secure the governorship,” and it was hinted that “Republicans would have publicly opposed equal suﬀrage except for the insistence” of the
“old abolition guard.” Democrats recognized the underlying logic of the situation when
they charged that “a Republican dare not endorse it [black suﬀrage], or a Republican
candidate go before the people upon it,” and Republican editors were largely silent on
the issue during the campaign (Berwanger 1967, 43).
The calculations of the Whigs occasionally led them to support black suﬀrage, especially as they were pressured by the rise of third parties such as the Liberty Party, the
Anti-Masons, the Free-Soil Party, and the American Party, which either were opposed
to slavery, lacked a signiﬁcant southern wing, or where the coalition between diﬀerent
state parties and sectional wings of the party was especially weak. The Democratic Party
as well was at ﬁrst uncertain about the threat posed by the rise of these third parties,
and both parties subsequently had an interest in sidestepping certain issues by passing
them to the electorate.279 The results of referenda in the 1840s-50s, however, seemed to
strengthen the Democrats’ resolve on the issue of black suﬀrage.
Party calculations were premised upon their reading of the public commitment to
white supremacy and the white man’s republic. Whigs believed, correctly in many cases,
that they would lose signiﬁcant support among white men if they were seen as violating
this dimension of citizenship. This was an instrumental calculation, but it was one
premised upon their belief that the idea of the white republic resonated so strongly
with the enfranchised population that they would lose constituencies that would have
otherwise supported them.
While the parties crafted policy on the suﬀrage in part based upon their reading of
public beliefs on the matter of black citizenship and equality, they also provided an institutional arena in which taking positions against black suﬀrage was strongly incentivized.
This is another instance, however, in which the ideas of the Jeﬀersonian understanding of belonging and citizenship were institutionalized. These understandings had been
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As noted by Field in discussing the New York convention of 1846, “both parties seemed troubled by
their lack of unity on black suﬀrage and, as a precaution, agreed by bipartisan vote at the convention’s
close to submit the property qualiﬁcation directly to the state’s voters in a referendum” (Field, 1982, 57).
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crafted to hold together a national coalition, and the exigency of doing so only became
more pronounced as the antebellum period progressed and the issue of slavery became
an increasing source of sectional contention and division. The Democratic Party became
even more committed to the ideal of the ‘white male republic’ as an understanding of
American republicanism and belonging that could function as an ideological glue that
could hold together their coalition. Accordingly, party agents who were able to eﬀectively
deploy this language to popular resonance and cross-sectional appeal were rewarded by
increased prestige and importance within the party. By contrast, those members of the
party who actively questioned the ‘white male republic’, or even worse, opposed slavery
and supported a policy of federal opposition to its expansion, had limited avenues for
advancement within the party, and in some cases were eﬀectively excommunicated. This
was the fate of Thomas Earle and Thomas Morris in the 1840s, and a similar fate had
greeted members of the Jeﬀersonian coalition in the ﬁrst decades of the 19th century who
had supported black suﬀrage rights.280
The dynamic in the Whig Party was somewhat diﬀerent. The party tended to draw
much of its support from cultural areas where Jeﬀersonian republicanism had had less
penetration, such as among the New England upper and middle classes. It likewise saw
itself as a consciously conservative party that took Washington as their political model,
while at the same time attempting to mimic and outdo the Democrats in their adherence to the symbols of American democracy.281 As the more conservative party, they
were more likely to support taxpaying qualiﬁcations or extended residency requirements.
While both the Democrats and the Whigs had supported the old Rhode Island charter
and its property qualiﬁcations, the Whigs maintained this support even after the rise
in popularity of Dorr’s Suﬀrage Party attracted Democratic support in the state and at
the national level. Their cross-sectional coalition was always more tenuous than it was
for the Democrats. While some northern Democrats had even come out in defense of
slavery—as a positive role for civilizing the African—very few northern Whigs were willing to do so, and they were very attentive to the necessity of reconciling the abolitionist
leanings of many of its northern followers with the commitment to slavery of its southern
supporters. The 1852 platform, for instance, resolved that
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There is good reason to believe that the changed votes of Republican delegates to the Ohio constitutional convention of 1802 on the issue of black suﬀrage were at least partly the result of party pressure
from the Republicans. See Thurston (1972, 24, fn.21).
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Whig party platforms, “Whig Party Platform of 1852,” Peters and Woolley,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25856.
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“the series of acts of the Thirty-ﬁrst Congress,—the act known as the Fugitive
Slave Law, included—are received and acquiesced in by the Whig Party of
the United States as a settlement in principle and substance, of the dangerous
and exciting question which they embrace;. . . and we deprecate all further
agitation of the question thus settled, as dangerous to our peace; and will
discountenance all eﬀorts to continue or renew such agitation whenever,
wherever, or however the attempt may be made; and we will maintain this
system as essential to the nationality of the Whig party and of the Union.”282
Just as the party acquiesced in the settlement of 1850, they had eﬀectively acquiesced at
the national level in the Jeﬀersonian settlement of a ‘white male republic’. Countervailing interests in the northern states, where they would have beneﬁted from black suﬀrage,
meant that the party was more appropriately seen as acquiescing to the ‘white male
republic’ than in having an embedded interest in promoting and strengthening this political order. Nonetheless, until their ultimate demise in the early 1850s, when exigencies
of national and party unity pressed, they supported not only the protection of slavery but
“all its degrading consequences and accompaniments,” black disfranchisement included.
Because they were sensitive to these national considerations, northern Whigs were often
unable to advance an eﬀective critique of the ‘white male republic’, which only further
embedded this understanding in political calculations and popular opinion. As a result,
they were largely ambivalent about supporting black suﬀrage in conventions.
In Pennsylvania on the ﬁrst vote to insert the word ‘white,’ 1 Whig out of 14 voted to
do so, as did 42 of 67 Democrats and 5 of 52 Anti-Masons. By the second vote to do so,
in January 1838, 6 Whigs supported disfranchisement, as did 57 Democrats and 15 AntiMasons: “Although Whigs did not embrace black disfranchisement with the unanimity
of the Democrats, they increasingly sided with them on this issue. . . [and] Whig converts
to the disfranchisement cause used similar rhetoric to the Democrats, identifying black
suﬀrage as a necessary sacriﬁce to promote harmony between the North and South”
(Wood 2011, 96). In Ohio in 1851, only two Whigs out of 40 supported striking the word
‘white’ from the electoral qualiﬁcations. No Democrat supported it while 10 of the 11 Free
Soilers did. In Wisconsin in 1846, only 6 of 16 Whigs voted for black suﬀrage, as did 9 of
101 Democrats; 9 Whigs voted for a referendum on black suﬀrage, as did 49 Democrats.
In Tennessee and North Carolina, party lines were largely irrelevant to the vote on black
suﬀrage. While the Democrats are clearly more committed to racial exclusion than
282
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Whigs, and more committed to white and immigrant enfranchisement, the Whigs were
not a party in which black suﬀrage enjoyed overwhelming strong support.
The behavior of the political parties—whose calculations of how to expand their
share of the vote was one of the crucial factors driving suﬀrage changes—was, like the
behavior of individual delegates, shaped by their understanding of the popular resonance
of the ‘white male republic’. They were never passive readers of public sentiment, however, and they sought to emphasize diﬀerent elements of the Jeﬀersonian ideals of American citizenship as it suited their electoral and policy objectives. Democrats highlighted
the racial dimension, while Whigs would often increasingly highlight the contributory dimension of Jeﬀersonian republicanism. The third parties, unconcerned for the most part
with securing a national coalition, increasingly highlighted the egalitarian language of
the Declaration of Independence, or the importance of developing an attachment among
new citizens for the institutions of American republicanism. Nonetheless, the diﬀerent
parties were operating within an electoral environment in which the image of Jeﬀerson
and the parameters of the Jeﬀersonian understandings of republicanism and belonging
were believed to be highly resonant, and this structured their behavior accordingly.
But perhaps the most important way in which the ideas and institutions of the Jeffersonian ideals of American citizenship structured party behavior was its legacy of a
national party system. Both the Democrats and the Whigs emerged from a Jeﬀersonian
Republican party that had eﬀectively secured a national coalition based on a commitment to the ‘white male republic’ alongside more contested understandings of the
proper relation between the states and federal government and the proper structuring of
the nation’s political economy. The latter two provided the main lines of demarcation
between the Whigs and Democrats, and while these overlapped somewhat with diﬀering
commitments to the white male republic, the broad consensus in its favor worked to
secure this further as a political order. The party networks themselves incentivized, to
diﬀering degrees, member support for this ideal of citizenship. This was another way
in which the understandings of belonging were institutionalized, part of a political order that structured political processes in such a way that made position taking in favor
of class enfranchisement relatively easier politically than positions in support of black
enfranchisement, that made disfranchisement of naturalized citizens more diﬃcult and
that in certain states lowered the costs to supporting alien enfranchisement suﬃciently
to achieve this objective.
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Conclusion
The ideas of belonging that were at the core of the Jeﬀersonian ideal of citizenship imposed rhetorical barriers to members in advocating for black suﬀrage or the restriction
of suﬀrage along class lines. While these were important in structuring the debates in the
convention, they were also supported more broadly by diﬀerent conﬁgurations of party
and sectional interests: the ideas of Jeﬀersonian citizenship served as focal signals for
political agents, who could use these to identify threats to their interests or opportunities
for advancement based upon the rationales provided by delegates. While not necessarily
connected with the issue of slavery, free black suﬀrage in northern states became a focal
point for southern concerns with northern sympathy for abolitionism and anti-slavery.
Advancement within the political parties, and especially the Democratic Party, was selected in part based on those delegates who were able to build cross-sectional appeal.
Positions against or for black suﬀrage in the state conventions, then, were motivated in
part by delegates’ eﬀorts to send signals to party and sectional agents. At the same
time, delegates forced to respond to charges that they were calling into question core
components of antebellum American identity sought to disclaim any intention of doing
this, so as to avoid electoral consequences from a population for whom the principles
and contours of Jeﬀersonian citizenship were highly resonant.
These political dynamics were structured by the parameters of Jeﬀersonian understandings of belonging. Its broad popular resonance meant that delegates concerned
with constituent opinion were cautious about violating its terms. As outlined in the
previous chapter, this understanding of citizenship and national identity had been constructed so as to maintain a national coalition, and accordingly the articulation of its
core ideas and their defense in policy could function as a signal to coalitional allies. This
provided an organizational imperative for the promotion of suﬀrage policies that were
aligned with the Jeﬀersonian standard, one to which both of the national parties—albeit
the Democrats more so than the Whigs—were sensitive.
The overall eﬀect of this was to distribute the costs and opportunities available to
political agents for their position on the suﬀrage for diﬀerent categories of persons.
Over the long-run, this established a dynamic highly favorable to the enfranchisement
of white males, to naturalized male citizens, and even—although to a lesser extent—to
white male aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens, but one that
at the same time increased the likelihood of black disfranchisement. That these went
together, resulting in the simultaneous inclusion of the white laboring classes and the
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exclusion of free blacks was a function of these simultaneous incentives that were both
constitutive of and central to the advance of the Democratic Party.
By the end of the antebellum period, however, a new, anti-slavery coalition was
emering, drawing on the various strands of abolitionism, anti-Catholicism, and northern
anti-Democratic politics. In its initial years, it would work to broaden its appeal beyond
the anti-slavery and abolitionist movements, in part by committing itself to the standards
of the ‘white male republic’, but repudiating slavery as a constitutive element to this
citizenship ideal. As the course of the war progressed, however, and as the imperatives of
establishing a new political order and secure their national coalition became clear, those
factions of the Republican coalition that had been supporting black suﬀrage since the
1840s came to the fore, and the party organization would in turn become an institutional
space incentivizing the defense of equal rights for blacks.
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Chapter 6
Democratization in the United Kingdom, 1829-1948

“The progress of democracy, though not constant, is certain.”
—John Acton, 1880283

Introduction
As I argued in Chapter 1, standard political science accounts of democratization continue to reﬂect the core arguments of a progressive narrative of history, one that in
the United Kingdom is aptly named the ‘Whiggish’ interpretation (Butterﬁeld 1931).284
While scholars of democratization reject its presumed teleology—by stressing political
contingency, institutional incentives, and structural conﬂict—they nonetheless frequently
accept and reconstitute the ‘Whiggish’ interpretation in their empirical narratives of the
right to vote. This is especially so in the case of the United Kingdom.
The ‘Whig’ form of historical interpretation, characterized by its narrative of a gradual but certain expansion of liberty and political rights, has signiﬁcantly informed British
historiography and popular understandings (Hall and McClelland 2010, 4). This inﬂu283
284

Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone (Acton 1904, 44).
Herbert Butterﬁeld should be credited with the earliest exploration of the whiggish interpretation of
history and the identiﬁcation of its progressive assumptions. Before Butterﬁeld, the terms “Whig history,” “whiggish history,” or “whiggish interpretation” largely referred to the sympathies of the historian
regarding the central conﬂicts of the 17th and early 18th centuries, and their claimed descendants in
the Liberal and Conservative parties of the 19th century (Butterﬁeld 1931, 1944). Butterﬁeld’s later The
Englishman and his History (1944) was itself something of an embrace of a Whig narrative, and is explicitly directed at Britain’s war-eﬀort: tthe 1944 edition was published as part of the “Current Problems”
series of Ernest Barker; the preface to the 1970 edition oﬀered praise to “Liberal, Conservative, and
Labour, schooled in the English practice” for embracing the whiggish attitude toward historical change,
progressive, moderate adaptation—“taking care of the continuities”—and rejecting radical revolution
(1944 [1970], 101).
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ence is evident in the political science literature on British democratization. The work
of earlier scholars of democratization was deeply imbued with this narrative:
“The orderly extension of the suﬀrage in Britain in the nineteenth century
presented a striking contrast to the revolutionary movements on the continent. . . . [T]he great reform acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884-1885 seemed to
prove a democratic theory of progress. . . . The British genius for peaceful
popular reform seemed to demonstrate a particular and signiﬁcant ability on
the part of the aristocracy, the middle classes and the people in harmonizing
the institutions of an ancient kingdom with the advanced political ideas of
the age” (Herrick 1948, 174).
While the ‘Whiggish’ narrative stressed the absence of revolution, it did not claim an
absence of violence or revolutionary threat. In fact, Whig histories emphasized reform
as statesmanship in response to popular demands arising from society’s moral and intellectual development. Progress was the accommodation of enlightened government to
the demands of reason and the popular mood (Trevelyan 1922, 347).
Most accounts of democratization in the UK hew closely to the Whig narrative of
‘British exceptionalism,’ in which an ‘orderly’ process of progressive enfranchisement
is enabled by institutions able to accommodate popular pressure. For Acemoglu and
Robinson, Britain is the “best example of. . . a path of political development” that “leads
from nondemocracy gradually but inexorably to democracy” and where “once created,
democracy is never threatened, and it endures and consolidates” (2006, 1). The “origins
of democracy in Britain” are found in the “the creation of regular Parliaments that were
a forum for the aristocracy to negotiate taxes and discuss policies with the king,” an
institutional arrangement advanced by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Ultimately, “the
ﬁrst important move toward democracy in Britain was the First Reform Act of 1832,”
which began a series of progressive extensions of the franchise (2006, 2). Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens characterize “English democratization” as the “classic (though
not typical). . . slow expansion of democratic rights from the aristocracy to gentry to
bourgeoisie, to petty bourgeoisie and upper working-class, to all male adults, and then to
the whole population” (1992, 62).285 Douglass North, John J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast
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There is an elision in much of this literature between democratization in England, in Britain, and
in the UK. Most accounts use the terms interchangeably, but focus exclusively on England without
consideration of diﬀerent cross-national patterns or how the implications of legislating for multiple
countries might have impacted the democratizing process. I look at the patterns in the UK as a whole.
I refer to the individual countries by name, or refer to Great Britain to distinguish Scotland, England,
and Wales from Ireland.
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argue that the institutions established by the 1832 Reform Act generated a logic of
progressive enfranchisement that ultimately would result in universal suﬀrage. The focus
on gradualism and on an intra-elite accommodation that make subsequent progress
easier is very much in line with the Whig narrative, in which the Reform Act of 1832
“made later extensions of citizenship to a much wider group easier” (2009, 219). For
Toke Aidt and Raphaël Franck the 1832 “Great Reform Act was the pivotal event that
got the snowball rolling” (2012, 2).286
Part of the reason this narrative continues to structure our understanding of democratization in the UK is that it is not without empirical support: democratization from
1832 onwards did proceed through the cumulative passage of legislation, each iteration
of which enfranchised a greater net proportion of the population of the UK; and the
1832 Reform Act did make later extensions politically easier. The Whig interpretation
of history, however, has limited our understanding and theorizing of democratization in
the UK, in at least two ways: (1) its narrative of progressive, gradual enfranchisement and
democratization has obscured the disfranchisements and exclusions that have both accompanied and often enabled this progression; and (2) its focus on England, sometimes
extended in name (but rarely in analysis) to Great Britain or the UK, has limited our
ability to analyze the relationship between enfranchisement and disfranchisement across
the four constitutive nations as well as across the empire more broadly. This case study
reconsiders democratization in the UK from the perspective of democratic exclusion,
while treating the government and parliament not only as the executive and legislature
for England but for the entire UK and the empire. The objective is to outline and explain
an alternative story to the standard narrative of progressive enfranchisement in the UK.
This narrative has also been a central feature in British national identity. The historian Herbert Butterﬁeld identiﬁed and critiqued the Whig “attitude to the historical
process, a way of co-operating with the forces of history, an alliance with Providence” but
also noted that during the 19th century it “became the common heritage of Englishmen”
([1944] 1970, vii). To a considerable extent, this understanding of national identity remains resonant and continues to be propounded. In February 2007, a few months before
becoming Prime Minister, Chancellor Gordon Brown spoke at a seminar on Britishness
286

The “rolling snowball” was the process of progressive enfranchisement, deﬁned by jumping from the
‘beginning’ in 1832 to the ‘end’ in 1928: “Less than 100 years later, in 1928, all men and women aged
21 and above could vote. In the intervening years, the franchise had gradually been extended by the
Second Reform Act of 1867, the Third Reform Act of 1884, and the Fourth Reform Act of 1918” (Aidt
and Franck 2012, 2).
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held at the Commonwealth Club in London, and invoked the “golden thread which runs
through British history,”
“from that long-ago day in Runnymede in 1215 when arbitrary power was
fully challenged with the Magna Carta, on to the ﬁrst bill of rights in 1689
where Britain became the ﬁrst country where parliament asserted power over
the king, to the democratic reform acts - throughout the individual standing
ﬁrm against tyranny and then - an even more generous, expansive view of
liberty - the idea of all government accountable to the people, evolving into
the exciting idea of empowering citizens to control their own lives.”287
Brown sought to weave together an interpretation of an exceptional British history characterized by the progressive unfolding of liberty but rooted in ancient institutions.
‘Britain’ was not a political entity at the time of the Magna Carta, let alone the Glorious Revolution. But Brown was speaking not as an historian but as a political leader,
and the speech’s theme was a story of peoplehood that could accommodate both the
resurgent nationalisms of the constitutive nations and the inﬂux of immigrants.
He was not the ﬁrst to fashion a historical interpretation of British national identity
designed to meet contemporary political circumstances. Thomas Macaulay was one of
the most important exponents of the Whig historical narrative, his History of England
elaborating a vision of British peoplehood that was characterized by its progressive expansion of civil and religious liberty. He was the “chief agent of [the] transformation” of
the Whig view of history into the English view of peoplehood (Burrow 1981, 92). He was
described by Lord Acton as “key to half the prejudices of our age” (1904, 285). But the
History was only the most successful instance of a narrative of political community and
purpose that the Whigs and Liberals had been advancing since the 1820s in a conscious
eﬀort to legitimate their opposition to the existing constitutional arrangement and to
build and consolidate a coalition of liberal Anglicans, Dissenters, Radicals, and Irish
Catholics. It was this broader vision of progressive Britain that would provide an organizing framework for the debates over reform and democracy in this period, and the
Liberal narrative’s “celebration of reform as a national tradition, made British politics
peculiarly vulnerable to reforming movements” (Saunders 2011, 8). As actual history, the
Whig interpretation is a very poor guide to identifying the empirical patterns to be explained. Rather, the Whig interpretation should be considered as part of the explanation.
It was the ideological and discursive context in which the political activists operated, and
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is crucial to explaining both the enfranchisements that the narrative highlights as well
as of the disfranchisements and exclusions that it obscures.
***
This chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by detailing the moments and ultimate trajectories of franchise change in the UK, paying close attention to the exclusions that are
usually obscured by the focus on English development. This is the empirical core of this
chapter, and outlines the patterns to be explained in Chapters 7 and 8. I identify historical cut-points, namely 1828-32 and 1884-86, which while by no means perfect provide
a coherent and meaningful periodization for the analysis (Hewitt 2006). I then turn to
a discussion of the institutional and partisan context of the Victorian era. The period
1828-32 was a critical juncture, and the subsequent decades saw the development of
durable party organizations in Parliament, in the constituencies, and in party sentiment
among the population. This was the institutional context in which the understandings
of peoplehood become embedded in the expectations and behavior of elected representatives. It was the institutional and ideological context that established the parameters
of democratization in the UK, and which in turn generated the patterns of progressive
enfranchisement alongside new disfranchisements and exclusions that this chapter will
highlight.

Franchise Variation and Reform in the United Kingdom
Standard accounts of democratization in the UK focus on the succession of Reform Acts:
1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928, and 1948 (Figure 6.1). TThese are far from being considered
equal in importance. A historian of the Third Reform Act [1884] has remarked that this
bill “has never been thought a dramatic episode in itself, nor is it now seen as dramatic
in the development of representative government” ( Jones 1972, 10). The 1918 Act is
frequently presented as an afterthought, necessary to begin the process of enfranchising
women, but otherwise not a consequential bill. The 1928 and 1948 Acts are often not
included at all in the narrative progression. The ﬁrst equalized the franchise across
gender, while the second abolished plural franchises for the universities and business
owners. An additional set of acts in 1949 established a single franchise for municipal and
parliamentary elections, but did not alter the municipal franchises in Northern Ireland.
Accordingly, plural municipal elections as well as a more extensive residence requirement
was maintained for Northern Ireland local elections, which became one of the major
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grievances of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s.288 Moreover, the analyses tend
to look only at the passage of the reform acts of England and Wales. In reality, a
series of separate reforms radically changed the franchise in Scotland and Ireland, a
misleading oversight on the part of many historians and political scientists (Hoppen 1985,
202). The net result of the 19th century reforms was an increased electorate. In many
Figure 6.1: Timeline of Franchise Reform in England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland 17901950

constituencies, however, the eﬀect was to reduce the electorate or substantially alter its
composition, enfranchising some while disfranchising others. And across the diﬀerent
nations, Scotland and Ireland saw distinct patterns and tended to have more onerous
requirements until 1884. The contours and politics over reform cannot be understood
in isolation from the national question and a limited focus on England obscures the
exclusions and disfranchisements that accompanied the extension of the franchise.
While the standard narrative of democratization in the UK begins in 1832, it was
preceded by the enfranchisement of Irish Catholics in 1793, for elections to the Irish
Parliament, and the subsequent disfranchisement of Irish small freeholders in 1829 for
elections to the Union Parliament.289 This section identiﬁes patterns of exclusion and
disfranchisement largely obscured by the familiar narrative. I begin with an overview
of the franchise as it stood at the end of the period of the Protestant Constitution,
immediately before Catholic Emancipation and the Reform Acts of 1832. I then discuss
the most important changes and their consequences over the course of the 19th and
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The Ireland Act of 1949 was careful to maintain voting rights for Irish citizens living in the UK,
despite the exit of the Republic of Ireland from the Commonwealth in 1948 at a juncture when the UK
still insisted that republics could not be part of the Commonwealth—a position reversed after India’s
independence.
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Catholics in Great Britain were not enfranchised until the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829.

205

early 20th centuries, highlighting the simultaneous occurrence of disfranchisements and
exclusions alongside signiﬁcant expansions of the electorate.
The most important axis of categorization for the franchise in the 19th century UK
was the national dimension, followed by the distinction between county and borough
constituencies. In England and Ireland, each county had two MPs; in Wales each county
had one MP; and in Scotland, twenty-seven counties had one MP while six smaller
counties were combined into three pairs of two counties, each electing one MP but only
on alternating elections. The borough constituencies were speciﬁc towns, cities—and
occasional uninhabited hill or hamlet—that were given the right to return MPs. These
were, in theory, supposed to provide a representation of commercial and urban interests,
although in reality many had been created to secure political majorities. Almost all of
the English and Irish boroughs returned two MPs, while the Welsh and Scots boroughs
(or burghs, in Scotland) returned one MP. Only Edinburgh in Scotland had a distinct
burgh representation, and the other 14 burgh constituencies were composed of groups of
usually ﬁve burghs, often having little relation to each other.
The most important exclusions were based on the amount and type or tenure of
property, according to particularly deﬁned classes in the boroughs, and before 1829,
by religion. English Catholics were barred from sitting in the English Parliament in
1692, and were stripped of the vote in 1696; Irish Catholics were disenfranchised in
1728.290 Catholics in Ireland were re-enfranchised in 1793, although they could not sit in
Parliament or hold most state oﬃces until Emancipation in 1829, which also enfranchised
Catholics in Great Britain. In the English and Welsh counties the right to vote was
extended to male subjects of the King, not subject to any legal incapacity, who held
freehold land of a yearly value of 40 shillings (£2).291 This franchise dated to 1430, when
a concern that “elections had been crowded by persons of low estate, and that confusion
had thereby resulted” led to the establishment of a property qualiﬁcation (Seymour 1915,
11). In pre-reform Scotland, the county franchise was conﬁned to those who held property
directly from the King, and which had been rated at 40s. and on the land register
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The date of Irish Catholic disfranchisement is somewhat ambiguous, although most sources agree that
de jure it was accomplished by 1728. Voting continued illicitly, especially in closely contested elections,
through the ﬁrst half of the 18th century. See J.G. Simms (1960). For the history of the Irish Penal Laws,
see Maureen Wall (1976).
291
The development before 1832 was for a liberal interpretation of what constituted a freehold. While an
explanatory act of Parliament had restricted the suﬀrage to lands of freehold tenure, in practice the
county franchise was considerably wider, including annuities and rent charges arising from freehold
land and with some ecclesiastical oﬃces conferring a county franchise (Seymour 1915, 11).
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prior to September 16th 1681 (Carmont 1947, 180). The Irish counties had until 1829 a
40s. freehold qualiﬁcation as well as £20 and £50 freehold franchises. After the 1829
disfranchisement, the lowest county qualiﬁcation was set at a £10 freehold. Prior to 1829,
the Irish county franchise was only marginally more restrictive than England and Wales
in its level of inclusion on the eve of disfranchisement.
Figure 6.2 shows a box plot of the enfranchisement rate in English, Welsh, Scots,
and Irish counties before 1829.292 The box covers 75% of the observations, the ‘whiskers’
cover all but the outliers, and the outliers are individually marked. The line through
the central box is the median. The outliers are labeled, and their total electorate is
included.293 The cross-national pattern is clearly evident, with Scotland deprived entirely
of a representative system and with no county in any of the nations exceeding 10%
enfranchisement. Even the counties where there was relatively higher enfranchisement,
however, might be under the control of a local landlord, family, or families. Leaseholders
whose tenure was for life or a series of lives were treated as freeholders, in contrast to
leaseholders for a series of years.294 Dependent upon the goodwill of their landlords,
tenants usually deferred to their wishes. Many counties were arranged so that the two
seats (in England and Ireland) were divided between elite families. The result was a low
rate of electoral contests, with many counties going uncontested for decades.
The pre-reform borough franchise was considerably more complicated, but the variation resulted in electorates that ranged from the genuinely popular—with some “elec292

The estimated electorates in the counties and boroughs for the pre-reform period were taken from the
various volumes of the House of Commons series, especially Namier and Brooks (1985), Thorne (1986),
and Fisher (2009). The size of the pre-reform electorate in the boroughs and the counties is a matter
of dispute (Beales 1992; O’Gorman 1993). Pre-1832, the enfranchisement numbers reﬂect scholarly
estimates of the total number of electors per constituency. Post-1832, the enfranchisement numbers are
of registered voters. This underestimates the proportion of the population that conceivably could have
registered. The registration procedures, however, constituted a cost similar to the payment of a poll
tax, and were similarly exclusionary. I report the proportion of the total population, thereby avoiding
making assumptions about the age and gender structure of the individual boroughs and counties.
The disadvantage, of course, is that this can lead to changes in the enfranchisement rate that have
nothing to do with changes in the number of people who have the right to vote. War and famine
can potentially increase the enfranchisement rate, while increased birthrates might decrease it. The
principal advantage, however, is that the larger denominator leads to a greater stability in the numbers
over time.
293
The y-axis has been set from 0 to 40%, for the purpose of making a straightforward comparison with
the borough enfranchisement rates. The tally of 33,014 electors in Co. Galway is almost certainly
inﬂated, but all the same was likely the Irish county with the highest enfranchisement rate.
294
A leasehold for 999 years, not uncommon, was therefore not treated as a freehold; while a leasehold
for the life of one person was so treated. During the period of Catholic disfranchisement in Ireland,
the eﬀect of including leaseholders and excluding Catholics from the vote was to encourage landlords
to lease to Protestants rather than Catholics, where the option was available (Simms 1960, 37).
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Figure 6.2: Variation in County Enfranchisement rates, pre-1829

torate[s]. . . approaching universal suﬀrage” (O’Gorman 1989, 181)—to the rotten boroughs of Old Sarum (with 13 voters and 12 residents, none of them the same) or the
closed corporations of Belfast (13 voters and 37,277 residents) and Edinburgh (33 voters
and 111,235 residents). A plurality of English, Welsh, and Irish boroughs were freeman
boroughs, where those admitted into the freemanship were entitled to vote. There was
considerable variation, but “in many of the larger freeman boroughs around 25% of adult
males had the vote,” while the medium-sized freeman boroughs saw between a quarter
and a third of adult males having the franchise (O’Gorman 1989, 180).295 Assessing the
295

O’Gorman lists Coventry, Chester, Nottingham, Norwich, and Leicester as freeman boroughs where
approximately 25% of adult males had the vote. My own counts—less in-depth than O’Gorman’s—ﬁnds
these boroughs to have had 11%, 7%, 10%, 7%, and 4% enfranchisement rates for the entire community.
Were we to restrict this to only adult males, assuming men were half the population and the under-21
were a third, we ﬁnd that they had approximately 33%, 21%, 30%, 21%, and 12% respectively. While these
numbers are only suggestive, given the assumptions of the gender and age demographics, the only one
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from O’Gorman’s is that of Leicester.
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representativeness of the freeman boroughs is complicated by the fact that residency was
not always required. Additionally, in many instances the parliamentary borough was
geographically smaller than the actual community it supposedly represented.296 These
are not necessarily compounding problems, however, as many of the non-resident voters
were from the community outside the restricted borough boundaries (O’Gorman 1989,
192). While these factors overstate the electorate in some of the freeman boroughs, they
do not undermine the core claim that the larger constituencies often had relatively high
levels of enfranchisement. In Ireland, the freeman boroughs were Anglican bastions
(Thorne 1986, 103).297
The scot-and-lot boroughs extended the franchise to householders who had paid a
local tax and been resident for six months, while the potwalloper borough extended the
vote to resident inhabitants who had not been a charge on the poor rate and whose
household included “a ﬁreplace at which he could cook” (Porritt and Porritt 1903, 31). In
the potwalloper boroughs, “universal male suﬀrage had all but arrived” (O’Gorman 1989,
181). The scot-and-lot boroughs had relatively high enfranchisement rates, but many of
these were small electorates and were correspondingly susceptible to corruption. The
reason for this was two-fold. In small constituencies, it was easier for the electoral agent
of a patron to check to make sure the bribed or intimidated had voted as they were
required. And, smaller constituencies meant fewer people to bribe and intimidate, so
that corruption was aﬀordable. However, in the larger scot-and-lot boroughs, such as
Westminster and Southwark, there was a lively and relatively independent political life
(Thorne 1986, 30).
The corporation boroughs vested the franchise in the burgesses of the corporation,
eﬀectively the municipal council and mayor. These self-perpetuating oligarchies were
most important in Scotland, where only about 1,280 persons across all the Scots burghs
had the right to vote (Thorne 1986, 77). The burgage borough extended the franchise
to the owner or tenant of speciﬁc properties in which the franchise had been vested
when the borough was enfranchised. At Droitwich electors were those “seised in fee
of a small quantity of salt water arising out of a pit” while at Richmond they were the
296

See Parliamentary Representation. Parliamentary Papers (92) XXXVI.31 (1831-32). The return provided
the population of the parish, of the parliamentary borough, and the electors in the borough for the 120
boroughs considered for disfranchisement or reduced seats. While some boroughs and parishes were
co-extensive, a considerable number of these were not. East Grinstead (borough) was listed as having a
population of 1,007 persons in 1831, while East Grinstead (parish) was given a population of 3,364.
297
The Test Act, excluding non-Anglican Protestants from municipal corporations, was repealed in Ireland
in 1780. Nonetheless, local discrimination retained control over the corporations in Anglican hands.
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owners of pigeon lofts (Cannon 1973, 29; Porritt and Porritt 1903, 36). These had the
great advantage that they were often insigniﬁcant plots of land or property rather than
primary residences or active farms; ownership of these could accordingly be quickly
transferred as the election approached. Additionally, the owner of the burgage plot
could transfer the accompanying right to vote to a nominee. Patrons would purchase as
many of the burgage plots as needed, and eﬀectively nominate the MP.
The result of this variation in electoral qualiﬁcations was a corresponding variation
in the enfranchisement rates. Figure 6.3 shows the same information as was shown in the
case of the counties.298 The cross-national pattern is evident, as is the greater variation
and higher rate of enfranchisement in the boroughs relative to the counties. Scotland was
deprived of a representative system, while Ireland had a lower rate of enfranchisement
than England and Wales.299
The unreformed electorates in the open boroughs, moreover, included electors across
most of the social classes. Vernon argues that in Boston and Lewes retailers, craftsmen,
and unskilled laborers “accounted for 80 per cent or more” of the electorate (Vernon
1993, 34); O’Gorman that “the unreformed electorate. . . reached quite far down the social
scale, beneath the artisanate and into the labouring classes to an extent that the Great
Reform Act could not emulate” (O’Gorman 1989, 216). In some of the Irish boroughs,
such as Carrickfergus, Cork City, and Dublin, the unreformed electorate included considerable members of the laboring classes, albeit disproportionately and even exclusively
Protestant.300
A core critique of the pre-reform electoral system was that the boroughs were a source
of political corruption. This was achieved through the smaller electorates in the boroughs, which enabled patrons—individual families as well as the Treasury department—
to buy the votes of the freemen, to purchase the burgage plots in which the franchise
was vested, and to create freemen as well as ﬁctitious voters in a contested election. But
298

Those few boroughs that saw rates of enfranchisement above 50% have been excluded, on the grounds
that these were tiny electorates with a considerable number of non-resident electors.
299
The labels show the range in size of the electorate among the high enfranchisement outliers. While
the extreme outliers are likely to have miniscule electorates, there is no general tendency for the high
enfranchisement boroughs to have tiny or very small electorates. Although there are a large number
of small boroughs, there are also a considerable number of others such as Preston, Lancaster, Beverley,
Newark, and Lichﬁeld with relatively large electorates despite being respectable sized towns and cities.
300
Voters, (Ireland.) Returns of the number of persons entitled to vote at the election of members for cities
and boroughs in Ireland. Parliamentary Papers, (522) XXXI.321 (522) (1830) The freeman electorate
in 1830 Dublin was approximately 2,700 persons and the total borough electorate was approximately
3,400.
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Figure 6.3: Variation in Borough Enfranchisement rates, pre-1829

while patrons could expect, on most occasions, to receive the majority of votes, they
needed to cultivate support through community service. And as many patrons would be
forced to recognize, “the opinions and feelings of the voters had, in the last analysis, to
be consulted,” especially on “particular, long-term issues, such as the war in America,
Catholic emancipation, slavery, the Corn Laws, and parliamentary reform” (O’Gorman
1989, 53). The inﬂuence of dominant families in the counties likewise rested on a combination of economic dependence, goodwill through paternalistic service, and respect
for the broad contours of constituent sentiment. But the size of the counties made them
more unwieldy. It was widely believed that contested elections would lead to a fracturing
of “the connection between the gentry and their dependents” (O’Gorman 1989, 60).
But it was on the boroughs that the political stability of the post-1688 constitutional
order rested. These were defended as an institutional space for the cultivation of political
leaders and a mechanism to ensure the government could maintain a majority in the
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Commons. They were the institutional underpinnings of the Protestant Constitution,
and the corruption in many of these was central to the durability of the post-1688
settlement.301
***
This was the electoral system on the eve of Catholic Emancipation and Reform.
These acts, passed respectively in 1829 and 1832, established a new institutional arrangement, but one that disenfranchised a large number of existing voters and built
in new exclusions. The 1829 Disfranchisement Act excluded almost all of the modest
and poor farmers in Ireland. The Reform Acts of 1832 and the Irish Franchise Act of
1850 dramatically altered the size and composition of the electorate, increasing it on
balance, but disfranchising considerable numbers of electors from the laboring classes.
The Reform Acts of 1832 and 1868 in Scotland and Ireland enlarged the electorate,
but the extensions of the franchise there were much less liberal than in England and
Wales. The Reform Act of 1832 enshrined in law for the ﬁrst time the disfranchisement
of women, only a year after women’s right to vote in parish elections had been statutorily conﬁrmed. These exclusionary and disfranchising patterns are not incidental to the
trend of progressive enfranchisement. They were crucially implicated in the extensions
of the franchise emphasized in the familiar narratives, but they are largely obscured in
the political science explanation of these narratives.

Disfranchisement of the 40 Shilling Freeholders, Ireland 1829
When Catholic Emancipation was passed in 1829 it was paired with the Irish Disfranchisement Act, meant to provide “security” for the Protestant population and established
Church. The Act removed the franchise from the 40s. freeholders in the counties and
established a new qualiﬁcation of £10 freehold. This was coupled with an oath that the
301

The exception to the Protestant dominance of the boroughs during the ﬁght over the deposition of
James II. Tyrconnell and James II altered the electorates in the corporations, “employing all the niceties
of a confused law to quash [the corporations]” to remove control of these from Protestant burgesses and
place it in the hands of Catholics (Davis 1893, 29). The Catholic Lord Lieutenant, Richard Talbot—
the Earl of Tyrconnell—ordered that Catholics be admitted to the corporations, thereby establishing
a more loyal electorate. The largely Catholic parliament that was returned quickly overturned the
Cromwellian land settlements of 1652 and 1662, returning land to the descendants of the owners before
the 1641 Irish Rebellion. It also established civic and political equality and a bill of attainder against
thousands of Williamites (Davis 1893). This exception supports the claim that the function of the
boroughs was eﬀectively to secure the Protestant Ascendancy, because when James II sought to overturn
this ascendancy to secure the support of Irish Catholics it was against the boroughs and their miniscule
Protestant electorates that he moved.
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tenant could aﬀord “as an additional Rent, fairly and without Collusion, the annual sum
of Ten Pounds, over and above all Rent to which I am liable.” The interpretation of
this varied, but where applied had the eﬀect of establishing a £20 freehold franchise.302
The impact of this act on the Irish electorate was massive, reducing the county electorate from approximately 216,791 to 39,772 (Farrell 2009).303 The disfranchisement was
not restricted to Catholic freeholders, but the British government was anxious to ensure
security against the election of radical Irish Catholic MPs. Not only would the vast majority of Catholics be excluded, but the overall electorate would be drawn from a higher
class. As the Ulster Protestant journal The Northern Whig noted, the vote had been
“transferred from the serfs of the great landed proprietors to the merchants and traders
of Belfast.” The ultimate eﬀect of disfranchisement was a massive constriction of the
electorate, which would now be both more Protestant and more “respectable.”304

The 1832 Reform Acts, England and Wales, Scotland, and Ireland
The goal of a more respectable electorate ﬁgured prominently in the debates over the
1832 Reform Acts as well. The impact of 1832 has been heavily debated by historians.
O’Gorman has argued the English reform increased the electorate from 3.2% of the
population to 4.7%, important but “scarcely the stuﬀ of which political revolutions are
made” (O’Gorman 1989, 179, 182).305 Others have argued that it was less the size of
the increase than its impact on political behavior: the Reform Act of 1832, it is argued,
“fundamentally altered England’s political landscape by politicizing the electorate to a
302

Farrell cites Thomas Spring Rice’s intervention in the House when debating the Disfranchisement Act:
“As he stated to the House, in determining whether an elector was qualiﬁed ‘ﬁrst, we have to establish
the existence of £10 proﬁt in the hands of the lessee, and then you call on the freeholder to prove
that a responsible and solvent tenant could aﬀord to pay £10 a year over and above that ... You are
not here contemplating a £10 freehold—you go inﬁnitely beyond it, quite as far as some honourable
gentlemen are desirous of going.’ As he implied, this was practically the equivalent of establishing a
£20 qualiﬁcation on the basis of the old ‘beneﬁcial interest’ interpretation. The introduction of the
much tighter ‘solvent tenant’ test, which was strictly applied by assistant barristers in Irish counties,
had the eﬀect of lowering the size of the electorate more than would otherwise have been the case”
(Farrell 2009).
303
These estimates are similar to those provided by Hoppen, of 216,000 to 37,000 (1984, 1). The county by
county tally provides a number of 231,843 in 1829 and 39,762 in 1831, but because of the vagaries of the
Irish registration system this is likely inﬂated. In 1832, Nicholas Leader would suggest in the House of
Commons that the decline was to 26,000, but Peter Jupp argues that the post-disfranchisement county
electorate was approximately 37,000, from which Hoppen’s ﬁgure derives (1973, 153).
304
Northern Whig, 23 April 1829 (Kingon 2007, 11).
305
The estimates I have generated and use throughout this work are similar to O’Gorman’s, 3.06% to 4.63%
in England and 3.37% to 4.55% in Wales.
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degree and on a scale hitherto unimaginable” (Phillips 2005, 139; Beales 1992; Phillips
and Wetherell 1995; Salmon 2003). The Scots reform quite clearly had a massive impact
on the electorate, but even here historians often stress an essential continuity in political
behavior (Ferguson 1966; but see Pentland 2008).306 The Irish Reform Act did not undo
the 1829 disfranchisement, but by opening the boroughs likely contributed to the success
of candidates pledged to support repeal of the Union in the 1832 elections (McElroy
2007).
These views are not necessarily incompatible: the unreformed system was not the
moribund system it is often caricatured as and the 1832 Acts did indeed establish a new
institutional arrangement that over time radically altered the politics of the UK. What
is without doubt, however, is that the 1832 Reform Acts led to a signiﬁcant but modest
net increase in the size of the electorate, and that in each country it was paired with
the disfranchisement of existing voters. This disfranchisement was both immediate, for
non-resident freemen and those electors in boroughs that lost the right to return an MP,
as well as gradual, resulting from provisions that signiﬁcantly curtailed the creation of
voters in the pre-reform franchise classes. The result was that while the counties and
many boroughs saw a considerable increase in the enfranchisement rate, a number of
boroughs saw a decline, either immediately or over time. Just as important, the class
composition of the electorate changed considerably.
The England and Wales Reform Act of 1832 created four new franchise classes in the
counties in addition to the old 40s. freehold class. The clause which most increased the
electorate was a franchise for tenants-at-will whose annual rent was £50, passed against
the wishes of the government by an alliance of the Tory party with Whigs from agricultural districts.307 A standard borough franchise was established, enfranchising the owner
or tenant occupier of built property assessed for rating at £10 per year. The existing
borough franchises—the ‘ancient right’ voters—were not disfranchised immediately, with
the exception of the non-resident freemen. No new scot-and-lot, freehold, burgage, or
potwalloper electors would be enfranchised, and existing voters retained their franchise
while they lived within seven miles of the borough where their right originated. Since
306

Ferguson does note that “a case. . . can be made for the assertion that the Scottish Reform Act, like the
Irish, was more revolutionary than its English counterpart” (Ferguson 1966, 106). Nonetheless, his stress
is on the continuity in political behavior (namely corruption).
307
In 23 counties the ‘Chandos’ electors constituted over a third of the electorate (Hoppen 1985, 205)
and were 20% of the aggregate county electorate (Seymour 1915, 79). The copyholder and leaseholder
franchises, the classes introduced by the Whigs, constituted together only 10% of the county electorate.
See Parliamentary Papers, LVII.121, (3736) (1866).
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no new non-freemen electors were to be enfranchised under these classes, they would
gradually diminish as a proportion of the electorate. New resident freemen would still
have the right to vote. In the extinguished boroughs, the old electors lost the right to
vote unless they could meet the county qualiﬁcations, more diﬃcult for town residents.
In both the boroughs and counties a registration system was established, intentionally
designed to impose burdensome obstacles; this system “greatly increased the scope of
disfranchisement” (Salmon 2003, 59).308 Anyone could object to an elector’s registration,
and party managers did just this in an eﬀort to keep their opponents’ supporters oﬀ the
register. In Warwickshire, “the Liberals objected to every single farmer, or tenant-at-will,
on the county registers. In Middlesex the Tories went one better and objected to every
single elector who had earlier voted for the Liberals, about half the entire constituency”
(Salmon 2003, 56).
An additional limitation on the franchise in the boroughs was the exclusion of compounding rate payers. These were householders who did not pay the rates directly, as a
result of an arrangement between parish oﬃcers and landlords. The parish would oﬀer
the landlord a reduced rate and the landlord would collect the full amount from the
tenants, taking the remainder as proﬁt. But the result was that only the landlord’s name
was on the rate books, which was necessary for the £10 occupier franchise and made
necessary for the old franchise classes as well (Seymour 1915, 150).309
The combination of the taxation requirement on ‘ancient right’ and new franchise
voters, the registration fee and its procedural obstacles, the exclusion of the compounding rate payers, and the objection system greatly limited the eﬀect of the new franchise
classes and even disfranchised large numbers of former electors. As ‘ancient right’ voters died or moved they were not replaced: “at the 1832 election at Boston, of the 1,257
electors that could be accounted for a remarkable 374 (29.8 per cent) still qualiﬁed as
freemen. By 1866 that number had decreased signiﬁcantly to 148, 13.5 per cent of the
electorate” (Vernon 1993, 38). In the English borough of Honiton, there were 455 registered electors in 1837, 372 of whom were potwallopers. By 1865, only 53 potwallopers
remained and the electorate had declined to 279 ( Jenkins 2009). Figure 6.4 shows an
estimate of the change in the enfranchisement rate of non-rotten borough English con308

While some of the boroughs—and all the scot-and-lot- boroughs—had required payment of taxes, these
now needed to be paid by July 20th of each year or else they would be struck oﬀ the lists. No longer
could a voter fall behind and then settle at election time (Salmon 2003, 59). Many borough franchises
had not required payment of taxes, and so this constituted a new disfranchisement.
309
An act in 1850 facilitated the ability of compound rate-payers to have their name added to the registry,
but it remained a cumbersome process and few took advantage of it.
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Figure 6.4: The Reform Act’s Change to Electorate Size in England

stituencies. The panel on the left shows the change in those constituencies that saw an
increased electorate; the panel on the right shows the change in those constituencies
that saw a decreased electorate. The grey lines are the individual constituencies; the
black line is the average change. The disfranchisements were concentrated in the boroughs, and the enfranchisement rate in the non-rotten boroughs that existed pre- and
post-1832 declined from 9.4% to 8.0%, a reduction that would be compounded over time
as the ‘ancient right’ voters died or moved away.
The act also changed the class composition of the borough electorate. Figure 6.5
reproduces estimates of the occupational structure in English two-member boroughs
for the pre-1832 period compiled by O’Gorman (1989, 217) and the post-1832 period
compiled by T.J. Nossiter (1975, 166).310 The occupational categories are arrayed in de310

Table 4.16 in O’Gorman (1989, 217). Data for 1832-66 are from T.J. Nossiter, Inﬂuence, Opinion and
Political Idioms in Reformed England: Case Studies from the North-east (1975), 166. Data for pre-1832
is from O’Gorman, tables 4.12-4.14. The comparison is O’Gorman’s. Nossiter includes an additional
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scending order, from the elite to laboring classes.311 The pattern is clear: semi- and
unskilled labor and craftsmen lost ground to retailers, merchants, manufacturers, gentlemen, and professionals. For O’Gorman, “there seems no escape from the conclusion
that the 1832 Reform Act diminished the penetration of the electorate down the social
scale” (1989, 217). The acts operated to diﬀerent eﬀect across the diﬀerent nations. ScotFigure 6.5: Occupational Structure of the English Borough Electorate, Pre- and Post-1832

land and Ireland each had separate and more conservative reforms. The Scots reform
unambiguously increased the electorate. Five new classes were added to the county franchise, including an at-will-tenant class, roughly in line with the new county franchises in
category of “Drink” (9%), which I have allocated between the Merchants/Manufacturers and the Retailers. These were largely publicans, which O’Gorman has classiﬁed as Retailers, and Brewers, which
O’Gorman has classiﬁed as Manufacturers, as well as other categories of merchants. Nossiter also
includes a category of “Other” (6%), which O’Gorman treats as comparable to the Semi/Unskilled Laborers.
311
Agriculturalists—small farmers—are placed at the low end of the boroughs’ social structure, although
their position in the counties and in many boroughs was likely above that of the semi- and unskilled
laborers.
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England and Wales. However, there was no alteration of the old 40s. franchise to bring
it in line with the much more liberal English qualiﬁcation. Accordingly, the resulting rate
of enfranchisement remained considerably lower in Scotland. The Scots burgh reforms
likewise established a new franchise class of owner or tenant occupier that was eﬀectively
the same as England and Wales. But again, there was no compensation for the lack of
an electorate in the freemen, householders, or scot-and-lot payers.
The Irish Reform Act established a number of new county franchise classes, but
there was no equivalent to the tenants-at-will franchise. And like the Scots reform, there
was no redress of the previous exclusions. The new franchises were roughly equivalent
in the types of tenure required, but did not take into account much lower land values in
Ireland. This ensured the increase in the county electorate was considerably smaller than
it had been in Great Britain. Like in England and Wales, a new borough franchise of £10
occupiers was established throughout Ireland. Against the wishes of the government, the
freeman franchise was continued on roughly equivalent terms as the English freemen,
the result of an alliance of the Irish nationalist Daniel O’Connell with the Tories.312 In
the ‘county-boroughs’ where the 40s. freehold franchise had not been abolished it was
now curtailed and targeted for gradual elimination.
The Irish Reform Act of 1832 did not undo the 1829 disfranchisement. Figure 6.6
provides some perspective on the changes to the Irish electorate between 1829 and
1832. Each panel shows the change in the enfranchisement rate for the diﬀerent Irish
constituencies, with the counties in black and the boroughs in grey. The left panel shows
the change from 1829 to 1831, showing the impact of the Disfranchisement Act. The
right panel shows the changes from 1831 to 1832, showing the impact of the Reform
Act. The Reform Act had little impact in the counties, where the vast majority of the
Irish Catholic population lived. It did, however, open up the closed corporate and small
enfranchisement boroughs. These were now at the level of enfranchisement of the more
open boroughs, although some of these saw declines in their enfranchisement rates as
non-resident freemen were excluded and the registration system imposed.
Across the U.K. the 1832 disfranchisement of the old borough electorate was accom312

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, Daniel O’Connell fought to keep the freeman voters, despite the fact
that they had tended to be overwhelmingly Tory. The Tories, understandably, also sought to ensure
the maintenance of this franchise. There were two likely motivations for O’Connell: he believed that
expected changes to the Irish municipal corporations would allow for the creation of more Catholic
freemen, and his position on the Irish Reform Act was to demand equality—on all terms—with the
English Act. As the English freemanship had been retained, he insisted that the Irish be retained as
well.
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Figure 6.6: Disfranchisement and Enfranchisement in Irish Counties and Boroughs,
1829-1832

panied by a more subtle exclusion. In both counties and boroughs the qualiﬁcation that
the voter be ‘male’ was made explicit for the ﬁrst time in British history, and so the
act not only changed the actual composition of the electorate but the “political citizen
was formally named as masculine” (Hall 2000a, 107). Some aristocratic women had,
and would continue, to exercise political power as patrons of boroughs, or through an
interest or inﬂuence over tenants in counties. And by custom women had not been electors for Parliament, so this did not remove the right to vote from those who might have
previously been included. But it was an important signal that women’s electoral capacity
was to be limited to the “private” sphere of the parish vestry, while the public functions
of the vestry were in turn reduced by the Municipal Corporations Act.313
313

Since the 1739 case of Olive v. Ingram, the right of women as ratepayers to vote in parish elections and
to be elected to the oﬃce of sexton—responsible for maintaining the cemetery and church—had been
explicitly conﬁrmed in English law (H. L. Smith 1998). See also Burn, Chitty, and Chitty (1837, 633).
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Representation of the People (Ireland) Act, 1850
The next major reform came in 1850 and was exclusively concerned with Ireland.314
There were two central motivations: ensuring a more ‘respectable’ electorate through a
tightening of the registration and valuation system, and expanding the electorate after
its near-disappearance during the Famine. Like the 1832 reforms the act was intended to
both enfranchise and disfranchise. The Irish franchise and registration system had been
an issue of controversy throughout the 1840s, but proposals went nowhere until the crisis
of the Famine. The scale of death and ﬂight meant that “voters simply melted away,” with
the overall county electorate declining from 60,597 in 1832 to a registered total of 27,180
in 1849 (Hoppen 1984, 17). But the registration system in Ireland counted the number
of outstanding certiﬁcates, good for 8 year periods, and so did not fully capture the
departures and deaths of those who had certiﬁcates that had not yet expired. Hoppen
estimates the county electorate in 1849 at somewhere between 15,000 and 18,000.
In the counties, the 1850 Act decreased the freehold qualiﬁcation and established an
occupier franchise, for resident males paying rates and occupying, rather than owning or
leasing, property valued at £12. The borough occupier franchise was likewise reduced.
The registration system was totally overhauled, and all of the property assessments were
to be established on the basis of the new poor law valuations. The impact on the county
electorate was considerable, increasing between 360% and 650%, depending on whether
one uses the nominal electorate or the ‘eﬀective’ post-Famine electorate estimated by
Hoppen (1984, 17).315 The boroughs, however, did not see much of a gain and the
Suﬀragists would point to this case and a few others as part of their legal and discursive strategy in
the late 19th century. See for instance Charlotte Carmichael Stopes’ British Freewomen (1894). For an
overview of the case and its implications for women’s citizenship in 18th and 19th century Britain, see
(H.L. Smith 1998).
314
The Act was accompanied by the Parliamentary Elections (Ireland) Act, 1850, which aimed to shorten
the duration of elections and provide additional polling places. The Representation of the People Act
is occasionally listed as the Registration Act, 1850 in recognition of the importance of rationalizing the
registration system. See Cleary (1886, 135).
315
Hoppen gives a total county electorate of 135,245 in 1850. The numbers I have given are for 1852-53,
allowing for the changes to the registration system to take eﬀect. I take this from Electors. Abstract
return of the number of electors on the register of 1852-53, in each county, city, and borough in
Ireland, distinguishing their qualiﬁcations, Parliamentary Papers, LXXXIII.413 (957) (1852-53). There
is a discrepancy of 500 electors between the ﬁgures I report and the ones listed in the parliamentary
report, which I believe to be the product of an addition error in the report. The Famine-era estimates
of the electorate should be treated with even more caution than the pre-1840s estimates. In both cases
the reason for caution is the certiﬁcate registration system, in which the dead and departed might
still be listed as registered electors for having failed to turn in their certiﬁcates. Given the massive
dislocations of the 1840-1850 period in Ireland, this problem is exacerbated, creating a ‘nominal’ and
‘eﬀective’ electorates of widely varying size. For instance, Rallings and Thrasher gave an estimated Irish
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changed valuation and registration system were almost certainly disfranchising in these
constituencies. The borough electorate before the Act was somewhere between 30,000
and 40,000.316 Hoppen’s estimate for the post-1850 borough electorate is 28,301, and the
oﬃcial returns for 1852-53 count 29,634.317 Regardless of what estimate is used for the
pre-1850 electorate, the result is the same: a decline, either considerable or slight, in the
size of the borough electorate. Figure 6.7 shows the change in the enfranchisement rate
from the 1850 Franchise Act.318 The black lines are the change in the counties; the grey
lines the change in the parliamentary boroughs. The pattern is clear. The counties saw a
signiﬁcant increase in their electorates, while the boroughs (with some exceptions) saw an
important decline. But the dual objectives of the Act had been achieved, an expansion of
the county electorate and the establishment of both the borough and county franchises
on a basis that would ensure a respectable electorate with an upwardly-skewed class
composition, “eﬀectively exclude[ing] many of the poor and marginal who had found it
possible to get the vote before 1850” (Hoppen 1984, 18). The net result of the act was
electorate of 124,825 in 1847, while contemporary parliamentary papers placed it at 78,433 in 1848-49
and 72,066 in 1849-50 (2007; see also Craig 1968). Hoppen gives an estimate of 45,000 in 1849-50 (1984,
17). The ‘real’ number is likely in between that provided by Hoppen and by the contemporary accounts,
although I suspect Hoppen’s is a closer approximation. See Parliamentary electors. Abstract of return
of the number of parliamentary electors in Great Britain and Ireland, according to the registrations of
1848 and 1849, and 1849 and 1850. Parliamentary Papers, (345) XLVI.199 (1850). See also Return of
Registered Parliamentary Electors in the Counties and Boroughs in Ireland in 1829, 1830, 1833, 1837,
1841, 1845, & 1850. M.S. Clarendon Dep. Irish Box 25, Sir Thom. Redington 1850-51 (Bundle 33).
316
Hoppen gives the number of electors in the boroughs before the Act as 29,471, roughly what it was in
1832 (1984, 17, fn2). Using the registrations of 1849-50, there were 40,234 electors in the boroughs. This
is almost certainly too high. Nonetheless, examining the sources referenced by Hoppen suggests that the
29,400 borough electors he reports is too low, especially given the fact that leasing was less important
in these constituencies and these had been more stable in population size during the Famine, with some
even growing. Hoppen notes that the “best estimates that can be made suggest that between 1832 and
1850, at a time when the population as a whole was increasing, the electorate was declining, slowly at
ﬁrst and then more quickly” but that “the boroughs held their numbers more successfully” (1984, 6).
He notes elsewhere that during the Famine “the boroughs held steady, partly because few were in the
areas of greatest deprivation” (1977, 754). Parliamentary electors. Abstract of return of the number of
parliamentary electors in Great Britain and Ireland, according to the registrations of 1848 and 1849, and
1849 and 1850. Parliamentary Papers, (345) XLVI.199 (1850). A tally of eﬀective, rather than nominal,
voters in 6 Irish boroughs was given by John Reynolds, MP for Dublin. He gives these as 27,335, only
1,000 fewer than using the ﬁgures for the 1849-50 registration. Hansard, House of Commons, March 1,
1850, cc.286.
317
Abstract return of the number of electors on the register of 1852-53, in each county, city, and borough
in Ireland, distinguishing their qualiﬁcations, Parliamentary Papers, (957) LXXXIII.413 (1853).
318
I have used my estimates rather than Hoppen’s for this analysis. The direction of change would be
the same in both cases, although the borough decline would be less steep using Hoppen’s ﬁgures.
The increase in the county electorate is likely under-stated here, as reliable county-by-county estimates
of mid-Famine electorate do not exist; the decline in the borough, by contrast, might be somewhat
overstated, although Hoppen’s estimate of 4% is a likely low end of the possible range.
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Figure 6.7: Eﬀect of the Irish Franchise Act (1850), Counties and Boroughs

an important increase in the size of the aggregate Irish electorate. But this increase
masked the removal of many of the poorer borough residents and laboring classes from
the electorate.

The Second Reform Acts, 1867-68
The English Reform Act of 1867 is frequently treated as marking the arrival of democracy in the UK (Himmelfarb 1966, 97; Park 1921, 7; Saunders 2011, 1). When considered
in isolation, the enfranchising character of the English Reform Act of 1867 is indeed remarkable. In England the borough electorate was more than doubled, while the county
electorate was increased by nearly 50%. In the counties the copy- and leaseholder franchises were reduced and an occupancy franchise similar to that established in Ireland
in 1850 was introduced. But the reform was really aimed at the boroughs, and here
almost all male rate-paying householders, regardless of the assessed or rental value of
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the home, were enfranchised. In addition, a lodger franchise for those whose rent was
£10 was included, although this was not a major source of enfranchisement.319 While
there were considerable numbers of adult men who were excluded by the act’s provisions, and all adult women given the Commons’ rejection of women’s suﬀrage, the scope
of enfranchisement is impressive.
When we consider the accompanying acts for Ireland and Scotland, however, another
dimension is visible. In both countries the resulting electorate was considerably smaller
as a proportion of the population, and the reform had very little eﬀect in Ireland. Just
as the English counties received less liberal treatment than the boroughs, Scotland and
Ireland received less liberal treatment than England and Wales. The Scots Reform
Act, passed in 1868, established a new county occupier franchise, but set this at a
higher threshold than the English and Welsh qualiﬁcation. The eﬀect was to exclude
approximately 12,500 male occupiers who would have been enfranchised had the English
qualiﬁcation been used, about 16% of the new county electorate.320 The increase in the
Scots county electorate was small, and the enfranchisement rate was still below that of
England and Wales after the 1832 Reforms. The new burgh qualiﬁcations were largely
in line with England and Wales, but as with 1832 there was no compensation for the
continued presence of 30,000 ‘ancient right’ voters in England.321
It was Ireland, however, that was most obviously marked for disparate treatment. The
county franchise was left untouched, as the 1867 England and Wales bill had brought this
into rough alignment with that of the 1850 Irish reform. That these masked considerably
diﬀerent property valuations—with similar land in England worth more than that in
Ireland—and that this did not compensate for the greater enfranchisement in England
319

By 1885 only 56,961 of England’s borough electorate of 1,772,479 (3%) was qualiﬁed under this franchise.
This did vary, although the proportion enfranchised by the lodger qualiﬁcation was always quite low.
Two notable exceptions are Westminster, where 23% (4,307) of the electors were qualiﬁed under the
lodger franchise, and Marylebone, where 11% (4,016) where so qualiﬁed. See Return for each Parliamentary City, Town and Borough in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland of Population and Number of
Electors on Registry, 1866, 1869 and 1873, Parliamentary Papers, LIII.43 (1874).
320
See Electoral returns (Scotland). Electoral returns. Burghs and counties, Scotland, 1865-66, Parliamentary Papers LVII.805, (3651) (1866), Return 5. A £14 is not used in this return, but rather a £10 to £12
and a £12 to £15 are reported. I estimate that half of the 7,733 male occupiers between £12 and £15
would have been under £14, a conservative approximation. I added to this the 7,850 male occupiers
between £10 and £12.
321
The lodger qualiﬁcation had unexciting results enfranchising only 1,959 in the burghs by 1885. Francis
Barrymore Smith reported in 1866 that the Scots reform bill “contained the same qualiﬁcations as the
English Bill, with the exception that it had no lodger franchise” as lodgers were legally tenants and thus
had qualiﬁed since 1832 (1966, 226). The Representation of the People (Scotland) Act, 1868, however,
does indeed include a clause enfranchising lodgers. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 48, §4.
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Figure 6.8: Borough Enfranchisement Rates, Four Nations 1868

through the 40s. freeholder and leaseholder franchises did not much matter.322 But
the householder franchise adopted for England, Wales, and Scotland was too far a
leap. Disraeli insisted he would not extend the franchise in Ireland “in the midst of
the outbreak of Fenianism”—the Fenian Brotherhood had organized a failed uprising in
1867, and there was fear of an insurrection by Irish in English cities (Hall 2000b, 204220)—and a Conservative Irish delegation had “demanded that the Irish Bill be dropped
as a condition of their supporting the English and Scottish Bills” (Smith 1966, 225).323
322

Members in support of a more liberal franchise extension in Ireland noted that the £12 county franchise
would be equivalent to a £30 threshold in England (Park 1921, 260).
323
Despite the attention paid by Acemoglu and Robinson to the 1867 Hyde Park riots as “the most
immediate catalyst” (2000, 1183) for the 1867 Reform Act, there was no serious threat of revolution,
the next year when the government decided to not risk confrontation by dispersing another crowd in
the park, the “main eﬀect of the humiliation of the following May was to place a premium on resisting
further concessions” (Saunders 2011, 15). There was, however, a failed eﬀort at revolution in Ireland,
successfully repressed, and a genuine belief that Fenian insurrections might occur in English cities. The
result was to make a further extension of the franchise in Ireland even less likely.
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Figure 6.9: County Enfranchisement Rates, Four Nations 1868

Rather than extend the franchise to all male occupiers who paid rates, the franchise was
extended to rate-paying male occupiers of property valued at £4, as well as to lodgers
on the same terms as in Great Britain.
The overall result of the 1867-68 acts was that the franchise had been extended
to much of the working classes of the English, Welsh, and Scots boroughs. The Irish
Catholic laboring classes, by contrast, remained outside the “pale of the constitution.”
Figure 6.8 shows a box graph of the enfranchisement rate for boroughs in each of
the countries; Figure 6.9 shows the same for the counties. The borough electorate
of Scotland lags behind England and Wales, but Ireland is a clear outlier with only
Carrickfergus, with its traditionally broad based and Protestant electorate, reaching the
median of English enfranchisement.
In each of the countries the enfranchisement rate was higher in the boroughs than
in the counties, but again Scotland and Ireland are considerably less enfranchised than
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England and Wales. This was the result of intentionally more restrictive franchises as
well as a legacy, consciously maintained, of the earlier disfranchisements and exclusions.

The Reform Act of 1884 and Redistribution Act 1885
If the Reform Acts of 1867-68 are often presented as marking the arrival of democracy,
the Reform Act of 1884 is often presented as its consolidation (Blewett 1965, 27; Matthew,
McKibbin, and Kay 1976, 724). The 1884 Reform Act extended a common franchise
qualiﬁcation not only across the boroughs and counties but also across the diﬀerent
countries of the U.K. The “union of the kingdoms was, indeed, the very foundation of the
bill,” but the inclusion of Ireland was, for Liberals and Conservatives alike, a source of
considerable anxiety and opposition ( Jones 1972, 4). But while the 1884 reform massively
increased the electorate, it did not inaugurate manhood suﬀrage. Furthermore, it was
paired with changes to the electoral system, notably the introduction to England, Wales,
and Ireland of gerrymandered Single Member Plurality districts that were intended to
undermine the new power of the working classes in the counties (Ahmed 2010, 2013).
If the 1867-68 reform acts created a mass constituency in the boroughs of Great
Britain, the 1884 Representation of the People Act (and the equally important 1885
Redistribution Act) did the same for the counties of Great Britain and the boroughs and
counties of Ireland.324 The Cabinet had information, which they sought to conceal, that
the expansion of the electorate in Ireland would be huge: the ﬁgures on the anticipated
Irish county electorate were too “awful. . . for poor Hartington [the foremost Liberal critic
of the bill] to swallow—700,000 county householders” in Ireland (cited in Jones 1972,
42).325 The eﬀect was nearly as dramatic in the Irish boroughs, nearly doubling the
electorate. In total, the enfranchised population of Ireland increased by 226% compared
with increases of 65%, 75%, and 73% for England, Wales, and Scotland respectively.
Perhaps most importantly, the establishment of a common franchise at such a liberal
rate brought with it a common enfranchisement rate across the countries for the bor324

See Electors (Counties and Boroughs), Parliamentary Papers, (44 Sess.2) LII.569 (1886) and Parliamentary
Constituencies (number of electors), Parliamentary Papers, (11) LXII.213 (1884).
325
While this was an over-estimation, the 1885 registration gave a total of 619,000 county electors, up from
177,000 before the act. All but 2% of these were householders or £10 occupiers. A return from 1884
showing the number of county lands, tenements or hereditaments rated at various valuations showed
741,775 rated under £12, the occupancy threshold since 1850. There were 720,217 inhabited houses
rated below this value in the counties, with 435,179 rated below £1. In the boroughs there were 38,022
lands, tenements or hereditaments rates below £4, the borough qualiﬁcation since 1868. And 53,582
inhabited houses rate below this amount. See County and borough franchise (Ireland), Parliamentary
Papers, (164) LXII.221 (1884).
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Figure 6.10: Borough Enfranchisement Rates, Four Nations 1885

oughs and counties (Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11). From 1884, changes to the franchise
qualiﬁcations would no longer be discriminatorily applied across the diﬀerent nations.
The result was a convergence in the degree of enfranchisement. But the Redistribution
Act also ensured that the occupation of the voters would be taken into account in drawing the new district boundaries, to ensure that suburban and middle class voters were
not overwhelmed by the working class electorate. Suburbs of parliamentary boroughs
were hived oﬀ and included in the county districts, with the net result being that many of
the county constituencies were wealthier, composed more of householders than lodgers,
and with more settled residence. The enfranchisement rate in ‘county’ districts after
1885 was higher than in ‘borough’ districts, across all countries, despite the fact that
both sets of districts shared common qualiﬁcations.
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Figure 6.11: County Enfranchisement Rates, Four Nations 1885

The Reform Act of 1918
By 1911, approximately 17.5% of the population had the right to vote, 30% of the adult
population and 63% of the adult male population (Blewett 1965, 31).326 The classes
that were excluded by the 1884 Reform include paupers, live-in servants, most of the
military, sons living with parents, those who had changed residence within a year, and
women.327 The qualiﬁcation of 12 month residence for the household franchise was
especially important in excluding workers (Blewett 1965, 37, 32).328 The 1918 Reform
326

The estimates of the size of the electorate are somewhat exaggerated by the existence of plural votes—
likely in the area of 500,000 by 1911, or 6.3% of the electorate. Blewett therefore estimates the proportion
of adult men enfranchised to be 59%, and attributes this to the speciﬁc classes of persons excluded, the
disabilities imposed by the registration system, and the capricious workings of this system.
327
See Blewett (1965), Matthew et al. (1976) and Tanner (1990).
328
The same was the case if the elector changed from a householder qualiﬁcation to a lodger qualiﬁcation:
while 12 months was required for both, the qualiﬁcation attached to 12 months of residence as a lodger
or occupancy as a householder.

228

Act repealed all existing franchise qualiﬁcations and in their place established a 6months residence and a business qualiﬁcation, enfranchising actual occupiers of land or
premises valued at £10 and occupied for the purpose of business, trade, or profession for
six months. Residence was extended to include the contiguous parliamentary boroughs
or counties, and the county of London treated as a single borough.
The most radical change, however, was the limited enfranchisement of women.
Women were enfranchised if they were 30 years of age, not subject to any legal incapacity, and were entitled to be registered as a local government elector or married to
a man so registered. The municipal franchise had been initially granted in 1894. Given
that husband and wife could not qualify on the basis of the same property, and that it
was more likely that the husband would be listed as the tenant/owner for purposes of
the local government franchise, women were highly dependent upon their marital status. This limited the extent and eﬀect of women’s enfranchisement, “keeping the women
electors in the minority” and ensuring that “servants, maids, daughters living at home,
and other women in similar position in the family” were not enfranchised, the vote being
extended only to the “head woman of the household” (Morris 1921, 146).329
In England, the Act resulted in an enfranchisement rate increasing from 18.8% in 1912
to 47.2% in 1922.330 Looking only at male electors, the enfranchisement rate increased
from 18.8% to 27.2% of the population, highlighting the limits of the 1884 Act. In Wales,
the increase was from 19.3% to 45.5% (27.1% for men); in Scotland, from 16.8% to 46.5%
(27.5% for men).331 The enfranchisement rates in Ireland are more diﬃcult to calculate,
given fatalities during WWI, the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1919, and the
lack of a census in 1921. Using the 1911 census, a far from perfect measure, the Irish
enfranchisement rate increased from 16.2% to 43.7% (28% for men) in 1918.332 Women
329

Conservative Unionist MP Basil Edward Peto sought to remove the marriage qualiﬁcation, enfranchising
only those women who held the occupancy in their own right and those who qualiﬁed under a business
qualiﬁcation. He estimated that this would have enfranchised one million women, as opposed to the 5
to six million the government intended to enfranchise (Morris 1921, 146).
330
Parliamentary and local government electors (United Kingdom), Parliamentary Papers, (138) XIX.925
(1918). I use the 1922 registration data so as to use the 1921 rather than the 1911 census ﬁgures. The
war had not only seen approximately 2% of the population killed, but there was an enormous amount
of movement to the cities from the countryside.
331
There was a worry that the enfranchisement of women in Scotland would be more liberal than it was
in England, the result of a more liberal municipal franchise. The solution was an amendment so that
women could vote in local elections based on the Scots municipal qualiﬁcations, but could vote in
parliamentary elections only on conditions as in England. Women constituted 40.8% of the new Scots
electorate, compared with 42.5% of the English electorate.
332
The population of Ireland was continuing the decline that had begun during the Famine. While the
population of the 26 non-Northern Ireland counties was 3,140,000 in 1911, it was 2,970,000 in the ﬁrst
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were a smaller proportion of the new electorate in Ireland than elsewhere.

Equal Franchise Act, 1928
The Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, 1928, did not alter the franchise
qualiﬁcations for men but equalized the qualiﬁcations across gender. It was nonetheless
a massive increase in the electorate, from 48.7% to 63.5% enfranchisement in England,
48.8% to 61.4% in Wales, and 46.8% to 60.7% in Scotland. Ireland had left the Union, but
the Northern Irish electorate increased from 48.4% to 60.6%.

Legal incapacity
In all of the Reform Acts, the vote was limited to those who were of full age (21) and
not under any legal incapacity. The legal incapacities included various oﬃces, such as
returning oﬃcers, whose neutrality was considered crucial to the machinery of election;
oﬃces considered part of the executive or judicial branches; peers with representation
in the House of Lords; aliens; idiots and lunatics; convicted felons; persons employed
by candidates at elections; those convicted of bribery or corruption of parliamentary or
municipal elections; and from 1832 in the boroughs and 1867 in the counties those in receipt of parochial relief for a period of 12 months period. To this list of ‘incapables’ was
added in 1918 the category of conscientious objectors, who were disfranchised during
the war and for ﬁve years thereafter.333 There were additional statuses between subjecthood and alienage, however, and ‘certiﬁcated’ aliens could vote unless the certiﬁcate in
question explicitly denied this right, as could denizens. The naturalized could vote, but
could not serve in Parliament, in Privy Council or have any oﬃce or place of trust until
1870 (see Wilkinson 1868, 2-20).334

Perspectives on Democratization
Before 1884, England and Wales consistently had more liberal franchise qualiﬁcations
than Scotland and Ireland. After 1793, Irish representation was similar to that of England: some genuinely open boroughs, disproportionately but not exclusively Protestant,
census of the Irish Free State in 1926. This would understate the enfranchisement rate in 1918.
8. Geo. V. c.64. §9(2). See Hugh Fraser (1918, 4-6).
334
The status of aliens was somewhat unclear. The legal incapacity that had traditionally barred them
from the vote was the inability to hold freehold property, but this did not apply in the boroughs where
the franchise was vested in the householders. See Anstey (1867, 104-120).
333
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alongside counties where the inﬂuence of the landlords over the tenants was not absolute or un-negotiated, but was certainly predominant.335 The disfranchisement of 1829
would not be undone for twenty years and the legacy of a smaller number of narrower
franchise classes meant that both Scotland and Ireland remained comparatively underrepresentated.
Figure 6.12: Proportion of Population Enfranchised, UK 1785-1880

Each of the major episodes of franchise extension from 1829 to 1884 was accompanied by either a disfranchisement of previously enfranchised electors or a franchise
arrangement that was exclusionary across nations. The cumulative eﬀect of these reforms is shown in Figure 6.12, which plots the aggregate enfranchisement rate—the total
335

By the early 1820s, for instance, the bulk of the county MPs from Ireland were in favor of Catholic
Emancipation. The landlords did ‘deliver’ votes, and they did so with a considerable, but not total,
disregard for the preferences of their tenants. As in England, maintaining ‘harmonious’ relations was
a constant concern, and encouraged a pre-election settlement among elites so as to avoid the county
being contested.
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number of electors divided by the national population—from 1785 to 1880. The comparative exclusion of Scotland and Ireland is easily visible. Figure 6.13 extends this series
beyond 1884. The closeness with which the national enfranchisement rates tracked each
other after 1884 is indicative of the degree to which the exclusion of Scotland and Ireland
was a function of institutional arrangements. Once the franchises were harmonized, the
enfranchisement rates converge.
Figure 6.13: Proportion of Population Enfranchised, UK 1880-1930

Aggregate increases in the electorate, however, can mask disfranchising trends. Figure 14 shows the distribution of constituencies according to their enfranchisement rates.
Additionally, the proportion of constituencies with more than 10% and 25% of the population having the right to vote is noted. Looking at the UK as a whole, the Reform Acts
of 1832 increased the number of constituencies with rates between 5-10%, but this was
accompanied by the disfranchisement of the more popular constituencies. This process
continued as ancient right voters died or moved, and with the economic recession of the
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1840s. By 1851, only 3.5% of constituencies had more than 10% enfranchisement, down
from 25.9% in 1829.336 The Reform Acts of 1867-68 returned much of the constituency
diversity and representative districts to Parliament, while the Reform Act of 1884 ensured that very few constituencies had less than 10% of the population enfranchised. The
Figure 6.14: Distribution of Parliamentary Constituencies by Extent of Representation,
United Kingdom

ﬁgure ends shortly after the partial enfranchisement of women and the inauguration of
residence suﬀrage in 1918, when all constituencies had more than 25% and many have
more than 40% enfranchisement rates. It should be noted, however, that the aggregate
changes at the UK level are largely driven by changes in England, and to a lesser extent,
Wales. After the 1868 Reform in Scotland, there were only 25.9% of constituencies with
336

The disfranchisement of the Irish 40s. freeholders decreased the representativeness of the Irish delegation considerably. I did not include the pre-1829 distribution for space reasons and because the basic
image and proportions above 10% and 25% would have remained the same, as the disfranchisement
largely reduced counties with 4% enfranchisement to 1% or lower.
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more than 10% enfranchisement—the same proportion England had before the 1832 Reform Act. In Ireland, there was only 1 constituency with more than 10%—the borough
of Carrickfergus, which had maintained a relatively high level of enfranchisement since
before the Act of Union.
How should this accounting modify our perspective on democratization in the UK?
First, it becomes harder to maintain the Whig emphasis on a trajectory of progress.
Between 1828 and 1884, there were disfranchisements in the Irish counties, disfranchisements in the English, Welsh, and Irish boroughs, and the exclusion of county and
borough residents in Ireland and Scotland relative to England and Wales. The aggregate national trends were, outside of Ireland, in the direction of an expanded electorate.
The constituency and class level trends, however, showed considerably more variation.
Accounts of democratization in the UK need to accommodate the fact that franchise
extensions were motivated not only by an eﬀort to increase the size of the electorate, but
to simultaneously exclude some of the poorer classes—to construct a new “‘rational and
respectable’ male subject” (Vernon 1996, 10-11).
Second, it should be clear that the national dimension cannot be ignored to the
degree that it has been. It needs to be integrated into analyses to understand the
dynamics of democratization and exclusion in the 19th century UK. The question of
whether reforms would be undertaken across the diﬀerent nations was in the foreground
of every debate over the franchise, greatly inﬂuencing the considerations of legislators
and ministers. This dynamic varied over the course of the 19th century, but at each
moment when the reform of the franchise was considered, the implications of doing
so for the diﬀerent national arrangements were considered by legislators and at each
moment they substantially altered the ﬁnal package of reforms.
But the national dimension impacted the politics of democratization more subtly as
well. Take, for instance, the argument of Lizzeri and Persico that the electorate was
increased in order to dis-incentivize investment in ‘corruption.’ Before 1832, corruption
worked as a buttress to the Protestant Constitution, both in Britain and in Ireland,
and it was the fears about the consequences to this constitutional order that prompted
the hostility toward Reform and the demand for Irish disfranchisement. A dislike of
‘corruption’ could not be separated from considerations of nationality and the sectarian
character of the British State.
Figure 6.12 through Figure 6.14 provide the periodization that will structure the chapters to follow. The period from the Act of Union (1801) to the repeal of the Test and
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Corporation Acts (1828), Catholic Emancipation (1829), and the Reform Acts (1832) saw
the dismantling of some of the core institutional features of the Protestant Constitution
established in 1688. The years 1828-1832 saw the establishment of a new constitutional
order, one that was both the product of and would eventually undergird the ascendancy
of a new coalition of religious dissenters, radicals, Whigs, and Irish Liberals. The new
constitutional order would largely continue after 1884, but the partisan conﬁguration
that it sustained would be dramatically reconﬁgured. The Irish Parliamentary Party
would now have considerable leverage, returning more than 70% of the Irish parliamentary delegation in every year before 1918. And the Liberal Party would be irrevocably
fractured over the issue of Irish Home Rule. In the interim, debates over democracy,
representation, and the franchise were deeply informed and structured by narratives
about national identity and purpose that had been articulated and disseminated after
1832. These narratives drew on longstanding traditions of English exceptionalism, and
their resonance was not the result of a top-down imposition. But they were purposefully reconﬁgured and tied to the project of consolidating an unstable Liberal coalition.
The commitment of the nascent party organization to these narratives, and its growing
popular resonance, structured the behavior of MPs, both Liberal and Conservative.

Institutional and Partisan Context
The Tory Party governed at Westminster from 1783 until 1831, interrupted only brieﬂy by
coalition governments in 1807 and 1827 in which Whigs were included but not dominant.
Whig or Liberal governments were in charge from 1830-1886 for a total of 39 years (70%)
and won a majority of the seats in all elections but two, 1841 and 1874 ( Jenkins 1994, ix).
If anything, the long-stretch of Liberal government might understate the degree to which
this period was one of Liberal ascendancy. The Conservative victory in 1841 is usually
credited to the policy of Peel in accepting the new constitutional order, “a ﬁnal and
irrevocable settlement of a great constitutional question.” And while the parties were
associated with broad public philosophies, they would at times both seek to position
themselves as the ablest representatives of liberalism. Conservative leaders including
Peel and Disraeli sought to break the “old Whig monopoly of Liberalism,” and to position
themselves as the party best suited for carrying through liberal policies (St John 2005,
56; Roach 1957, 325). As William Gladstone, an ultra Tory in the 1830s turned champion
of Irish Church disestablishment and Irish Home Rule, claimed in 1884, liberalism, both
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the party and the ideology, had been “the solid permanent conviction of the nation”
from the 1832 Reform Act onward (Morley 1903, 128).
Figure 6.15: Party Share of Parliamentary Seats, 1820-1910

There was a clear popular preference for the Liberal Party in the reformed electorate,
as can be seen in Figure 6.16. This shows the two major parties share of the popular
vote from 1832, when oﬃcial records were implemented, to the election of 1910. The
non-Tory/Conservative Irish delegates are included with the Liberals, although I have
indicated by the dotted line the Liberal vote share absent the Irish independents and
nationalists. Until the party split on the issue of Home Rule for Ireland, and undermined
by the change to Single Member Plurality districts, the Liberals won a clear majority of
the popular vote in every election but one, even in the heavy defeat of 1874.
However, while the Liberals were able to form ministries for the majority of the
period after 1832, they were never in a position of absolute dominance in the House
of Commons and their support was always limited in the House of Lords. Figure 6.15
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Figure 6.16: Party Share of Popular Vote, 1832-1910

shows the party share of parliamentary seats, between Liberals and Conservatives. I
have separated out the Peelites—former Conservatives who left the party over the repeal
of the corn laws and over a grant to a Catholic seminary—between 1846 and 1859, after
which they were solidly in a Liberal coalition.337 I have also separated out the Irish
independents and nationalists.
There are some problems with the periodization of Liberal ascendancy that I have
sketched out here. For one, the Liberal Party was a party in formation and far from being
the coherent and permanent organizations we associate with modern political parties. It
was always a much more uneasy and tenuous coalition. Nevertheless, it makes sense to
speak of this period as one of Liberal Ascendancy, and the early lack of coherence and
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The natures of the Rallings and Thrasher (2007) data makes it impossible to separate out Peelites from
the Conservatives in the share of the popular vote. Given that the Peelites were increasingly aligned
with the Liberals, this understates the Liberal vote share in Figure 6.16. I was able to separate out the
Peelites in Figure 6.15 using the information in Blake (1997).
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strong organization should not be measured against our later intuitions of parliamentary
systems generating highly centralized parties (Gash 1981, 161; Jenkins 1994, 24; Parry
1996, 128).338 It was in this period that party loyalty began to develop in the electorate,
that parties began to exercise greater control over their membership in Parliament, and
that new party organizations in the constituencies could bring pressure on their MPs, in
turn increasing their sensitivity to public opinion and constituent preferences (Cox 1987,
4).

Parties and Public Opinion: the constrained independence of MPs
In Chapter 2 I outlined a model of how ideas conditioned political behavior, one that
focused on the extent to which the strictures of a given idea become embedded in the expectations of political operatives. Crucial to this process are mechanisms by which nonconformity or violations of policy and behavioral prescriptions could be punished. Two
of the most important of these mechanisms are party organizations, which have varying
capacity to ‘whip’ members and enforce discipline, and the electoral institutions, which
ensure varying degrees of representative sensitivity to electorate preferences. These institutional parameters establish the relatively stable context in which certain patterns of
political behavior were incentivized and became regular features of Victorian political
life.
The most important institutional parameters of Victorian politics were the new organizations in the constituencies, the steadily growing partisanship in the electorate, and
the new party organizations centered in sites such as the Reform Club. All of these
encouraged a greater sensitivity of elected oﬃcials to their constituents or their party
leaders. O’Connell’s Catholic Association and the collection of the Catholic rent in Ireland, and its imitators in the Political Unions supporting reform, had shown that mass
organization was possible and could greatly inﬂuence government. The election of 1831
had shown that radical swings in the composition of the Commons could be achieved,
and both conservatives and liberals recognized the need to organize in the constituencies
rather than rely solely on the vagaries of local patronage. The parties in the constituencies were less formal organizations than loose networks of like-minded individuals, but
the new registration and objection system encouraged both local organization and some
338

An alternative view is that “the origin of the Liberal Party is usually found in the famous meeting
held in Willis’s rooms on 6 June 1859 when the Whig, Peelite and Radical leaders in Parliament,
drawn together by common sympathy with Italy, agreed to combine together to expel the minority
Conservative Government of Derby and Disraeli” (Adelman 1997, 3).
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measure of centralization. This was gradually taken on by single-issue organizations,
and subsequently by the parties themselves. The long-run eﬀect was the “modernization” of the British electoral system: the development of an electorate with clear and
stable partisan loyalties, permanent institutional parties competing around registration
and voting, through a mixture of coordinated organization and local and national appeals, and the eventual emergence of clear programmatic political platforms that would
be the basis for legislative action by the parliamentary party.
The ﬁght leading to and the eventual passage of Emancipation and Reform “unleashed a wave of political modernization that the Whig Party eagerly harnessed and the
Tory Party grudgingly, but no less eﬀectively embraced” (Phillips and Wetherell 1995,
412). Coinciding with the mobilization of the electorate around reform in 1831, the
proportion of voters who split their two votes between candidates of opposing parties
dropped dramatically (Cox 1987, 92; Phillips and Wetherell 1995, 424). And after 1832,
the propensity of voters to display partisan loyalty in successive elections (voting for the
same party, even if not for the same candidate) likewise increased (Phillips and Wetherell
1995, 432). British electors were decreasingly characterized by localism and patronage
relationships and more by an attachment to national parties articulating programmatic
policies rooted in clearly articulated principles.
This political modernization was in part the consequence of the new forms of constituency organizing that the Reform Act induced. The annual process of registration
and revision established by the Act encouraged the parties to establish constituency
groups, although these lacked central coordination and anything resembling a modern
policy apparatus. The brief Conservative government of Robert Peel in 1834-35 encouraged the formation of “hundreds of Conservative associations. . . established right across
the country” to register their supporters and object to their opponents (Salmon 2003,
56). The Reform Association in London, in turn, took a central role in organizing Liberal associations across the country, “with a view of objecting to the claims of such as
are not likely to vote in the Liberal interest” (Salmon 2003, 56).
It should be underlined, however, that the means by which these associations pursued
their objective were, like the reform act itself, both enfranchising and disfranchising.
“Agents of the [Anti-Corn Law] League were sent out to every county of
doubtful political colour. They made inquiries, frequently from door to
door, as to the political opinions of persons upon the register; the information thus gained was transmitted to the central oﬃce at Manchester. . . . The
solicitors of the League. . . objected to every Conservative whenever oppor239

tunity oﬀered.” (Seymour 1915, 135-36).339
In the constituencies, political modernization was achieved by partisan organizations
securing the right to vote for many while simultaneously imposing additional costs and
denying the vote altogether from thousands of a diﬀerent political persuasion.
Alongside this growing development of partisanship and party organization in the
electorate, the post-1832 period saw the gradual emergence of clear party formations and
organization in Parliament. With the increase in the size of the electorate, there was an
increased need for MPs to engage in non-patronage politics. In smaller constituencies, it
was less costly to bribe and intimidate electors, and easier to track voting behavior. The
result was a larger incentive to secure re-election through individual level clientelistic
politics or bribery as compared to larger constituency, where it was harder to organize
bribery or intimidation and much more costly to do so. As the corruption option became
closed oﬀ to a larger number of MPs, the incentive to engage in programmatic polices
and clear position-taking on issues of importance to their constituents increased (Cox
and Ingram 1992; Lizzeri and Persico 2004).
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These committees also served as a potential check against the disfranchisement of their supporters,
ﬁnding party supporters whose “qualiﬁcations were loosely described and who might stand in need of
legal assistance in the support of their claims” (Seymour 1915, 136).
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Table 6.1: Median Electorate Size, Counties and Boroughs of Four Nations
England
Wales
Scotland
Ireland
Boroughs Counties Boroughs Counties Burghs Counties Boroughs Counties
1829
399
2,492
752
1,754
88
101
521
3622
1830
—
—
—
—
—
—
560
621
1832
761
2,416
815
1,694
1,181
1,100
603
946
1851
1,115
3,341
839
2,408
1,617
1,683
591
2,332
1868
3,579
4,254
3,222
3,938
4,802
2,377
910
2,772
1885
7,828
10,076
6,210
9,186
7,513
8,340
6,602
7,451
Source: Author’s calculations, using UK Constituency Dataset

Year

The creation of a mass electorate across the boroughs and counties of the UK is
shown in Table 6.1, which shows the median electorate size for each nation’s delegation
to parliament. The smaller the electorate, the more likely that patrons and landlords
could bribe or intimidate the electors, especially in the pre-1872 period when not only
was the vote public but was published in local poll books. Before the 1884-85 acts, there
were a large number of electorates that numbered in the hundreds. But there was also an
important number from medium and large constituencies, whose MPs could not bribe
or secure support through individualized patronage but had to take into account the
political preferences of their constituents (Schonhardt-Bailey 2003).
The legislative behavior of individual MPs, including the ability to buck the party
leadership, was relatively comparable with that seen in the 19th United States. Measures
of party cohesion during the period under analysis, for instance, were comparable to
those found in American legislatures (Cox 1987; Lowell 1902), while party organization
in and outside of Parliament lagged behind that in the United States. Just as important, Cox ﬁnds that “the early Victorian polity was more American than its twentiethcentury successor” in the relationship between MPs and constituents: “pressures from
constituents were a signiﬁcant consideration in the roll-call voting decisions of MPs seeking re-election, and were an important cause of dissent from the party line” (Cox 1986,
215).
The general picture, then, is one of MPs balancing the competing demands of constituency and party opinion, with a gradual trend toward greater dependency on the
latter. During the period with which we are concerned, both public opinion and parties were becoming more important as mechanisms of pressure on individual MPs. The
position-taking of MPs—in debates, in voting in Parliament, in questions posed to ministers, in the introduction of private members’ bills—was conditioned by the parameters
of public opinion and party discipline, and understanding their behavior requires an
attention to how they navigated their own preferences through the context of political
and partisan exigencies. These processes would continue after 1884, as the forms of
parliamentary unity with which we are familiar today came into existence. But after
1886 the underlying partisan arrangement would be dramatically re-arranged, as the
Liberal Party split into Home Rulers and Unionists, the latter allying themselves with
the Conservatives.
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Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the basic argument of the UK case study and has empirically
documented the disfranchisements and exclusions that characterized the British path
toward democracy. It has also outlined the basic institutional context in which the
processes of democratization operated during the 19th century. This was characterized
by an ascendant Liberal coalition in which political operatives’ behavior was conditioned
both by the demands of their parties and the preferences of their constituents.
The next chapter will look at the coalitional dynamics that underlay the passage of
repeal, relief, and reform in the years 1828-1832. Reformers were able to hold together
a diverse coalition by articulating an account of British history, identity, and purpose
that stressed the causes of religious and civil liberty achieved through gradual reform
of governing institutions. What would become the familiar Whig narrative of history,
and would become a constitutive account of British political community, was formulated
in a speciﬁc political context and for a speciﬁc political purpose. And the vision of
peoplehood that the reformers elaborated, including the strategic accommodations and
compromises they were forced to make to this vision, would be embedded in the institutions and organizations of the Victorian era, conditioning the behavior of political
operatives.
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Chapter 7
The Fall of the Protestant Constitution, 1828-32

“It is of the very essence of the truth of God to make distinctions. God put a
diﬀerence between the fruits of Eden: Satan said there was none. Liberalism is
the very principle of Satan in action at the present day”
—‘A Tory of the Old School’340

Introduction
In his 1962 novel A Murder of Quality, John le Carré has a character reﬂect on the
conversion of his son-in-law to the Church of England: “Where I come from in the
North, we don’t do that. Chapel was something we’d stood up for and won. Almost like
the Vote.”341 The character’s pairing of dissenting Protestantism and the right to vote
reﬂects a central but often overlooked feature of British democratization: the extension
of the vote was part of a sustained eﬀort to redeﬁne the sectarian character of the British
state and people, one whose central achievements were the repeal in 1828 of the Test
and Corporation Acts, which excluded Dissenters from various public oﬃces, and the
1829 Catholic Relief (Emancipation) Act, which allowed Catholics to hold public oﬃces
and sit in Parliament.
In 1828, a self-described ‘Tory of the Old School’ warned that both the cause of repeal
and relief sprung from “the same root of inﬁdelity”—that “there is no diﬀerence, and
that there ought to be none made, ‘between him that feareth God, and him that feareth
him not’.” Liberalism was, for this writer, the rejection of all distinctions. It was “the very
principle of Satan in action at the present day.” The core claim of liberalism, formulated
340

A Letter to the King against the Repeal of the Test Act (1828, 28). The pamphlet was anonymous, but
Henry Drummond is known as the author.
341
Le Carré (2002, 78)
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by Dissenters and Catholics in their pursuit of repeal and relief, had allegedly led even
despotic “papists” to embrace “the absurd sentiment, that the people are the source of
legitimate power” (1828, 28-29). For this author, and for many of his contemporaries,
electoral reform could not be separated from repeal and relief.
The preceding chapter charted the enfranchisements, disfranchisements and exclusions in the United Kingdom during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The next chapter will look at the content of the Liberal vision of progressive Britain and detail how
this narrative conditioned political behavior, ultimately shaping the trajectory of British
democratization. This narrative continues to structure our understanding of democratization, suggesting a uniquely British democratizing path of gradual and progressive
enfranchisement. But the Whig/Liberal understanding of history has obscured a central
fact of the revolution of 1828-32: both Emancipation and the Reform Act had among
their central purposes the disfranchisement of voters and the demarcation of a desired
‘people’ through new exclusions.
This chapter looks at the context and process by which a story of the character and
purpose of political community was crafted and employed in the struggle to dislodge
the Protestant Constitution. The period 1828 to 1832 was a critical juncture in the
development of the United Kingdom, and the ideas of political community articulated
by reformers were a necessary, albeit insuﬃcient, condition for its occurrence. To hold
together a reforming coalition, political operatives articulated narratives of community
that allowed them to see not just a common interest but a common principle and moral
imperative in the political projects desired by their diﬀerent constituencies. These ideas
included a new delineation of the boundary and interpretation of the purpose of political
community. The people were the middle classes, without sectarian distinction. They had
a providential purpose, the cause of civil and religious liberty, all over the world. This
cause was the purpose of British constitutionalism. But it could only be brought about by
the expedient reform of governing institutions to the changing circumstances of history.
This legitimated Whig governance, for they saw themselves (and believed others saw
them) as uniquely capable of the statesmanship progressive reform required.
***
The stories of Catholic Emancipation and the Reform Act have been told many
times.342 I am less concerned with the many turns in the drama than in highlighting how
342

The Reform Act in particular has been amply covered by historians, with the most recent being Edward
Pearce’s Reform!: The Fight for the 1832 Reform Act (2010), Eric J.J. Evans’ The Great Reform Act of 1832
(1994), and Kenneth Morgan’s The Great Reform Act of 1832 (2001). There are fewer recent comprehensive
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narratives of political community were used to reconcile diverging interests and sustain
a transformative coalition; how the political dynamics made disfranchisement a central
feature of the institutional transformation; and how these exclusions were justiﬁed by the
articulation of a new basis for inclusion into the British people. I begin by introducing
the Protestant Constitution, a frequently invoked idea of the purpose and principles of
the British constitution and people. While elaborated by Whigs in the 18th century, it
gained renewed importance under the nascent ‘Tory’ party during the years of crisis
between 1776 and 1819. I then trace the process by which it was overturned. I look ﬁrst
at the construction of a loose reform coalition, emphasizing the role of ideas of political
belonging in reconciling potentially divergent interests across constituencies. I then look
at the political crisis that led to repeal (1828), emancipation (1829), and reform (1832). I
highlight how these ideas helped sustain a reforming coalition, despite expectations to
the contrary, and how the commitments and compromises of this coalition were reﬂected
in a new deﬁnition of the ‘people.’

The Protestant Constitution
Anti-Catholicism and Toleration in British Constitutionalism
The dominant understanding of political community in 18th and early 19th century Britain
was what contemporaries called the ‘Protestant Constitution’: the people and Crown of
Britain were Protestant and the constitutional arrangement of a sovereign King in Parliament existed for the purpose of maintaining their Protestant character and Established
Churches. The centerpiece of this narrative was the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688, which
consolidated national identity and settled the “long, painful struggle” with intolerant and
despotic Popery (Best 1958, 109).343
The Revolution is usually placed in a framework of securing of civil liberties, the rule
of law, and the establishment of property. For contemporaries, however, the distinction
between religious and secular liberties was less rigid. The Declaration of Right and the
Bill of Rights—core documents of the Revolution—asserted the supremacy of Parliaaccounts of Catholics emancipation. See Wendy Hinde’s Catholic Emancipation: A Shake to Men’s Minds
(1992) and O’Ferrall’s Catholic Emancipation: Daniel O’Connell and the Birth of Irish Democracy, 1820-1830
(1985). I rely particularly on the narratives of O’Ferrall and Edward Pearce.
343
Linda Colley argues that a ‘British’ identity, one that incorporated English, Welsh, Scots, and the
Protestant Irish, had been forged through a constant juxtaposition against Catholicism, especially the
Catholic powers of Spain and France (2005).
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ment by denying the Crown’s “pretended power” to suspend the laws.344 This assertion
was provoked by James II setting aside the penal laws against Catholics and Dissenters,
which threatened English liberties by raising the specter of Catholic governance and
threatened English property by calling into question the Established Church and the
property settlement of Ireland.345 Limiting the power of the Crown was intended to secure the Protestant character of the State and people, which in turn secured liberty, law,
and property, all threatened by Popery, and created the conditions for English prosperity:346 “England was now Protestant, and with that Protestantism began her prosperity.
And what a prosperity!”347
In the eyes of its exponents, religious toleration was considered a central feature of
the Protestant Constitution and British peoplehood (Best 1958, 111). But it was the centrality of toleration that mandated the exclusion of Catholics, as Catholics were deemed
incapable of toleration. Horace Walpole, for instance, wrote in 1784 that “I have ever
been averse to toleration of an intolerant religion.”348 In the 1820s the poet Robert
Southey was “for abolishing [the Test Act] with regard to every other sect—Jews and
all—but not to the Catholics. They will not tolerate” (Southey 1855, 217). The great majority of contemporaries would have agreed with the juxtaposition of British toleration
against Catholic intolerance.
344

The basic constitutional documents include the Coronation Oath Act, the Toleration Act, the Bill of
Rights, the Act of Settlement (1701), the Act of Union (1707) with Scotland, which secured Parliament’s
control over the succession, and the Act of Union (1800), which united the Churches of Ireland and
England and pledged the King and Parliament to the defense of their establishment and property.
These were buttressed by the penal laws against Catholics.
345
The property settlements that James II was perceived to threaten were the conﬁscations of the monasteries and the Church of England’s claim to the property of the former Catholic Church, as well as the
large-scale conﬁscations in Ireland, starting at the end of the Nine Years war (1594-1603) and concluding
after the Williamite settlement. The ‘patriot parliament’ convened in Ireland in defense of James II in
1689 passed a law that would have overturned the Cromwellian settlement. The penal laws, it should
be noted, “went further than merely protecting the estates of the Protestants; they aimed at breaking up
those holdings which had, despite the seventeenth century conﬁscations, remained in Catholic hands.
The property of any Catholic was to be divided by gavelkind on his death among his sons and Catholics
were not allowed to purchase the freehold of land in their own name or in the name of others nor to
take a lease exceeding thirty-one years, and even then the rent was to be at least two-thirds of the full
yearly value of the land. The result of this policy was to make the landlord class almost exclusively
Protestant and the tenant class almost exclusively Catholic” (O’Neill 1955, 325).
346
The right of the Hanoverians to govern would be defended against Jacobites on this basis. As a
pamphlet at the time of the 1745 Jacobite uprising put it, the Hanoverian Kings had “a Right to the
Crown of England by blood. 2dly, By the Protestant constitution of England. 3dly, By the general and
free Consent of the People. 4thly and lastly, By the wonderful Interposal of divine Providence.” The
Case of the Revolution Truly Stated (Anonymous 1746, 26).
347
British Magazine, March 1832. Cited in Best (1958, 111).
348
Walpole to Horace Mann, Berkeley Square, November 8, 1784 (Walpole 1844, 197).
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“I should justly render suspect my pretension to the character of a Briton
and a Protestant, if I wished to have conﬁded to them a legislative authority
which their principles would oblige them to use for the suppression of heresy,
that is in their language Protestantism.”349
Catholicism’s ostensible intolerance extended to the lay Catholic, supposedly under the
authority of the priest. Henry Addington (Lord Sidmouth) opposed emancipation because Catholics were “not masters of their own consciences, their own opinions, and
their own conduct” (Pellew 1847, 495). An 1827 pamphlet, The Admission of the Catholics
into the Legislature, Inconsistent with Constitutional Principles and of Advantage to None but
the Priesthood, argued that there was something “peculiar in the principles of [Catholicism]” that placed “the principal inﬂuence into the hands of the clergy,” who would
oppose “every government. . . unfavourable to it” (1827, 7–8).
Catholics were also incapable of allegiance, both because there was a line of Pretenders to whom they supposedly clung and because their primary allegiance was always
to the Pope (Ó Ciardha 2004). Lord Molesworth, an important 18th century advocate
of toleration, had argued that the Whig principles upon which the Revolution had been
settled were “not circumscribed and conﬁned to any one or two of the religions now professed in the world, but diﬀuses itself among all.” Catholics, however, were dangerous
not because of they were of a diﬀerent religion, but “because popery sets up a foreign
jurisdiction paramount to our laws. So that a real Papist can neither be a governor of a
Protestant country, nor a true subject” (1721).
Dissenting Protestants, who did not adhere to the Church of England, could be
aﬀorded a greater toleration, but certainly not equality with Anglicans. They too were
dangerous to the State and constitutional settlement, as their principles were “merely to
pull down, an Ecclesiastical establishment.” While not considered incapable of toleration
and not owing allegiance to a foreign power, Dissenters were believed likely to support
disestablishment, which would be ruinous as well as open the door to Papist despotism.
As a result, “the members of the established church alone can be cordial friends to the
entire constitution of this realm, with perfect consistency of principle” (Woodward 1787,
14–15).350
The Test and Corporation Acts—a successful defense of which was mounted in the
late 1780s—and the unreformed electoral system provided an institutional foundation
349
350

Adam Clark to Sidmouth, circa March-April 1821 (Pellew 1847, 349).
For a more extensive discussion of Woodward, see Hill (1989). While concerned with the Protestant
Ascendancy in Ireland, Woodward’s pamphlet was quickly reprinted in London, with a preface insisting
that the problem was the same across both kingdoms.
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for the limitation of Dissenting electoral power. Not including Scots Presbyterians, the
Established Church of Scotland, approximately 107 of 6,148 MPs between 1715 and 1820
were Dissenters from the Church of England. This was much smaller than their relative population size, which was growing rapidly by the end of the 18th and early 19th
centuries.351 The exclusion of Dissenters from local oﬃces and their exclusion from proportionate inﬂuence in Parliament through the unreformed electoral system, especially
the closed boroughs (Bradley 2002, 98), were central to the defense of the Protestant
Constitution.352 Parliamentary reform, then, was a major threat to Anglican hegemony.
Both Catholics and Dissenters had been extended as much tolerance as was safe.
J.C.D. Clark has argued that “despite its internal diﬀerences, Anglicanism, not Protestantism, should be our key term” (Clark 2000b, 274). There is considerable truth to this;
but the term ‘Protestant’ brought with it a useful ambiguity, at times covering over one
of the central cleavages across the United Kingdom. What the Protestant Constitution
signiﬁed was not a unanimity or equality within Protestantism, but rather that the core of
the British constitution was an established church, Episcopalian in England and Ireland
and Presbyterian in Scotland, with toleration for Dissenters and Catholics. But tolerance
did not mean equality, and as much as the ‘Protestantism’ of the constitution worked to
facilitate a broader identity across Dissenters, Anglicans, and the diﬀerent nationalities
(Colley 2005), it was always subject to an anxiety that there would emerge a coalition
of the excluded, a fear realized to some extent in the rebellion of the United Irishmen
of 1798. Catholics and “Dissenters, of all classes, and particularly the Unitarians, [were]
odious to the people” (Kendall 1826, 514). Anti-Catholicism and aggressive Anglicanism
were not mere prejudice and were anything but tangential: they were embedded in a
narrative of English history and deﬁned the state and the constitution’s purpose.

The Years of Crisis
This vision of political community would be reaﬃrmed during the years of crisis that
lasted from 1775-1819. Both the American and French Revolutions initially encouraged
reforming currents of opinion, and there was some reason to believe the British State
351

Religious aﬃliation was ﬁrst examined in the 1851 census. One estimate of the size of the Dissenting
denomination in England put it at 19.2% in 1801, versus 80.8% for the Church of England. This was
an estimate of attendance, not aﬃliation or upbringing, and only includes Anglicans and “British”
denominations—i.e., Protestants in churches whose origins were in Britain. In 1851, the same estimate
was 48% Dissenting and 52% Church of England. See Voluntaryism in England and Wales (1854, 50).
352
Annually passed Indemnity Acts allowed for Dissenters to hold local oﬃce, but few availed themselves
of this opportunity, in part because of the temporary and uncertain nature of the tenure.
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was receptive to moderate reforms. The rising ministerial star, William Pitt, presented a
measure of parliamentary reform in 1782; it was defeated, but he became Prime Minister
the following year. He quickly began pressing the Irish government to reform that
country’s parliament. Pitt hoped a modest reform might satisfy Protestant reformers
and rally them to the defense of the Protestant Constitution. He suggested the Lord
Lieutenant adopt a “prudent and temperate reform of Parliament, which may. . . unite the
Protestant interest in excluding the Catholics from any share in the representation or the
government of the country.”353 By Pitt’s reasoning, “the Protestant reformers are alarmed
at the pretensions of the Catholics, and for that very reason would stop very short of the
extreme speculative notions of universal suﬀrage.”354 The context for Pitt’s eﬀorts was
the recently concluded American War, which had underscored the importance of Irish
Catholic recruits as well as the republican sympathies of Presbyterians.
The American War was not primarily a conﬂict with a Catholic power, although
the Québec Act’s toleration of Catholicism was a major irritant for the colonists. And
indeed, there were moves toward increased toleration for Catholics, notably (and causing the most violent backlash in England and Scotland) the Catholic Relief Act of 1778,
motivated by the growing reliance on Irish Catholics in the army.355 It was not the antiCatholicism of the constitution that was brought to the fore during the American War,
but rather its ‘Anglicanism.’ Support for the Americans broke largely along sectional
lines within Protestantism, with Anglicans much more supportive of coercive measures
and Dissenters much more likely to be sympathetic to the colonists (Conway 2000 14041). The Dissenters were seen as associated with radicalism, while the Anglican clergy
“were clearly the most consistently pro-government body in the nation” (Bradley 1989,
363). The American Revolution led to a resurgent commitment to the Protestant Constitution as it became an occasion for a vigorous defense of the Anglican Establishment
(Clark 1985, 230). There could be no concession on parliamentary reform or the Test
Laws, the defense of which from 1787-1790 helped consolidate a new ‘Tory’ party around
Pitt.356
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The French Revolution likewise did not initially encourage a projection of a Protestant identity against a Catholic ‘other’ (Clark 2000b, 262). If anything, it created the possibility for further including Catholics within the pale of toleration, as it enabled a trope
of Great Britain as a religious state in opposition to an avowedly anti-clerical regime
while simultaneously generating sympathy for an assaulted Catholic Church. The image
of a religious state, tolerating nonconformity but rooted in the rituals of the Church of
England, was a useful point of contrast with the secularism of republicanism, and French
anti-clericalism was a core part of government propaganda (Hole 1991). The Anglican
Church entered into a “combine against the devil” with Catholic refugees arriving from
the Continent, and loyalist pamphleteers praised the French Catholic Church as a bulwark of social stability and political order (Mori 2003, 45; Rice 1981).357 As remarked
by E.P. Thompson, there was a “drastic redirection of hatred; the Pope was displaced
from the seat of commination and in his place was elevated Tom Paine” (E. P. Thompson
1963, 391; Haydon 1993, 264).
Much of this redirection was targeted against Dissenters. Edmund Burke denounced
the “rising race of Dissenters” whose comparison of “the church of Rome to the whore of
Babylon, the kirk of Scotland to a kept mistress, and the church of England to something
between a prostitute and a modest woman” suggested radical doctrines that would destroy the Established Church.358 The Church of England was a bulwark against “radical
dissent” (Rice 1981, 276). The eﬀect of juxtaposing a religious State to the ‘Rational’
state of revolutionary France, along with the expected need for Irish manpower and quiescence, initially helped further increase the scope of toleration allowed Catholics. In
1791 a Catholic Relief bill was passed that allowed Catholics in Great Britain to practice
law, to hear mass, to live in London, and various measures related to inheritance.359 The
British ministry began to pressure the Irish government to enfranchise Catholic voters.
Opposition to enfranchisement was organized by the Corporation of Dublin, which issued an address to “the Protestants of the land,” reminding them that “the Great Ruler
of all things decided in favor of our ancestors [one hundred years prior], he gave them
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victory, and Ireland became a Protestant nation—The Roman Catholics should rest content, with. . . security for their persons, and property, & toleration for their religion.”360
The British ministry, however, was greatly concerned with the possibility of a French
invasion of Ireland, by the need for Irish enlistment, and by the threat of unity between
the Presbyterian radicals in Ulster and Catholics. They informed the Irish government
that Catholics, if peaceable and loyal, should obtain “participation, on the same terms
with Protestants, in the elective franchise and the formation of juries.” Lacking support
for continued exclusion, the Irish government conceded and pushed through the Irish
Parliament an enfranchising bill, albeit one that maintained the exclusion of Catholics
from holding oﬃces such as MP.361
Ministerial reaction was soon underway, including both a rejection of constitutional
changes—exempliﬁed by Pitt’s changed position on reform, which he now denounced as
an “opening for those principles which aim at nothing less than a total annihilation of the
constitution”—as well as a reassertion of the sectarian character of the state.362 Loyalist
publications sought to undermine support for even moderate parliamentary reform. In
the highly popular Englishman’s Political Catechism, the author rejected reform outright:
“Q. But do you not think the manner of representation of the People in
Parliament ought to be altered?
A. No.
Q. Why?
A. Because I consider it to be the foundation, the step, on which those
enemies of the community want to mount, who, instead of the present form
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of government, wish to have us under the dominion of the mob.”363
The anti-ministerial party around Charles James Fox, claiming the mantle of Whigs, was
under considerable pressure to disclaim support for radicalism, to denounce universal
suﬀrage, and to reaﬃrm their support for the constitution and the principles of 1688
(Smith 2005, 82). In 1797, Charles Grey (future PM) asked to bring in a reform bill. His
request was defeated 256-91, prompting most of the supporters of Fox to “secede” from
Parliament—to stay away from Parliament and remain inactive in political life (Turner
1999, 71).
This reaction was not solely a top-down repression by the state or the aristocracy.
While it did entail repressive legislation and public and private coercion, it was also a
“war of ideas” aimed at securing cross-class loyalty to the ‘Protestant’ Constitution and
the Hanoverian order (O’Gorman 2007, 235). But this “war of ideas” was in considerable part aimed at shaping popular perception of material interest. The Chairman
of the Canterbury Association, for instance, insisted that “everything that is now published on this subject [anti-radicalism] ought to be adapted to the capacity and pockets
of that class of person whom it is most essentially necessary to inform,” namely the
small property-owning and laboring classes (O’Gorman 2007, 235). The ideas of the
Protestant Constitution were not separate from the material and political interests, but
rather informed how these interests were understood and recognized.
Elites within and without the state were not only closing ranks in opposition to
reform, but against changes to the sectarian deﬁnition of the State. The widespread
organization of loyalist associations reasserted a vision of political community that was
essentially a “statement of commitment to the principal features of the old Hanoverian
order” and the Glorious Revolution (Mori 2000, 81, 2003; O’Gorman 2007). This assertion of loyalty to the constitution of 1688 was what Clark has described as the “strange
rebirth of Anglican hegemony” (Clark 2000a, 300). It was in defense of the Protestant
Constitution that Pitt opposed the repeal of the Test Acts in the late 1780s, as it implied
Dissenters “who might conscientiously think it their duty to subvert the establishment”
and “Papists, who acknowledge the supremacy of a foreign ecclesiastical Prince” were to
be extended equality with Churchmen: “the indispensable necessity of a certain permanent church establishment for the good of the State, required that toleration should not
be extended to an equality.”364 Edmund Burke, who also opposed repeal of the Test Acts
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in Parliament, wrote that “the majority of the people of England. . . consider [the Church
Establishment] as the foundation of their whole constitution. . . . Church and State are
ideas inseparable in their minds, and scarcely is the one ever mentioned without mentioning the other.”365 These were not new sentiments, but they were being expressed
with a ﬁerceness that had not been seen in decades and in popularly organized clubs
that were largely a novelty.
In 1798 there was a rebellion in Ireland, one that in some areas saw coordinated
organizing among dissenting Protestants and Catholics and that was accompanied by
a French invasion.366 The rebellion provided an opportunity to highlight the danger
posed by Dissenters and Catholics. Before and during the rebellion the British and
Irish governments were concerned with the advance of radicalism among Presbyterians:
“[T]he leveling system, under the mask of reform, is spreading furiously. . . . The source
of all the mischief is the town of Belfast.”367 Especially worrisome was the prospect that
the United Irishmen would unite Presbyterian and Catholic, which for a brief period
seemed likely (Curtin 1985).368 An animating principle of British rule over Ireland was
to make sure this did not occur, and they worked to ensure that Catholics believed the
insurgents to be Orangemen and Protestants that they were Catholic.369
Most Tories blamed the rebellion on a “Jacobinical conspiracy,. . . pursuing its object
with Popish instruments.”370 Richard Musgrave’s Memoirs of the Diﬀerent Rebellions in
Ireland (1802), which alongside Burke’s Reﬂections “most deﬁned the nineteenth-century
British Right” (Sack 1993, 96), reversed the primacy—the unchanging Papist, organized
in the Catholic Committee, were the real force behind the rebellion and had relied on
deluded Dissenting radicals (Smyth 1998). Regardless of which was most responsible,
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elite British opinion had managed to reconcile the seemingly divergent bugbears of Popery and Jacobinism. “Though jacobin principles were the foundation of the rebellion,”
declared Pitt, “I do not mean to deny, that the inﬂuence of the priests themselves, tainted
with Jacobin principles, might not have aggravated the evil, though they were not the
cause of it.”371 With the signing of the Concordat between the Papacy and Napoleon in
1801, the ideological space available for sympathy with Catholicism was again restricted
(Patterson 1998, 57).
The reclassiﬁcation of Catholics as a subversive element ensured that even the most
liberal Protestants were compelled to defend further relief as necessary strengthen the
Protestant constitution. This was the purpose behind the Act of Union (1800), which
created the United Kingdom with the Irish given 100 seats in an expanded Westminster Parliament. It also united the Churches of England and Ireland and declared the
Church’s “continuance and preservation. . . to be an essential and fundamental part of the
union.” The new constitutional entity of the U.K. was a reaﬃrmation of the Protestant
Constitution.372
The anti-radical organizing during the crisis years advanced an aggressive association of English national identity with the terms of the Glorious Revolution, one that was
reﬂected in the propaganda of the Pitt ministry and disseminated across the country. Its
central theme was adherence to the constitution, which in practice meant a rejection of
parliamentary reform, the defense of the Test and Corporation Acts, and opposition to
Catholic Emancipation as violations of the boundaries and bases of the English political
community. The successive waves of loyalist and patriotic associations throughout this
period provided the organizational infrastructure to articulate and disseminate this understanding, and to impose costs on those who would violate its strictures (O’Gorman
2007, 227; Sack 1987, 637).
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The Fall of the Protestant Constitution
In 1828, the leader of the Whig party in the House of Commons, John Russell, moved
to repeal the Test and Corporation Acts. Against the government’s wishes, it passed.
Shortly after, the Irish leader of the Catholic Association, Daniel O’Connell, was elected
to Parliament from County Clare. While the oath required of MPs meant he could not,
as a Catholic, take his seat in Parliament, there was nothing preventing him from being
elected. The ensuing crisis led the Prime Minister Duke of Wellington and Commons
leader Robert Peel to break their repeatedly pledged opposition and usher through the
Catholic Emancipation and the Irish Disfranchisement Acts. The ideological core of the
Protestant Constitution was fractured. The Tories were split, enabling the Whigs to take
oﬃce for the ﬁrst time in a generation. They immediately moved to reform the electoral
system, and after another crisis pushed the Reform Act through Parliament. This in turn
radically altered the institutional foundation of the old order, and ushered in a period of
intensiﬁed party competition, partisan identiﬁcation, and the possibility of a competitive
logic of progressive enfranchisement.
This transformation was a critical juncture, but it was neither unforeseen nor unpredictable (cf. Ertman 2010). It had long been believed that extensions of political rights
to Catholics would provide an opening for electoral reform. Catholic emancipation had
been contested since at least the Act of Union, and had come close to passing as recently
as 1825. Even the election of a Catholic to the legislature, and the tumult this would
produce, was not unforeseen. What made this a critical juncture was that over a short
period of time the institutions and ideologies that underlay the governing authority and
politics of the old regime were reconﬁgured, with the outcome of the political struggle
uncertain and contingent.
The juncture was the result of at least two broad processes that had been unfolding
over several decades. The ﬁrst was the self-undermining hegemony of the Tory party in
the ﬁrst decades of the 19th century. After 1807, the political dominance of the Tories
was nearly absolute. Aspiring politicians were more likely to adhere to them than to the
opposition, and their political tent increasingly covered members who were relatively
liberal on issues of religion and trade (Brock 1967). At the same time, the problem of
governing Ireland had encouraged many ministers and military oﬃcers to consider the
expediency of emancipation. Robert Stewart (Castlereagh), certainly not in the ‘liberal’
wing of the Tory party, would not serve unless he was given a free hand to support
emancipation (Bew 2012, 301). Lord Liverpool, PM from 1812-1827, could not form a
256

ministry unless Catholic relief was not a matter of collective Cabinet responsibility.373 It
became impossible to form a government that included the political talent except on the
principle of ministerial neutrality on this issue.
The second process was the long run project of building a political coalition that
included Whigs, Dissenters, radicals, and Irish Catholics.374 Central to this coalition was
the development of a counter-narrative of the purpose underlying the British political
community. By stressing civil and religious liberty as the foundational purpose of the
Revolution, and including Catholics in its ambit, activists were able to reconcile their
interests as roughly compatible and reinforcing, even if they did not share a common
identity in a single and coherent political party. On the issue of electoral reform, Whigs
were more uncertain. It was “still inscribed on their banner, but not as their chief and
most immediate object” (Trevelyan 1920, 182). But the unreformed system was central
to the exclusion of Dissenters and the opposition of the Tories to repeal of the Test and
Corporation Acts encouraged them to embrace parliamentary reform. As the exclusion
of the Whigs from oﬃce continued, their own political interests pointed toward reform,
even if this meant bringing them into closer association with radicals than they desired.
The ability of the Tories to govern was contingent upon their not being disrupted by
the Catholic question. And if they faltered, the Whigs were increasingly committed to a
profound alteration of the House of Commons. They would soon be prepared to “pull
down around their ears the late-eighteenth-century constitution” (Clark 1985, 36). But
ﬁrst they needed to build a coalition of the excluded, one that could maintain at least
some measure of cohesion—if not identity—against Tory dominance.

Building the Reform Coalition
The Protestant Constitution was always contested, but it was remained highly popular
and appeals to it had broad resonance. Some radicals were willing to stake out positions
entirely outside the Protestant Constitution, attacking the Church establishment, the
House of Lords, the narrow franchise, and even the monarchy itself. After Pitt’s gag laws
and the repressive legislation of the Perceval and Liverpool administrations much of
this activity was illegal. The Whigs prioritized Catholic Emancipation in their political
program, but “their obstinate ﬁdelity to it alienated the sympathies of the [English],
373
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and was one of the main reasons for their failure to obtain oﬃce” (Roberts 1939, 2).
They continued to support reform, but were divided over the extent and cowed by the
government’s successful association of reform with Jacobinism. This was the political
context in which reformers and advocates of Catholic emancipation found themselves in
the ﬁrst decades of the 19th century, one that provided strong incentives for reformers,
religious and electoral, to accommodate their appeals and strategies to ﬁt the strictures
of the Protestant Constitution.
Most of the discursive strategies they employed wrestled with this dilemma: the more
they accommodated their rhetoric, the more they conceded and the more their opponents could say that they were prepared to endanger the constitution for very modest
gains. The less accommodative, the more they were presented as Jacobinal radicals,
prepared to overturn the foundations of the British constitution. Given the increasing
legal harassment, violating its strictures might mean jail or worse. But a more pressing
consideration was the prospect of political failure. Given the broad resonance of the
Protestant Constitution, violating its strictures was not usually the path to political success. Support for Catholic relief, as well as free trade with Ireland, cost Edmund Burke
his seat in Bristol (Levack 1952, 402); often invoked as a popular rejection of the ‘trustee’
model of representation that he had advocated on his election, it was the cracking of the
whip to punish a violator of the Protestant Constitution. Less important MPs could not
expect to have a patron willing to return them from a pocket borough, as Burke subsequently was. Nonetheless, the reform movement became “adept at deploying a variety
of discursive strategies to legitimate opposition and keep itself alive, though at times just
barely” (Harling 2003, 891).
For parliamentary reformers, it was imperative to frame reform as compatible with,
and possibly even demanded by, the spirit of the constitutional settlement. They rejected claims that 1688 was a ﬁnal constitutional arrangement and argued that it was
the most glorious part of a tradition of reform. To counter the “trembling anxiety for the
immutability of the laws of our ancestors” and the “antijacobin clamor[] against innovation,” advocates for reform insisted that moderate change was embedded in English constitutional traditions (Protestant Dissenter 1813, 2). Future Liberal Prime Minister John
Russell, in his Essay on the History of the English Government and Constitution, portrayed
English political development as reliant on the “practical wisdom of our ancestors” who
knew when “to alter and vary the form of our institutions as they went on; to suit them to
the circumstances of the time, and reform them according to the dictates of experience”
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(1823, 18). Russell oﬀered a note of warning: the English ancestors “never ceased to work
upon our frame of government. . . . It is an art that is now seldom used, and the disuse
has been attended with evils of the most alarming magnitude” (1823, 19).
This emphasis on reform as part of the constitutional tradition had earlier been
articulated by Charles Grey in the 1790s, explaining the position of the Society of the
Friends of the People against more radical reform: We are convinced that the people
bear a ﬁxed attachment to the happy form of our Government, and to the genuine
principles of our Constitution. . . We wish to reform the Constitution, because we wish to
preserve it.”375 This phrase, repeated by Whigs whenever reform was debated over the
subsequent three generations, was a touchstone for their understanding of their political
purpose and the principles of the British constitution. When Russell would declare on
the Reform Bill’s introduction in 1831 that “The principle on which I mean to act is
neither more nor less than that of reforming to preserve, and not to overthrow,” he was
not referring to the immediate political context. Rather, he was placing the bill within
the discursive frame reformers and Whigs in particular had developed over the previous
decades.376
The trope of reform as part of the constitutional tradition was also a key discursive
strategy of those advocating for Catholic emancipation. Advocates argued that English
public opinion had changed, that Catholics had changed, and that regardless of the past
purpose the penal laws served, they were now a threat to the tranquility of Ireland and
the security of the established Church: as with electoral reform, changed circumstances
required changed institutions. Speaking of a petition presented against Catholic Relief,
Peter King noted that “the opinion of the country on the question could not be disguised,” and the “horrid cry” of “No Popery, which had so much inﬂuence some years
375
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ago. . . was now dead, he trusted, for ever.”377 This appeal to changed popular opinion
faced the diﬃculty that anti-Catholicism remained if a resonant dimension of English,
and British, political identity. Despite King’s conﬁdence, few doubted that “as an English
question, [emancipation] is decidedly unpopular.”378
A more important discursive strategy was the argument that the Catholics had
changed, because of a reduced inﬂuence of the clergy. Accordingly, the tolerating spirit of
the Constitution could now be extended in security. Lord Calthorpe made this claim—
and was met with an immediate ﬂood of angry letters. He clariﬁed his position, but
in doing so revealed the dilemmas the ‘Protestant’ narrative of peoplehood imposed on
reformers:
“He wished to clear up this misunderstanding. He had distinctly stated,
that he thought the Catholic religion, as to its form of faith, still remained
unchanged; but that, as regarded the laity, the inﬂuence of the clergy was
greatly diminished.”379
The claim that Catholics had changed was a weak assertion in defense of Catholic
emancipation. For one, it left advocates vulnerable to the charge that a renewed inﬂuence
of the clergy would require a reversal of emancipation. Peel for instance admitted “for
the sake of argument, that none of the dangers against which the present penal laws
were intended to guard the community at present existed.” But he asked whether it “was
altogether certain that no others would arise in the lapse of years.”380
More importantly, it contradicted well-rehearsed British narratives about the essential intolerance of Catholicism. Calthorpe was compelled to respond to an organized
denunciation of him as denying “that there is really any diﬀerence of religion between
the Roman Catholic and the Protestant” (Kendall 1826, 514). All British history taught
otherwise, and it was the common knowledge and experience of British Protestantism
that “the Roman Catholic, zealous, and instructed in his creed, never did, and never
can, acknowledge the Protestant, as a worshipper of his God, and of his Saviour; nor
ever admit the pretension to the name of Christian” (Kendall 1826, 514-15). This would
be the case until there was “a considerable change in the principles and character of
the church of Rome; a change so considerable as to justify the removal of all those
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securities. . . with which the wisdom of a former age had surrounded the Protestant constitution of this country.”381 Defenders of the Protestant Constitution would frequently
survey “the history of England to prove the anxious precautions which had always been
taken against popery.”382 It was a narrative of struggle against Catholic tyranny and
subversion, memorialized in the importance attributed to the Spanish Armada, the Gunpowder Plot, the Crown’s encroachment on Parliament, the Revolution. And it taught
essentially that “the church of Rome is not merely unchanged, but unchangeable.”383 .
One activist wrote derisively of arguments that these Catholic tendencies were in the
past, that the time was ripe for emancipation. They were an attempt to deceive the
better judgment of the English: “A blind attention to history is the single cause of our
mistakes. Roman Catholicism is no longer what it once was. This is the story in England, for the hood-winking of poor John Bull!” (Kendall 1826, 328). Dominant English
narratives of peoplehood belied the possibility of Catholic toleration.
The argument that Catholics had changed did not contest the Protestant Constitution, but accepted and vindicated it. It was crafted to accommodate Catholic oﬃceholding with commitments to a Protestant constitution, and accordingly supported a
relaxation of disabilities but not equality. Lord Eldon articulated the response of many
when he remarked that “the times, it is said, are changed and the Catholics, it is said,
are changed; be it so; but such change does not aﬀect the soundness of the principles, upon which this kingdom has established itself as a ‘Protestant kingdom’ with the
powers of the state in Protestant hands, and with a Protestant church establishment,
and toleration,—toleration from time to time enlarged to the utmost extent the public
welfare will admit; but toleration only, for those who dissent from it.”384
Another strategy was followed by what O’Ferrall calls the “liberal Catholics.” The
basic premise was that the Irish were the victims of a historical injustice, the violation
of the Treaty of Limerick (1691). The Treaty secured Catholics in the rights enjoyed
during the reign of Charles II, which among others included the right to sit in the Irish
Parliament.385 The virtue of this appeal was that if the Treaty could be read as part
of Glorious Revolution, then by implication the exclusion of Irish Catholics was a violation of the Revolution’s principles.386 Emancipation, then, was not required because
381

Inglis, House of Commons, Hansard, 10 May 1825, 2nd Series, vol. 13, c.489
“Constitutional Questions,” in The Edinburgh Annual Register for 1821, Chapter IV (1823, 133).
383
Inglis, House of Commons, Hansard, 10 May 1825, 2nd Series, vol. 13, c.489
384
Lord Eldon, House of Lords, Hansard, April 17th , 1821, 2nd Series, vol.5, c.317.
385
This right had been removed for English Catholics in 1678.
386
O’Connell defended the Treaty as the basis for Catholic rights, and argued that during the Williamite

382

261

of the changed mind of the English or the character of the Catholic, but “was required
by. . . those treaties which had been violated.”387 Placing Catholic claims within the tradition of the constitutional settlement was a central theme for advocates of emancipation,
and were “put forward as expressions of liberal political theory rooted in the British
Whig and constitutional traditions” (O’Ferrall 1985, 26–7).
Frequently paired with this was the claim that Catholic disabilities were the root
cause of Irish instability, that it was in removing the “religious persecution” that “has
divided the kingdom against itself; [that] lies the cure of insurrection” (Young 1897,
168–69).The removal of the disabilities would be akin to the expedient alteration of
institutions defended by the reformers. Liberal Catholics were responding to the rhetoric
of Tory leaders such as Robert Peel, who claimed he would have supported emancipation
if he thought it would lead to the restoration of peace in Ireland.388 But he did not
believe it would, as the divisions sprang from a “gallant struggle for mastery” involving
“perpetual transfers of power” and “repeated conﬁscations of property” (O’Ferrall 1985,
6). As a rejoinder, Liberal Catholics worked to convince the middle and upper classes
that the “struggle for mastery” was at least very much exacerbated by, if not the outright
product of the religious discrimination.
Henry Grattan, in introducing petitions for emancipation, articulated many of the
themes advanced by advocates:
“in [the] success [of the Catholic claims], they will give strength to the Protestant church, to the act of Settlement, and to the Protestant succession to the
crown; . . . they will form an identiﬁcation with the people, so as to preserve
tranquility at home, and security and respectability abroad.”389
Relief would provide tranquility in Ireland, the penal laws were no longer necessary, and
in any case it would preserve and strengthen the Protestant Constitution. These were
war Irish Catholics “took, unfortunately, the side of legitimacy—we combated for that fundamental
principle of the Holy Alliance—that he who is a king by descent, when once king, can never be
deposed.” But the Irish “diﬀer from them at present, and we are punished for maintaining opinions
then, which all the sovereigns of Europe are leagued to support.” It was an intentionally ambiguous
speech: it vindicated the loyalty of the Irish to William by treating it as a species with their earlier
loyalty to James II; it associated the principle for which the Irish fought with the current foreign policy
of the Tory party; and it suggested that this principle was unfortunate, thereby aligning the Irish with the
Whig and Radical critiques of Tory views of monarchy and their unpopular foreign policy (O’Connell
1867, 397–98).
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the most prominent arguments advanced in defense of Catholic emancipation at the
beginning of the 1820s.
The arguments did not win emancipation, but they were important. The tranquility
argument was calculated to appeal to Tories who had been in the armed forces or in
ministerial oﬃces. The claim that it was consistent with the constitutional tradition
provided cover to them and to those W.R. Brock (1967) termed ‘liberal Tories’ to support
relief. But the constitutional claim was also important for reconciling the potentially
divergent interests of the various excluded classes. The projects of relief, repeal, and
reform appealed to distinct and often mutually suspicious constituencies. The division
between Irish parliamentary reformers and the Catholic Committee had helped defeat
electoral reform there in the 1780s, and the problem in the early 19th century was the
same: while the middle class Catholics that would be the immediate beneﬁciaries of
emancipation were largely in favor of reform and repeal, there was no guarantee that
Dissenters and reformers would support emancipation. An alternative was a broad
Anglican-Dissenter coalition, reforming the electoral system in England and Scotland
and opening corporate oﬃce-holding to Dissenters. The Protestant, but not Anglican,
character of the State would be preserved.
If the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts was an issue of symbolic and practical
importance to Dissenters, it was widely understood that electoral reform would considerably strengthen their inﬂuence.390 But securing reform and repeal would require the
support of the Irish MPs, many of them liberal Protestants who would require reciprocal support for emancipation. There were good strategic reasons for bringing these
groups into closer association and sympathy. But there was also considerable antipathy,
especially between Dissenters and Catholics (Hexter 1936).
The Dissenters were split, with many representatives of their churches and the most
politically active supporting Catholic claims but much of their membership opposed.
When a bill for Catholic relief was debated in 1825, opposing petitions were submitted
by Dissenter groups, which were in turn condemned by the Unitarian Association, the
Dissenter MPs in the House, and the General Body of Protestant Dissenting Ministers
(Machin 1979, 116). Methodists—at the interstices of nonconformity—were especially
committed to the Protestant Constitution (Hexter 1936). Nor was the suspicion one
way: in Catholic Association meetings, O’Connell would frequently censure Quakers for
390
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putting the abolition of African slavery above the emancipation of Catholics.391 Matters
were not made easier by evangelical proselytization, and the establishment of Bible
Societies and schools in Ireland by English Protestant Dissenters was a frequent source
of conﬂict.
Establishing a common basis for action could be facilitated by a belief that these
diﬀerent policies were held together by a common principle, around which reformers
could rally. This might enable them to maintain constituency support across the three
projects. This challenge was met through the assertion that civil and religious liberty was
a constitutive principle of the British political community. Dissenter political activists
sought to muster an often suspicious constituency behind this standard of religious liberty for all: “If the Dissenter deserts the standard of religious freedom, his consistency
is lost forever. To stand trembling is to be destroyed; to unite is to conquer” (Hexter
1936, 304). William Smith, the Unitarian MP for Norwich, was a consistent defender of
Catholic emancipation, and authored a pamphlet entitled “An Appeal to the Protestant
Dissenters of Great Britain, to unite with their Catholic brethren, for the removal of the
disqualiﬁcations by which they are oppressed” (1813).
The politically organized Catholics sought to build friendly relations and mutual support with Dissenters, and deployed the same frame of a common principle of religious
liberty (O’Connell 1867, 322). A meeting of the Catholic Association moved to petition
Parliament concerning “the liberty of conscience.”392 The Midland Catholic Association
“expresse[d] its anxious wish to join the Dissenters of [Birmingham]. . . in common exertions to obtain the full enjoyment of their constitutional rights.” The Association invited
“Dissenters of every denomination, Catholics, and those most numerous, liberal, and
respectable Protestants of the established church” to “wipe oﬀ the foul blot of religious
intolerance.” But while limiting itself to religious reform, parliamentary reformers and
representatives of the working class were invited to the conference, where a toast was
oﬀered to the “Mechanics of Birmingham” and much praise was given to the disappear391
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ance of religious intolerance from this class.393
The emphasis on civil and religious liberty came to be a core identifying commitment
of the Whig party. Reﬂecting late in life, John Russell would write that, “Belonging to
the Whig party, the aim of that party has always been my aim—‘The cause of civil and
religious liberty all over the world’ ” (Russell 1875, 213). This motto became a regular
toast at political and religious meetings, and was described as “a sentiment which should
be warmly cherished by every Dissenter.”394
The phrase had antecedents in the 18th century understanding of the Protestant
Constitution, which became more prominent during the conﬂict with America: “the
cause of liberty, civil and religious, is the cause of Britain herself. . . . Civil liberty, the
protestant religion, the principles of toleration,. . . subsist but in a few places of the globe;
and Great Britain is their principal residence.”395 The Protestant Advocate, a magazine
dedicated to defense of the Protestant Constitution, was founded in 1812 to “maintain
the general cause of civil and religious liberty against the intolerant principles of the
Roman Catholics.”396 The Protestant Constitution’s narrative of English history insisted
the Church of Rome was “a theocracy. . . a complete system of civil Government,” the
rankest tyranny, and that therefore “the cause of Roman Catholic Exclusion in England
[was] the cause of the whole world” (Kendall 1826, 542).
The “all over the world” seems to have been appended to the “cause of liberty”
during the French Revolution, and Charles Fox invoked it regularly in his opposition to
the ﬁrst anti-French military coalition and the suspension of habeas corpus.397 Charles
Grey likewise toasted the cause in the Society of Friends of the People in the 1790s,
and in 1829 reminded Russell that he was “a friend, in the words of the old Whig
toast, to ‘the cause of liberty all over the world’ ” (Russell 1913, 299). But it was during
the re-assertion of Anglican hegemony between 1776 and 1829 that reformers worked
to extend its meaning to include Catholics. At the meeting of the Midlands Catholic
Association, “the cause Civil and Religious Liberty all over the World!” was toasted.
This prompted the representative of the city’s mechanics to express the “warm interest
I feel in the toast you have recently drank. . . . I had never heard a Catholic speak on
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the subject of Catholic Emancipation, and now that, for the ﬁrst time in my life, I have
the honour of sitting down with a Catholic body, my ears are greeted with the great and
glorious toast—‘Civil and Religious Liberty all over the world!’ ”398 At an 1817 meeting
of reformers in London toasts were given to “The regent, and may he never lose sight of
the principles which seated his family upon the throne—. . . . The constitution. . . . May
all the eﬀorts to endanger it be rendered abortive by the timely exertions of all good
Englishmen to correct such errors and abuses as time and design have introduced—. . . .
Civil and religious liberty to all mankind.”399 These were good Whig toasts, invoking the
expediency of reform, 1688, and civil and religious liberty. But Irish liberal Protestant
John Philpot Curran was most moved by the last, and was pleased and hopeful the toast’s
coverage might be universal.
“You have been pleased, however, to give one toast—the cause of civil and
religious liberty all over the world. When you drank that toast, I felt my
heart embrace the negro—I felt also that it sympathised with my own poor
country. Ireland, if it heard that toast, would bless that generous prospect of
your’s, from which alone can grow our human existence—(applause). . . . You
will not ﬁnd them unworthy coadjutors in the vineyard of liberty.”400
The toast was made by Catholics in England, where the tiny minority of Catholics
were especially anxious to ally with Dissenters, but also in Ireland. At a feast for the
Friends of Religious Liberty, numerous liberal Protestant nobles, MPs, and Catholic
attendees toasted “civil and religious liberty all over the world” and called for a moment
of silence for “the glorious and immortal memory of Charles James Fox.”401 In speeches,
O’Connell would frequently remind the audience that “every additional Protestant who
joined was an accession of strength as the principle they acted upon was one of universal
liberty of conscience.”402 The Manchester Guardian, launched in 1821 as a Dissenting and
liberal weekly, promised in its prospectus to “zealously enforce the principles of civil and
religious liberty” and to “warmly advocate the cause of reform” (Prentice 1851, 206).
As noted by Abraham Kriegel, it was “restrictions pertaining to religious beliefs [that]
provided the most dramatic opportunities to plead for civil and religious liberty. . . . It
was no accident that Catholic Emancipation should have been the one issue to unite [the
398
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Whigs] in opposition” (Kriegel 1980, 262).
Whigs claimed civil, political, and especially religious liberty as central to their inheritance. John Russell argued that the “authors of the Revolution did as much as they could
[to advance religious liberty], and by their maxims laid the foundation of much more”
(Russell 1823, 137). The Whig view was that before the Revolution all sects agreed that
a “uniform faith, and an uniform church were absolutely necessary” (Russell 1823, 139).
For Russell and other Whigs, it was only with the 1688 Toleration Act that the framework for achieving future religious liberty was established. The principle was being read
into the heart of the constitution; and carrying it forward was how Whigs understood
their political purpose, as well as the purpose of the British political community. And
securing civil and religious liberty required political liberty: the “right of the people to
control their government, or to take a share in it” was “the only eﬃcient remedy against
oppression” (1823, 115, 148).
Liberal Protestants and Catholics were advancing a diﬀerent understanding of British
political community and toleration, redeﬁned to mean the non-imposition of disabilities
based on religious distinctions. This vision, developed over the course of the early 19th
century, would be central to the Liberal understanding of British peoplehood and constitutionalism. At the moment, however, it was hesitantly defended outside communities
of shared conviction, and its advocates were careful to balance the call for the cause of
religious liberty with assertions of loyalty to the established Church and the historical
justness of the disabilities they now opposed.
Ultimately, it was the force of events that drove emancipation and in its wake, parliamentary reform. The ideological eﬀorts and rhetorical strategies of the reformers,
however, were not without importance. They may have softened opinion in England,
even if the bulk of the population likely opposed Catholic emancipation. And they provided cover for liberal and ministerial Tories to argue some measure of conciliation was
expedient: the only relief measure to pass after 1812 was aimed at removing barriers
on the deployment of Irish Catholics in the armed forces. But equally important, the
reconﬁgured understanding of toleration and of the necessity of expedient reform as
the purpose of English constitutionalism worked to reconcile the diverging interests of
a potential reformist coalition. This coalition was rooted in the Whig party, but was
not identical to it. It was a fragile network of Whigs, English Radicals, Dissenters, and
Irish Catholics, each motivated by their own concerns and laying the foundations for a
governing agenda were the Tories ever to be dislodged.
267

Repeal and Emancipation
The Catholic Association inaugurated modern, mass politics in the United Kingdom
(O’Ferrall 1985, xiv). It was the ﬁrst mass membership organization dedicated to achieving legislative change through constitutionally recognized political activity, and inspired
both counter-organizing by the ‘Brunswick Clubs’—dedicated to the defense of the
Protestant Constitution—and the Political Unions that would organize for electoral reform. The most important innovation of the Association was the ‘Catholic Rent’: all Irish
Catholics were encouraged to make a regular and small contribution to the Association,
varying depending on the contributor’s income. The rent raised badly needed funds,
enabling petition drives, the hiring of a lobbyist, and especially the protection of voters
against landlord recriminations. But the most innovative function of the Rent was as a
metric of the breadth and the depth of support for the Association, a signal to “show
England that [the Irish] have a deep interest in that measure [emancipation]” (O’Ferrall
1985, 51).403
The organizing success of the Association focused the attention of Parliament. In
1824, before organizing the Catholic rent, Daniel O’Connell had urged the liberal Attorney General for Ireland William Plunket to bring up Catholic emancipation. Plunket
warned that no legislative action would be forthcoming, and discussion “would not only
be useless but injurious” as “the English Representatives, will not vote, or attend when
the subject is merely discussion.”404 Even supportive MPs would rather not provide
fodder for the anti-Catholic press. The Rent was a massive success, and in 1825 the
Association was more persuasive. Money was coming in and a signal was sent out. The
excitement the Rent caused gave the Whigs an opportunity to press the government on
emancipation. The ministers, in turn, were determined to repress the Catholic Association, but there was a suﬃcient body of liberal Tories to suggest that some concession
might be allowed (O’Ferrall 1985, 86, 90). Peel asked “where were these Associations to
end,” and reminded the Commons that if the example of the Catholic Association was
permitted to stand, “why might not the country expect an Association for the purpose
of obtaining parliamentary reform?” This was met with loud approval from the Whig
benches.405 The government quickly passed a repression bill.
On March 1st , Francis Burdett, Whig MP and advocate of parliamentary reform,
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moved that the House consider emancipation. Burdett repeated many of the themes
central to the Catholic cause. He warned that tranquility would not continue “until full
and ample justice be done.” He acknowledged that in in 17th and 18th centuries “there
really was danger to be apprehended from the Catholics,” and denied that the penal laws
were motivated by religious bigotry. This preserved him from charges of denigrating the
1688 Constitution. He invoked the broken Treaty of Limerick. He blamed the landlords
of Ireland—a favorite Whig theme, who saw in them the derogation of aristocratic duty.
He said circumstances had changed and that the papacy was no threat.406 Furthermore,
the “public mind of this country” had changed. He declared his loyalty to the Church of
England. And ﬁnally, he hoisted the Whig standard of religious liberty as a constitutive
principle of the country:
“I have further to remember what the constitution of my country teaches
me;. . . that all men bearing an equality of burthens are, in a free state of
society, entitled to the enjoyment of an equality of rights [hear, hear!]. . . On
[the] authority [of this principle] I contend, that, so far from this being a
Catholic question, the Catholics themselves stand upon a Protestant principle; and that I am now maintaining their claims, upon the very principles
which assured the security of England.”407
For Burdett, drawing on themes developed over the previous decade, the Constitution
mandated emancipation and parliamentary reform. The vote in favor was 247-234.
Negotiating for the Association in 1825, O’Connell accepted the disfranchisement of
the 40s. electors and the payment of the Catholic clergy as securities for the Protestant
Establishment. This caused friction in the Association; more importantly, it threatened
to scuttle a reforming coalition with English radicals and Dissenters. While O’Connell
had disclaimed support for reform—a tactic meant to assuage liberal Tories—the radicals were enthusiastic about the Association and hoped that he might come out in favor
of reform nonetheless (Machin 1963a, 463). O’Connell’s acceptance of disfranchisement
made this hope diﬃcult to sustain. If O’Connell was willing to sacriﬁce the Irish franchise, what reason was there to think he would support the middle classes of England?408
One Whig MP, supportive of emancipation and reform, worried that “if a forty-shilling
qualiﬁcation were considered as too small for an elector in Ireland, what was to pre406
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vent its being considered as too small for an elector in England?”409 Even Lord Grey
opposed disfranchisement on the grounds that it conﬂicted with the Whig stance on parliamentary reform: it was “quite untenable either in policy or principle” (Machin 1963a,
473).
Many Whigs sought to assuage the concerns of reformers. The MP who introduced
the disfranchising bill claimed it would not include electors “who held their freeholds
under the same practice that prevailed in England at this period.”410 Francis Burdett
insisted that the disfranchisement did not have anything to do with the question of
parliamentary reform—against the claim of Irish MP Henry Grattan—and that it was
“conjuncture of circumstances which might never again occur” and which, on balance,
would establish peace in Ireland on “the solid basis of civil and religious liberty.”411
Thomas Spring Rice stressed that if the disfranchisement of the 40s. electors were likely
to diminish “the strength of popular principles among the peasantry and the small landowners of Ireland, it should not have his concurrence.” In the speciﬁc case of Ireland,
however, “it would be a most wise, salutary, and popular reform of the constituent body.”
But he insisted this was a uniquely Irish situation, the result of the dependency of the
electors and hostility between landlord and tenant.412
But liberal Tories and many Whigs defended disfranchisement on the grounds that
the 40s. electors were not independent, that they were “most ignorant class of Irish
peasantry,” and that their exclusion should comfort Protestants as Parliament extended
“political rights to the higher orders of the Catholic body.”413 The 40s. electors were the
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“weakness and. . . discredit” of the country.414 Even the committed Irish reformer Henry
Parnell defended disfranchisement as beneﬁcial, and quoted Fox that the ideal form of
representation “shall include the greatest number of independent electors, and exclude
the greatest number of those who are necessarily by their condition dependent.”415
Tory Lords regretted that previous concessions “had been followed by increased restlessness and irritation,” rejecting the argument that emancipation would lead to tranquility as Catholics “would be content with nothing short of Catholic ascendancy.”416 The
general position was that Catholics should not be allowed, as a matter of principle, “civil
rights and political power in a free Protestant country” and warned that emancipation
would entail “the sacriﬁce of some essential principles of our Protestant constitution and
government.”417 After two days the Lords rejected the bill by a majority of 48 votes, more
than Catholic pessimists had feared (O’Ferrall 1985, 101).
In 1825 the Duke of Wellington worried that it would not “be very easy to revive a
public feeling in this country upon the Roman Catholic question, which would enable
those inclined to oppose themselves to the Roman Catholic claims to resist them eﬀectually” (Davis 1997, 45). The general election of 1826 suggested otherwise. In Britain the
elections were, in the opinion of one Tory, “decidedly friendly to Ministers, and particularly to Protestants. The Whigs have been beaten, wherever there have been popular
contests, and the radicals have not met with much better success” (O’Ferrall 1985, 147).
The Tories’ election standard was ‘No Popery,’ and its success conﬁrmed the strength of
anti-Catholic opinion in Britain. But they had been slow in organizing, and would later
regret that a more aggressive eﬀort and more determined anti-Catholic majority was not
returned.
In Ireland, however, the elections revealed a potential new source of power for the
Catholic movement.418 Electoral revolts occurred throughout the Irish counties (O’Ferrall
1985, 143-44), leading to the establishment of “Liberal Clubs” across Ireland. Through
these clubs, “the Catholic, or rather independent constituency of Ireland, will be com414
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pletely disciplined, and will not need any application of extraordinary stimulants to
rouse them to a sense of their constitutional duty” (1829, cliv). The possibility of independent Catholic political organizing led one Protestant to write to Peel that “a bellum
servile would ensue all over Ireland” (O’Ferrall 1985, 151).
In January 1827, the Duke of York, the King’s brother, next in line for the throne,
and an important defender of the Protestant Constitution, died; a few months later
Prime Minister Liverpool suﬀered a severe stroke, and his political career was dead. A
motion on Catholic relief was defeated in the Commons, taking emancipation oﬀ the
table for the near future; this gave the King suﬃcient comfort to ask liberal Tory George
Canning to form a ministry. Peel, Wellington and many of the senior and junior cabinet
oﬃcers either resigned or turned down Canning’s invitation to form a government, and a
coalition of liberal Tories and Whigs came to oﬃce, neutral on emancipation but pledged
against repeal and reform. Canning would not survive the year; he died in August 1827.
The King asked Wellington to form a government on January 9th , 1828.
Wellington, of Irish Protestant birth, was seen as the lead defender of the Protestant
Constitution. But in April of 1828, John Russell moved that the Test and Corporation
Acts be repealed; against the wishes of the government, it passed in the Commons and
would soon be passed by the Lords. Scholars usually identify the surprising success of
repeal as improving the chances for emancipation by undermining the “principle that
the State and the established Church were co-extensive” (Machin 1979, 119; Ertman 2010,
1006; O’Ferrall 1985, 180). This is how it turned out, but this was not a necessary implication. Rather, that repeal strengthened the Catholic claims is somewhat surprising;
contemporaries were as likely to believe it would undermine the prospects for emancipation.
Many Dissenters wanted repeal disassociated from emancipation:
“I think it can never be deemed a want of liberality in Protestant Dissenters,
if they should wish to disjoin their cause from the Catholics, against whom a
prejudice exists, that retards the accomplishment of their most earnest and
reasonable hopes. . . . [M]any no doubt might be disposed to listen to the
application for relief from Protestant Dissenters, whose honest and conscientious scruples would indispose them to make any further concessions to
the believers in the religion of the Church of Rome.”419
In 1828, the United Committee of Dissenters announced that they would not join in
419

A letter to Lord John Russel [sic] on the Necessity of Parliamentary Reform, as Recommended by Mr. Fox; and
on the Expediency of Repealing the Corporation and Test Acts (Civis 1819).

272

common cause with Catholics, and as a result were able to secure the support of the
anti-Catholic Protestant Association for repeal (Machin 1979, 118). Even anti-Catholic
Tory Ultras agreed with this logic, and some supported repeal as a way of undermining
emancipation and promoting a broader Protestant political project. Many liberal Tories
saw the matter in the same light, and opposed repeal because it would undermine the
more pressing issue of emancipation.
The ideological work of the last several decades here paid dividends. As noted by
G.I.T. Machin, while many were pressing for separating the two issues, this “distinction
could not be complete because the [W]higs did not believe in such a severance. . . . [T]hey
saw the two causes as fundamentally linked in their policy of civil liberty” (Machin 1979,
119). Whigs believed that “it was on one great principle of universal, undistinguishing
right to religious liberty, and on that alone” that they should support both emancipation
and repeal.420 Whigs secured the assurance of Dissenting MPs that they would not
abandon the Catholic cause, and the organized political leadership of the Dissenting
denominations was marshaled to reaﬃrm their commitment to emancipation. When the
crucial division in the House of Commons came, there was “a perfect whip” among the
Whigs (Machin 1979, 123).
The success of repeal seemed initially to undermine prospects for emancipation
(Machin 1979, 139). Among Whigs, however, the success of repeal was a clear sign
that the buttresses of the old constitutional order were giving way. Russell, responding
to an inquiry about his health, remarked that “My constitution is not quite so improved
as the Constitution of the country by late events, but the joy of it will soon revive me.
It is really a gratifying thing to force the enemy to give up his ﬁrst line—that none but
Churchmen are worthy to serve the State; I trust we shall soon make him give up the
second, that none but Protestants are.”421 O’Connell had seen the potential in the repeal
movement and he drew up a petition in favor which passed unanimously in the Catholic
Association. It was ultimately presented to Parliament in February with 80,000 signatures (O’Connell 1843, 63). He then issued an Address of the Catholic Association to the
Protestant Dissenters of England, reminding them of their common cause. The contribution of repeal on the emancipation movement was real. It was not a logical implication,
however, but the product of ideological work among Whigs, Dissenters, and Catholics
to constitute a shared interest in ending Anglican hegemony, rather than building an
420
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expanded Protestant Constitution including Anglicans and Dissenters.
The Association’s policy of total opposition to Wellington soon necessitated a drastic course of action. The Irish MP for Clare, a respected liberal Protestant, joined the
Wellington ministry and was required stand for re-election. O’Connell was selected to
oppose him. While O’Connell could not sit in Parliament, there was nothing stopping
him from being elected. He won, 2,057 to 982, with the 40s. electors revolting against
their landlords (O’Ferrall 1985, 199). It was a political earthquake threatening reverberations. Peel foresaw a long shadow, an evil that was “not force—not violence—not any act
of which law could take cognizance” but rather “the peaceable and legitimate exercise of
a franchise according to the will and conscience of the holder” (cited in O’Ferrall 1985,
202). Long existing rights, which had maintained ultimate control in the landed elite,
were being repurposed: “novel exercise of constitutional franchises—in the application
of powers recognised and protected by law—the power of meeting in public assemblies—
the systematic and not unlawful application of all those powers to one deﬁnite purpose,
namely, the organisation of a force which. . . which might ultimately render irresistible
the demand for civil equality” (O’Ferrall 1985, 202). In short, the modern programmatic
political party was being born, drawing on a broad based civil rights movement.422
A more proximate worry was what would happen if O’Connell was turned away. The
Catholic Association had demonstrated that they could successfully mobilize Catholic
electors. The government believed this put almost the entire county representation in
Ireland within their grasp. If Catholic MPs were elected at the next election, and were
refused entry to Parliament, they might sit in a ‘Popish Parliament’ (O’Ferrall 1985, 200).
That is, they might do what Sinn Féin would do 90 years later: sit separately, as elected
representatives, and claim governing authority.
Agrarian violence by clandestine bands had been a recurring feature of Irish life, a
means of enforcing codes of behavior regarding land use, rents, evictions, and tithes.
While most frequently directed against property and animals, in more extreme cases
they involved assaults and murder, for giving evidence against persons charged with
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violating the various illegal oaths acts or for some other oﬀense against codes of behavior
(Crossman 1996, 10-11). In the late 18th the United Irishmen had attempted to broaden
its base by organizing through the secret societies, and since at least this period the
societies had taken on an increasingly nationalist and revolutionary cast.423 O’Connell’s
strategy had been to insist on peaceful organization, as much within the bounds of the
law as possible, but to remind the government that there were more radical forces in the
wings. After his election, O’Connell reportedly suggested that the government’s soldiers
might be unreliable: “Allow me now, Duke of Wellington, to send one whisper to your
ear. Three hundred soldiers threw up their caps for me since I left Ennis” (O’Ferrall 1985,
200). If the Commons turned away elected Catholics, the government would be forced
to ensure that they did not meet and claim governing authority. Such an intervention
would, O’Connell suggested, almost certainly provoke a civil war.
Catholic support for aggressive actions was increasing; so too was Protestant counterorganization and ‘No Popery’ rhetoric. And so did the recognition of Wellington and
Peel that some concession was necessary. Given the unreliability of the 40s. electors, the
ministry decided disfranchisement would be necessary. Peel sought advice from John
Leslie Foster, a hardline anti-Catholic Irish MP from County Louth. Foster had warned
years earlier that “the time would come when the Catholic clergy would be seen exerting
their inﬂuence at elections.”424 The ministry now believed he had been right. Foster
advised Peel that the county franchise be raised to ensure a less Catholic electorate
(Farrell 2009). He described how “the tendencies of the [electoral system] prior to the
rebellion of the freeholders were to enable a few great proprietors to nominate the county
Members.” The disfranchisement of the 40s. freeholders would have the perverse eﬀect
of reducing the inﬂuence of the “great proprietors,” and would “transfer much of the
real power. . . to the minor gentry, the [Protestant] clergy, and the more opulent farmers.”
This transfer of power was, for Foster and Peel, “an evil.”
“But if this be an evil. . . can we help it? The inﬂuence of the aristocracy
is annihilated. The priests and the demagogues are in their place. The
practical question seems to be whether we should not now aim at placing
423
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the power in the hands of that middle class as the best course within our
reach. The minor gentry of Ireland are essentially Tory rather than Whig.
Very little of what is radical enters into their composition. They are also
essentially Protestant.”425
The Protestant Ascendancy of Ireland had relied on the ability of the aristocracy to
control the 40s. electors; this was now uncertain. If the transfer of power to Catholics
was to be avoided, the government needed to take “the business of elections out of the
hands of the lower classes.”426
By the summer of 1828, Wellington had made his decision: in a letter to the King
he warned that “we have a rebellion impending over us in Ireland,. . . and we have in
England a Parliament which we cannot dissolve [lest Catholics win across Ireland], the
majority of which is of opinion, with many wise and able men, that the remedy is to be
found in Roman Catholic emancipation” (O’Ferrall 1985, 203). The King gave him and
Robert Peel permission to consider emancipation, with promises of suﬃcient securities.
Secrecy was essential; a ‘No Popery’ campaign in England and Ireland was underway,
and the King and ministers wanted to ensure that it was contained.427 On January 28th
the Cabinet presented the King with their plans: emancipation with a disfranchising
security.
Robert Peel had been one of the foremost opponents of emancipation; he was now
one of its chief architects. He felt obliged to present himself for reelection in his constituency, the Anglican bastion of the University of Oxford. He lost, underlying “the
dangers of the sectarian backlash on the career of a man like Peel who was regarded
as having ‘ratted’ on the Protestant cause” (O’Ferrall 1985, 245). The commitment to
the Protestant Constitution was, for many MPs, embedded in their electoral expectations: those from anti-Catholic constituencies or with anti-Catholic patrons expected
that they would be defeated or dismissed if they changed course. Peel was essential to
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the government, however, and the pocket borough of Westbury was made available for
him.
In the Commons, Peel defended the government’s changed position. In not a single
year since 1800 had Ireland been governed exclusively by regular laws without some
emergency legislation or the suspension of habeas corpus. The disturbances would
only grow were concession denied, and the franchise placed “tremendous power” in the
hands of the Catholics. While there might be a majority for disfranchisement, this was
contingent upon emancipation:
“is it possible. . . to let the franchise remain in its present state? . . . What
will you do with that power. . . which the elective franchise, exercised under
the control of religion, at this moment confers upon him? ‘Take it away,’
is again the ready answer. But, is it possible to take it away? Will this
House of Commons, two hundred and seventy-two members of which voted
last year in a majority for the extension of further privileges to the Roman
Catholics—will this House of Commons retract those which have been already granted. . . ?”428
Perhaps a new Commons majority could be reconstituted, after a ‘No Popery’ campaign?
Peel raised this possibility but rejected it. For one, it contravened his understanding of
Parliamentary Supremacy: “I know it has been said, that in 1826 the country had not
suﬃcient warning. No, forsooth, we ought to have roused the country by the cry of ‘No
Popery!’ Never, Sir, never, under any circumstances. The Parliament, and the Parliament
alone, will I ever acknowledge to be the ﬁt judge of this important question.”429
“you cannot make that appeal [to the elective body of Great Britain], without
making a simultaneous appeal to the elective body of Ireland—that body
exercising the present franchise, under every circumstance of superadded
mistrust, apprehension, and excitement.”
The result would be the severance of the last few ties between tenant and landlord, the
conﬁrmation of the “spiritual inﬂuence in political matters of the Roman Catholic priesthood,” and the permanent uniﬁcation of “Roman Catholic wealth, intelligence, numbers,
and religion” in a “dangerous, but not illegal, exercise of a great constitutional right.”
An election on the question of emancipation might return a more ‘Protestant’ Parliament. But it would ironically conﬁrm the inﬂuence of the priests, which the Protestant
Constitution was intended to guard against.430
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The control regime under which Ireland was governed was collapsing, and some new
method needed to be established. The only solution was immediate concession combined with massive disfranchisement. Peel maintained that the objective of the bill was
to establish a new institutional basis for the Protestant Constitution. Disenfranchisement
would remove the inﬂuence of the priests:
“We must look for real security in the regulation of the elective franchise of
Ireland. . . . It is in vain to deny or to conceal the truth in respect to [the
40s.] franchise. It was, until a late period, the instrument through which the
landed aristocracy—the resident and the absentee proprietor, maintained
their local inﬂuence —through which property had its weight, its legitimate
weight, in the national representation. The landlord has been disarmed by
the priest. . . . That weapon which he has forged with so much care, and has
heretofore wielded with such success, has broke short in his hand.”431
Disfranchisement would “restore” the control of the Protestants, by concentrating power
in the hands of the middle and upper class gentry. Peel stressed his statesmanlike conduct, noting that he “might have taken a more popular and a more selﬁsh course. I might
have held language much more acceptable to the friends with whom I have long acted,
and to the constituents whom I have lately lost.” But he had been motivated exclusively
by the “anxious desire to provide for the maintenance of Protestant Interests; and for
the security of Protestant establishments. This is my defence—this is my consolation—
this shall be my revenge.”432 Ultimately most Whigs acquiesced in the disfranchisement
of the Irish small freeholders. Even radical MP Joseph Hume, who had opposed the
measure as an infraction of popular rights, announced that he was unwilling to continue his opposition “lest he might thwart, the great measure of emancipation.”433 The
commitment to a broad franchise was being traded for religious equality.
For all his talk of restoring the Protestant Constitution, Peel understood the revolutionary implications of emancipation. He asked whether any “great measure, which
has stamped its name upon the era of its adoption, has been carried through without
431
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objections and obstacles, insuperable, if they had been abstractedly considered? What
was the Revolution itself, but a violation of principles...?”434 He moved the House go into
committee to consider relief, which was followed by “loud and protracted cheering.”435
It was the end of the Protestant Constitution, at least as it had been understood up to
then; and as much as Peel disclaimed this fact, everyone knew it was the implication.
When the Commons voted to resolve itself into committee, it was supported by 348 to
160 votes, a determined majority but with the Tory party evenly divided.436
In the Lords, Wellington defended emancipation as consistent with the 1688 Revolution, and in doing so adopted much of the arguments that had been advanced by the
reforming coalition. He not only rejected the contention that continued exclusion would
“preserve the principles of the constitution of 1688” but also that “the measures of 1688
permanently excluded Roman Catholics from parliament.” Rather, he sought to separate
the permanent from the contingent components of the constitution.
“My lords, in the Bill of Rights, there are some things permanently enacted,
which I sincerely hope will be permanent;—those are, the liberties of the
people; the security for the Protestantism of the person on the throne of
these kingdoms, and that he shall not be married to a papist. . . . Therefore
we have the great principle of the Revolution,. . . which consisted of the Bill
of Rights and liberties of the subject.”
He rejected the claims that the “principles of 1688” included disabling oaths against
Catholics, and that these were “equally permanent with the Bill of Rights, by which
the Protestantism of the Crown is secured.” And if Catholic exclusion (other than the
succession) was not a permanent feature of the constitution, then “I would ask your
lordships, whether you are not at liberty now to consider the expediency of doing away
with it altogether, in order to relieve the country from the inconveniences to which it
I have already adverted?”437 The purpose of the Revolution was being redeﬁned, from
the permanent exclusion of Catholics to the supremacy of Parliament and the security
of civil liberties. That these had been intended to maintain the state free of Catholic
inﬂuence was being actively forgotten.
On April 10th , the bill was read a third time in the Lords and passed: 213-109. The
King gave his assent and the bill became law on April 13th , 1829. Its practical eﬀect was
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to change the oath required for various oﬃces, including that of Member of Parliament.
But when O’Connell arrived to take his seat, he was refused on the grounds that he was
elected before the change in oaths, and so would have to take the old exclusionary one.
Those who had failed to defend the constitution were not above petulance. O’Connell
was quickly re-elected in Clare.438
Emancipation and repeal delivered “a hefty blow to the Tory concept of an inviolable
Protestant constitution” (Pentland 2008, 50). These marked a fundamental change in
the constitution of the country, a break with its clear intent and foundational principles.
These marked a fundamental change in the constitution of the country, a break with
its clear intent and foundational principles. Emancipation was almost certainly passed
against the wishes of the majority of the British population (Machin 1963b, 195). For
the Whigs its passage was a source of considerable satisfaction but also disgust with its
delay: it had been claimed as a matter of justice, but had only been conceded when it
became absolutely necessary.

Reform and Revolution
Catholic emancipation split the Tories, their more active partisans unwilling to forgive
Wellington and Peel. Posters defending “Our Protestant Constitution and the Ancient
Institutions of My Country for ever!” were posted throughout Cambridge, attacking
“bastard Whigs and apostate Protestants.” The Tory leaders “are our enemies. Impeach
them.”439 Similar sentiments were expressed around the country.
In one year, two of the key issues of the Whig program had been passed during a
Tory government. The achievement of repeal and emancipation meant that for many
Whigs “the only struggle really worth making was reform of parliament” (cited in Pearce
2010, 53). In 1829 a severe recession hit the United Kingdom. Inspired by the Catholic
Association, reformers began convening organizations to press for reform, the most
inﬂuential of which was the Birmingham Political Union (Flick 1978). The successful accomplishment of emancipation had united reformers around similar themes and patterns
of action across the United Kingdom. Scots reformers took from “the national protest in
Ireland. . . a powerful and successful model of constitutionalist agitation” (Pentland 2008,
50). The Scots reform movement was one of national reconstitution, with reformers writ438
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ing “aspects of Scottish history and native ideas of popular sovereignty into the story of
the British constitution” (Pentland 2008, 154-55). But the language of British liberalism
infused the Scots, English, and Irish movements. Mirroring the earlier reinterpretations
of the liberal Catholics, reformers throughout Britain sought to “appeal to a history of
British liberty” and embedded their critiques and demands in an understanding of the
constitution as advancing religious and civil liberty (Pentland 2008, 154). Thomas Wyse,
speaking of the Irish Liberal Clubs, described the organizations in these terms:
“We call ourselves Liberal—and are what we profess to be—We abhor exclusions, monopolies and oppressions of all kinds, but none more than those
created or continued by religious ignorance and intolerance. We are foes
to all Ascendancies, whether Catholic or Protestant, which set up the false
interests of the few at the expense of the just interests of the many.”
Liberalism for Wyse was the cause of civil and religious liberty: the right to “worship
God according to the dictates of his conscience” and the “Right to the advantages and
honours of the State” for the citizen who contributes to its burdens (O’Ferrall 1985, 221).
The Whigs were now propping up the Tory government and believed they might
form a ministry. But that meant bringing over liberal Tories such as Lords Palmerston
and Melbourne, and they remained opposed to all but modest reform of the electoral
system (Trevelyan 1920, 222, 234-35). Nonetheless, as early as 1819 Grey had come
to believe that reform needed to be extensive. The reasoning was political: in order to
counter the Tories’ built-in advantage, they needed to excite broad public support, which
necessitated an extensive reform. And to pass reform against the Lords, they would need
some sustained and sizeable demonstration of public support to convince the King. A
limited bill would deny the Whigs the “strength in public opinion” needed to “force the
Court” to pass any measure.440 There was likely an additional motivation: by 1830,
the future Whip Edward Ellice and Lord Durham—Grey’s son-in-law—were talking of
passing reform to “cook” the boroughs and “expel as much as possible all local interests
belonging to Tories.”441
The passage of emancipation hardened Tory opposition to reform, for which there
was little sympathy among the Tory ‘liberals’ or the party’s reactionary ‘base’ of local
elites (Sack 1993, 20; Cannon 1973, 195). However, in June 1830 the King died and
William IV, open to reform and a Whig ministry, acceded to the throne. The succession triggered an election in which the Whigs gained 50 seats. Most important, Henry
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Brougham, a reforming political activist who had been central to the popular expansion of the Whig party (Hay 2005), was elected in the enormous county of Yorkshire.
By presenting himself as advocate of the middle classes and drawing on the extensive
network of urban abolitionist and antislavery organizations in the county, Brougham
was able to build a support network that could defray the massive expense of the campaign (Thompson 1959, 218-19).442 It was widely read as a signal the people supported
reform.443
In Parliament Grey called for modest reform. Wellington, still Prime Minister, responded that “as far as he was concerned, as long as he held any station in the government of the country, he should always feel it his duty to resist such measures when
proposed by others.”444 In less than a week the government was defeated on a vote
on the civil list and in December Lord Grey formed a Whig government, pledging to
introduce a reform bill. Most analyses of the Reform Act of 1832 stress its modest character, but at the time the measure went much further than any expected (Pearce 2010,
72). Of 658 parliamentary seats, 168 of these—all in England—were to be abolished or
redistributed. Over 30 new boroughs with one or two members were to be created and
the counties were given additional seats. New franchise classes were created, new qualiﬁcations were placed on the existing classes, and the ‘ancient right’ franchises would be
gradually abolished. Scotland and Ireland would each gain 5 seats.
The bill had the broad support of Whigs, Irish Liberals, and radical MPs. The
speciﬁc provisions of the bills were generally equal across the diﬀerent countries and so
were not needlessly insulting. The moderate Whigs and liberal Tories, however, were
intimidated by the extent of the reform. In part to assuage their concerns, the Whig
leadership highlighted the disfranchisements of the laboring classes and the increased
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representation of the wealthy and respectable middle. Central to the bill’s purpose was
the creation not simply of an enlarged electorate, but a respectable one.
In introducing the bill, Russell deployed a theme popular with radicals of England’s
lost democracy, remarking that “in ancient times every freeman, being an inhabitant
householder resident in a borough, was competent to vote for Members of Parliament.”
Nonetheless, even this expansive franchise was in Russell’s telling exclusionary. The
ancient householder franchise had “excluded villains and strangers,” and thus had always belonged to a particular body, “undoubtedly possessed of property.” The course
of history, however, had resulted in the franchise being both too generous and too restrictive. The ending of villainage had led some boroughs to extend the franchise “down
to the lowest degree, and even sometimes beyond,” while others had become closed
oligarchies.445
The problem now was the “great evil” of nomination. Too much power was placed
in the hands of a small number of mostly Tory patrons through their ability to bribe
and intimidate poor electors.446 Alongside the excessive inclusion of the poor, historical
development had produced an “anomaly in our Constitution—a mass of industrious,
intelligent, prosperous men, without any direct tie binding them to our Government.”447
Reform would end the power of nomination by “placing the franchise as much as possible
in the hands of the middle classes” and the “more intelligent of the working class” while
disfranchising the dependent working class.448 .
Their disfranchisement was neither accidental nor incidental (Cannon 1973, 257). For
many Whigs it was one of the central virtues of reform, which was intended to ensure
“that wealthy and respectable men would be let into the right of voting” instead of those
who “were neither rich nor noble.”449 Russell, like Parnell in 1825, cited Fox, that “the
most perfect system. . . shall include the greatest number of independent electors, and
exclude the greatest number of those who are. . . dependent.” He bragged about the
exclusion of the working class, comparing the “quarters of the town chieﬂy inhabited
by the working classes,” where only 1 in 50 households would have the vote, to the
“principal streets for shops” where “almost every householder will have a vote.”450
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But disfranchisement of poor voters was also necessary to comfort the King and the
moderate Whigs. As late as May 1832 Grey was re-assuring the King that “in truth, the
right of voting, taken generally, will be found much less popular than the old one.”451
The moderates insisted the people were oﬀended by the corruption enabled by poor
electors. Viscount Palmerston listed the key defects in the unreformed system, one of
which was the “very unequal and unjust distribution of the power of voting among the
middle and lower clases.”452
The disfranchisements were looked on with disapproval by some radicals. Henry
Hunt, a democratic radical, was the most active in opposing the disfranchisements. He
presented a petition signed by 3,000 persons “praying that the franchise rights which
they at present possessed might not be interfered with,” and regularly denounced the
bill’s exclusion of the working classes.453 Nonetheless, even he was anxious not to sink
the bill: “he was content to give up a great deal, in order to meet the wishes of those
who did not go the full extent that he was prepared to go.”454
It was mostly Tories who opposed the disfranchisements.455 Lord Ellenborough defended the electoral system’s balance, giving representation to “property and wealth,
without exciting. . . popular jealousy,” and to “the very lowest contributors” without excessive democratic inﬂuence. He warned against the disfranchisements and noted fearfully in his diary that “in ten years the poorest class will be unrepresented & then we shall
have a servile war or universal suﬀrage” (Pearce 2010, 276).456 While many Tories believed the value of the laboring class franchises was the power it gave to the aristocracy,
others valued the balanced representation these provided.
Peel criticized the diﬀerent residence qualiﬁcations across the diﬀerent franchise
classes, noting that residence did “not apply to the Universities! Every non-resident
voter in England to be disfranchised, except non-resident Masters of Arts!” The M.A.
and non-resident clergyman of Cambridge or Oxford were juxtaposed to the “nonresident voter of Norwich, who cannot ﬁnd employment in the place of his nativity—who
is earning an honest subsistence in London.” Peel was framing the reform bill as class
legislation. But he was also pointing out that residence had always been tangential to
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the British electoral system, and would continue to be so as many of the county franchises did not require residence and plural franchises were still allowed across diﬀerent
districts.457
Tories appealed to moderate Whigs by arguing the new franchise arrangements only
worsened the problem of corruption. Many Whigs had explained their support of the
1829 disfranchisement on the grounds that the Irish 40s. electors were a dependent
class.458 But this dependence was not solely a function of their situation as tenants:
their poverty and ignorance made even those who were not dependent on a landlord
unﬁt for the franchise. Russell refused to follow this precedent in England, arguing that
the English 40s. electors were “a class of persons eminently qualiﬁed to have the trust
of electing committed to them.”459 But by extending the right to vote to copyholders
and leaseholders the ministers undermined the principle of independence.460 The Whig
response was “that the principle of the Bill was, the extension of the right of voting to
the respectable and intelligent classes of society” and that few would deny that “the yeomanry” had suﬃcient “property, character, and intelligence” to exercise the franchise.461
The Whigs had committed themselves to a principle of exclusion in their support
of disfranchisement in 1825 and 1829 and in their disfranchising of the freemen: not
simply independence, as marked by relations of tenant to landlord, but intelligence and
respectability. The ministers would have this standard thrown back at them in their
opposition to the Chandos clause, opposed by the government, which extended the right
to vote to tenants-at-will of £50 rent. Whigs representing agricultural interests insisted
that this was an intelligent and respectable class. In response, Lord Althorp praised
the respectability of farmers, but insisted the “Committee were not now called upon
to decide upon their respectability” but merely their independence. He argued that
the tenant-at-will standard, while appropriate in the boroughs, was inappropriate in the
counties, where it was in “the power of the landlord of the farmer to do his tenant a
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greater injury than the landlord of the householder.”462 Certainly the political interest
that many Whigs had in a tenant-at-will franchise led to its passage, but their defenses
of this further encouraged them to adopt the standard of middle class respectability and
intelligence outlined by reformers.
For the most part, the Tories opposed the bill on the same grounds they had opposed
emancipation: it was an overturning of the Constitution and the “ancient institutions”
that secured it. One MP thought the measure “to be unprincipled, tyrannical, revolutionary, introducing a new Constitution.”463 Some disclaimed hostility to modest reform that
would have a “due regard for the ancient institutions of the country.”464 But what was being proposed was far from that: it was a “revolutionary measure” and were it passed one
“could see no moorings or anchorage-ground for the Constitution.”465 Reform would not
be ﬁnal: the new electors would gradually shape a new constitution to reﬂect their beliefs
and interests. It would also lead to new electoral reforms. Peel warned the ministers that
other parties will “outbid you, not now, but at no remote period—they will oﬀer votes
and power to a million of men, will quote your precedent for the concession, and will
carry your principles to their legitimate and natural consequences.”466
It was widely expected the bill would not pass (Pearce 2010, 99). The course of the
debate and the consistent voice of the press, however, made clear that the popular mood
was strongly in favor. The Tories accused the Whigs of threatening them with the power
of the mob; but this was “not so much intimidation through the mob as intimidation
through the electoral process” (Pearce 2010, 112). The unreformed House of Commons
had a diversity of electoral connections. MPs whose situations made them sensitive
to public opinion, however, began to waver. Where the incentives on emancipation
had been to signal adherence to the Protestant Constitution, here popular preferences
incentivized signaling openness to reform. Members worried that they “might expose
[themselves] to the possible imputation of indiﬀerence to Reform” if they did not actively
indicate that they supported the principle of reform.467
If the bill were defeated, the ministers would ask the King for dissolution. He was
reluctant to grant this given ongoing agitation in Ireland (Crossman 1996, 54). The
Lord Lieutenant reportedly told the ministers that an election “would throw Ireland into
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anarchy” and that he would need to be sent 20,000 men along with the election writs
( Jennings 1885, 113). There was also the problem of Daniel O’Connell. He had been
arrested in January after a speech in favor of a bank run. But he was needed in the
Commons, and so the ministers colluded with the prosecution to ensure the trial was
postponed.
The Tories made their stand on second reading. On March 22nd , 1831, in the most
attended vote in British history the bill passed second reading by 302-301. Even this
narrow result required massive exertions: “the Government are moving hell and earth.
They have been tampering even with the little household oﬃcers.”468 That is, they
informed every MP with a sinecure (of which there were many) that they would be
dismissed if they did not vote for passage.469 The majority of the English and Welsh
(238-241) and Scots MPs (13-26) voted against the bill, and it passed only by the adhesion
of the Irish (53-36).470 The ministers were right to prioritize O’Connell’s vote over his
prosecution.
In committee an amendment was introduced that the total number of seats for England and Wales remain the same, eﬀectively foreclosing the modest redistribution of
seats to Ireland and Scotland. Again it was Ireland that animated debate. O’Connell denounced the amendment as intended “to excite English prejudices;. . . to excite a religious
feud.”471 Russell made it clear that it was a conﬁdence question.472 By a vote of 299-291,
the amendment passed, and the ministers went to the King. O’Connell’s vote had been
needed; now his restraining inﬂuence was needed. The day the amendment passed, the
Irish prosecution had the proceedings against O’Connell delayed again (Pearce 2010, 141).
Shortly after, the government announced that they could not prosecute, as the statute
had just expired.473 O’Connell would restrain the agitation in Ireland and the ministers
could give the King the assurance he required (Pearce 2010, 141-2).
It was one of the most decisive elections in British history, a massive victory for re468
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formers who now had a 130-140 vote majority in the Commons. This was not a disfranchised mass demanding the right to vote from a narrow elite: it was the enfranchised
themselves demanding the right to vote be extended to others. The second reform
bill was similar to the ﬁrst, with some slight moderations including a proposal, soon
dropped, that would have greatly curtailed the franchise extension in the boroughs.474
After months of delay, the bill passed easily in the Commons.
The organization of popular support continued. The Whigs leadership encouraged
the activism of the Political Unions. The Prime Minister met with the Unions leadership and hinted “against too much quiet, suggesting that the union should now make
itself publicly felt” if the Lords rejected the bill (Pearce 2010, 165). The Tories denounced the “northern Unions” as seeking reform for ulterior ends—namely Church
disestablishment.475 The Whigs defended them but denied that these were now to be
a regular part of political life.476 Rather, they were manifestations of the underlying
problem: a changed society that had not been accommodated by changed institutions.
The political unions and the Catholic Association, like the Irish Volunteers of 1782 and
the American Revolutionaries, were the product of “Justice denied—rights withheld—
wrongs perpetrated—the force which common injuries lend to millions.” But the chief
injustice was the failure to recognize the development of society and adapt governing
institutions accordingly. It was “the idiotcy [sic] of treating Englishmen like the children
of the South Sea Islands—the frenzy of believing, or making believe, that the adults of
the nineteenth century can be led like children, or driven like barbarians!”477
MP Thomas Macaulay articulated the Whig theme of statesmanship as accommodating institutions to historical development. History was the story of revolution and
reform:
“A portion of the community which had been of no account, expands and
becomes strong. It demands a place in the system, suited. . . to its present
power. If this is granted, all is well. If this is refused, then comes the
struggle between the young energy of one class, and the ancient privileges
of another.”
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This was the story of the United States and of France, Whig favorites on the theme
of failed statesmanship. But it was also the story of “the struggle which the Catholics
of Ireland maintained against the aristocracy of creed,” and the ongoing story of “the
struggle which the free people of colour in Jamaica are now maintaining against the
aristocracy of skin.” And it is “the struggle which, the middle classes in England are
maintaining against an aristocracy of mere locality—against an aristocracy, the principle
of which is to invest 100 drunken, potwallopers in one place, or the owner of a ruined
hovel in another, with powers which are withheld from cities renowned to the furthest
ends of the earth, for the marvels of their wealth and of their industry.”478 Macaulay was
implicating the struggles of Ireland, American, France, and of blacks in Jamaica in the
cause of civil and religious liberty. He was outlining the purpose of British liberalism as
the struggle against odious distinctions.
He was also circumscribing its liberality. The illegitimate aristocracy in the United
Kingdom held power on the basis of the poor and lower classes. British circumstances
made universal suﬀrage unacceptable, but this was not out of bounds forever:
“if the labourers of England were in that state in which I, from my soul, wish
to see them,—if employment were always plentiful, wages always high, food
always cheap,—if a large family were considered not as an encumbrance,
but as a blessing— the principal objections to Universal Suﬀrage would, I
think, be removed.”479
The implication was that future reforms should depend on the material and intellectual
progress of the country. However much the Whigs would claim this reform was ﬁnal,
they were embedding both the idea of reform and the conditions for sustained exclusion
into their governing philosophy. They deﬁned themselves as recognizing that historical
progress made it “necessary to alter, adapt, and enlarge [governing] institutions, in order to accommodate the continually increasing number of intelligent and independent
citizens who are entitled to share in their beneﬁts.”480 To not adapt created an injustice:
the wrongs against England were the failure to recognize when a people had ceased to
be children and become ﬁt for participation in government.
On October 7th , 1831, the bill was defeated in the House of Lords. The immediate
response was rioting in Nottingham and Derby. The government was concerned, but the
riots did not present a serious threat (LoPatin 1999, 92). The Bristol riots a few weeks
478

Macaulay, House of Commons, Hansard, March 2nd , 1831, 3rd series, vol.2, c.1196.
Macaulay, House of Commons, Hansard, March 2nd , 1831, 3rd series, vol.2, c.1192.
480
Lord Advocate, House of Commons, Hansard, March 4th , 1831, 3rd Series, vol.3 c.62.
479

289

later lasted three days and were suppressed by the military. This was more threatening,
but still was not a cause for alarm. As noted by John Beckett, “modern historians no
longer think of the 1831 riots as heralding revolution, and of revolution being averted
only by reform” (Beckett 2005, 114). But the Tories were eager to portray them as such,
and reformers feared moderate Whigs might come to agree.
Recent work by Aidt and Franck has shown that the unrest of October “hardened
the anti-reform stance of the Tory MPs and their patrons” (Aidt and Franck 2012, 14).
However, they also ﬁnd that the riots had the inverse eﬀect on Whigs, who became
increasingly likely to support reform. I suggest that the eﬀects were opposite in part
because of the diﬀerent interpretative frames by which the conﬂict was understood. The
violence conﬁrmed Tories in the belief that reformers were jacobins who would not stop
until there were no more “King, no Lords, no inequalities in the social system; all will
be leveled to the plane of the petty shopkeepers and small farmers.”481 For Tories,
concession would only signal weakness. But for Whigs, the violence was a conﬁrmation
of their beliefs about statesmanship and expedient reforms. It made the intransigence
of the Lords more galling and further ennobled the Whigs’ purpose and stiﬀened their
resolve.
The Tories dubbed the violence the “Reform riots,” and accused the political unions
of plotting violent revolution (Pearce 2010, 208). In fact, the Unions were very concerned that violence not occur, recognizing that public and elite perception was crucial
(LoPatin 1999, 88, 99-101). The unions sent addresses to the King expressing their loyalty and aﬀection. The Cabinet encouraged a moderate stance, but was reliant on them
to demonstrate public opinion in favor of the bill (Cannon 1973, 227). When a plan
for the Birmingham Union to arm itself in order to maintain the peace threatened their
standing with moderates, the government decided to issue a proclamation “declaring
all associations assuming a power of action independent of the civil magistrates illegal
and unconstitutional” (Cannon 1973, 227). But they would not prosecute or disband the
Unions if they abandoned this plan.482 The Birmingham Union obligingly retreated, and
no further government actions were taken. This was political cover for moderates to
continue supporting the bill. The Birmingham Political Union received over 50 requests
for its rulebook, which Union members believed reﬂected a growing belief among the
481
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middle classes that the Unions would stop further outbreaks of violence (LoPatin 1999,
101). And the increase in Union organization strengthened Grey’s eﬀorts to present them
“as proof of public support for the Bill” (LoPatin 1999, 101).483
To assure passage of the latest iteration of the bill, the Ministers had asked for and
received a commitment from the King to create suﬃcient peers in the House of Lords
(Pearce 2010, 226). After a key setback in committee in the House of Lords, the Cabinet
decided that 50 to 60 peers were needed, and on May 9th the Prime Minister took
this proposal to the King. To their surprise, he refused and accepted their resignation
(Pearce 2010, 276). This began the Days of May, a key period in the ‘revolutionary threat’
account of reform’s passage.
As early as March 1831 Hunt had warned that “he knew from good authority that
there would be such agitation as they had never seen before.”484 This agitation had
already transpired, and it was almost entirely constrained to constitutionally legitimate
activity. The Unions’ membership jumped again, as they encouraged ‘respectable men’
to join in order to prevent violence. Some, however, were moving toward more targeted
political action. The Northern Political Union moved to cease the payment of taxes until
reform was passed. The National Political Union in London encouraged a bank run, and
posted placards that read: “To Stop The Duke Go For Gold.” The slogan was printed in
newspapers throughout the country, but it was targeted only at Tory owned banks and
the Bank of England (LoPatin 1999, 150).485 In all, £1.6 million was withdrawn from the
Bank of England, from reserves of £3-4 million (Pearce 2010, 298).
While this heightened the drama it did not change the underlying calculus. Any
ministry would have to pledge an extensive reform, a condition demanded by the King.
But it would also have to keep the bill intact in all its essential provisions, a condition
demanded by the Commons.486 There was no ministry other than Grey’s that could
muster the support of Commons, King, and Lords. Insofar as the Tories tried to appease
the King and Commons, they lost the support of their right-wing. When Tory MP
Alexander Baring suggested a Tory ministry might pass the bill, he was attacked on
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all sides.487 One Tory said that “as the Bill must pass, it should be passed by those
Ministers who had introduced it.”488 Robert Inglis, speaking for the far right of the Tory
party, considered a Tory ministry pledged to reform as “one of the most fatal violations
of public conﬁdence which could be inﬂicted.”489 Macaulay stated what amounted to
a consensus: if Wellington’s “pledge [against reform] should have been violated within
one month, no other pledge of [a Wellington] Administration. . . could hold out long.”490
Seeing the impossibility of the situation, Baring suggested that “it would be much for the
good of the country if the present Administration were not dissolved.”491
The King and Lords conceded on reform not because there was a potential revolution
out of doors but because there was an institutional failure indoors: one chamber would
have to concede, and the most easily acted upon was the House of Lords. The agitation
was not unimportant. It did not threaten revolution so much as stiﬀen the resolve of
Whigs, at least as long as it veered away from violence. Grey helped coordinate the
actions of the Unions, “secretly directing the activities of the Political Unions on the
public stage” and urging them to restrain any agitation that might weaken the Whigs
(LoPatin 1999, 155). During the Days of May, Grey remarked that “their conduct hitherto
has been praiseworthy,” and expressed his belief that “if things can only be kept quiet I
have not the least doubt of being able in a very few days, to set everything right again”
(LoPatin 1999, 155).
The Unions served the function the Whigs wanted them to, signaling public support
for the bill. Grey had long recognized that public opinion would have to be mobilized,
writing that “my own feeling. . . would be to insist upon [an extensive reform], rather
than incur all the labour, anxiety, and danger of undertaking the Government in a
moment of such embarrassment, and with the certainty of being counteracted from the
beginning, and ultimately betrayed and sacriﬁced by the Court on the ﬁrst favourable
opportunity.”492 Only by pointing to public opinion, given deliberate form through the
Unions, could they persuade the unelected branches to accept reform.
This is not to say that averting revolution was not an objective of the Whigs. Grey
did believe that absent reform a revolution would occur, and his desire for the Unions
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to demonstrate “strength in public opinion” was intended to enable the Whigs to “force
the Court before it is too late to carry this or any other measures.”493 But this was
less a belief that revolution was imminent than that it would be made inevitable absent
Whig statesmanship. On March 2nd , well before any serious agitation had occurred
or any threat of violence been made, Macaulay remarked that he “entertain[ed] great
apprehension for the fate of my country. I do in my conscience believe, that unless this
measure, or some similar measure, be speedily adopted, great and terrible calamities
will befall us.”494 In the language of elite versus masses, with democratization as a
concession, this was an entirely pre-emptive gambit on the part of the elite.
The arguments and narratives that circulated in Whig networks insisted that the genius of British constitutionalism was to vary and alter governing institutions as needed
to match a changing society. The failure of the Tories to grant Catholic emancipation
earlier was a conﬁrmation that this ‘genius’ required statesmanship by those who understood the ﬂexible and progressive character of the constitution: i.e., not the Tories. Grey’s
remark that reform be forced on the King before it was too late was a projection based
on the Whigs’ own ideas (and pretentions) of governance and historical development.
The rhetoric of reforming to preserve was the story they had been telling themselves
since the 1790s, rather than any imminent threat. When the ﬁrst bill was introduced
in 1831 there was no fear of revolution; but there was an ideological certainty among
Whigs that absent reform revolution would come. And to make sure that the King and
Lords were aware of this, they made the prospect of revolution central to their rhetoric
and encouraged the Unions, which the King and Lords believed to be the most likely
instigators of revolution.495
On May 15th , the Duke of Wellington informed the King he could not form a government. On the 18th the ministers could state that they had a “suﬃcient guarantee” that the
King would create however many peers were needed. In the end, this was not necessary;
once the King had committed, the Tory Lords walked out. The bill passed with only 21
lords voting against. Grey and the Whig ministers implored the King to sign the bill in
person, but he was determined against it.496 And so on June 7th , 1832, the bill received
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assent via commission rather than in person; more petulance.
***
This was not only the inauguration of a new constitutional order. It was the institutionalization of a newly ascendant vision of the boundaries and basis of political
community. Throughout the debates the Whigs returned to the theme of ‘the people,’
whose reconstitution was necessary to secure the principles of the British Constitution.
The Commons was intended to represent “the knowledge and spirit” of the people; but
the over-weighted inﬂuence of the laboring classes had allowed the aristocracy to unbalance the Constitutional order.497 A new deﬁnition of ‘the people’ was needed to restore
the constitutional principles.498 And for Whigs, this new deﬁnition was demarcated on
class grounds. The middle class was the real body of the people: “the people—and by
the people, I repeat—I mean the middle classes, the wealth and intelligence of the
country, the glory of the British name.”499 The measure promised “to the people of
England an overpowering inﬂuence in the choice of Representatives” and by ‘the people’
the Whigs “meant the great majority of the respectable middle classes of the country.”500
The repeated invocation of the middle classes as ‘the people’ preempted the Tories’
critique that they were giving power to the mob. And so the people were deﬁned not
only against the aristocracy but against the laboring classes. Brougham distinguished
the ‘people’ from the ‘populace.’
“I do not mean the populace—the mob. . . . But if there is the mob, there
is the people also. I speak now of the middle classes—of those hundreds
of thousands of respectable persons—the most numerous, and by far the
most wealthy order in the community. . . the genuine depositaries of sober,
rational, intelligent, and honest English feeling.”
The distinction between the people and the populace was not a sharp one. The populace
were not aliens, and the people were “connected with that populace, who look up to them
as their kind and natural protectors.” The middle class was “the link which connects the
upper and the lower orders, and binds even your Lordships with the populace.”501
But the demarcation of a middle class people was not only meant to defend them
from charges of an excessively ‘popular’ franchise. It also reﬂected the Whigs’ own
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understanding of the proper basis for membership in the political community. And
the basis for inclusion into the Whigs’ ‘people’ was above all intelligence, respectability,
and sober rationality. There was a “growing spirit of intelligence amongst the great
mass of the community,” evidenced in organizations such as the Mechanics’ Institutions,
with their reading rooms and instruction session. The cause of reform was that of an
enlightened and rational people, and the Lords needed to know that they did were not
dealing “with an ignorant, or unintelligent body of men. . . [but] with men who are well
instructed, intelligent, well-conducted, peaceable, and orderly.”502 In the discourse of
Whig and liberal reformers, progress had created the middle class (Wahrman 1995). The
progressive character of British constitutionalism meant that it could be adapted, by
Whig statesmen, to this change in the structure of society.
Hunt called attention to the exclusions this middle class focus generated, regretting
that while “on former occasions, all the talk was about the representation of the people
of England; but now [the ministers] only spoke of the representation of the intelligence
and property of the country” (Pearce 2010, 216). But emphasizing the exclusions threatened the bill’s success, and even O’Connell warned members “not to delay, by ﬁnding
needless faults, the progress of a measure which would confer incalculable beneﬁt on the
country.”503 The ‘populace’ and the ‘working classes’ hovered over the proceedings, not
primarily as a threatened force for revolution or insurrection but as a class that could
not be included unless counterbalanced or ‘inﬂuenced’ by property (the Tory position) or
attaining a level of intelligence and respectability that made them political “adults of the
nineteenth century” (the Whig position). But the discursive category of the ‘middle class’
was in a sense reconstituted by the ﬁght over the reform bill, and it was in its aftermath
that the category of ‘middle class’ became central to contemporaries’ conceptualization
of society (Wahrman 1995, 18).
The newly deﬁned ‘people’ was rooted in the supposed moral characteristics of a
particular and ambiguously demarcated middle class. But the scope of the ‘people’ was
also expanded on religious and national dimensions. The inclusion of a disproportionately Dissenter middle class threatened to undermine support for the Church of England,
another blow to the sectarian character of the state. Opponents argued that petitioners “solicit Parliamentary Reform, chieﬂy as a step to the abolition of tithes. . . . [I]s the
Church to be despoiled of its property? This, indeed, will satisfy the petitioners—nothing
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else.”504 The Lords were warned that the “real radical Reformers only considered the
present Bill as a stepping-stone to the total overthrow of the Constitution,” with the
Church being the next target.505 These fears were stoked when Hunt presented a petition
“couched in violent and abusive language, directed principally against the Church.”506
And the fact that the leadership of the Political Unions came largely from Dissenting
communities, many embracing Church disestablishment as an objective, only conﬁrmed
their suspicions (LoPatin 1999, 58, 61, 83, 108-9). Reﬂecting afterward, Wellington wrote
that “the revolution is made. . . power is transferred from one class of society, the gentlemen of England, professing the faith of the Church of England, to another class of society,
the shopkeepers, being dissenters from the Church.” In the counties the Dissenters arrayed themselves against the “aristocratic inﬂuence of the landed gentry,” and “there are
Dissenters in every village in the country; they are the blacksmith, the carpenter, the
mason, &c. &c.”507
And ‘the people’ to be deﬁned were not just English. The bill for Ireland was especially controversial. In introducing the reform package, Russell remarked that the Irish
“have suﬀered the greatest inconvenience and injury from the political rights being in
the hands of a few” and hoped “this enlargement of the franchise in Ireland will tend
to promote industry and encourage trade.” But the Reform Bill’s oﬀering to Ireland
would be limited: there would be no revision of 1829 disfranchisement.508 Lord Stanley,
responsible for the Irish bill, took care to emphasize that it was in almost all respects
identical to the English, the only exceptions being the result of the diﬀerent forms of
tenure. Using language that would become commonplace in Liberal rhetoric for the next
several decades, Stanley proposed “to assimilate the practice in England and Ireland.”509
This assimilation was contingent on local conditions, but “unless they were prepared to
contend, that what was true with respect to England was false when applied to Ireland—
unless there were hon. Members prepared to maintain, that the reality of Representation
should apply to England while only the mockery should be continued in Ireland, on
504
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them must rest the onus” of supporting a substantially diﬀerent qualiﬁcation.510
The Tories saw in British MPs’ antipathy toward the Irish Catholic representatives
a possibility of splitting the reformist coalition. But they also believed that the Irish
bill further undermined the Established Church and Protestant community by changing
the security required for emancipation. The Bishop of Exeter, in a quickly published
speech, reminded the Lords that the Established Church in Ireland relied on the closed
boroughs, that the electoral system was “avowedly unequal. . . formed for a small band of
Englishmen settled in the midst of a hostile population” (Phillpot 1832, 12-14). Opening
them to Catholic electors would undermine their central function, which had always been
to maintain the Protestant and Anglican character of the State. The Tories’ attempt
to shift attention to Ireland was motivated by antipathies rooted in the narrative of
the Protestant Constitution.511 Ultra Tory Robert Inglis asked, “bigot as he might be
thought for asking, whether this country had not prospered exactly in proportion as
it had maintained its Protestant character, and had defended Protestant interests every
where?”512 Anthony Lefroy felt similarly, insisting that reform of Irish representation
meant the fall of the Protestant Church of Ireland, and with it, the Church of England.513
O’Connell made fun of these claims: “he assures us that his Protestantism will be
destroyed, that it will be for ever annihilated, if you destroy thirteen rotten boroughs!
The gallant Member’s Protestantism is not ‘built upon a rock,’ but upon thirteen rotten
boroughs.”514 But even moderate Whigs asserted that religious distinctions would no
longer be recognized. Lord Stanley conceded that opening the boroughs might have
been dangerous “when the Government ruled by a small body of what was termed
the Ascendancy.” But he was insistent that “that time had gone by,” and that Roman
Catholics “must be allowed that weight in society which their property could not fail to
command.”515
The ministers bragged about the bill’s disfranchisements. But they would not return
to a system founded upon religious distinctions. Stanley would not concede the bill
“menace[d] the Protestant institutions of Ireland”; but even were this true he would not
accept this as a valid argument “for the year 1832” as it ignored the system “perfected
and concluded by the great legislative measure of 1829.”
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“[A]ll religious distinctions, with their kindred rancour and strife, had been
done away in Ireland. If the House admitted the general principle of Reform,
and if it had admitted that no distinction any longer existed between the
Church of England and the Catholics, or between the Church of England
and the Dissenters, he asked upon what ground they could turn round and
say, that they would not extend the right of returning Members to Parliament
because the Catholics must participate in the extension? They might as
well object to Reform in England, because the Dissenters would share its
beneﬁts.”516
This was of course one of the underlying motivations for opposing reform, and Stanley
was daring the Tories to antagonize the Dissenters further.
To end the perpetuation of religious distinctions, the ministers proposed a signiﬁcant
deviation from the English bill: the gradual ending of the freemanship franchise in
Ireland. They argued the freemen of Ireland had acquired rights solely because they
were Protestants, and did not want to “perpetuate a generation of Protestant voters”
who possessed rights only due to a “system of exclusion.”517 This was certainly in the
Whigs’ electoral interests, and predictably Wellington and the Tories opposed this as
unsettling the 1829 arrangement.518 The Whigs, willing to maintain the exclusion of
the Irish 40s. electors, were not willing to accept a reassertion of religious distinctions:
“what did the noble Duke’s argument amount to? Simply that the people of Ireland were
chieﬂy Catholics. Was that a reason why they should be shut out from the beneﬁts of the
Constitution?”519
Initially O’Connell and the Liberal Irish expressed satisfaction with the bill, and
anxious for the English bill to pass, told the Whigs what they wanted to hear, “that
the [Irish] Bill. . . would contribute to make a perpetual and irreversible union of the two
countries.”520 The conciliatory language would end as new information on the likely
impact of the bill became available.521 By the spring of 1832, O’Connell denounced the
bill as a disfranchising one and could demonstrate that the eﬀects of the new franchises
in the counties would be very slight.522 He disputed that assimilation was the objective
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of the ministers, and argued this claim “was always used when the constituency was to
be decreased, but it was never applied for the opposite purpose.”523
But assimilation was an important rhetorical trope that the ministers, O’Connell,
and even Tories would frequently deploy. In O’Connell’s series of letters To the Reformers
of Great Britain, he “ask[ed] for the people of Ireland the same measure of Reform
which the people of England receive. . . for as complete an equality of Reform in both
countries as possible” (Cusack 1875, 458-59). The rhetorical value of giving to Ireland as
was given to England led O’Connell to embrace a measure that was clearly against his
political interests: the Tories’ eﬀorts to retain the freeman franchise in Ireland (Hoppen
1984, 3). The Irish freemen were Protestant and so notoriously corrupt that even Henry
Hunt supported their disfranchisement, remarking that “freemen were the worst class of
voters in the country.”524 But O’Connell demanded the continuation of this franchise
“because it is in substance preserved in the English borough towns, and is reasonable in
itself” (Cusack 1875, 484). Tories pointed to O’Connell’s support and the Irish freemen
franchise was continued.
The King and moderate Whigs, angered by the renewal of unrest in Ireland, wanted
the ministers to curtail the extension of the Irish franchise.525 But Grey was insistent. He
needed Irish support for the English and Scots measures, and told the King’s Secretary
that “if any Bill is to pass, the 40s. freeholders remaining disqualiﬁed and the county
representation unaltered, it does not seem possible to do less than what is proposed.”526
Still, Grey sought to appease the King by assuring him the Irish did not approve of the
bill.527
To secure the support of O’Connell and the Irish Liberals, the Whigs needed to commit to equality across the three bills, altered only so much as was required to conform
to speciﬁc diﬀerences of land tenure and legal systems. This would be a central Liberal
commitment in the coming decades: that a perfected union between Ireland and Engincrease in representation and that one of the new members was being given to the University of Dublin,
an Anglican enclave. Grey would remark to the King’s Secretary that “the Irish members are furious
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land should be achieved through the assimilation of Irish institutions to English ones,
tempered only insofar as diﬀerent conditions required slightly diﬀerent laws, and without
a substantial revision of the securities required for emancipation.

Conclusion
The understandings of the character and purpose of the British political community were
crucial for creating the conditions necessary for the critical juncture of 1828-32, as well
as for structuring the basic contours of its resolution. By stressing the importance of civil
and especially religious liberty as a core value of 1688, one that had to be progressively
achieved through the reform of governing institutions, reformers were able to develop a
relatively coherent alternative identity to the Tories while securing themselves against the
charge of undermining the Protestant Constitution. The insistence upon the cause of civil
and religious liberty as the purpose of the Whig party and of the British constitution
worked to hold together a deeply fragmented reforming coalition. During the 1825
organizing and again after O’Connell’s election, the Tory ministers had the option of
repressing Ireland or of conceding emancipation. That the Whigs and Radicals placed
such a high priority on emancipation meant the Tories were assured that they would get
the ‘security’ needed to pass a relief bill through the Lords. Had the reform coalition
fragmented after passage of repeal, as many contemporaries expected, Dissenters might
have abandoned emancipation or been unwilling to accept it the disfranchising security.
Under these circumstances, repression might have been the more attractive option. The
resulting split in the Tories created the conditions for rapid and dramatic changes to the
state’s governing institutions.
The ideas of party and national purpose also shaped the agenda of the Whigs once
they came into power. Their understanding of statesmanship as accommodation to historical development informed their strategy: they could justify their radical measures,
including the encouragement of the Political Unions, to themselves and to history by
insisting that absent reform revolution was inevitable, even if it was not imminent. And
their understanding of reform as necessitated by the emergence of a commercial and
industrial middle class legitimated not only the enfranchisement of this class, but the
disfranchisement of the laboring classes, whose inclusion was also the result of institutions not having been adapted to historical development.
These ideas were not necessarily reasoning from ﬁrst principles: they were accom300

modations and rationalizations and reﬂected the vagaries of the debates. The language
of assimilation, with its implication of perfecting the Union between Britain and Ireland,
took on a heightened importance during debates over the reform bills. Its rhetorical
value encouraged O’Connell to commit to a program that was certainly counter to his
political interests and that the Irish, Liberals, and even Conservatives would frequently
come back to in the coming decades.
Nor did the activists necessarily get to defend the principles that they wanted. Their
accommodations to political reality shaped the principles to which they were committed.
Consider the two novel exclusions of the period: the disenfranchisement of the Irish
40s. freeholders and of the ‘ancient right’ voters in the English and Irish boroughs. The
reformers accepted the disenfranchisement of the 40s. freeholders, but with considerable
reservations. It may or may not have been in their electoral interest, but they did not
wish to risk emancipation by rejecting a security that was defended as preserving the
Church establishment and blocking priestly inﬂuence. As they had spent the last decade
disclaiming hostility to the Church and defending emancipation on the grounds that
this would strengthen the Protestant Constitution, they were weakly positioned to resist
disfranchisement. By contrast, they disfranchised the English and Irish ‘ancient right’
borough electors because they wanted to: it was quite clearly in their electoral interest
to do so, and they believed this class was largely responsible for electoral corruption.
But in both cases they defended their actions with a common argument: that the
poverty and moral degeneracy of these classes of voters, and not just the terms of their
property tenure, meant they were susceptible to intimidation or bribery, giving the aristocracy (or the clergy) a disproportionate inﬂuence in the Commons. The argument was
not novel. But as debates over Irish disenfranchisement and the reform bills proceeded,
it took on an increasingly central role in their ideas of peoplehood, and contributed to
their articulation of a coherent basis for exclusion. The overall eﬀect was to deepen
their commitment to the exclusionary dimensions of the stories they were telling; and
this commitment to the boundaries of peoplehood, like perfection of the national union,
would be a central feature of political life throughout the Victorian period.
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Chapter 8
An Apprenticeship to Liberty

“But the party is the team that draws the coach.”
—Gladstone, 1884.528
“We admitted Natives to the Civil Service on the same principle that we opened
it to competition, because we hate artiﬁcial privileges and monopolies. . . Since the
struggle for life and survival of the ﬁttest theory came to be applied to politics, the
part which race-distinction plays in the world is better appreciated scientiﬁcally.”
—Deputy Commissioner of Silhat, Assam Province.529

Introduction
The critical juncture of 1828 to 1832 changed the developmental trajectory of the United
Kingdom. The party conﬁgurations that emerged would profoundly shape democratization in the 19th century, and of crucial importance were the ideas of political community advanced by the adherents of the Liberal Party. John Russell, in an 1833 letter,
remarked that the government had been “very busy with Church, slavery, and other matters.”530 These “other matters” would quickly expand to include signiﬁcant alterations
to the Anglican tithe system in England and Ireland, the New Poor Law, new rights for
non-Anglicans to have their marriages recognized, and a thoroughgoing reform of the
municipal corporations in England, Scotland, and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland.
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The Whig leaders believed their course should be “to work out the necessary reforms,
which the state of our institutions may require, upon safe and moderate principles; in
accordance with the constitution of our mixed government & with the spirit of the age.”531
This did not necessarily mean a further reform of the franchise; but it did preclude a
dogmatic opposition to further extensions. John Russell was proud of his self-image as
a reformer, contrasting it favorably to the new designation of Conservative that many
Tories had embraced: “I am ready, in opposition to their name of Conservative, to take
the name of Reformer, and to stand by that designation.”532
“Luther was a Reformer; [Pope] Leo X., who opposed the Reformation, was
a Conservative. What was Galileo? Galileo, in astronomy and in science,
was a Reformer; the Inquisition, who put him into prison, was Conservative.
The Christians, who suﬀered martyrdom in Rome, were Reformers; Nero,
who put these Christians to death, was a Conservative” (Walpole 1891, 295).
He saw himself in good company, and declared that if education and moral regeneration
could be accomplished, under Liberal stewardship, then England would “not forget her
precedence of teaching the nations how to live.”533
But if the optimism of reformers was well expressed by Russell’s comment that “in
England, I hope it may be true that there is no wrong without a remedy,” he also
expressed their pessimism: “in Ireland,” he continued, “all is wrong, and nothing a
remedy.”534 The Tithe War—an organized opposition to the collection of tithes—was
ongoing, O’Connell was campaigning to repeal the Union, and there was an alarming
increase in agrarian violence (Crossman 1996, 63). In response, the Whig ministers
introduced a coercion bill and suspended habeas corpus (Crossman 1991, 321).535
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In 1866, a Conservative MP mocked Liberals for suggesting that “Ireland at this
moment is the happiest, the most loyal, and the freest country in the world,” noting
that “every barony in Ireland is proclaimed, the Habeas Corpus Act is suspended—
but that is always so when Lord Russell is Prime Minister.”536 Liberals insisted that
they oﬀered justice alongside coercion, which supposedly distinguished them from the
Conservatives.537 But coercion acts were also presented as serving progressive ends.
As Whig Lord Althorp wrote to Grey in 1832, “if I had my own way I would establish
a Dictatorship in Ireland until by the increased wealth and intelligence of the People,
they were become ﬁt for a free Government.”538 Althorp’s desire to suppress Ireland,
his concern with Irish ﬁtness for representative institutions, and his willingness to use
coercion to achieve progress, would ﬁnd echoes in British discourse throughout the 19th
century.
Chapter 6 looked at the trajectory of franchise reform in the United Kingdom, highlighting the disfranchisements and exclusions that these entailed, and outlining the institutional, partisan, and ideological context in which they occurred. Chapter ___looked
at the political eﬀort to dislodge the Protestant Constitution. Particular emphasis was
placed on the process by which a distinctive understanding of political community was
articulated to hold together a reforming coalition and legitimate new exclusions.
This chapter examines how this understanding—the Liberal vision of progressive
Britain—conditioned the behavior of political operatives and structured the politics of
democratization in the decades after 1832. The discourse of British Liberalism outlined
a narrative of political peoplehood that both accepted and disclaimed disfranchisements:
it demarcated categories of persons that had progressed in civilization against persons
and peoples who were still developmentally immature. But the rhetorical commitments of
British Liberalism also implied that future enfranchisements would occur and provided
a basis for groups to claim inclusion. I argue that the politics of the franchise were
structured by a narrative of political community. Diﬀerent groups were able to build
legislative support for these by framing their projects within the terms of this narrative;
they found their task more diﬃcult insofar as they were seen as violating this narrative’s
key strictures. While certainly not the only factor determining trajectories of the right
to vote, the Liberal narrative of progressive Britain was consequential and shaped the
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diﬀerent patterns of inclusion and exclusion in Britain, in Ireland, and in the Empire.
I begin with a discussion of the Liberal vision of progressive Britain. I then explore
how members of parliament understood, invoked, and responded to this narrative of
political community. The invocation of a shared belief in progressive reform left the
party leadership vulnerable to pressure from activists seeking a franchise expansion.
But if the progressive narrative gave activists rhetorical leverage, its invocation also
entailed an acceptance of the terms of exclusion that this narrative established. This
helps explain a key pattern of democratization in the U.K.: the receding support for
manhood suﬀrage after the 1830s alongside the gradual, progressive incorporation of
the working classes.
The Westminster Parliament was not legislating for England alone, but for the United
Kingdom and the Empire. In the empire Liberal commitments to representative institutions and a broad franchise were tempered by the degree to which the colonies were
considered ﬁt for self-government. And the initial rhetorical commitment to a universal
human capacity for progress became increasingly uncertain, as advocates of the view
of the essential incapacity of ‘inferior races’ for civilization were emboldened by scientiﬁc development. Ireland was a source of ongoing conﬂict. But while Liberals were
ostensibly committed to integrating Ireland into the Union, the language of progress and
ﬁtness provided a potential legitimating framework for coercion and sustained exclusion.
And by the end of the period, the premise that equality between the countries should
be realized was called into question, as sustained insurrection and race science gave
new impetus to longstanding and still-resonant arguments that the Irish were not ﬁt for
self-government.
This chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the mechanisms by which the
parliamentary behavior was structured. MPs highlighted themes central to the Liberal
vision of progressive Britain to send signals to partisan allies and constituencies; they
reminded colleagues of Liberal principles; and they warned ministers that violating the
strictures of Liberalism would cost them support in the Commons and country. In short,
they invoked the ideas of political community within Liberal discursive networks to pressure the party leadership into taking positions that they might otherwise prefer to avoid.
And the success of the party in disseminating this rhetoric frustrated Conservatives, who
were perennially torn between the need to accommodate themselves to the resonance of
the Liberal vision and the fact that it remained deeply unpopular with their base.
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The Liberal Vision of Britain
The Age of Liberal Progress
Central to the Liberal vision of Britain was a belief in the potential for constant progress
( Jenkins 1994, 85). Progress was in part a material process; but more importantly, it was
moral and intellectual development, the “new era. . . the age of social advancement” that
brought with it a “tide of human improvement.”539 And this progress required a certain
posture of statesmen, a willingness to adapt institutions to expand the conditions under
which it could occur and to accommodate its eventual occurrence.
Progress required a context of ‘rational’ liberty, in which property was respected
but the innate human drive for self-improvement and the pursuit of truth were given
extensive freedom; liberty was “the chief ingredient of individual and social progress”,
the only “unfailing and permanent source of improvement” (Mill 1989, 57, 70; Macaulay
1856a, 83).540 Liberal statesmanship was required to provide the freedom necessary
for progress. Restrictions on trade, regressive taxation, and the arbitration of truth in
religion, science, and opinion were forms of class legislation, which Liberals claimed was
the hallmark of the Tory party (Parry 1993, 4).541 Liberals believed that since the Reform
Act and the ascension of Liberal government, the scope of liberty had been greatly
expanded.542 In almost all respects, the “the nation has pursued a career of progress
and improvement”: “there could be no retreat.”543 And Liberals expected this progress
to continue into the future: “we are far, very far, indeed, from the utmost limits and end
of human improvement, whose centre is everywhere, and whose circumference recedes
indeﬁnitely as mankind advances.”544
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But progress also required statesmen who could recognize the need to accommodate
governing institutions. Since 1832, the belief in progressive reform as the essence of
statesmanship had become a touchstone among Liberal MPs (Pearce 2010, 218), The
primary responsibility of “statesmen pretending to rule in this country” was to accommodate institutions to encourage and adapt to the progress of the people.545 In short, it
needed the Liberal party and its leaders.

The Providential Purpose of Britain
This was not just optimism; it was a narrative of the purpose of the British political
community. Progress was a universal phenomenon, but it was nowhere more advanced
than in England (Macaulay 1856a, 83). The English were “on the whole. . . the best
educated, the most intelligent, the most enlightened, people in the world, and better
deserving of freedom than the people of any other nation.”546 But what made England
unique was that it had early in its history secured the ordered liberty that was the
necessary foundation for progress. That England had not been impeded in progress was
a consequence of “our moral position,” such that while “revolutions have taken place all
around us, our government has never once been subverted by violence” (1856a, 83; Hall
2012, 177). The history of England was not unblemished, and Liberals condemned the
historical oppression of Ireland, although many regretted that this oppression was made
worse for not having exterminated the Irish when they had the chance (Macaulay 1889
[1838], 450).547
At the center of the Liberal interpretation of history was the dangers of racial heterogeneity. Most Liberals believed in stable racial and national characters and believed
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these should be taken into consideration in designing institutions. But “in those States
which are composed of people of diﬀerent races and nationalities,” representative institutions did not provide a popular bulwark against despotic government but gave “greater
scope to those popular feelings of jealousy, and perhaps of dislike which prevail among
those races.”548 A central theme in Liberal accounts of English development was that
racial heterogeneity in England had been overcome through amalgamation: in no country “has the enmity of race been carried further than England. In no country has that
enmity been more completely eﬀaced” (Macaulay 1856a, 5). By doing away with “the
distinctions of caste and creed” England had assured “the silent operation of those inﬂuences which. . . out of the discordant elements of Norman and Saxon, built up the
homogeneous greatness of the English people.”549 It was because of its earlier racial
amalgamation that England enjoyed a “happy immunity from any feelings of national
hostility.”550 Consequently, Liberals believed, the country was one in which free institutions could be established and progressively improved.
And progressive improvement was the essential character of the British constitution.
A Liberal MP called upon the House to accept a reform bill as “one of those alterations
which aﬀorded a specimen of the living vitality of the British constitution.”551 It was
only insofar as the progressive character of the constitution was recognized that the
purpose of England could be vindicated: to teach the nations of the world how to live,
which meant the “general success and extension of liberal principles” in Europe and the
world.552 It was the core idea from which much Liberal rhetoric drew its inspiration.
The Liberal vision of a progressive Britain was not only an elaboration of national
purpose and character; it also delineated the boundaries of the community. Exclusions
from the ‘people’ could be legitimated on the grounds that a given category of persons
had not suﬃciently progressed in civilization or in moral and intellectual development.
But British Liberalism did consider some forms of exclusion inherently suspect. Closely
548
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related to Liberals’ commitment to non-exclusivity and their faith in progress was ambivalence toward the idea of immutable racial or national characters.553 Liberals justiﬁed exclusions by reference to humanity’s capacity for progressive improvement. And
as progress required non-exclusive institutions in which a genuine aristocracy of merit
could arise, racial distinctions in matters such as the franchise were inherently suspect.
Liberals rejected “invidious race-distinctions,” explained by a Deputy Commissioner in
India, “because we hate artiﬁcial privileges and monopolies.”554 But racial distinctions
also impeded the process of amalgamation: they imbued in the favored race an unwarranted sense of pride and jealousy, exempliﬁed in the 1830s and 1840s by Protestants in
Ireland and whites in the West Indian colonies.555 The process of amalgamation that had
rendered England ﬁt for free institution could occur elsewhere, but racial distinctions in
law would “produce not friendship but hostility” and prevent “the amalgamation of the
native population with the English settlers.”556
Explicit racial exclusions were suspect. Religiously motivated exclusions were entirely
illegitimate. They were odious distinctions, and opposition to these and the exclusive
institutions they enabled would be a recurring factor in unifying the Liberal party. This
was clear in the periodic ﬁghts over Jewish emancipation, which was vigorously opposed
by Conservatives on the grounds that it would “unchristianise” parliament, England,
and the constitution; because the “Jewish nation had committed a great national crime”;
and because the Jew was fundamentally “an alien and a stranger.”557 Liberals were
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unanimous in insisting that “British subjects are all, without regard to religious opinion,
entitled to the free exercise and enjoyment of all civil rights.”558 They denied a religiously
exclusive deﬁnition of political community: “What is proposed is, not that the Jews
should legislate for a Christian community, but that a legislature composed of Christians
and Jews should legislate for a community composed of Christians and Jews” (Macaulay
1889, 134–35). When in 1847 Russell requested the Commons remove the civil disabilities
imposed on Jews, he denied the legitimacy of using race or religion to allocate political
right, concluding that “there is no part of the human race, however divided from us by
feeling or by colour, which does not yet belong to the family of man, and who ought not
to be received into one universal brotherhood.”559
But the Liberal vision of progress was nonetheless inﬂected by an association of
Protestant Christianity with civilization.560 Christianity and the “glories of the country”
had never been merged by “the enforcement of opinions;. . . by the putting down of
heresies;. . . [not] even by magniﬁcent eﬀorts after extended proselytism.” Rather, British
glory and Christianity had been merged in the
“knocking oﬀ the fetters of the slave; it has been in respecting the rights of
poverty and industry; it has been in measures which, by stimulating free and
fair intercourse between diﬀerent nations, bind them together in the bonds of
peace. It has been not by exclusiveness, but by expansion; it has been. . . by
England vindicating her ancient prerogative, of teaching the nations how to
live.”561
By adopting Liberal policies of non-exclusivity, the nation had “committed ourselves to
the general laws of Providence, and Providence now rewards us with a vista of social
improvements, and unexpected blessings, which men had not dreamt of ten years ago”
(Alison 1852, i).562 Britain’s purpose was to secure Liberalism, and through it, the true
April 3rd , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.97, c.1238.
Lord Chancellor, House of Commons, Hansard, july 17th , 1851, 3rd Series, vol.118, c.862. Peel, House
of Commons, Hansard, February 11th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.96, cc.520-21; The exclusion of the Jews was
“a partial law, and I think, therefore, an infringement of Christ’s law.” Roundell Palmer, House of
Commons, Hansard, May 1st , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.98, cc.621-22, c.646; Pearson, House of Commons,
Hansard, February 11th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.96, c.461
559
Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, December 16th , 1847, 3rd Series, vol.95, cc.1248-49
560
Gladstone, House of Commons, Hansard, December 16th , 1847, 3rd Series, vol.95, c.1286; Gardner,
House of Commons, Hansard, April 3rd , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.97, c.1224; Fox, House of Commons,
Hansard, December 16th , 1847, 3rd Series, vol.95, c.1272. See also Russell’s remarks in 1837 (Niles and
Niles 1837, 394)
561
Fox, House of Commons, Hansard, December 16th , 1847, 3rd Series, vol.95, c.1272.
562
Palmerston, November 7th , 1856; October 29th , 1860. Cited in Parry (1993, 168).
558

310

spirit of Christianity: “perfect Christianity is perfect liberality.”563
Liberals opposed religious and racial distinctions because they denied the capacity
to improve, fostered antagonism and impeded amalgamation. The opposition to such
odious distinctions was embedded in the Liberal narrative of English history, in which
liberty and progress were premised upon the early eﬀacement of racial distinctions. This
narrative helped reconcile the ambivalences of 19th century British Liberalism. Liberals
were committed to non-exclusivity in religion, but their most active partisans and much
of the leadership shared a belief in a civilizing Protestantism and many continued to
believe that Catholicism was incompatible with liberty.564 And most Liberals believed in
resilient racial and national characters—considerations they believed should inform the
degree to which political rights were extended—but largely opposed an explicit reliance
upon such distinctions in policy. For much of the post-1832 period, the Liberal vision
of Britain helped reconcile these tensions by suggesting that true Christianity could only
advance under conditions of liberty of conscience, and by sublimating a growing belief in
essential racial diﬀerence into a language of progressive civilization and amalgamation.

The Changing Pale of the People
The Liberal narrative established a basis for inclusion as a full member of this community. This basis varied in its emphasis across diﬀerent categories of persons and
communities, but was largely framed in common terms derived from the Liberal understanding of national purpose.

Political Rights in Britain
The centrality of the Liberal narrative of progressive improvement is crucial to understanding key features of democratization in the UK, including its gradualism, the decline
in support for manhood suﬀrage, and its variation across the constituent countries and
the Empire. The Reform and Emancipation debates had helped to crystallize an understanding of ‘the people’ among Liberal activists. The right to be a full member of the
563
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political community, to be admitted into “the pale of the constitution,” was premised
upon a class’s moral and intellectual ﬁtness.565
But this was not a static fact: the “middle-class people” constituted by the Reform
Act had been legitimated as the product of historical progress, resulting in a moral and
intelligent class that was inappropriately excluded from the Constitution.566 But Britishled progress would ultimately result in the moral and intellectual development of the
excluded classes. When this happened, new reforms, tailored to the situation, would
be necessary. “The time was not distant,” Macaulay said in 1832, “when character and
power would be synonymous.”567
The Liberal deﬁnition of the ‘people’ excluded those who had not yet reached political maturity, by which they meant respect for property, for authority, but also for
religious liberty and the principles of liberal political economy (Parry 1993, 4).568 When
the ﬁrst Chartist petition was presented in 1839, Russell opposed the enfranchisement
of the working classes because they were allegedly radically diﬀerent from the middle
class or aristocracy. “Particularly in the manufacturing districts”, there were “very large
masses of people who have grown up in a state of society which it is lamentable, if
not appalling, to contemplate. . . [T]hey diﬀer; and because they diﬀer. . . some means are
necessary to preserve us from sudden excitement amongst them.”569
Liberals argued that “without a great improvement in the education and morals of
the people at large the advantages [of a franchise extension] never could be realized.”570
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Charles Buller “wish[ed] to ﬁt the people for the use of political power before it was
granted to them.”571 Macaulay granted that “education would remedy these things [the
poor judgment of the working class],” but asked whether Parliament should not “wait
until it has done so, before we agree to such a motion as this. . . ?”572 For Liberals,
education was a critical metric and solution to the problem of whether reform could
be carried out in safety, and the purpose of education was in considerable part the
dissemination of Liberal principles. If the franchise was extended before the progress
of Liberal opinion, the eﬀect would be to retard Liberal measures: an “unlimited extension of the franchise. . . would be an evil and an obstacle to liberal and enlightened
legislation.”573 Russell agreed, arguing that “with respect to many subjects in relation to
religious liberty, as to the Roman Catholics particularly. . . [m]y belief is, that Members
of this House are far more liberal than the community in general are disposed to be.”574
Conservatives would occasionally point out the tension between popular representation
and Liberal policies, asking whether measures such as the Poor Law “would ever pass if
the Parliament had been returned by universal suﬀrage?”575 And many Liberals worried
that the working classes did not understand the harmonious operation of liberal political
economy.576
But most believed that Liberal principles were making steady progress among the
working classes, that “the feelings of the English people had been improved of late years,
as was proved by the fact, that for the last six years the Government had been kept in
power on the ground of adhesion to the principles of liberal Government.”577 Almost all
considered the adoption of Liberalism to be inevitable: “no principle. . . could be popular
571
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without being liberal, and every liberal principle would sooner or later be popular.”578
The exclusions the Liberal narrative of progress reinforced were disclaimed as contingent and temporary: the enfranchisement of any given class could be postponed so
long as their intellectual development had not suﬃciently progressed. As the drafters
of the Chartists’ “National Petition” argued, “our slavery has been exchanged for an
apprenticeship to liberty, which has aggravated the painful feeling of our social degradation, by adding to it the sickening of still deferred hope.” Liberalism, however, provided
activists with a language that resonated with party leaders. Supporters of franchise extensions referred to Russell’s defense of the 1832 Reform Act, reminding him that he
had defended reform on the grounds of “the increasing intelligence and education of the
humbler classes,” and daring him to suggest “that in 1848 intelligence and education
have not made enormous progress?”579
The events of 1848 threatened to undermine the Radical position. Revolutions had
occurred across Europe, and the Chartists had organized a “monster meeting” on April
10th , 1848. The Duke of Wellington was given military control over London and members
of the middle and working classes were sworn in as special constables. The meeting took
place without incident, but was portrayed as a revolutionary threat, and Conservatives
believed that by associating Chartist organizing with European revolutions they could
provoke a backlash.580 But within weeks supporters of a franchise extension had claimed
the 10th of April as their own, as the day that proved “the ﬁtness of the great body of the
people to be entrusted with the franchise.”581
Liberal pretentions to statesmanship were premised on the conceit that only they
could recognize the need for reform. The combination of warning with an emphasis on
progress—the language Whigs had relied on 1831-32—was used to great eﬀect, and it
ultimately unsettled Liberal leaders and contributed to their embrace of reform. This
was most clearly the case with John Russell. In an 1837 speech Russell had claimed that
the Reform Bill had been oﬀered as an extensive measure so that “we might be assured
that we were bringing forward one which might have a prospect of being. . . ﬁnal.”582 For
578

W. Clay, House of Commons, Hansard, July 14th , 1847, 3rd Series, vol.94, c.316
Osborne, House of Commons, Hansard, July 16th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.100, c.161; W.J. Fox, House of
Commons, Hansard, June 20th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.99, cc.937-38
580
See the remarks by W.P. Wood, House of Commons, Hansard, February 28th , 1850, 3rd Series, vol.109,
cc.179-80
581
W.P. Wood, House of Commons, Hansard, February 28th , 1850, 3rd Series, vol.109, cc.179-80; Page
Wood, House of Commons, Hansard, August 8th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.100, c.1261; Hume, House of
Commons, Hansard, February 20th , 1851, 3rd Series, vol.114, c.864
582
Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, November 20th , 1837, 3rd Series, vol.39, cc.68-71. The day after
579

314

the next decade, Russell was the most prominent leader of the Liberal party to support
progressive legislation, but also the one called upon to defend the status quo (Saunders
2005, 1299).583 He disliked this responsibility, ﬁnding it “very disagreeable when these
reform motions were made by Hume & others that the debate always fell on G. Grey &
himself, no other member of the cabinet spoke, some were not even present.”584 In 1849,
a Liberal MP recalled “a declaration of the noble Lord. . . , which had the eﬀect of giving
him the soubriquet of ‘Finality John.”’ Russell interrupted to “explain. . . that the word
‘ﬁnality’ was never used by me. It was, no doubt, a very good nickname; but I never
used the word ‘ﬁnality’ at all.”585 It was not simply that Russell disliked being mocked;
rather, ‘ﬁnality’ violated his understanding of the purpose of the Liberal Party and his
pretension to progressive statesmanship.
While much of the Cabinet was opposed to further Reform, Russell argued that
it would demonstrate that “the Liberals’ deﬁnition of the ‘people’ was expanding with
economic development” (Parry 1993, 175). His disclaiming of ﬁnality further encouraged
Liberals.586 And from 1850 onward Russell and the Liberal leadership were more often
willing to support reform than not. As Russell remarked in 1852, the government could
have opposed reform but this would have placed them “on the side of resistance [against]
progress,” which was “a false position for the Whig party” (cited in Saunders 2005,
1300–01).
Russell suggested a modest reform to the Cabinet in 1849 and again in 1850. He
pledged to reform in 1851 and introduced a measure in 1852, shortly before the ministry
was forced to resign. In 1852, he explained his belief that a new reform was necessary
as resulting from a development that had had a “great inﬂuence on my mind.” It was
the ground upon which he had based “the original proposition for reform in 1832—it is
the ground of the growing intelligence and education of the people.”587 He introduced
another in 1854, withdrawn as Britain declared war on Russia. Responding to taunts that
the measure had been a sham, Russell defended his identity as a reformer and, holding
back tears, asked whether the “hon. Gentleman the Member for Westminster think that
his so-called ‘ﬁnality’ statement, Russell sought to clarify his remarks, and insisted he had not ruled out
further reforms. Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, November 21st , 1837, 3rd Series, vol.39, c.108.
See also the Letter to the electors of Stroud (1839, 4). For an excellent overview of Russell’s involvement
in reform see Saunders (2005).
583
Henry Berkeley, House of Commons, Hansard, August 8th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.100, c.1240.
584
Broughton Diary, January 28th , 1851. Cited in Saunders (2005, 1300)
585
Muntz and Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, July 3rd , 1849, 3rd Series, vol.106, c.1302.
586
D. Stuart, House of Commons, Hansard, July 6th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.100, c.217
587
Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, February 9th , 1852, 3rd Series, vol.119, c.261

315

he has a right to treat me—. . . .” There were cheers as he trailed oﬀ.588 When Disraeli
introduced a Conservative reform bill in 1859, Russell mocked him for “arriv[ing] only
so far as I arrived in the year 1837, namely, that persons who had money in savings’
banks should be allowed a franchise.”589 He would introduce measures again in 1860
and in 1866, and on each occasion would defend the extension of the franchise using the
same language of an intelligent class excluded from the Constitution that he had used
in 1831-32.
The belief in the working classes’ “gigantic strides in moral, material, and educational progress” would unite almost all Liberals during the 1850s and 1860s.590 And the
language of progress provided reformers with a powerful rhetorical argument against the
Liberal leadership—powerful because it was framed in the terms that justiﬁed Liberal
governments. But it also limited the scope of reforming projects in important ways. As
the progress of the working classes was ongoing, it justiﬁed gradualism; it also encouraged Radicals to adopt more explicitly exclusionary deﬁnitions of the ‘people.’
The gradualism of democratization in the United Kingdom, what Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens refer to as the “classic (but not typical)” historical sequence (1992,
62), is perhaps its most well-known feature. Liberals were ideologically committed to the
principle of expedient accommodation to progress, and rejection of this principle would
have cost them the support of their most ardent activists. And so gradualism appealed to
the leadership, with Lord Palmerston confessing to being a “bit-by-bit reformer.”591 And
many Liberals were led to expect that by rallying around progressive Liberal leadership,
the time would soon come “when it would be in the power of the Minister to propose
to Parliament the adoption of a much larger measure of reform, suited. . . to the progress
of national education.”592 Gradualism resonated because of the narrative of national
purpose that the Liberals had articulated, and the leadership adhered to it, rhetorically,
lest they risk their standing among Liberals in the Commons and constituencies for
violating its strictures.593
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The commitment to progressive improvement, however, also encouraged the Radicals and working class activists to embrace the exclusions outlined by the Liberal vision
of Britain. An often overlooked feature of democratization in the United Kingdom is
the decline in support for manhood and even universal suﬀrage over the course of the
Victorian period (Cowling 1967, 2). This was not just among the broader public, but
among working class activists as well. As noted by Keith McClelland, by the 1860s
working class radicals had adopted “a narrower political deﬁnition of the putative citizen than any dominant strand of radicalism had been prepared to draw between 1790
and 1848” (2000, 101). The change in radicals’ behavior and rhetoric was a strategic
accommodation to the narrative of progressive Liberalism. Reforming activists began
to gain traction in Parliament only when they embraced the Liberal vision’s bases for
exclusion—pointing out the extent to which the excluded classes had progressed in civilization, while framing their proposals with an explicit bar to those who had not. Radicals such as O’Connell, Hunt, Fergus O’Connor, and William Cobbett had demanded
universal suﬀrage—by which they meant manhood suﬀrage—in 1832; the United Irishmen had called for this in the 1790s; and in 1780 the Duke of Richmond had introduced
a bill to this eﬀect, of which copies were being published and disseminated well into the
19th century.594 Joseph Hume championed “universal suﬀrage and the vote by ballot” in
the post-Reform Act period.595
Hume was the preeminent supporter of franchise reform in the 1840s and early
1850s, and his rhetoric would increasingly move toward that of the Liberal leadership.
He stressed that his increasingly modest proposals would not signiﬁcantly expand the
electorate and would not “disturb the feelings of any man by wishing improper persons
to obtain the franchise.”596 This tacking toward the center would be seen in the rhetoric
and proposals of other radicals as well. John Bright, for instance, described a class for
“which it would be much better for themselves if they were not enfranchised. . . . I call
this class the residuum.”597 In 1842, Radical John Arthur Roebuck had supported the
Chartists. By 1867 he opposed too great an extension: “I think the people of this country,
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people of property, wealth, and virtue, will feel that they have security [in a taxpaying
qualiﬁcation], without which you would let in that beautiful residuum. . . . I do not want
the rabble to vote.”598
The most radical Liberals of the period were using language nearly identical to
that of the most conservative Liberals.599 Radicals calculated the Liberal party would
advance the cause of reform; moderate and conservative Liberals believed they needed
Radical support to sustain a majority against Conservative rule. The Liberal vision of
progressive improvement provided a means to reconcile these factions. But while this
political dynamic was crucial, it did not occur in a social vacuum. It was aided by
the relative prosperity of the 1850s. But it also reﬂected the changed composition of the
English and British working classes: emigration was making the working class in England
more Irish, in composition and, it was feared, in character. While debates over franchise
reform in England rarely characterized the working class in racial or religious terms, this
was an important subtext to concerns with their moral and intellectual character.
Many Liberals were anxious about their party’s willingness to redeﬁne the people,
and how the new people would redeﬁne Liberalism (Arnold 1869, 36–37).600 Russell’s
1866 reform bill failed under the combined opposition of Conservatives and a faction of
Liberals, given the name Adullamites, who opposed the proposed scale of working class
enfranchisement.601 For Robert Lowe, it was the illiberalism of the working class that
most upset him: the working class’s “political economy is not that of Adam Smith.” He
viewed the question as one “between progress and retrogression” from Liberal princi598
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ples.602 Lowe and the Adullamites believed the incorporation of the working class would
radically change politics: “You now argue the question of denominational education,
and the opening of University privileges to Dissenters; but by the course you have taken
you will bring agencies into force which will make all these questions disappear like dust
before the wind.”603
But the implication was that the various policies that had divided Liberals now had
to be resolved. Lowe had believed that the British education systems were “as eﬃcient
as they could well be,” and had been an advocate of the voluntary system “shrink[ing]
from the notion of forcing education on people.” The question of education, however,
was “completely changed”:
“I was opposed to centralization, I am ready to accept centralization; I was
opposed to an education rate, I am ready now to accept it; I objected to
inspection, I am now willing to create crowds of inspectors. This question
is no longer a religious question, it has become a political one. . . . You have
placed the government in the hands of the masses, and you must therefore
give them education.”604
He agreed with Liberal premises: “I have full conﬁdence in the progress of society to a
degree incalculable to us.” But it was for “the very reason that I look forward to and
hope for this amelioration—because I am a Liberal” that he opposed the “transfer power
from the hands of property and intelligence” to the working classes.605 Progress had not
yet been suﬃcient, and “before we had intrusted the masses. . . with the whole power of
this country we should have taught them a little more how to use it.”606
But the Adullamites were the exception. Most Liberals had already integrated the
educated working classes into their understanding of the people. The Reform Act of 1867
was, for them, not a displacement of the middle class people established in 1832; rather,
it was the fulﬁllment of the progressive promise of Liberal statesmanship, and the bases
upon which the middle class people had been legitimated now justiﬁed the inclusion
of the working classes. The party remained intact, won a landslide victory in 1868,
and re-absorbed most of the Adullamites. The party had seemingly consolidated the
support of the working classes, and the next twenty years would be the apex of Liberal
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Britain. The narrative of a progressive constitution helped to hold the Liberal Party
together, giving assurances to Radical and working class activists while not alienating its
moderate middle-class constituencies.
Progress also seemed like it might be able to assist the cause of women’s suﬀrage.
John Stuart Mill, elected to Parliament in 1865, argued that “The notion of a hard and
fast line of separation between women’s occupations and men’s. . . belongs to a goneby state of society which is receding further and further into the past.” The progress,
however, was less of women as a class—although some supporters emphasized this as
well—so much as progress of British society: “We live in a world of novelties; the despotism of custom is on the wane.”607 As with the broader Liberal narrative of progress,
the cause of women’s suﬀrage was framed in terms of ‘teaching the nations how to
live.’ Bright had a “strong desire that when our children come to read the story of their
country’s fame, it may be written there that the British Parliament was the ﬁrst great
Legislative Assembly in the world which, in conferring its franchises, knew nothing of
the distinctions of strong and weak, of male and female, of rich and poor.”608
His desire was not to be realized, although for a time it seemed otherwise. Mill
proposed a limited women’s suﬀrage amendment in 1867, which was defeated. A few
years later the Liberal parliament extended the right to vote in English municipalities,
without any notable opposition in the Commons or Lords.609 And on May 4th , 1870,
the Commons approved a women’s suﬀrage bill for parliamentary elections by a vote
of 124-91. But on May 12th , Gladstone announced that while the government remained
neutral on the question, he would vote against it. It was quickly defeated 94-220.
While supporters relied on the argument of a progressive constitution, they also
stressed what had become an especially important argument in the ﬁght for working class
suﬀrage as well. Liberalism’s self-conceit as the opponent of “all injurious monopolies”
was invoked in support of working class votes, women’s votes, and as we shall see, nondiscriminatory franchises in the Empire.610 Monopolies were forms of class legislation,
which could only be sustained in a Parliament that did not represent the people.611
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Women’s right to vote was framed by Liberals in similar terms as an exclusive distinction that supported class legislation. Mill asked sarcastically whether all employers and
all husbands were good and benevolent: “[W]orkmen need other protection than that of
their employers, and women other protection than that of their men.”612 He condemned
as the product of class legislation the degree to which women were left uneducated. He
went further: “I should like to have a Return laid before this House of the number of
women who are annually beaten to death, kicked to death, or trampled to death by their
male protectors; and, in an opposite column, the amount of the sentences passed in
those cases in which the dastardly criminals did not get oﬀ altogether.”613 Women could
claim that “men monopolized all the legislation; that they made the laws for women, to
which women were subjected, without having any voice directly or indirectly in making
them.”614
The exclusion of the woman was defended because she would “los[e] those admirable
attributes of her sex-namely, her gentleness, her aﬀection, and her domesticity.”615 Conservative MP Herbert Croft agreed with the Punch cartoon that “those who want woman’s
rights also want woman’s charms. His own constituents were fair, graceful, and feminine;
therefore they did not want a vote.”616 A Liberal MP admitted that he could not provide
a logical defense of women’s exclusion, but that although MPs “might not be able to give
a single argument for their opinion he would back their instinct against the logic of the
hon. Member [Mill].”617 “Nature had drawn clear lines of distinction,” was his baseline,
a claim repeated by many opponents.618
But there was also strong opposition to what were claimed to be artiﬁcial distinctions.
Liberal MP Lyon Playfair argued that “the application of the principle [of ratepayer
suﬀrage] must be as much to the female as to the male citizen.”619 A Conservative MP
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argued that “the diﬀerence of the sexes was not. . . an essential diﬀerence of mind. It was
a mere accident of the body and of training.”620 Others compared gender distinctions to
those between races, arguing that the exclusion of women was equivalent to “the position
of the negro in the Southern States of America before the American Revolution.”621 In
the United States, and “in this country to a great extent also,” the people had been told
that “the negro was not ﬁt for freedom.”
“People never are ﬁt for freedom or for constitutional rights until they obtain them;. . . there is not a man in America who would like to go back to the
terrible state of things which existed before the Civil War. . . . a negro population of 4,000,000 has now become enfranchised, and no one will deny
that the peace and prosperity of these Southern States have been secured by
that great legislative change.”622
Fitness was important, but it was a product of one’s legal status rather than race or
gender. While it was more common during this period for Liberals to support women’s
suﬀrage, its supporters were drawn from both parties. While Liberals tended to support
it on the same grounds as they supported working class suﬀrage—progress and antiexclusivity—Conservatives relied on the language of anti-monopoly as well as suggesting
that the extension of the vote to women would make manhood suﬀrage impossible: “it
would imply womanhood suﬀrage, and as women exceeded men in numbers universal
suﬀrage would give them the controlling power in political aﬀairs, an absurdity which
no one contemplated.”623
Women would be denied the franchise for almost 50 years after passing second
reading in 1870. The municipal franchise was extended to women in Scotland in 1882
and to Belfast—but not the rest of Ireland—in 1887.624 Irish women outside of Belfast
620
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would only get the vote for municipalities in 1898. And for most of the post-1886 period
the burgeoning women’s suﬀrage movement would advance arguments that drew on the
themes of progressive Liberalism which resonated within the Liberal political culture of
the late Victorian era. But the rhetoric and strategic behavior would reﬂect the changing
context of the post-Liberal fragmented party space, as they sought to make allies with
the labor movement, with the more successful suﬀrage movements in the empire, and
to identify means by which pressure could be applied against a state that seemed to be
steadfast in its exclusion (Fletcher, Mayhall, and Levine 2000; Mayhall 2003, 22–24).

Disfranchisement and Representation in the Empire
Liberalism justiﬁed an exclusion of the British working classes contingent on their moral
and intellectual development. The justiﬁcation for exclusion from political rights in the
Empire—from the franchise and from powers of local self-government—was framed in
similar terms. Imperial expansion necessitated one of two courses: either the conquered
people is “suﬃciently advanced in civilisation to be ﬁt for the same kind of government
for which we were ﬁt. . . ; or she was in that stage of advancement at which absolute
subjection to a more civilized and a more energetic people, is a state more favourable
to improvement than any government which can be framed out of domestic materials”
(Mill 1977 [1834], 6:216).
In the ﬁrst situation, the oﬃcial statement of Liberal policy was perhaps best articulated by the Durham Report recommending representative government in Canada. The
Report became the “textbook of every advocate of colonial freedom, of every one who
does not deny that our countrymen in the colonies should have that voice in their own
government which Englishmen are used to regard as the birthright of their race” (Buller
1912 [1840], 375). While the Liberal leadership did not entirely agree with the report,
they believed it could not be ignored and shared many of its commitments (Morrell
1966, 20).625 A good statement of Liberal policy in the second situation was provided
by Macaulay, who argued that while “in Europe. . . people are every where perfectly competent to hold some share,—not in every country an equal share—but some share of
political power,” the same was not true everywhere: “in India, you cannot have representative institutions.” The problem empire posed for Liberals was that “we have to frame
a good government for a country into which. . . we cannot introduce those institutions
625

They were careful, however, to ensure that a recommendation of ‘responsible government’ did not imply
an absence of imperial supervision or control of key issues.

323

which all our habits. . . which all the history of our own part of the world would lead
us to consider as the one great security for good government. We have to engraft on
despotism those blessings which are the natural fruits of liberty.”626
Liberals were committed to the principle of self-government for those populations
who achieved a reasonably high level of civilization. But for those “backward states of
society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage” representative government would be ill-advised. “Despotism,” wrote John Stuart Mill, “is a legitimate mode
of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and
the means justiﬁed by actually eﬀecting that end” (Mill 1989, 13–4). And Liberals believed the colonial subjects could be made ﬁt for representative government.627 “Radical
improvement” would be slow, requiring “a generation or two”; but there was no doubt
that through education, the races under English dominion would be improved.628 It was
England’s capacity to advance progress that “could alone justify the despotic, though
paternal, rule of a superior race.”629
The level of civilization was not the only impediment to representative institutions.
Liberals believed racial and national heterogeneity made representative institutions dangerous, because they raised the possibility of “several national parties” being arrayed
against each other.630 Liberals projected their narrative of English national development onto the Empire to argue that racial and national amalgamation was necessary.631
The problem of heterogeneity was complicated when there was variation in the diﬀerent
groups’ progress in civilization.632 Where racial heterogeneity involved similarly civilized
groups it was less of a problem, provided it was not rigidiﬁed by legal distinctions into
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exclusive privileges. If the diﬀerent groups in question were each ﬁt for self-government,
the responsibility was to encourage amalgamation.633
But situations where a highly civilized population was mixed with an “inferior” posed
a dilemma. The civilized population had a strong claim to representative government,
but most of the natives would be unﬁt for inclusion. Reconciling these requirements
could be accomplished through a grant of self-government limited by racially exclusive
franchises. But aﬃrming such distinctions in law violated key strictures of British Liberalism against ‘class legislation.’ Much of the Liberal experience with colonialism was a
response to this dilemma: it would be illiberal to deny civilized populations the right of
self-government, but it would be equally illiberal to include races not yet ﬁt for political
rights or to establish exclusive institutions through racial distinctions.
The tensions between these commitments came to the fore in the ﬁght over slavery.
As abolition drew near, the political rights of freed persons became more controversial. Reformers rejected the argument of immutable racial inequality, but many did not
believe the enslaved population was suﬃciently progressed to merit immediate enfranchisement.634 The solution was improvement and amalgamation. Peel warned the “distinction of colour” posed a “moral and physical” diﬃculty to realizing “the amalgamation
between the slave and the free population, which all must admit to be desirable.”635 But
the most vocal Liberals denied the implication that racial distinctions “could not be
overcome by any legislation.” Legal distinctions and exclusive privileges had prevented
“the due amalgamation of the European and African races.”636 Once these were gone,
amalgamation would proceed.
Emancipation was followed by a period of ‘apprenticeship’ to liberty, during which
time parliament allowed the colonies to disfranchise the ‘apprentice.’ By the late 1830s,
however, ‘apprenticeship’ was over and the right to vote was extended without a racial
qualiﬁcation. And the Liberal government and MPs closely monitored colonial legislation to ensure adherence to non-exclusivity.637 The Governor of Barbados, responding
633
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to an inquiry from the Secretary of the Colonies, strongly criticized the legislative assembly’s insistence “on preserving these distinctions, which must tend to keep the other
classes down. . . any distinction, no matter how founded, is galling and insulting.” All he
“had ever sought for these classes” had been what they were demanding themselves: “if
we are free British Subjects, give us equal Rights; don’t restrict us if we have Qualiﬁcations of property, character and Education, by laws against complexion.”638
The House of Assembly of Barbados denied that their laws perpetuated “one of those
invidious distinctions referable to European and African origin.”639 In reality, the Barbados legislature had established a nominally equal franchise, conforming to pressure
from the Colonial Oﬃce. But they increased the property qualiﬁcation in order to exclude the free black population, while including a clause that maintained current voters’
franchise so long as they owned the property in which it was vested. It was this distinction that generated complaints, and that the Governor and Colonial Oﬃce opposed
as “a grievance of Castes.”640 The Governor suggested keeping the higher qualiﬁcation,
and abolishing the exemption.
The diﬃculty would be replicated in the settler colonies of New Zealand, Australia,
and the Cape of Good Hope. The settler colonies were central to the project of expanding Liberalism, and the settlers were portrayed in terms that emphasized their character
as progressive, civilized, Liberal, and English: “New realms have been brought under
British rule, our sons have found new paths for industrial enterprise, are extending
our language and our laws, are founding institutions still more liberal than our own,
and are enforcing the recognition of those institutions from the Imperial Legislature.”641
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Their rhetoric committed them to self-government and extensive franchises in the settler
colonies, but there was wide agreement that the indigenous populations were not yet
suﬃciently advanced in the progress toward civilization to merit inclusion.
The Conservative Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in 1842,
articulated the diﬃculty in a dispatch explaining why the Cape Colony should be denied representative government. A “moral diﬃculty” presented itself in the “formidable
distinction. . . which results from diversity of race and origin.” Stanley acknowledged the
constraints imposed by commitments to non-exclusivity, acknowledging that “the law,
no doubt, especially since the abolition of slavery, places all the Queen’s subjects, in all
the possessions of the Crown, on a footing of perfect civil equality.” But Stanley argued
that racial distinctions were “almost indelible,” and that in many of the colonies “it has
been found to be a task of almost insuperable diﬃculty, to reconcile the principles of
free institutions with this legal equality between diﬀerent races.”642
When Liberals returned to oﬃce in 1846, Cape Colonists worked to refute Stanley’s
points. John Montagu, the Government Secretary acknowledged that while “this distinction [“of colour”] has ceased to be the badge of civil disabilities and moral wrongs,
yet. . . it still forms a bar to social intercourse and intimate relations.” But in political
matters, he and others emphasized the degree to which Africans were already included,
argued that they would be included even further, and that their inclusion was accepted
without incident among the colonists. “The prejudices, feelings, and habits thought to
result from diversity of race and origin, are daily passing away,” wrote the TreasurerGeneral, “and the civil equality upon which the law has now placed all Her Majesty’s
subjects has been freely conceded to those of colour, and is acknowledged in all transactions with them.”643
ism’s conﬁdence in enlightened progress and rejection of racial distinctions helped legitimize a growing
settler colonial movement. Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British settlements). Parliamentary Papers (1837, 76). See also Copy of a Letter from J. Somes, Esq., to Lord Stanley, January
25th , 1843, no.7 in Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand. Parliamentary Papers (1844, 34).
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The colonists’ claim to racial liberalism cannot be taken at face value, but the arguments they advanced are indicative of what they believed the Liberal government wanted
to hear. “There is,” wrote the colony’s Governor, “a current, conducting to liberal measures, which is progressing quietly, but irresistibly, and can neither be stemmed, nor
ultimately averted.”644 In 1848 the Liberal Cabinet recommended the extension of representative institutions to the Cape Colony. They suggested the diﬃculties highlighted
by Stanley would be less serious than expected. After all, “the coloured inhabitants
have taken part, without objection, in the municipal government of Cape Town.”645 The
animating purpose of Liberal colonialism, claimed Earl Grey, was “the civilisation of the
black, and the ultimate amalgamation of the two races”; this could only be achieved by
ensuring the government “enforce[d] on both sides a respect for each other’s rights, and
to foster all those germs of improvement which are already showing themselves among
the aboriginal population” (1853, 253).
The settlers had other things in mind. As soon as they had secured representative
institutions, the Cape colonists increase the franchise’s property qualiﬁcation to exclude
colored and blacks. John Montagu now warned that it would include “a body of ignorant
coloured persons whose numbers would swamp the wealthy and educated portions of the
community” (Evans et al. 2003, 93). Committed Liberal and Attorney-General William
Porter, who had prepared the initial constitution with a low franchise, considered this an
attack on “the heart of the whole Constitution”: “I think the sentiment is in the American
declaration of independence, but it is not the worse for that,—that God has endowed
all men with the desire of happiness, and the right to enjoy as much of it as harms
no one else.” He rejected council members’ “allegation of [“the Hottentot’s”] unﬁtness
in an intellectual point of view.”646 The Liberal Secretary agreed and reinstated the
No. 1. Correspondence relative to the establishment of a representative assembly at the Cape of Good
Hope. Parliamentary Papers (1850, 13, 16, 26).
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original franchise: “It is the earnest desire of Her Majesty’s Government, that all her
subjects. . . without distinction of class or colour should be united by one bond of loyalty
and a common interest and we believe that the exercise of political rights enjoyed by all
alike will prove one of the best methods of attaining this object” (Evans et al. 2003, 93).
The Colonial Oﬃce insisted on including the indigenous peoples and emancipated
slaves, without legal distinction between them and the white population. But they were
attentive to, and shared, the concerns of settlers and whites that the black, colored,
Indian, and native populations not acquire predominance in the representative assembly.
“I am for increasing the power the people of the colonies have over their own aﬀairs and
government,” claimed Russell, but “not at once for granting them an assembly chosen
from the blacks for the government of these colonies.”647
As a result of these commitments, exclusion from the franchise in the British settler
colonies was diﬀerent than the United States or the other settler colonies in Africa.648
Julie Evans and collaborators have characterized mid-19th century British indigenous
policy as “equal subjects, unequal rights,” in which natives were granted a nominal
equality that was in practice stripped of any meaning (Evans et al. 2003). Settlers
were persistently seeking ways to exclude the indigenous or former slave populations
from political rights, searching for franchise qualiﬁcations, that while “carefully worded
to counter Colonial Oﬃce concerns about discriminating on the basis of race. . . simply
coded race in other ways” (2003, 6). British and Liberal governments acquiesced in
many of the settlers’ disfranchising measures, but not those that had explicit racial
qualiﬁcations for the franchise. It was a recurring process of settler restrictions, Colonial
Oﬃce objections, and a nominally equal compromise that had the eﬀect of excluding all
but a handful of the non-settler population.
Liberal governments were explicit that they would insist upon the principle of racial
equality in law, while equally assuring critics that this did not imply equal treatment
in practice.649 In 1861, the Liberal government introduced the Indian Councils Act,
(1852-53, 219-20). Evans et al. argue that Porter’s view on the matter were strongly inﬂuenced by his
understanding of Catholic emancipation as a ‘safety valve’ (Evans et al. 2003, 98).
647
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allowing natives to be employed in the legislative councils and various judicial and
executive oﬃces, which they defended on the basis of non-exclusivity and progress.650
But the minister noted that “he had not thought it at all desirable to name the Natives
expressly in the measure.” The ideal legislation should be color-blind, as the “great
object” of Liberal government in India “ought to be to obliterate the distinctions between
the conquerors and the conquered.” The government must uphold “the perfect equality
before the law of all Her Majesty’s subjects, without distinction of race, birth, or religion,
and he would not do anything which could lead to the supposition that he doubted for
a moment the existence of that principle.”651 But color-blind policy did not mean equal
treatment, and on another issue, the Liberal minister defended a non-discriminatory
standard but insisted that in “exercising the powers of the law. . . a great distinction must
practically be made between Natives and Europeans, but it would be a very diﬀerent
thing and most mischievous, to establish such a distinction by law.”652
Liberals’ conception of the appropriate extent of colonial political rights varied according to race: “no question would arise if the House were dealing only with Whites;
but the mixed Colonial population constituted the diﬃculty.”653 Liberal aversion to explicit racial distinctions would change in subtle ways over the course of the 19th century,
reﬂecting scientiﬁc development and especially the permeation of the theory of natural
selection into politics. In 1850, anatomist and grave-robber Robert Knox shocked the
Victorian and Liberal public with his The Races of Men, a Fragment. “Race is everything”
he declared (Knox 1850, 7). What most shocked contemporaries was his attack on rejection of the Liberal narrative of English racial amalgamation, denying its very possibility:
the “whole of this theory,” that the amalgamation of races “was not only possible, but
that it was the best mode of improving the breed. . . has turned out to be false” (Knox
1850, 52).654 Knox was by no means the most inﬂuential race theorist of the 1850s or
650
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after.655 But he and others were part of a trans-Atlantic discourse that, while disagreeing
on many speciﬁcs, sought to give priority of place to the role of race in political development. Their arguments were increasingly adopted by political operatives and colonial
oﬃcials. “Since the struggle for life and survival of the ﬁttest theory came to be applied
to politics,” one remarked, “the part which race-distinction plays in the world is better
appreciated scientiﬁcally.”656
Theories of racial essentialism gained traction and became integrated into political discourse around certain focusing moments: controversies over labor shortages in
the West Indies; the Irish Famine of 1845-52; colonial rebellions, especially in India
(1857-58) and Jamaica (1865); the Fenian violence of the 1860s; the U.S. Civil War and
Reconstruction; the Indian Famine of 1877; and renewed Irish political activism of the
1870s and 1880s. When Thomas Carlyle responded to labor shortages by calling for the
re-enslavement of blacks in the West Indies, John Stuart Mill attacked the claim of inherent racial hierarchies: no “doctrine more damnable” had even been “propounded by a
professed moral reformer. . . that one kind of human beings are born servants to another
kind” (1977 [1950], 92). Half of all “all thinking persons, who have attended to the subject,
either doubt or positively deny” the “vulgar error of imputing every diﬀerence. . . among
human beings to an original diﬀerence of nature” (1977 [1850], 93).657
More Liberals would have agreed with Mill in the 1850s than in the 1880s; fewer still
in the early 20th century. This ideological shift was reﬂected in parliamentary discourse,
where it became tied to Disraeli’s Conservative project of displacing Liberals’ ascendancy
655
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(Eldridge 1996, 70, 72). Disraeli mocked Liberals’ core beliefs, writing that “progress and
reaction are but words to mystify the millions. They mean nothing, they are nothing,
they are phrases and not facts. . . . All is race.” (Disraeli 1872, 239).658 The English
character was not the product of racial amalgamation with the Normans, he argued, but
essential to the Saxon; it could be suppressed but never eliminated and eventually would
be determinative of national destiny.
When Disraeli emphasized the importance of race in his parliamentary speeches,
he was criticized by Liberals. His defense of Jewish emancipation was premised on
the grounds that they were “an ancient and superior race” (Chung 2004, 274).659 The
Jewish Chronicle rejected this: “Jews asked for justice not as a peculiar race, or [on]
account of a peculiar religion, but as citizen of the same state” (cited in Chung 2004,
274). In discussing the American Civil War, he warned that the United States would be
irreparably damaged:
“There will be several millions of another race emancipated; legally in the
full enjoyment of the rights of freemen. . . placed upon an equality with the
Saxon race.. . . [W]e know from experience that in practice there will be a
diﬀerence—a marked diﬀerence—between these recently emancipated and,
I will not call it the superior race, because I may oﬀend some Gentlemen opposite,
but a race which is certainly not identical.”660
And while Liberals insisted that racial amalgamation was the proper end of colonial
government, Disraeli warned that it had the eﬀect of undermining imperial authority,
that amalgamation threatened the policy of divide and rule.661
Other Conservatives picked up on the theme of racial essentialism. The Earl of
Lytton argued that “unwelcome as the fact may be to certain theorists, it is a fact
which asserts itself at every turn” that Europeans “are not the equals, but, the superiors,
of the races beneﬁted by their capital, and governed by their countrymen.”662 Future
Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, agreed. “‘You must get rid of these race
distinctions,”’ he mocked a Liberal Lord. “That is a very ﬁne popular phrase. It may be
very ﬁtting for popular use. . . . I do not see what is the use of all this political hypocrisy.
658
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It does not deceive the Natives of India. They know perfectly well that they are governed
by a superior race.”663
By the 1870s, many Liberals were reconsidering the party’s opposition to explicit
racial exclusions in the franchise. During debates over the annexation of the Transvaal,
a Liberal MP argued that no federation should occur until there was a settlement of the
relations between the white and black races. “The right principle,” he argued “was that
the Colonists of White race should govern themselves.” But it did not necessarily follow
that they should govern the Black race among whom they were settled.664 There “were
principles which England could not give up. . . . [H]e was sure they would all admit that
there ought to be social equality independently of race and colour.” But “the franchise,
it was, no doubt, a matter of great diﬃculty.”
“The ﬁrst idea that occurred to his mind. . . was that the franchise ought to
be given indiscriminately. A colour franchise was to him a most repulsive
thing. On the other hand, a large proportion of the coloured men were
undoubtedly savages, and it was clear we could not give them all votes.”
While Liberals were beginning to consider the possibility of franchises that were explicitly exclusive on racial grounds, they strongly denied the suggestion “that it was
impossible for the Natives to take part in a representative system of Government.” They
did not abandon their commitment to non-exclusivity in the franchise, but they placed
it in the future, looking forward “to the time when the qualiﬁcation for the franchise
should be independent of race or colour.” If it were meant that the Natives “ought not to
have votes immediately, he was right; but if [it were] meant that they were not ultimately
to have equal rights with the Whites, [that] went too far.”665
By 1892, the Cape legislative council insisted that the property franchise be tightened,
as too many black voters had been included. Lord Ripon, the Liberal Secretary of State
for the Colonies expressed misgivings but agreed not to suggest its disallowance (Evans
et al. 2003, 163). By mid-1909, after much disclaiming to the contrary, a Liberal
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government allowed a Union of South Africa to proceed which eﬀectively sanctioned a
“colour bar” in the franchise for all provinces but the Cape Province.
The rising generation of Liberal politicians and intellectuals were much more comfortable with race as a determinative and essential factor in politics.666 As one MP noted
while debating constitutional reform in Jamaica, “it was somewhat strange to hear from
the Liberal Benches that we were to be guided in this manner by considerations of race
and of creed. That might be one of the doctrines of esoteric Radicalism; but he ventured to think it was not to be found amongst the generally accepted principles of the
Liberal Party.”667 For the earlier generation of Liberals, distinctive racial and national
characters were the product of historical circumstances and governing institutions. The
growing belief that only some races were ﬁt for representative institutions helped delegitimize the idea of the progressive, amalgamating state that mid-19th century Liberalism
had suggested.

Equality and Fitness in Ireland
The position of Ireland in the United Kingdom was always ambiguous. It was claimed to
be an integral part of the Union and yet it was under a diﬀerent administrative system,
governed from Dublin Castle as it had been before the Act of Union. And to maintain
order and against political agitation, revolutionary threats, and local conﬂicts, successive
governments suspended habeas corpus, restricted the importation and sale of arms, and
passed numerous coercion acts. And all agreed that the Irish maintained a distinct
nationality: “They sprang from diﬀerent stocks. They spoke diﬀerent languages. They
had diﬀerent national characters, as strongly opposed as any two national characters
in Europe” (Macaulay 1856b, 38). For many Liberals, this diﬀerence of character was
mapped on to “widely diﬀerent stages of civilisation” (Macaulay 1856b, 38).
For much of the pre-1886 period, the Liberal narrative of British purpose provided a
framework in which Ireland’s position and Irish character could be understood in ways
that ostensibly legitimated Liberal governments and policy. Irish “national resentment”
was the product of misrule and exclusive institutions, and it would be improved by
666
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Liberal reforms and good government.668 The Union was not complete, but still had to
be realized. And union had to be comprehensive, resting on the amalgamation of the
nations.
The rhetorical insistence upon equality with Ireland was confronted by appeals to
highly resonant anti-Irish antipathies, which threatened to turn public opinion against
the party for its occasional periods of coordinating with Irish nationalists. And as the
antipathies were shared by many Liberals, the stability of the Liberal coalition was always
more uncertain with regard to Ireland than any other issue. During the Famine, it was
the Liberal party that was most aggressive in its anti-Irish rhetoric, but the ostensible
faults in Irish character were now cast in a Liberal mould: policy was only encouraging
Irish dependency, treated more as an attribute of moral character than the political and
economic situation it had been heretofore considered, and so the retrenchment of relief
was not only appropriate but highly desirable.
A longstanding theme in English discourse marked the Irish as not only distinct in
their national character, but unﬁt for self-government.669 L.P. Curtis has shown (1968,
1997) that an image of the Irish as monstrous and simian was formulated during the
mid-19th century, one that drew on older narratives of Irish degeneracy and contemporary discoveries in zoology. Most subsequent analyses of British portrayals of the Irish
in the 19th century conﬁrm this ﬁnding, while disagreeing on its political importance
or uniformity (de Nie 2004, 4–5; Peatling 2005b, 2005a; Belchem 2005; Curtis 2005;
Lengel 2002).670 Rather than a persistent and uniformly held stereotype, there were
important diﬀerences across parties and between oﬃcial, public, and private discourse
(Lengel 2002, 4). The Protestant Constitution, the Liberal progressivism, and ‘scientiﬁc’
racism each had their distinctive explanations for the assumed degeneracy of Irish character; but each shared a belief in its degeneracy. A ‘Tory of the Old School’ would blame
Catholicism, and insist that the property settlement and the Church of Ireland were the
only means of securing England from Popery. A Liberal would blame centuries of Tory
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rule, the ‘demagogues’ who agitated the “ignorant and inﬂammatory population,” and
landlords who wanted to maintain a system of exclusivity.671 And they would suggest the
assimilation of Irish institutions, the education of the Irish people, and amalgamation—
by which they meant the Irish should become more like the English—as the only means
of securing progress. And the ‘scientiﬁc’ racist of the late 19th century would compare
the progressive and industrializing North to the poor and agitated South, and suggest
not only that the cause lay in something deeper than either religion or oppression, but
that these too were a function of their racial character: “without what they call English
misrule, [the Irish] would be ... the willing slaves of some hereditary despot, the representative of their old coshering chiefs, with a priesthood as absolute and obscurantist as
the Druids” (Smith 1882, 5-6).
Liberal political operatives certainly shared many of the beliefs about Irish character,
as demonstrated in their emphasis on Irish degeneracy during the Famine; but they were
constrained in their ability to participate in an overtly anti-Irish discourse. They were
often reliant on Irish Liberals or Repealers for support in Parliament, and there was a
clear coalitional exigency to not only disavow rhetoric of racial unﬁtness but to draw
attention to this rhetoric when it was deployed by Conservatives. This tension led to a
greater divergence on the question of Irish government between private correspondence
and public rhetoric than on any other issue considered in this project. Lord Althorp
wrote in 1832 that “if I had my own way I would establish a Dictatorship in Ireland
until by the increased wealth and intelligence of the People, they were become ﬁt for a
free Government.”672 It was not just that the previous six centuries of English coercion
had not been long enough; it was that they had not been Liberal enough. Althorp had
earlier expressed the opinion that “the population of Ireland is not suﬃciently advanced
in civilization to make it desirable that they should have any very great preponderance
in the Legislative Assembly of a highly civilized State.”673 In 1848, Russell remarked to
the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland that “Ireland was better suited to czarism than English
liberty” (Saunders 2005, 1304). Macaulay was reported as writing in the 1830s that “if
he had had to legislate on Ireland, he would have suspended the laws there for ﬁve
years, given the Lord Lieutenant’s proclamation the force of law, and put the Duke of
Wellington in charge” (Hall 2012, 178).
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In public, however, the Liberals were committed to ‘justice for Ireland,’ and denied
the coercive fantasies indulged in private. Viscount Howick, Lord Grey’s son, expressed
the party line on Ireland in 1844, warning Conservatives that they could not go on
misgoverning Ireland: “if you could govern Ireland as a great Crown colony, by Order in
Council, I could conceive the possibility of going on. . . . If you could do this and could
govern as Austria does in her Italian provinces, it might be possible to reduce Ireland
to a state of quiet. . . . This is conceivable, but thank God! you have not the power of
trying so hateful an experiment.”674 Privately, Liberals were willing to consider these
options. When they were in oﬃce they would repeatedly enact legislation to strengthen
the constabulary, allow the government to proclaim counties, and other measures for
suppressing disorder in Ireland.675 But publicly, Liberals were compelled to insist on
equality for Ireland and the abolition of exclusive institutions.
The apparent failure to amalgamate the Irish and English into a shared nationality
would inform Liberal political thought throughout the Victorian period. Liberals drew on
their understanding of English development to argue that they could perfect the union,
through the assimilation of Irish institutions to English ones and the amalgamation of the
races. Ian Lustick has argued that the “political unity of the British Isles” had become a
hegemonic “given” by the 1840s, that Repeal was “almost impossible to conceive” (1993,
57–8, 54, 69).676 For Liberals, Repeal was certainly conceivable; and they suggested
that if Conservatives continued to govern as they had it would not only be likely but it
would be just. But they acknowledged this possibility not to seriously entertain it but to
insist upon the importance of Liberal government. Only they could combine ﬁrmness
with progressive reforms, and so only they could realize the Union. But they would not
question the basic terms of the property settlement of Ireland or the Union, and were
willing to defend both through extreme coercion.677
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Rather, repeal of the Union violated the strictures of progressive Liberalism because
it would be a retrograde step, denying the promise of the Union and Empire as a means
for extending Liberalism. The Irish had to be assimilated to the English, and the racial
amalgamation so important to England’s development must take place in Ireland as well:
the true remedy was “fusion—lamentably incomplete as yet, but in the natural course
of things progressively advancing towards completeness—of the interests, opinions and
wills of Great Britain and Ireland into one, which is the real UNION of the countries”
(“The United Irishmen and the Repeal Agitation” 1843, 68). It was not that Liberals
could not conceive of separation. Rather, such an outcome would be the result of poor
statesmanship (“The United Irishmen and the Repeal Agitation” 1843, 68).678 To prevent
this required the dismantling of exclusive institutions, which they now claimed was the
real purpose of the Union:
“[Pitt] wished to blend, not only the parliaments, but the nations, and to
make the two islands one in interest and aﬀection. With that view Roman
Catholic disabilities were to be removed. . . measures were to be taken for the
purpose of giving to Roman Catholics the beneﬁts of a liberal education”
(Macaulay 1875, 249).679
There was a consistent Liberal position on how to perfect the Union: “Do them ample
justice, and you will gain their hearts, and unite the two countries in the holy bond of
national aﬀection.”680 Until equality and Liberal institutions were extended to Ireland,
“the Union was a Union in name only” (Macaulay 1875, 249).
Racial amalgamation was central to Liberals’ understanding of how to reconcile Ireland to the Union, and their rhetoric stressed that this could only be done by dismantling
exclusive institutions and treating Ireland equally with England. In 1844 Macaulay argued that after Cromwell’s 17th century conquest, extermination of the Irish would have
been more “humane in reality” than the situation of caste imposed on the Irish Catholics:
“they were doomed to be what the Helots were in Sparta, what the Greeks were under
the Ottoman, what the blacks now are at New York” (Macaulay 1875, 249). This was the
out the last spark of freedom in the country. Place Ireland permanently in a ‘state of siege”’ were worth
listening to as an indication of “how much of the worst spirit of Toryism is still extant.”
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“very worst of tyrannies that can exist. . . the tyranny of race over race.” The Conservatives, “by [their] own boasting and taunts” had encouraged the racial pride of England
and were impeding that which “we have seen in our own country. . . [where] Celt and
Saxon—Dane and Norman—all have been fused down and melted together, to form the
great and united English people. A similar amalgamation, we might have hoped, would
have taken place in Ireland.”681 Underlying this hoped for amalgamation was no small
amount of English chauvinism: Russell believed the Irish “would become Protestants—at
least. . . less Catholic, and therefore more English” (Parry 1993, 107).682
When Conservative Lord Lyndhurst proposed a much more restricted municipal
franchise for Ireland than England, Russell denounced this as an odious distinction:
“I have never heard anything like a plausible reason assigned for making this
distinction between the two countries. Diﬀerences there are—great and wide
diﬀerences, I am not the man to dispute their existence; but the question here
is simply this—are there such diﬀerences in the towns of Ireland as to render
them unﬁt to have popular and municipal Corporations?”
He recalled the recent constitutional revolution and argued that parliament was “bound
to unite the whole people under one Government of the same kind, and to treat the
inhabitants of Ireland as you would treat the inhabitants of Lancashire or Berkshire. . . .
[Y]ou do not do that which justice requires; you do not act fairly and equally by all parts
of the empire, and you cannot expect that this will be in reality an United Kingdom.”683
While in opposition in 1840 the Conservatives proposed extending the post-1832
English registration system to Ireland. They insisted that this would put Ireland “on
the same footing as England,” but by not providing a corresponding reduction in the
franchise the bill would have disfranchised a considerable number of voters.684 It was
a highly selective assimilation, and was roundly condemned by Irish and Liberal MPs:
“[L]et only the means be shown of molesting the people of Ireland by any English institution. . . and then you would carry the spirit of assimilation of the institutions of the two
681

Macaulay, House of Commons, Hansard, February 19th , 1844, 3rd Series, vol.72, c.1172; Gladstone, House
of Commons, Hansard, March 16th , 1868, 3rd Series, vol.190, c.1765; W. Cowper, House of Commons,
Hansard, February 11th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.96, cc.476-77
682
Wilde and Buxton, House of Commons, Hansard, April 2nd , 1835, vol.27, c.687, 708-09.
683
Russell, House of Commons, Hansard, June 9th , 1836, 3rd Series, vol.34, cc.232-34; see also O’Connell,
quoting from a petition from the Natives and Inhabitants, Electors and Citizens, of the City of Dublin,
House of Commons, Hansard, February 23rd , 1844, 3rd Series, vol.73, c.196
684
Stanley, House of Commons, Hansard, February 25th , 1840, 3rd Series, vol.52, c.642; March 26th , 1840,
3rd Series, vol.53, c.143

339

countries with force.”685 Russell insisted that only a genuine equality could provide the
necessary basis for union, a point on which nearly all Liberals who spoke concurred.686
Liberals warned the Commons that the Conservatives were going to “obstruct the present
liberal policy which had worked so well for Ireland,” and thereby ensure that the Union
could never be perfected.687
Russell introduced an alternative bill, one that would alter the registration system
while extending the franchise. O’Connell, hoping to secure passage, confessed “frankly,
that this bill. . . if adopted,. . . would give satisfaction to the people of Ireland.”688 Stanley
accused the Liberal leadership, not without cause, that they were only proposing an
expansion of the Irish franchise to cement their coalition: “it had been introduced under
false colours and under false pretences.”689 The bill passed second reading by 299-294,
a slim majority unlikely to pass through committee without substantial amendments; sure
enough, the bill was withdrawn when the Liberals were defeated on a measure raising
the property qualiﬁcation.690
Irish franchise reform, along with Church disestablishment, was now central to the
rhetoric of progressive improvement that would cement the Union.691 The eﬀects of
the Famine nearly wiped out the Irish electorate, and provided the Liberal government
enough support in the Commons to pass a reform bill for Ireland. It was similar to
the Reform Act of 1832 in that it premised the expansion of the franchise not only
on expanding the small electorates in Irish constituencies, but on the fact that the existing system allowed persons who were considered unﬁt to acquire voter certiﬁcates.
Accordingly, the bill’s changes to the registration disfranchised many voters in the Irish
boroughs. The Irish Reform Act of 1850 nevertheless considerably expanded the franchise, increasing the average county constituency to 4%, compared to 5% for England,
and up from 0.66% in 1849. While not establishing an equally sized electorate with
England, the Irish franchise was now on par with Scotland and approached parity with
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England for the ﬁrst time since 1829. “The popular party,” argued one MP, “were fond
of saying that they were ready to hold out the right hand of fellowship to Ireland, that
they would meet the Irish as fellow subjects, and recognise Ireland as an integral portion
of the empire.”692 The 1850 Act was a manifestation of this commitment, but it was
passed only when all but the most conservative factions of the Liberal party and Lords
recognized the need to do something.693
In 1852 and 1854, when Russell proposed modest enfranchisement bills for England,
he promised bills for Ireland and Scotland in which the “same principles will be applied
generally.”694 The separation of the bills from the English worried some Irish members
but most were “glad that a measure substantially identical with the English Reform Bill”
was promised.695 The defeat of the English measures made the Irish and Scots bills
moot. When it was the Conservatives pressing a reform bill in 1867, Disraeli declined
to respond directly to the question of whether the franchise would be equal across the
countries.696 The government delayed the measure in 1867, allegedly because of Fenian
unrest. When they returned to it in 1868 they proposed no changes to the Irish county
franchise on the grounds that the English Reform Bill of 1867 had set the franchise at the
level established by the 1850 Irish Reform Act.697 Almost all Liberals present opposed
the government bill because it was insultingly limited, but the ﬁght was lost due to a
low turnout among “English and Scotch Liberal Members, who would not come down
to the House to assist their Irish brethren.”698 Given Fenian disorders in Ireland and
England, Liberal MPs wanted to avoid being seen either supporting an extension of the
franchise to a nation who were increasingly seen as unﬁt, or taking a vote that was
palpably contrary to the long-stated commitments of their party.
The alleged unﬁtness of the Irish—denied by Liberals during debates on the Reform
Act and the municipal franchise bill in the 1830s—came to renewed prominence during
the 1850s through 1870s. Increased migration to England and Scotland during the 1830s
had led to an increase in anti-Irish sentiment, manifested in part in claims that they
were degrading the conditions of the British working classes (Swift 1987, 269, 2001). The
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1836 Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain characterized the Irish as “a
less civilized population. . . a kind of substratum,” for which improvement could come
through ﬁrm guidance (Swift 2001, 73; Hickman 1993, 289). “Crowds of miserable Irish
darken all our towns,” wrote Carlyle in Chartism: “the time has come when the Irish
population must either be improved a little, or else exterminated” (Carlyle 1840, 28–29).
The campaign for Repeal of the Union was revived in 1843, before being suppressed
by Peel; a rebellion in 1848 had been accompanied by even harsher measures. The seeming failure of the limited Church, franchise, municipal reforms to secure Irish quiescence
left British political activists, Liberals included, more sympathetic to claims that the
Irish character was pathologically disturbed. Many Liberals found in the Famine a silver
lining, “a deus ex machina, a beneﬁcent providential intervention to break the log-jam
impeding Ireland’s progress towards an anglicised modernity” (Gray 2004, 13).699
As the scale and cost of relief and public works during the Famine expanded, both
the economists’ predictions about the demoralizing eﬀects of relief and pre-existing
beliefs about the character of the Irish seemed to be conﬁrmed (Bernstein 1995, 515,
523). Roebuck asked “If they were really ‘a people,’ wishing for distinct nationality, was
there not some man among them who would raise the standard of Irish independence
in the simple way of ceasing to be a mendicant?”700 The Times, which took it upon itself
to expose the Famine as the product of ﬂaws in the Irish national and racial character,
wrote in 1847 that “Ireland has a people whose character bears a stronger aﬃnity to that
of the Bengalese or the Cingalese than of any Teutonic family, or even their kindred Celt.
To this people we have communicated popular institutions and Saxon laws.”701
Before the Famine, most Liberals would have rejected this, and many still did: The
Times’ stance was denounced, in print and more reservedly in private (Lengel 2002, 110).
Even Roebuck reaﬃrmed the Liberal desire to perfect the Union: “Let it be forgotten that
the Channel was between England and Ireland, and let there exist in both countries the
most absolute equality of rights and privileges.”702 But in private correspondence, Liberals such as Trevelyan expressed hope that the Scots highlands, where a simultaneous
potato blight led to Famine and dislocation, would see “ﬂights of Germans settling here
699
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in increasing number - an orderly, moral, industrious and frugal people, less foreign to
us than the Irish or Scottish Celt, a congenial element which will readily assimilate with
our body politic” (Hall 2012, 189).
Even after the denunciations of Irish character by many leading Liberals, the party
was united in extending the franchise in 1850. But the belief that the Irish character was
the product of misrule and could be improved in the near term was on the defensive
(Russell 1875, 351).703 The rising Liberal star Charles Dilke stressed not only the centrality of race to political institutions, but the degeneracy of non-Anglo-Saxons, especially
American Indians, Africans, and Celts (1869, vii, 44). In America he contrasted the
success of “Belfast names” to the failures of the Catholic Irish to rise in society (1869,
299). And he urged statesmen to recognize “in legislation that which they cannot but
admit in private talk—namely, that there may be essential diﬀerences between race and
race” (1869, 298).
In 1867, James Higgin published The Irish Government Diﬃculty, Considered as a
Race Problem which argued that the problem of English rule over Ireland is that it had
been adapted for the genius of the English race, rather than “the genius of the [Irish]
people” (1867, 2). His recommendation was to divide the country, with despotic rule
in the South and representative institutions in the North, “an attempt to bring about
greater happiness and content and progress than now exists, by adjusting the system
of government to the ineradicable tendencies of diﬀerent races” (1867, 7).704 In 1882,
an anonymous author published a pamphlet entitled “What Science is Saying about
Ireland,” which relied on Herbert Spencer and others to argue that “lower races” could
never be ﬁt for self-government, and that the Irish were especially needful of despotic
rule (1882, 20, 26).705
Thomas Huxley opposed the growing sentiment that the Irish were inferior and that
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this should inform political institutions (1870, 198). Huxley had concluded his criticism
of basing political arrangements from race by pleading with “any man who has political
power,” to believe him “that the arguments about the diﬀerence between Anglo-Saxons
and Celts are a mere sham and delusion” and without foundation as “a matter of science”
(1870, 203). Men with political power were going the other way. By the end of the 1860s,
the belief that “the diﬀerence between the condition of England and Ireland [could be
attributed to a] diﬀerence of race,” had become prominent in political thought and
parliamentary debates.706 Discussing a reform proposal for Ireland in 1849, Disraeli
suggested that “a nation that is unable to appreciate the dignity and importance that
attach to the possession of a vote, is unworthy of the franchise.”707 By 1870 he was
juxtaposing an ostensible Irish lack of ﬁtness to the superior qualities of the British in
Ulster: “I want to know how much of [Ulster’s] prosperity, success, and high spirit are
not due to British blood and British enterprize.”708
Many Liberals agreed, arguing that it was because of the character of the races that
“England became a great nation,” while Ireland had not.709 Liberal MP, and former Chief
Secretary for Ireland, Edward Horsman argued that the primary way in which England
had misgoverned Ireland was “to ignore diﬀerences of race, of religion, of circumstances
and character between the two countries, and to rule Ireland. . . in conformity with English laws and customs, and feelings, and even prejudices and requirements.”710 Many
Liberals continued to reject this as the “fanciful devices invented to save the trouble of
thinking.”711 And Horsman, a key ﬁgure with Lowe in the Adullamites, was unwelcome
in the party from 1868. But the rhetoric of a Liberal commitment to equality between
England and Ireland was under increasing strain.
In 1884, as in 1841, the Conservatives accused the Liberals’ support for an equal Irish
franchise as being a ploy for votes. “Is that a fair accusation?” asked Gladstone.
“Is this the ﬁrst time on which we have endeavoured to enlarge the Irish
constituencies? Have we not again and again, during past years, and without
the slightest idea or prospect of the Irish vote—have we not again and again
supported the Irish Members in their endeavours to obtain an extension of
706
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the franchise to Ireland as regards equality?”712
The Liberals had lost almost all of their ground in Ireland in recent years to the Home
Rulers. Still, despite the private opposition of a key Liberal leader—Lord Hartington—
they nonetheless sought to expand the franchise and to do so on largely equal terms.
Many Conservatives insisted that the longstanding eﬀort to “assimilate” the franchise
was a sham. There might be a “pretentious assimilation,” but actual assimilation was
impossible given that the class of Irish to be enfranchised was not yet ﬁt “to be called
‘capable citizens.”’713 But the rationale oﬀered by Liberals was the same they had been
promising since Russell. “With respect to Ireland,” continued Gladstone, “the real question. . . is this, in our view, a United Kingdom?”714
A scholar of the 1884 Reform Act, William Hayes, notes that Gladstone, while allowing the Cabinet to frankly discuss the question of including Ireland, had already made
his decision well in advance: “he favoured a complete assimilation of the franchise for
the whole of the United Kingdom” (Hayes 1982, 86). This decision was made not on the
basis of an analysis of the likely impact, but “was founded entirely on his personal judgement of the Irish question in its broader sense and must be seen as a part of his private
mission to do justice to Ireland” (Hayes 1982, 86). It is certainly true that Gladstone was
among the Liberal leadership most sympathetic to Ireland (Matthew 1997, 44). Ian St
John remarks that “there was a continuing thread running through Gladstone’s approach
to Irish problems since the 1860s: appropriate legislative reform would pacify the Irish
and make them loyal members of the Empire” (2010, 325). As we have seen, however,
this was not unique to Gladstone but was the rhetorical commitment of the Liberal party
since the reform coalition of the 1830s.
And while it was a sincere commitment for Gladstone and some others, it served
as much of a political function in 1884 as it had ﬁfty years earlier. The leader of the
conservative Liberals, Lord Hartington, had threatened to resign, disliking the extension
of the franchise to Ireland. And Joseph Chamberlain, a leader of the radical faction and
soon to be a key ﬁgure in breaking with the Liberals over Home Rule, was aggressively
campaigning in favor of “one man one vote” and equal treatment of Ireland (Hayes 1982,
69, 91). The support of the Irish party was not essential for the bill’s passage, but it
would make it considerably easier.715
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To reconcile Hartington and his Cabinet, Gladstone invoked the standard Liberal
position that Ireland could not be governed on the basis of an inequality ( Jackson 1994,
172). He warned, and the Lord Lieutenant Spencer concurred, that it was impossible
to not include Ireland within the bill or to oﬀer a more limited extension. Without the
Irish vote, Trevelyan warned, the bill could only be passed by organizing “revolutionary
excitement,” as the Whigs had done in 1832, and which Gladstone would eventually do
(although with less urgency) when the bill was rejected in the House of Lords.716 And
Liberals would not get Irish support, “and [would] have no reason to expect it, unless the
bill treated both Countries alike” (Hayes 1982, 87).
Ultimately Hartington would defend the bill in the Commons in the language of equal
treatment, stressing that to do otherwise would give a legitimate grievance that the Irish
Party would exploit. He conceded that it was certainly possible that the extension of
the franchise would strengthen the Irish around Parnell. And while he held out hope
that it might be otherwise—that with a larger electorate the constituencies would be
more diﬃcult to “manipulate[e]”—his central argument was that exclusion would “would
perpetuate and intensify almost the only real grievance to which the Irish Representatives
can now point, an inequality of political rights as between the Three Kingdoms.”717 He
concluded by appealing to Liberal principles, but in doing so suggested the degree to
which many Liberals understanding of the relationship between Ireland and Liberalism
had changed.
The Liberal party, he argued, had always been willing to extend both justice and
order to Ireland, and he referred to the recent land acts as well as a recent coercion act.718
His central concern, he suggested, had been in protecting the Protestant community in
Ireland. He now argued that this could never be accomplished by schemes of minority
had 63. If the Liberals remained reasonably united, they could pass reform without Irish support, but
they would lose considerable number of Liberals if they did abandon Ireland, while including Ireland
was viewed with consternation by its more conservative wing. Moreover, the Irish party under Parnell
was adept at obstruction and this could delay the bill and other legislation considerably. Cloture had
been instituted in the House of Commons in February 1881, as a response to Irish Party ﬁlibustering,
but the party had other means of obstruction, including the frequent calling of quorum counts.
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representation or even a higher franchise: to argue this would be “to ignore the liberal
character of the Legislature, and to admit the existence of separate nationalities. . . . The
real representation of the loyal minority of Ireland is to be found, not in any artiﬁcial
devices. . . but in the 550 Members for England and Scotland, the vast majority of whom
agree more closely with the minority in Ireland than they do with the majority of Irish
Members here.”719 This was not a new sentiment; it had been the basis for the Act
of Union. But its implication that Irish Catholics were outside the pale of the Liberal
community was closer to the Conservative position of the 1830s than to any position
publicly endorsed by a member of the Liberal leadership up to then.
Liberals stuck to their script of perfecting the Union.720 A Conservative MP, William
Brodrick, moved that the words ‘United Kingdom’ be struck from the draft legislation,
and replaced with ‘Great Britain.’ “What was the intelligence of these Irish serfs?”
he asked. “The average intelligence of half-a-dozen of them would not make up the
intelligence of one of the minors [miners sic] of the North of England.”721 The measure
failed to gain any signiﬁcant number of Liberal adherents; it received only 137 votes
to 332 against, “the largest majority ever recorded in favour of an extension of popular
liberties” (O’Connor 1886, 527; cited in Jones 1972, 129). Nor was Ireland’s representation
reduced from the 103 seats it currently held.722 And in no election from 1885 until
1918 would Irish Nationalist parties win less than 70% of the Irish representation to
Westminster.
It would be over the question of Home Rule for Ireland that the Liberal party would
ultimately split. Liberal administrations, in Russell’s mind, had largely overcome Tory
misgovernment; this progress would be undermined and further improvements impeded
by Home Rule (1875, 191). Liberals such as Goldwin Smith believed that Home Rule
would weaken the Empire, and thus weaken the cause of Liberalism (Smith 1885, 8).
And it was over Home Rule that the claim that the Irish were racially unﬁt became more
clearly expressed than during the previous several decades.
Speaking in favor of the Irish reform bill in 1850, Radical MP Joseph Hume implored
the government to “take a liberal view,” and, referencing the recent extension of legisla719
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tive institutions to the Cape Colony, to “treat the Irish as they treated Hottentots.”723 In
1886, while speaking on Home Rule for Ireland, the Conservative leader Lord Salisbury
argued that self-government was not for all: “you would not conﬁde free representative
institutions to the Hottentots, for instance.” The Irish were “habituated to the use of
knives and slugs” and were equally unﬁt for free institutions: “when you come to narrow
it down you will ﬁnd that this,—which is called self-government but is really government
by the majority,—works admirably when it is conﬁded to people who are of Teutonic
race, but that it does not work so well when people of other races are called upon to join
in it.” The language of racial ﬁtness, however, also became more prevalent among Liberal Unionists—as the breakaway faction of Liberals was known. Many of them blamed
the franchise reform of 1884 for Home Rule’s electoral success: “Is everybody, ﬁt or unﬁt,
entitled to the suﬀrage by the law of nature? Why, then, are not votes given to the two
hundred millions of Hindoos?... [The Irishman’s] political instincts and habits are those
of the tribesmen, not those of the citizen” (Smith 1885, 6–7).
Liberal unionists had various motivations for opposing Home Rule, and Curtis is
certainly correct that a belief in the unﬁtness of the Irish for self-government was one
of these (Curtis 1968, 4). They were operating within an increasingly racist political
culture. And, with an explicitly nationalist Irish party in parliament and the post-1886
fracturing of the Liberal coalition, they were freed of the partisan commitments that had
constrained their ability to participate in anti-Irish discourse. But it would be inaccurate
to say that they abandoned the Liberal vision. Rather, they reconsidered where Ireland
ﬁtted within this framework. Smith claimed to believe that the Irish were capable of
being “train[ed]. . . for a full and active partnership in those free institutions which are
the original patrimony of the Anglo-Saxon” (1886, 22). The Irish apprenticeship to
liberty was now to be extended centuries into the future, and would only be complete
once the distinctive character of the Irish had been submerged under the English.
But this was a profound divergence from the longstanding rhetorical commitment
among Liberals that the Irish were ready for and deserved immediate political equality
and that this was the only basis upon which the Union could be secured or be considered
legitimate. This shift in argument reﬂected a re-situating of how Ireland was understood,
from being a constituent member of a perfectible Union, to being a colony composed of
persons who were alien in blood and alien in religion and for whom political equality
would have to wait for their progress in civilization.724
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Public Opinion and Liberal Principles
The Liberal narrative of progressive Britain was not important primarily for its persuasiveness. Its importance came from the perception among political operatives that
violating its strictures would carry costs, while conforming to its principles would carry
political and electoral beneﬁts. Behavior that conformed to the strictures of the Liberal
narrative—rhetoric, policy positions, and support of the variety of Victorian political
projects—signaled that a political activist would faithfully adhere to Liberal principles.
If one could not be trusted to oppose a monopoly in religion, how could one be trusted
to oppose a monopoly in trade? If one did not believe in the capacity for progress,
how could they be trusted, when the time came, to support an appropriately tailored
expansion of the franchise?
And the success of the Liberal party ensured that its discourse permeated the political
discourse of the country. Groups seeking free trade, the abolition of the death penalty,
the protection of indigenous peoples, colonization, representative government in the
colonies, and an extension of the franchise, all adopted its language in the belief that it
would help secure a more favorable reception by the ascendant political party. By doing
so, they encouraged the perception that the Liberal vision was “the solid permanent
conviction of the nation.”725 This belief was embedded in the expectations of political
operatives, Liberal and Conservative, and it conditioned their behavior accordingly.

Liberal Principles and Tory Rule
The Liberal narrative reﬂected the constitutive commitments of the coalition, but it also
served ongoing political functions, helping to coordinate the amorphous and factious
body of political operatives who were associated with the Liberal Party. The Liberal
narrative was invoked to remind MPs of the catastrophe of Tory rule, an important
consideration in a context where the fall of a government did not necessarily mean an
election. And it was invoked to remind the leadership that electoral support depended
on their adherence to Liberal principles and promotion of Liberal policies.
What united almost all Liberals was the belief that the Conservatives did not understand the progressive character of the British constitution and the “spirit of the age.”726
Even supporters of Home Rule, such as Edward Freeman, argued that Home Rule should be thought of
in a colonial context, as a situation that would make Ireland a dependency of the U.K. (1888).
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Conservatives were, in this telling, steadfastly opposed to all reform until it was wrestled
from them. It was in contrast to conservatism that Liberals could claim to understand
progressive improvement and non-exclusivity. As the Eclectic Review reminded its readers, “it is impossible. . . for those who are sincerely attached to the progress of human
improvement, and the native rights of man,—all of which are comprehended when we
say attached to civil and religious liberty—to contemplate the return of the Tories to
oﬃce without alarm and indignation” (Stowell 1841, 97).727
When the Conservative Lord Lyndhurst proposed a restricted municipal franchise
in Ireland in 1836 in terms suggesting national antipathy, Liberals pounced. Lyndhurst
had said that the English settlers in Ireland “had to contend with a population alien to
Englishmen, speaking, many of them, a diﬀerent language, professing a diﬀerent religion,
regarding the English as invaders, and ready to expel them at the ﬁrst opportunity.”728
Liberals invoked Lyndhurst’s observations to remind their coalition of the exclusivity
that characterized Tory rule. A Liberal leader in the House of Lords denounced Lyndhurst’s remarks: “Was not that an attack that ought not to be made on them as British
subjects?”729 Russell followed suit, quoting Lyndhurst as saying “three-fourths of the
people of Ireland were aliens in blood, diﬀering in language, diﬀering in religion.”730
The incident caused considerable controversy at the time and almost a decade later
Macaulay returned to it, attacking Conservatives for being “ready enough to call the
Catholics of Ireland ‘aliens’ when it suits your purpose.”731 In 1884, a Home Rule MP
expressed shock at seeing that an amendment to the Reform Bill had been put forward “alleging that Irishmen are not entitled to the same franchise as Englishmen and
Scotchmen”: “half a century ago a noble Lord—a great English statesman—startled his
hearers. . . by the astounding utterance that the Irish were aliens in blood, language, and
religion. . . . What is the Amendment if it be not a repetition in another form of the LyndRussell, House of Commons, Hansard, March 21st , 1859, 3rd Series, vol.153, c.398; Colonel Sykes, House
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hurst declaration?”732 This was by now longstanding Irish and Liberal rhetoric, one that
reminded everyone in the coalition that the Conservatives could not be trusted to govern Ireland on principles of equality and non-exclusivity. And sure enough, when Lord
Salisbury compared the Irish to ‘Hottentots,’ the same dynamic occurred. Most Conservatives defended Salisbury, suggesting both that he had been misquoted and that he
was fundamentally correct.733 But Liberal leaders were delighted—“‘Salisbury’s speech!!’
exclaimed Gladstone” (Steele 2001, 200): “for the next half-dozen years it would be safe
to say that there was not one Liberal Meeting in ten at which some speaker did not
repeat the assertion, that Lord Salisbury had declared Irishmen to be on a level with
Hottentots” (Cecil 1921, 303).
When the Conservatives opposed a Liberal reform bill in 1852, ostensibly because
there was no agitation and thus no “clear necessity” for reform, Russell asked the Commons to “recollect what has been the case with respect to the party opposite in regard
to great measures. We all know that the just requests of the Roman Catholics of Ireland
were denied until ‘a clear necessity’ arose in the shape of impending civil war.”734 The
juxtaposition of Liberal progressive reform to Conservative intransigence was meant to
ensure Liberal MPs were not tempted by Conservative reform proposals. Liberals warned
their colleagues that “when it comes to great organic changes your own good sense and
your instinct of party honour must tell you that a Conservative Government could not
give the same kind of Reform as a Government which represents your views and is
supported by your constituents.”735
And the Conservatives, as Liberal partisans never ceased to remind their colleagues,
were the party of monopolies and class legislation in taxation, trade, politics, and religion, all of which were joined in Liberal rhetoric (Cowherd 1954, 136; Biagini 1992,
11; Parry 1993, 108).736 The Conservatives represented the “classes,” against which was
arrayed the public: when Gladstone famously announced that “all the world over, I will
back the masses against the classes,” he was deploying a language that had been familiar
732
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to Liberals since the 1840s.737
Liberals invoked party principles to unite against the Conservatives, but also to
pressure each other. Activists were frequently demanding that the Liberal leadership
commit to “a straight forward and bold declaration of great principles of progression,
and unwavering adherence to CIVIL, to RELIGIOUS, and to COMMERCIAL FREEDOM” (Stowell 1841, 108). When John Russell sought to block an eﬀort by the Catholic
Church to establish an oﬃcial episcopate in England, fellow Liberals were appalled. One
reminded Liberals of their founding principles: “They sat simply as representatives of
the citizens of England—of that country which, pre-eminent as it was in civilisation,
and intellect, and enlightenment, was most of all pre-eminent in its enunciation of the
great doctrine of ‘civil and religious liberty.”’ Roebuck expressed shock that “a liberal
Administration—headed by one who had gained the honour and distinction of being
the Prime Minister of a great liberal party—taking the ﬁrst step backward;. . . at a time
when onward progress was the distinctive mark by which on every occasion that nation
held itself honoured. . . the ﬁrst actual backward step was attempted to be taken.”738
When Conservatives suggested reform in 1859, Liberals reminded their leaders and
colleagues of their commitment to reform: “he fully recognized the necessity of being
bound by party ties; but, entertaining as he did a deep and solemn conviction, he should
be unworthy of the conﬁdence of his constituents if he hesitated” to support reform.739
The “Whigs” were “verging on the ‘obsolete,”’ by having failed to pass reform: “let the
Whigs then quicken their pace, and step forward with the advanced Liberals, if they
wish to recover their position as leaders of the reform party throughout the country.”740
When the Adullamites were signaling that they might sink a reform bill under the Russell
government, Liberals warned their colleagues to consider the pledges they had made: “is
there any Member for a large and popular constituency. . . who does not know that when
he comes before them he will be asked why it is a Reform Bill has not been carried in
this Parliament, and that he will not be allowed to return to represent the Liberal party”
unless he pledges to do everything to support reform?741 In 1867, the Irish MP The
O’Donnell said he was not worried that an Irish reform would be denied because “he
737
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felt conﬁdent that the Liberal party, which constituted a majority in the House, and an
overwhelming majority in the country, would unite with those who really represented the
Irish people in securing for Ireland. . . a measure of Reform, the same in principle, and
in every respect as comprehensive as the measures adopted in the case of England and
Scotland.”742 This was not mistaken optimism, but rather an eﬀort to remind Liberals
of their commitments. And when Lowe opposed the Reform Bill in 1866, he was called
upon by other Liberals to explain himself: “Gentlemen think it the height of illiberality
on my part, and believe that I am abandoning the cause of progress. . . . I have been a
Liberal all my life. I was a Liberal at a time and in places where it was not so easy to
make professions of Liberalism as in the present day; I suﬀered for my Liberal principles,
but I did so gladly.”743
After the 1881 elections, which returned a Liberal majority, members sought to remind the ministers of what brought them there: “Throughout the country. . . that which
had united the Liberal Party at the last General Election was the question of the county
franchise.”744 Supporters of women’s suﬀrage “appeal[ed] [to Liberals] on the ground
that we desire to extend the franchise to all capable citizens,” and reminded them that
“according to our professions on every hustings,. . . we have established it as a political
axiom, that no class ever will receive legislative equality at the hands of another class.”745
And during debates on the 1884 Reform Act, Liberal MPs denied the suggestion of party
disunity while reminding their potentially refractory fellow partisans of their commitments: “if the Liberal Party and the Liberal Government meant anything they meant
this—that the majority of the electors were to choose the majority of the Representatives of the House of Commons.”746 Hartington reminded Gladstone—and moderate
Liberals—that the Prime Minister had committed to being open on the question of redistribution and minority representation: “I do not expect that the sketch. . . given by the
Prime Minister will satisfy the Opposition. . . but I think we may expect that the declaration of the Prime Minister. . . , will satisfy those who profess to feel conﬁdence in the
intentions of the Prime Minister and his Colleagues. . . .[I]t will not be denied that the
Prime Minister is the most powerful Member of the Liberal Party, and that the decla742
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ration which he has made of his own intentions on this subject carries with it a weight
which attaches to the declarations of no other man in this House.”747
MPs were also signaling to their constituents and a broad public, through speeches
reprinted in local newspapers and interest group newsletters, that a given measure entailed a broader threat to the Liberal political community. During the debates over the
Conservative Irish franchise bill in 1840 and 1841 Liberal MPs warned that it was indicative of Conservative plans for the rest of the country, “the bill was neither more nor
less than a disfranchising measure, and those who would inﬂict such a bill as that on
Ireland, wanted not the will but the power to inﬂict the same on England.”748 With an
election likely approaching, the meaning was clear.749 The Irish Repealers likewise used
the opportunity to signal to English audiences the revival of recalcitrant Toryism: “It
is as well, however, that the people of England should know what manner of man has
become the standard bearer of Toryism.”750 Liberal leaders worry was that a suﬃcient
number of Liberal MPs would vote for the Conservative measure, and sought to cast the
bill in terms that would concern their fellow partisans and hold the coalition together.
But the eﬀort to signal, and to force their opponents to reveal their policy positions,
was an ongoing element of the politics over the franchise. During a late session, one
MP insisted on continuing debate and a division, “He should like to know the opinion
of these Gentlemen at the present moment. [An Hon. Member: Not to-night.] Oh, yes;
to-night. An election was coming on, and it was necessary that the constituents of hon.
Gentlemen should know on what ground they stood.”751 But the beliefs of MPs about
the opinions of the voters to whom they were signaling changed over time. This is most
clearly seen in the running struggle over how the Conservative Party should seek to
compete during a period of Liberal ascendancy.

Conservative Reaction and Progress
The new Conservative Party, established by Peel, insofar as it was distinct from the
Tories of the pre-1832 period, had its origin in an anti-Irish ‘No-Popery’ campaign
coordinated by The Times, whose publisher had “acquired a distaste for Whiggery” and
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decided to “shift the ideological position of his newspaper” (Hudson 1943, 81; Cahill
1957, 67).752 But both Peel and Disraeli recognized that to compete in the post-Reform
Act electoral environment made it necessary to appeal beyond the Church of England.
But Dissenters were committed to Liberalism and rallied around the banner of ‘civil
and religious liberty.’753 When an inﬂuential dissenter defended the Irish Church before
a meeting composed largely of Orangemen, he was denounced by the Liberal journal
The Patriot for having converted “from English Liberalism to Irish Orangeism” (Machin
1967, 72). The Eclectic Review would write in 1847 that “We have no sympathy with the
political protestantism which shows itself in the old ‘No Popery!’ cry. We have suﬀered
from its intolerance. We detest it from our very souls.”754
But much of the Conservative party believed otherwise, “Our great force has been
Protestantism, we began the re-action with it; every step of success has been founded on
it.”755 In 1849, Lord Stanley believed that Catholicism was “revolting the feelings of a
great majority of English and Scottish people” and exploiting this sentiment would win
elections (McLeod 1999, 53). As late as 1854 Disraeli was asking “Have we or have we not
a Protestant constitution?”756 Disraeli’s invocation of the Protestant Constitution brought
him acclaim from the Conservative base, but he believed it hurt the party electorally.
Stanley wrote to him shortly after, “in the summer of 1852 you repeatedly told me that
our chance at the elections had been ruined by our taking up high Protestant politics.
I agreed with you then, as I do now. Shall we gain in 1854 by repeating the mistake of
1852?” (Monypenny and Buckle 1914, 544–45).
They were also unsure how to accommodate their rhetoric to the Liberal narrative of
progress. During the 1840s and 1850s, many Conservative Party members insisted that
the reforms of the Whig and Liberal government had been detrimental to the country.757
Disraeli and other leaders initially mocked Liberals’ language of progressive improvement and their conceit that they were essential to the Constitution: “I do not mean, by
the term constitution, merely the House of Commons, and still less a particular party in
the House, which some hon. Gentlemen opposite seem always to consider the English
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constitution.” He argued the country would prefer “the liberty we now enjoy to the
liberalism they promise.”758
But he recognized its increasing resonance with the population, and wanted to carve
a space for Conservatives within an otherwise Liberal political discourse. As Disraeli
remarked in a letter to Lord Stanley, urging him to run for the commercial seat of
Manchester, the Conservative Party needed to demonstrate to the country that “the
old Whig monopoly of Liberalism is obsolete. . . [that] we represent progress, which is
essentially practical, against mere Liberal opinions, which are fruitless.” Disraeli insisted
that “we should carry into eﬀect our policy by elevating and enlightening Conservative
sentiment, not outraging it, or mimicking mere Liberalism.”759 And so in speeches
to Conservative audiences, he asked Conservatives “not [to] place themselves in the
unfavourable position of saying on. . . [any] great public question that they are opposed
to all change. That is a diﬃcult position to occupy.” Conservatives must be “in favour of
progress,—in favour of the political, social, and intellectual progress of this country.”760
Disraeli was educating the party in the use of a resonant discourse in order to deny the
Liberals the claim of a monopoly on progressive statesmanship.761
And so he protested “against being placed in the category of ﬁnality.”762 Upon forming a government in 1858, the Earl of Derby (former Lord Stanley) told the Lords that,
“there can be no greater mistake than to suppose that a Conservative Ministry necessarily means a stationary Ministry.” “We live in an age of constant progress—moral, social,
and political. . . . Our constitution itself is the result of a series of perpetual changes. . . .
My Lords, in politics, as in everything else, the same course must be pursued—constant
progress, improving upon the old system, adapting our institutions to the altered purposes which they are intended to serve, and by judicious changes meeting the increased
demands of society.”763 And there was a gradual convergence of Conservatives around
the idea of progressive improvement. Attacking his party leader over a limited reform
measure in 1859, H.G. Sturt insisted that he supported the enfranchisement of the working classes “because he was a Conservative” and that the true “Conservative was that
man who advanced with the times in which he lived, and who supported progressive
758

Disraeli, House of Commons, Hansard, June 20th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.99, c.965; June 20th , 1848, 3rd
Series, vol.99, cc.957-58; February 1st , 1849, 3rd Series, vol.102, c.103
759
To Stanley, October 24th , 1858 (Buckle 1916, 176).
760
‘Mr. Disraeli In North Buckinghamshire.’ The Times 21 May 1857, p.9. See also Saunders (2011, 107).
761
Disraeli, House of Commons, Hansard, June 20th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.99, c.965
762
Disraeli, House of Commons, Hansard, June 20th , 1848, 3rd Series, vol.51, c.801
763
Earl of Derby, House of Lords, Hansard, March 1st , 1858, 3rd Series, vol.149, c.41

356

improvement.”764
Many Liberals welcomed the Conservative openness to the cause of reform, recognizing that this meant a more profound acceptance of Liberal ideas: “nobody could doubt
the march of intellect and the progress of opinion when they heard such liberal sentiments coming from that portion of the House which used to be called the Tory camp.”765
By 1867, Bright was both mocking Conservatives for coming “before us as Reformers”
and expressing his gladness that “you are Reformers; what is more, you will be glad of it
too hereafter; and your children, when they look back on the records of this Parliament,
will judge you the more favourably as the more honestly, generously, and completely you
do the work which now apparently you are permitting Ministers to try to do.”766
By the 1870s, Disraeli had largely accomplished what Peel had attempted: the accommodation of the Conservative Party to the new electorate and ideological regime
established in 1832. But in the process, he had also helped consolidate and advance
another idea of political community. Disraeli had sought to “harness[] patriotism to the
Conservative party” and advanced “an unashamed, militant, illiberal, and undemocratic
spirit glorying” in the empire (Eldridge 1996, 70, 72). While maintaining Liberalism’s
belief that diﬀerent institutional regimes were suited to diﬀerent peoples, this was now
more than ever rooted in an ostensibly essential racial characters.

Conclusion
The narrative of political community advanced by Liberals, with its emphasis on progress,
non-exclusivity, and racial amalgamation, did not uniquely cause the inclusions or exclusions of the Victorian era. Rather, it provided a set of rhetorical and behavioral
standards, and activists came to expect that violating these standards would entail political and electoral costs. And the broad popular resonance of British Liberalism meant
that political operatives were cautious about violating its terms. This did not do much
for Ireland, but it was a important factor in securing the Irish Franchise Act of 1850 and
crucial to the Reform Act of 1884. While explicit racial disfranchisements were ruled
out in the colonies, other means that achieved a broadly similar end were employed;
764

H.G. Sturt, House of Commons, Hansard, March 21st , 1859, 3rd Series, vol.153, cc.426-27; Ker Seymer,
House of Commons, Hansard, March 21st , 1859, 3rd Series, vol.153, c.434
765
Roche, House of Commons, Hansard, February 9th , 1852, 3rd Series, vol.119, c.293; Locke, House of
Commons, Hansard, March 28th , 1859, 3rd Series, vol.153, c.957
766
Bright, House of Commons, Hansard, February 25th , 1867, 3rd Series, vol.185, c.972

357

but Liberal commitments did shape the forms of exclusion in the colonies, sometimes
with lasting repercussions as with the New Zealand Maori franchise and the Qualiﬁed
Franchise in the Cape Colony/Province. And while working class activists were able to
secure important extensions of the franchise in 1867-68 and 1884, there was a steady
abandonment of more inclusive suﬀrage standards. It took 34 years after the Third
Reform Act to achieve a male citizen standard with a short residence requirement, and
during this time there was very little organized support for a further extension.
The ideas of British Liberalism provided an interpretation of agitation and disturbances in Britain, in Ireland, and in the Empire; and drawing on a narrative of English
historical development, it suggested a response. But just as importantly, the belief in the
resonance of Liberal language of political community conditioned what forms of suﬀrage
changes they believed they could and could not be seen as supporting, contributing to
the particularities of democratization in the UK.
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Chapter 9
Democratization in France, 1789-1962

“Sovereignty resides in the universality of French citizens.”
—Article 1, Constitution of 1848.

Introduction
The website of the French National Assembly maintains a series of pages on ‘The Republic and Universal Suﬀrage,’ which tell the story of the right to vote and its role in
French Republican history. The narrative presents universal suﬀrage and the Republic
as having been natural companions for over two centuries, showing an “inﬁnite” capacity for rebirth and expansion. “The universality of the suﬀrage,” the website continues,
“does not signify that it is given to all. The suﬀrage is, in eﬀect, submitted to certain
conditions. . . . The universality of the suﬀrage results from the assimilation of the status
of elector to that of citizen.” The site’s historical narrative locates the inauguration of
universal suﬀrage in 1848, nearly 100 years before the enfranchisement of women in
1944. The narrative acknowledges what it calls suﬀrages’ “forgotten”: women, 18-21 year
olds, and those serving in the armed forces. These later enfranchisements are described
as “the extension of universal suﬀrage,” suggesting a simple articulation of an established institution. The exclusions from the right to vote in the former colonies and the
departments of Algeria are left unmentioned. “To republican universal suﬀrage,” the
narrative concludes, “we owe nearly everything.”767
The course of democratization in France before 1870 is often portrayed less as a
progressive trajectory than a whipsaw between otherwise static states, with responsible
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legislatures exchanged for a broadly inclusive franchise or vice versa. The immediate
post-1870 period is treated as centrally important in the development of democracy
in France, not because manhood suﬀrage was in doubt but because parliamentary authority was not yet consolidated (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 67; Collier 1999, 44;
Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 90).768 In these accounts it is the 1877 victory of parliamentary government over the power of an unelected President that marks
the accomplishment of democratization.
This history is misleading. For one, that male citizen suﬀrage survived the collapse
of the Second Empire is in many ways surprising and should not be taken for granted.
The conservative majority elected to the National Assembly in 1871 preferred restricting
the franchise, and over the course of two years invested considerable time and energy
to this eﬀect. Moreover, there was considerable antipathy to “universal suﬀrage” among
political elites of all factions: liberal monarchists believed it was incompatible with the
protection of property and the family; republicans and monarchists bitterly recalled that
peasants and workers had voted for Louis-Napoleon, had ratiﬁed his coup, and had
approved of his empire; socialists were well aware that it had been a government elected
by universal suﬀrage that had repressed workers’ movements in 1848 and 1871, and many
were skeptical about the prospects for gains under “bourgeois parliamentarianism.”769
The years 1871 to 1877 were a critical juncture, with the heightened capacity to reshape institutions and political order that the concept implies. Deputies to the National
Assembly were free to design new institutions, and were nearly unanimous in their
disdain for the institutions of the Second Empire. Foremost among these institutions, and
crucial to the Empire’s legitimation, was “universal suﬀrage.” The suﬀrage qualiﬁcations
were far from given, and that they survived relatively unchanged requires explanation.
There is also another reason that ending the story of French democratization with
the victory of parliamentarianism is misleading. For all the republicans’ insistence on
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Acemoglu and Robinson note that 1877 marked the year when “democracy with complete male suﬀrage
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“le suﬀrage universel,” in 1910 there were over 15 million disfranchised adult French nationals living in departments that elected representatives to the Chamber of Deputies,
against 11 million electors.770 If the survival of male citizen suﬀrage in the 1870s is surprising, so too is how few changes there were over the subsequent decades. Soldiers were
disfranchised for the entirety of the Third Republic, a substantial exclusion given the existence of a conscript army in which every French male citizen was ostensibly obliged
to serve. More signiﬁcantly, all French women, the indigenous Muslims of Algeria, and
of some, but not all, categories of indigenous subjects in colonies with parliamentary
representation were excluded, and this was a recurring source of debate and political
controversy. In 1944 indigenous Algerian males were enfranchised, followed by French
women, soldiers, and eventually many categories of natives in the colonies. All of these
enfranchisements were proposed, debated, and ultimately defeated on several occasions
under the Third Republic.
This chapter outlines the exclusions and inclusions associated with French democratization, and sets up the central patterns to be explained in the subsequent chapters,
namely the surprisingly durable inclusion of male citizens, the surprisingly durable exclusion of French women, and the glaring and contradictory exclusions of indigenous,
and especially Muslim, subjects. The focus in the case study will be on the Third Republic, and so I also outline this period’s political and institutional context. The purpose of
the Chapter 10 will be to demonstrate how Republicans fashioned a narrative of French
political community that facilitated a broader republican coalition capable of maintaining popular support and establishing a new regime. Chapter 11, the last of the French
chapters, will demonstrate how the narrative of political community became embedded
in the expectations of political operatives, such that all reform projects were interpreted
relative to the inviolability of citizen suﬀrage and their implications for the survival of
the regime.
This chapter proceeds as follows: I begin by outlining the trajectory of the suﬀrage,
from the Revolutionary period through to the end of the Fourth Republic, highlighting
the exclusions and disfranchisements often obscured by a narrative of ‘all-or-nothing’
democratization. The focus of the French case study is on the Third Republic (18711940), and so closer attention is given to this period than the others. I then turn to
a discussion of the institutional and partisan context of Third Republic, the political
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contests of which reﬂected the institutional compromises and ideological debates of the
1870-1877 period.

The Franchise in French History
Estates-General
There was no established and institutionalized form of national representative government in absolutist France. Nonetheless, French electoral institutions and the franchise
were legacies of one of the ﬁnal acts of the ancien regime, namely the calling of the
Estates-General in 1789 (Crook 1993). As the last one had sat in 1614, there were no
clearly established electoral procedures (Furet 1988, s62), and it was ultimately decided
that elections to the Third Estate would be by “all the inhabitants. . . , born French or
naturalized, twenty-ﬁve years of age, domiciled and on the role of contributors.”771 In
the towns, the inhabitants would assemble by corporate guilds to elect deputies, who
would then choose from among their number deputies to the district level preliminary
assembly. The preliminary assembly would elect one quarter of its members, who would
be assembled with the other two orders of the district (the nobility and the ecclesiastical
orders) to elect the deputies to the Estates-General in Versailles (Brette 1894; Furet 1988;
Weil 1895, 3–4).
The corporations were treated unequally, and journeymen, migrant workers, adult
sons lacking a separate entry on the tax rolls, and the landless in towns where the poll
tax was paid by the community were all excluded (Crook 1996, 13).772 Nonetheless,
most historians conclude that outside of Paris, where special arrangements were made
to exclude the laboring classes, “the elections to the Estates General were conducted on
an extremely broad basis,” while the successively smaller electorates greatly diminished
the representation of the popular classes (Crook 1996, 15, 25; Furet 1978, 62).

National Assembly and the Revolutionary Period (1789-1795)
On July 14th , the Bastille was taken. In August, 1789, the Third Estate, now calling itself
the National Assembly, abolished feudalism and published the Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen. The 3rd Article of the Declaration stated that “all sovereignty
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resides essentially in the Nation” and that “no body nor individual may exercise any
authority which does not proceed directly from the nation.”773 Two years later, the
Assembly passed a Constitution establishing a representational system and franchise
qualiﬁcations for subsequent elections.774
The Constitution of 1789 famously distinguished between “active citizens” and “passive citizens,” an innovation of Abbé Sieyès:
“All the inhabitants of a country must enjoy the rights of passive citizenship:. . . not everyone has the right to take an active part in the election of
public oﬃcials; not all are active citizens. Women, at least in current circumstances, children, foreigners and those who make no ﬁscal contribution
to the state should not directly inﬂuence public aﬀairs. . . . [O]nly those who
pay taxes are real stakeholders in the great social enterprise” (Sieyès 1789a,
21).
Active citizens were men who were born or who had become French, 25 years of age
or older, domiciled in a city or canton for a period to be established by law, and had
paid a direct tax of the value of three days of labor. Hired servants were excluded,
and active citizens were required to be registered in the National Guard and to have
taken the civil oath.775 Those who had declared bankruptcy and had not entered into an
agreement with their creditors, as well as those who were being prosecuted or convicted,
were disfranchised.
The Constitution retained successive stages of election but imposed a more exclusionary qualiﬁcation to be eligible for election as second stage elector, and an even
higher qualiﬁcation to be eligible for election as a deputy to the National Assembly.
Robert Palmer estimates that about 70% of men over the age of 25 could vote, about 50%
of these could serve as second degree electors, and 1% could serve as a national deputy
(1959, 526). Initially, second degree electors were required to have paid a tax equal to 10
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The 6th Article stated that “law is the expression of the general will” and “every citizen has a right to
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days of labor, while to be elected as a deputy, one had to pay a direct tax of 54 livres,
but in August 1791 the Assembly signiﬁcantly raised the qualiﬁcations for second degree
electors: to be eligible as a second degree elector would now vary depending on whether
the election was held in the countryside or in a town, and with the size of the town.776
The monarchy was abolished on August 10, 1792; over the next two days the Assembly organized elections for a constitutional convention, eliminating the taxpaying
qualiﬁcation but retaining the two-stage electoral system. The new franchise did not
abolish pecuniary qualiﬁcations, as is often claimed, but limited this to French males
“aged twenty-one years old, resident in the canton for one year, living upon an income
or from the proceeds of employment, and not working as a domestic servant” (Duvergier
1824, 349; Crook 1996, 81).777 Second degree electors and deputies had to meet the same
requirements, but be 25 years of age.
The Convention drafted the Constitution of 1793 (Year I), which established a unicameral legislative body and extended the franchise to all French males 21 years of age
and resident in a canton for 6 months.778 It did away with second stage voting, and
so would have eﬀectively established direct manhood suﬀrage. But the Constitution of
1793 would never be put into eﬀect, suspended by decree and sidelined by the Terror.779
There were no elections under this constitution, and so we lack information on the size
of the electorate at the national level. Some departments did, however, compile electoral
registers in anticipation of the Constitution’s implementation. Crook notes that if all
adult males had been enfranchised, it would have amounted to approximately 28% of
the population; and in Côte d’Or an electoral survey in 1794 showed 25.9% of the population enfranchised under the provisions of the 1793 Constitution (1996, 83). Given the
continuation of residence and citizenship requirements, it seems reasonable to assume
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that approximately 25% of the population, or approximately 7,100,000 persons, would
have had the right to vote.

The Directory, the Consulate, and the Empire (1795-1814)
The Constitution of 1795 (Year III) established a ﬁve-member executive and a bicameral
legislature. Citizenship was limited to males 21 years of age or older, resident in the
Republic for 1 year, and having paid a direct tax on real or personal property; no
taxation was required of those who had fought in republican wars. The right to vote was
suspended for domestic servants, and the status of citizen was removed from members of
foreign corporations which recognized distinctions of birth (nobility) or required religious
vows, as well as felons, the bankrupt, those judged to be mentally incompetent, and those
who had served foreign powers.780 To register as a citizen one needed to know how to
read and write, as well as know a mechanical profession (which included agriculture),
but this would only come into eﬀect in 1805 (Year XII). Second stage elections were
re-established, largely reproducing the Constitution of 1791’s qualiﬁcations.
The Constitution of 1799 (Year VIII) further concentrated power in the executive—
the three Consuls, with Napoleon Bonaparte becoming the eﬀective ruler as First Consul
(Woloch 2002). A “Conservative Senate” was established, composed of 80 members for
life appointed by the Senate upon the recommendation of the Legislative Corps, the
Tribunate, and the First Consul.781 The Legislative Corps, in turn, was selected by the
Senate, its powers limited to voting on bills. The Legislative Corps, the Consuls, and
the Tribunate were named by the Senate: there was no more election for national oﬃce,
but rather a complex system of nominations. The citizens of every commune domiciled
for one year chose 1/10 of the their number to be placed on a “list of conﬁdence,” from
which all public functionaries at the communal level were chosen (Duvergier 1826, 24).
Domestic servants and the bankrupt continued to be excluded, but no tax contribution
was required. Those on this list in turn vote 1/10 of their number to be placed on a
departmental list, from which all departmental level functionaries were chosen. And
again those elected to the departmental list chose 1/10 of their number who are placed
on a national list of conﬁdence, from which national public functionaries—including
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the task of completing itself.
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Senators, Tribunes, Consuls, and Legislators—were chosen.782
Table 9.1: Enfranchisement under Monarchical and Republican Electoral Systems
Electoral System

1st Degree Electors
(% of total pop.)

Estates-General

3,500,000
(12%)

2nd Degree Electors
(% of total pop.)
Eligible
Elected
3,500,000 45,000
(12%)
(0.16%)

Pre-August 1791

4,298,360
(15.6%)

2,500,000
(9.1%)

50,000
(0.18%)

Constitution of 1791

4,298,360
(15.6%)

1,500,000
(6.3%)

50,000
(0.18%)

Decree of August 1792

≈6,000,000
(21.3%)

≈4,300,000 50,000
(15.4%)
(0.18%)

Constitution of 1793
(Year I)

≈7,000,000
(26%)

—
—

Constitution of 1795
(Year III)

≈5,000,000
(17.5%)

≈1,500,000
(5.3%)

30,000
(0.1%)

Sources: Crook (1996), Rosanvalon (1992), Huard (1991)
Cole and Campbell (1989)
Yet another constitution was promulgated in 1802 (Year X) establishing Napoleon
as First Consul for Life. The nomination system was retained for national and departmental oﬃce. All male citizens domiciled and registered, including domestic servants,
in the canton convened in cantonal assemblies to select two electoral colleges: one for
the arrondissement—eﬀectively an electoral district—and another for the department,
whose members were elected for life terms.783 Only the top 600 taxpayers in the department could be elected to the departmental college, who were to be Napoleon’s “representatives before the people and his point of contact with the nation at large” (Collins 1979,
90). Each college nominated two citizens to the list from which the Legislative Corps was
chosen. The Senate continued to select members for national oﬃce from the lists pre782

Given the fact that the Tribunate had 100 members, the Senate 80, and the Legislative Corps 300, there
was always considerable discretion left to the Senate in selecting the members of the other bodies. The
persons chosen for these lists are maintained so long as they are not explicitly replaced, which can only
be done by a majority of the eligible voters of the highest list to which the person has been placed.
783
As pointed out by Irene Collins, many historians continue to mistakenly argue that the arrondissement
colleges elected the departmental colleges (1979, 90). Rosanvallon, among others, makes this error
(1992, 202).
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pared by the colleges. When the colleges had been depleted by one third, the cantonal
assemblies would reconvene to return them to their initial size; the arrondissement and
departmental colleges would meet every ﬁve years to prepare the nominating lists for
the Legislative Corps, one-ﬁfth of the colleges meeting per year.784 This system operated
until the Restoration in 1814, although the supposedly annual one-ﬁfth replacement of
the Legislative Corps did not take place in 1810, 1812, or in 1814 (Beck 1974, 29).
Table 9.2: Enfranchisement under Nomination Systems
Constitution of 1799
(Year VIII)

1st Degree

2nd Degree

3rd Degree

4th Degree

≈6,500,000
(22.3%)

≈650,000
(2.2%)

≈65,000
(0.2%)

≈6,500
(0.02%)

Constitution of 1802
(Year X)

Primary Assembly
Eligible
Voters
Arrondissement Department
≈7,000,000
≈7,000,000
≈50,000
(25%)
(25.3%)
(0.17%)
Sources: Crook (2000, 1996), Rosanvalon (1992), Collins (1979)

Elected
Department
24,600
(0.08%)

The impact of the changes during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods is
summarized in Table 9.1 and Table 9.2. From the Estates General on we see a very
broad electorate, but one that is almost exclusively limited to the primary assemblies
or ﬁrst degree electors. Even the population meeting the qualiﬁcations to be a second
degree elector, however, is considerably broader than that seen in the United Kingdom
at the same period, and roughly equivalent to the non-slaveholding American states.
But the actual electorate—that subset of the population who could vote directly for
deputies—was much more constricted.
And, with the exception of the early republican period, these were not representative
legislative bodies. A broad electorate was, in principle, supposed to attach the population
to the state and provide the government a means of assessing the interests and needs of
the people; it was not supposed to be the arbiter of power.
784

The fact that the members of the colleges were elected to life terms, and could be removed only for
having lost their rights of citizenship or for having failed to attend three successive meetings of the
college, reduced the amount of electoral activity at the cantonal level.
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The Restoration, Hundred Days, and Second Restoration (1814-1830)
The electoral system of the Restoration was established in the Charter of 1814, with an
electoral law to follow. The Charter largely continued the Empire’s Legislative Corps,
but required deputies to be 40 years of age and to have paid a direct tax of 1000f. The
electors in the colleges needed to be 30 years of age and pay a direct tax of 300f. The
qualiﬁcations for cantonal assemblies were not speciﬁed and it is possible that this stage
of elections were to be suppressed.785 No electoral law was produced, as the King ﬂed on
the return of Napoleon. Benjamin Constant drafted a new constitution, which continued
the electoral system of 1802, but provided for direct elections from the arrondissement
and departmental colleges to the Chamber of Representatives.786
After the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo and the Second Restoration, the King established a new electoral system, which mixed elections with nominations: the colleges
remained as before—persons who met the qualiﬁcations established in 1814, although
the age requirement was reduced to 21 from 30, elected for life terms by the cantonal
assemblies—but the arrondissement colleges now nominated candidates, and the departmental colleges chose the deputies, with at least half chosen among the arrondissement
nominees (Beck 1974, 45; Duvergier 1827a, 15). To be elected, deputies had to be 25
years of age, a reduction from 40 years. Departmental electors, as under the earlier
Napoleonic system, had to be on the list of the most heavily taxed.787
In February 1817, an electoral law placed the restoration regime on a new foundation.
It gave the right to vote for deputies to all French males, not deprived of their civil or
political rights, 30 years of age, or older, and paying 300f. in direct taxes (Duvergier
1827b, 100). There would be only a single electoral college, which would directly vote
785

This is suggested by Crook (2000, 67), although the ordinance of July 31 1815, strongly implies that
the colleges were still those nominated by the cantonal assemblies, in which there was near manhood
suﬀrage (Duvergier 1827a, 21). For a discussion of the negotiations over the electoral law, see Collins
(1979, 153).
786
The Chamber was composed of 368 deputies elected directly by arrondissement colleges, 238 deputies
elected by departmental colleges, and 23 deputies chosen by select departmental colleges from a list
drawn up by chambers of commerce. The cantonal assembly would elect the departmental and arrondissement colleges, still on the broad suﬀrage qualiﬁcations that included nearly all French male
citizens aged 21 years. Persons elected to the departmental colleges still had to be drawn from the list
of the 600 highest taxpayers in the department. Elections were held under his system, and while chaotic
and suﬀering from low turnout, the deputies elected tended to be closer in background and politics to
the deputies of the late republic, rather than of the imperial period (Beck 1974, 38-43).
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Members of the Legion of Honor could be added by the prefect to the colleges, provided that any
added to the departmental colleges paid 300f. direct tax. Given the new membership restrictions, the
number of persons in the arrondissement and departmental colleges was an ongoing concern for the
government (Duvergier 1827a, 15).
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for deputies. It too would not last very long. In 1819, Abbé Grégoire—who during the
Revolution had advocated the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of the Jews, the
equality of races before the law, universal suﬀrage, and the execution of Louis XVI—
was elected. He was denied his seat for having been a member of the Convention
in 1792, and the Right quickly passed a new electoral law in 1820, the Law of the
Double Vote. The electorate was once again divided into two electoral colleges at the
departmental and arrondissement level.788 Two hundred and ﬁfty eight deputies were
elected by arrondissement colleges, which continued to require the 300f. direct taxation,
although fewer types of taxes were counted toward this amount. But a subset of the
arrondissement colleges—those who were in the top quarter of French arrondissement
electors in the department—voted additionally in departmental colleges for 172 new
seats.
Table 9.3 lists the approximate number of electors during this period. The column
labeled ‘Singular Direct Electors’ is the most important, as it tallies the number of
individual persons who had the right to vote directly for a deputy, avoiding doublecounting for periods in which the same elector could vote in multiple assemblies.789
While the pre-1817 period theoretically rested on the cantonal assemblies—in which the
bulk of the adult male citizen could participate—the relevant electorate was always in
the colleges. The 1817 law was, by contemporaries and many historians, “considered. . . as
a great victory won by liberalism at the time,” but it was also the ﬁrst electoral system
since the Estates General that did not rest in part upon the majority of the adult male
population (Fyﬀe 1896, 227).

The July Monarchy (1830-1848)
In 1824 Louis XVIII was succeeded by the absolutist Charles X. In 1830, the Chamber
voted no-conﬁdence in the King’s government, and after supporters of the Crown had a
weak showing in the subsequent elections he issued the July Ordinances, which included
788

Those departments that only elected one deputy who were to meet in a single college. For those
departments that only elected one member, the deputy was to be chosen by the departmental rather
than the arrondissement college, but these colleges could include no more than 300 or 400 electors,
depending on the size.
789
For the One Hundred Days (Constant’s Charter of 1815), both the arrondissement and departmental
colleges could directly elect the deputy, and members of one college could not be members of another.
For the Restoration Charter of 1814, as modiﬁed in July of 1815, only the departmental electors could
vote directly for deputies. There was considerable continuity in the number of singular direct electors
during the years 1814-1830, with the exception of the pre-1817 Second Restoration period.
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Table 9.3: Enfranchisement under the Restoration
Electoral System

Arrondissement Departmental
Singular Direct
Colleges
Colleges
Electors
One Hundred Days: each college elects deputies directly, multiple membership prohibited
1815

47,000
19,500
66,500
(0.15%)
(0.06%)
(0.22%)
Charter of 1814: arrondissement colleges nominate deputies, chosen by department colleges
1815

50,911
20,711
(0.17%)
(0.07%)
1816
48,958
20,066
(0.17%)
(0.07%)
Electoral Law 1817: direct elections by departmental colleges
1817

20,711
(0.07%)
20,066
(0.07%)

—

110,000
110,000
(0.36%)
(0.36%)
Electoral Law 1820: direct elections by colleges, dept electors vote in both colleges
1824

99,125
24,423
99,125
(0.32%)
(0.08%)
(0.32%)
1827
88,603
21,748
88,603
(0.27%)
(0.07%)
(0.27%)
1827
94,598
23,280
94,598
(0.28%)
(0.07%)
(0.28%)
Sources: Crook (2000, 1996), Rosanvalon (1992), Collins (1979), Stat. électorale (1881)
a severe restriction of the franchise: only electors in the departmental colleges, composed
of the top quarter of those who paid above 300f. direct taxation, could vote, and
the taxes that counted toward this amount were again restricted.790 The Ordinances
provoked the July Revolution, resulting in the installation of Louis-Philippe, Duke of
Orléans, as King.
The electoral system of the July Monarchy was established by the Charter of 1830
and the electoral law of April 19, 1831. The country was divided into single-member
constituencies, which would directly elect deputies. The franchise was expanded to
French male citizens over the age of 25 years and who paid 200f. direct taxation, as well
790

Additional restrictions included limiting the time in which the electoral register was shown to 5 days,
thereby making it more diﬃcult for an elector to assess whether they were on the register; and requiring
the votes of each elector to be recorded (Duvergier 1831, 127–32). The eﬀect would have been to
reduce the number of singular direct electorate to the levels seen in 1815 and 1816, around 0.07% of the
population and likely even lower given the restricted tax categories. A strict censorship regime was also
imposed on the press.
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as those who paid 100f. who were also members of the Institute or were oﬃcers in the
army or navy.791 Deputies had to be male French citizens over the age of 30 who had
paid a direct tax of 500f. The electoral law nearly doubled the number of voters, from
94,000 in 1830 to 166,583 in 1831. Still, the average constituency was very small, and by
1846 only 61 of 459 districts had more than 800 electors, while 172 had fewer than 400
electors (Huard 1991, 23).
Figure 9.1: Enfranchisement in France, 1815-1848

The enfranchisement rate for this period, beginning with the Restoration, is graphed
in Figure 9.1.792 The estimated eﬀect of the July Ordinances is also shown. Even after
the Revolution of 1830, provoked in part by an eﬀort to restrict the electorate, there was
no popular representation and the electorate was a tiny fragment of the population.
791

These had to have a pension of at least 1,200f. and be domiciled in the arrondissement for three years
(Duvergier 1838, 211). The type of taxes that counted to the 200f. amount was expanded.
792
Note that the y-axis shows percentages. The scale ranges from 0-1%. Those electors with multiple votes
are counted only once.
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The Second Republic, 1848-1851
Increasing political repression during a period of prolonged depression led to the revolution of 1848. On February 24, the Paris city hall was overtaken and a provisional
government was formed. On March 5 a decree announced elections for a constituent
assembly, by “direct and universal” suﬀrage: all French males aged 21 years and not
deprived of their rights and resident in the commune for 6 months could vote, while
all French males aged 25 years not deprived of their rights were eligible. Eligibility was
not tied to residence (Duvergier 1848, 92-94). The total number of representatives to
the constituent assembly would be 900, including Algeria and the colonies, which would
have 16 representatives (Duvergier 1848, 70–71). Elections would be secret and by list
ballot, with each voter having as many votes as there were available seats.793
The number of electors increased from approximately 246,000 to nearly 10,000,000
– from 0.68% of the population to 27.4%, an increase of nearly 4000%. In one sense, the
decree reinstated the broad electoral base that had, theoretically, existed until 1817.794
But the earlier systems had always been mediated through the successive rounds of
nomination and election, with the electorates that directly chose the deputies being
quite small. The constitutional convention elected in April and May 1848 maintained
the commitment to near manhood suﬀrage, and the constitution’s ﬁrst article declared
that “sovereignty resides in the universality of French citizens. – It is inalienable and
indefeasible. – No individual, no fraction of the people can claim to exercise it.” Article
24 declared that “suﬀrage is direct and universal” and the ballot is secret, while Article
25 provided that all French males, aged 21 years and not deprived of their political or
civil rights, and without any condition of cens, were electors. There would be a single
793

All citizens enrolled in the army or navy could vote. If they were on leave in their home commune,
they were to vote there; otherwise, they would gather in regimental assemblies and divide into departmental sections, casting their ballots for their home departments (Duvergier 1848, 79). The residence
requirement was speciﬁed in a follow-up instruction of March 8, 1848. Throughout this period, the
bankrupt were excluded from political and civil rights (Duvergier 1838, 211). This remained the case
in 1848: a decree of March 5th limited the suﬀrage to those who were not legally deprived of, or had
suspended, their civil rights, while the subsequent instruction speciﬁed that the categories for which
civil rights could be lost or suspended included naturalization in a foreign country, a felony conviction
(unless there had been rehabilitation), convictions in which the loss of the vote had been speciﬁed as
punishment, judgments for bankruptcy in which there had not been a subsequent settlement, and being
a ward of a psychiatric hospital (Duvergier 1848, 76).
794
The earlier existence of broad electorates underscores the magnitude of the change: the qualiﬁcations
required for elections to the Convention in 1792 had built upon the earlier qualiﬁcation of being an
‘active’ citizen, which in turn had been only modestly diﬀerent from the franchise qualiﬁcations for the
Estates-General. By contrast, in 1848 there was no preexisting broad electoral base.
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representative chamber, which would sit for three years.795
Following what should now be a familiar pattern, the near manhood suﬀrage would
not last long. In the May 1849 legislative elections, the conservative Party of Order won
the majority of seats. But by-elections in 1850 saw the victory of socialist candidates, and
the conservative majority decided to purge the electorate. The constitution had explicitly
barred the use of a taxpaying qualiﬁcation, and had set the age requirement at 21 years,
so they raised the residence requirements, imposed new burdens on registration, and
expanded the category of oﬀenses for which the right to vote could be removed.
The Law of May 31, 1850, raised the residency requirement from 6 months to 3
years, and required that the elector have their principle domicile in the canton for the
entirety of this period. Residence could be established by three years inscription on
the list of taxpayers. For sons at home and who had not been personally rated for
taxation, residence could be established by declaration of parents, step-parents, or other
related elders who were themselves domiciled for three years. For domestic workers who
primarily live with their employers, residence could be established by declaration of the
employers. If a worker, domestic or otherwise, had worked for multiple employers over
the course of the 3 years, a separate declaration was required of each of them. When
domicile was conﬁrmed by the tax lists, inscription on the electoral rolls was automatic;
otherwise, a sworn declaration had to be submitted between the 1st and 31st of December
each year.796
To the standard list of exclusions for certain crimes and bankruptcy were added
persons convicted of outrages against public morality or religion; or who had attacked
the principle of property and the family; persons convicted of vagabondage; and persons
convicted of interfering with army recruitment.797 The right to vote was denied for 5
years for persons sentenced to terms of more than one month for rebellion or violence
against public authority, for violating the ‘club law’ regulating political associations, for
795

Before adjourning, the constituent assembly passed an electoral law which speciﬁed the conditions for
denying an otherwise qualiﬁed French male citizen from having their name placed on the electoral
list, or for having their inscription on the list suspended. These were largely the same as outlined
by the March decree and subsequent instructions, and reﬂected longstanding French practice: persons
convicted of a felony; those convicted to three months prison for theft, fraud, or usury; non-reconciled
bankruptcy lost the right to have their names on the electoral list, while those accused of a crime or
not appearing in court, and those interned in psychiatric wards had their names suspended. Certain
functionaries were denied eligibility for election, as were those convicted of adultery (Huard 1991, 43).
796
When a parent or employer refused or was unable to make such a declaration, the justice of the peace
could assess whether the domicile requirement had been met.
797
Persons convicted of theft or fraud, who had been disfranchised if their prison sentence was greater
than 3 months, were now excluded regardless of the length of their sentence.
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illegally distributing pamphlets, and for soldiers who had been punished for various
oﬀences.
Of an electorate of approximately just under 10 million, 2,963,734 (30%) were disfranchised. Paris saw the greatest decline, with the city’s electorate declining by 56.6%.
The more working class districts of the city had their electorates nearly wiped out, with
the 12th arrondissement seeing 74.6% of its electors disfranchised. The industrial city of
Lille in the Nord department lost 80.3% of its electorate. Figure 9.2 shows the extent
of disfranchisement at the departmental level. The left panel shows the decline in the
enfranchisement rate for every department in France, as well as the national average,
which declined from around 28% in 1849 to slightly above 20% in 1850.
Figure 9.2: Disfranchisement in the Second Republic

But while there were no departments unaﬀected, there was considerable regional
variation. The right panel in Figure 9.2 divides the departments into quintiles, the
darker regions showing a greater level of disfranchisement. The major areas aﬀected
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were the industrial regions of the north, the Rhône region, centered on Lyons, and the
poor agricultural regions of Brittany and the Pays-de-la-Loire in the northwest. With
the exception of the latter, these were areas in which the Montagnards—the democratic
socialist faction—had performed well (Bouillon 1956). The Légitimists, however, drew
much of their support from the agricultural working class in the west, and many of their
supporters outside of the Assembly opposed the law (Huard 1991, 57).
In November 1851, President Bonaparte proposed to the national assembly the reinstatement of manhood suﬀrage, which was defeated by 355-348 votes. On December 2,
1851 came the coup d’état.

The Second Empire, 1852-1870
The electoral system and franchise under the Second Empire were organized to accommodate a broad electoral base with a centralized authoritarian administration. The
franchise qualiﬁcation largely renewed the initial electoral law of the Second Republic.798
The most notable disenfranchisements were of the colonies and Algeria—which lost the
representation in the legislative assembly—and of soldiers not on leave (“Statistique
électorale de la France” 1881, 319). The country was divided into equal single-member
electoral districts by ministerial decree, and redrawn every ﬁve years in order to secure
the election of oﬃcial candidates. An absolute majority of votes was required; but new
candidates were now eligible to compete for the second ballot, a change that allowed
the government to intervene where necessary to defeat opposition candidates (Cole and
Campbell 1989, 5). There were relatively few restrictions on standing for election, but the
government actively supported some candidates—the “oﬃcial candidates” whose campaign expenses were paid for by the government—and used a variety of techniques to
suppress others.

The Third Republic, 1871-1940
Following the collapse of the Empire during the Franco-Prussian War, elections to the
National Assembly were held on the basis of the 1849 electoral law (Duvergier 1871, 7–9).
A plurality, rather than an absolute majority of votes was required, and there was no
residence requirement for eligibility: deputies could be elected in multiple departments,
798

The imperial franchise did maintain the 1850 law’s waiving of the residence requirement for religious
ministers and functionaries
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although they had to choose which department to represent.799 Algeria returned 6
deputies; Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Reunion returned 2 deputies; and Guyana and
Senegal returned 1 deputy each. Soldiers on active duty were re-enfranchised. Despite a
conservative majority, and despite the antipathy expressed toward ‘universal suﬀrage’ by
inﬂuential deputies across the political spectrum, the electoral laws largely retained the
right of French male citizens to vote based upon a not prohibitively lengthy residence
requirement.
The right to vote was diﬀerent for municipal and national elections, with the “political” rather than the municipal franchise being more liberal. Municipal electors list
were divided into two categories: those who were automatically enrolled and those who
had to request that their name be included. Various classes of taxpayers and those who
were born in the commune were automatically registered if they were male citizens of
the age of 21; otherwise, the elector needed to be resident 2 consecutive years and ask
to be included on the registers. The municipal lists provided the basis for elections
to the Chamber of Deputies, supplemented by an additional list for persons who were
resident 6 months in the commune, and met the voting qualiﬁcations established in
February 1852, but who did not meet the municipal qualiﬁcations. The electoral register for national legislative elections, then, was compiled in three sweeps: the automatic
registration of persons of persons born in the commune, or on the tax roll or married
and resident for one year; those who requested to be on the municipal registry and were
resident two years; and those on the complementary list who were resident for 6 months.
This had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the enfranchisement rate in a department: those with a
larger proportion of the electorate inscribed on the second list—meaning there was less
comprehensive inclusion using the municipal list alone—had a considerably lower registration rate. The municipal franchise, however, was lowered to 6 months residence in
1884, removing any distinction between the parliamentary and municipal qualiﬁcations.
The electoral law of 1875 conﬁrmed the exclusion of soldiers, who had been enfranchised in 1871 but disfranchised in 1872 (Duvergier 1875, 534).800 The National Assembly
did, however, create a co-equal upper chamber elected by the members of department
councils and delegates chosen by the municipal councils.801 After Republicans and
799

Adolphe Thiers was elected in 26, and Gambetta in 8 departments. As a result, by-elections had to be
held in the 25 and 7 departments for which Thiers and Gambetta chose not to sit. This was magniﬁed
across the entire National Assembly, as many deputies ran in multiple seats to hedge their bets. As a
result the by-elections would sometimes be miniature general elections.
800
The exclusion of convicted criminals and the non-resolved bankrupt was also maintained.
801
Senators were chosen at the district level, by general ticket, by an electoral college consisting of depart-
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Bonapartists won a series of by-elections in 1871 and 1873, the monarchist dominated
chamber required that deputies be elected by an absolute majority, with a second ballot
if necessary, and returned to the single-member districts of the second Empire (Cole and
Campbell 1989, 49).802
The single-member district system was used until 1885, when the Republicans were
able to secure the departmental list system. Electors could vote for persons across lists,
but could not give more than one vote to any candidate, and an absolute majority was
required (Cole and Campbell 1989, 52). The departmental list had a short life, and after
General Georges Boulanger appeared to be gaining support for a coup, the republicans
revised the electoral laws and reestablished the single-member arrondissement system
favored by monarchists in 1875.803 For the remainder of the pre-WWI period elections
would be held in single-member districts.
A very slight measure of proportional representation was implemented in 1919, but
this system gave a beneﬁt “to those parties that could form joint lists before the election,
and discriminated against those which could not unite” (Cole and Campbell 1989, 6566). In 1919 this favored conservative parties, and when the Radicals and Socialists
came to power in 1924 they returned to the pre-war system, the last major revision to
the electoral system before WWII.804
mental deputies, general councilors, arrondissement councilors, and delegates elected by each municipal council in the department from among the electors of the commune. Initially, each council elected
1 delegate; in 1884 this was modiﬁed to provide a measure of proportionality. The size of municipal
councils was roughly based on the size of the commune. The law of December 9, 1884, provided that
councils composed of 10 members would elect 2 delegates; those composed of 16 would elect 3 delegates
of 21 would elect 6; of 23 would elect 9; of 27 would elect 12; of 30 would elect 15; of 32 would elect 18;
of 34 would elect 21; of 36 would elect 24; and Paris would elect 30. These delegates would then meet
in the departmental electoral college along with the other senatorial electors to elect the Senator.
802
There were some multi-member districts, but these were a minority.
803
Between 1885 and 1889, representatives were allocated based not on the total number of inhabitants but
on “inhabitants of French nationality.” This had the eﬀect of reducing the representative of areas—such
as along the borders and in the industrial regions—where there were a large number of non-citizens.
Each voter had as many votes as there were representatives, and could use as many or as few of these
as they chose. After 1889, representatives were again allocated based on the number of inhabitants
rather than French nationals.
804
The electoral law was changed in 1927, shortly before the next elections. After the war, a proportional
representation system was used, but this too was modiﬁed for political reasons: the ‘Third Force,’
combining republicans and socialists, passed the electoral law of May 9, 1951, intended to reduce the
support of Gaullists and the Communists. It did reduce the strength of Communists in 1953, who won
26% of the vote but only 16% of seats, but had a lesser eﬀect on the Gaullists, who won 22% of the vote
and 19% of the seats. No other party won more than 15%.
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Citizenship and Exclusion in the Metropole and Colonies
In France political rights were the monopoly of the male citizen, and a constitutive principle of French republicanism was that no non-citizen could claim any part of popular
sovereignty. The emphasis on citizenship in French republicanism had been intended
from the outset to exclude certain classes who had earlier been full participants in political life. Citizenship was equated with an equality of legal status, and the implication was
that the “privileged order. . . must be excluded from the right to vote and to be elected
more surely than you would exclude a foreigner, whose avowed interest at least might
very well not be opposed to your own” (Sieyès 1789b, 166, 168).
The exclusionary implications of citizenship were also directed against some Jewish
communities. The Jews of France were distinguished into two groups. “Those known as
the Portuguese, the Spanish, and the Avignonese Jews” were considered well-assimilated
and did not have important distinct statuses; they would “continue to enjoy the rights
they have had up to the present—and by consequence will enjoy the rights of active
citizens.”805 Alsatian Jews, however, remained excluded from citizenship until September
27, 1791, when it was aﬃrmed that all “Jewish individuals who will swear the civic oath”
were citizens, and that the oath “will be regarded as a renunciation of all the privileges
and exceptions introduced previously in their favor” (Hunt 1996, 99–101).806
The right to vote, then, was conditional upon citizenship, which was conditional
on the renunciation or the nulliﬁcation of distinct legal statuses. As the Revolution
continued, both access to citizenship and the equality of political rights for citizens
were restricted and denied (Weil 2002, 25). With the promulgation of the Napoleonic
Civil Code, French nationality was acquired when one was born to a French father;
born in France to foreign parents, upon request during the year of their 21st birthday;
or by request—subject to rejection—by one born outside of France to foreign parents,
but resident in France for 10 consecutive years after having declared an intention to
naturalize. Women could not naturalize.
By 1881, non-citizens resident in France constituted 2.7% of the population. But this
varied considerably by department: in the Nord, 21% of the population were non-citizens
805
806

Decree of January 28, 1790 (Rosanvallon 1992, 76, fn.2).
The day after the emancipation of the Jews, the measure’s opponents secured passage of a decree
ordering Alsatian Jews to present a list of debts owed to them by Christians, an eﬀort to make the
previous day’s emancipation contingent upon working out the debts (Szajkowski 1970, xxxiv). Jews
would be the subject of discriminatory laws throughout the Napoleonic period, notably the “infamous
decree” which annulled all debts held by Jews and various restrictions on their mobility and settlement
(Schwarzfuchs 1984; Szajkowski 1970, 920–24).
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Figure 9.3: Enfranchisement Rates in Third Republic Departments

(most born in France), 23% in the Alpes-Maritimes (the recently annexed Nice), and
14% in the Bouches-du-Rhône. In over half the departments the non-citizen population
was less than 1%. Figure 9.3 shows box plots of the continental French Departments’
enfranchisement rates, from 1871 to 1932. The departments that are consistently outside
the 95% interval are almost invariably those with a large non-citizen population.807
The naturalization laws were amended in 1889 to provide for the automatic acquisition of French citizenship by children born in France to non-citizen parents who were
born in France, the so-called “double ius soli.”808 The 1889 law decreased the propor807

The Seine, which did have a sizeable non-citizen population, saw a drastic decline post-1871. This reﬂected the large non-citizen population, the fact that it was a large city attracting signiﬁcant numbers of
migrants, who were less likely to be qualiﬁed for the municipal franchise; and perhaps most importantly,
the deep divisions and hostility that accompanied the suppression of the Commune. As elsewhere, the
reported enfranchisement rates are registration rates, as the burdens of registration have historically
been a means of intentional disfranchisement as well as a mechanism of providing for administrative
regularity.
808
The acquisition of citizenship by “double jus soli” could be renounced in the year after attaining
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tion of the population who were not citizens. But in many departments, immigration
and refugees from WWI led to an increase in the non-citizen population.809
Citizenship in Algeria and other colonies
The principle that new territories should be assimilated to the French legal system was
often seen as one of the Revolution’s central legacies; as much as possible, the colonies
should have the same form of civil administration and the same legal code as metropolitan France (Betts 2005, 13). In the colonial context the exclusionary function of citizenship was especially important in securing French control: some groups could be attached
to the French regime by its extension, while civil institutions could be established that
nonetheless denied the vast majority from meaningful political participation and civil
rights. But the exclusion of non-citizens from the suﬀrage was not applied everywhere,
and the contradictions and limitations of this principle were most clearly exposed by
Algeria.
The personal legal status of indigenous Algerians was based on their religion, with
the French codifying, extending, and enforcing the authority of Islamic religious law
in civil matters.810 The nationality of the indigenous, however, remained unclear. In
principle, French nationality and citizenship were synonymous, and as French jurist
Emile Larcher argued, there was a possibility that the Cour de Cassation—a ﬁnal appeals
court for civil matters—might decide that “regardless of whether they had or had not
retained their personal status” they were French citizens “and consequently they could
claim their political rights, and demand their registration on the electoral lists” (Larcher
1911, 384; cited in Brett 1988, 452).
The solution was the Sénatus-Consulte of July 14, 1865, which accorded the indigenous Algerians—Jews and Muslims—French nationality but explicitly severed this from
French citizenship: “the indigenous Muslim is French, nevertheless he continues to be
majority (Weil 2002, 56-7).
Additionally, the regions closely integrated into the cultural and economic life of the neighboring
country—such as the Alpes-Maritimes—likely saw a larger proportion of those who acquired citizenship
through double jus soli renounce this status.
810
On October 22, 1830, after the conquest of Algeria began, the government adopted the millet system:
with the exception of oﬀenses against the French, jurisdiction without appeal was given to a judge
of Islamic law for Muslims and a tribunal of three rabbis for Jews. The authority of the rabbis was
drastically reduced with formal annexation in 1834, and by 1854 the criminal authority of the Islamic
judiciary had been removed. A 1854 decree, however, aﬃrmed their authority over civil law and
expanded this beyond the cities, their limit of their jurisdiction before the French, and integrated its
enforcement into the colonial apparatus.
809
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governed by Muslim law. . . . He can, on his request, be admitted to the rights of French
citizenship, in which case he will be governed by the civil and political laws of France.”
The second article provided the same status and opportunity for access to citizenship to
Algerian Jews, while the third provided that foreigners with three years residence could
naturalize, upon which they would immediately have access to the rights of citizenship.
During the Government of National Defense in 1870, Adolphe Crémieux submitted
a series of decrees on the constitution of Algeria, the most important of which extended
citizenship to all indigenous Jews in Algeria. There is some confusion over the eﬀects
of the Crémieux decree. Azzedine Haddour and others have suggested that “Muslims,
unlike the Jews, had to renounce their religious law to obtain legal citizenship” (Haddour
2000, 5).811 In fact, the Crémieux decree did not allow Jews to become citizens without
abandoning their personal status: the collective grant of citizenship declared that “their
real and personal statuses will be from the promulgation of this decree regulated by
French law.”812 The premise of the Sénatus-Consulte was that as long as the indigenous
populations were subject to distinct legal statuses, they could not be granted citizenship.
This was maintained by the Crémieux decree, allowing French jurists to insist that there
was no denial of universal suﬀrage. But Algeria was not the only colony, and in other
places the indigenous population had been extended the right to vote without having
to give up their personal status. By the time of the 1789 Revolution, the French empire had been reduced to the sugar colonies in the Antilles and Indian Ocean, a few
outposts in India, and the communes of Gorée, Saint-Louis, and Ruﬁsque in Senegal.
Excepting India, the bulk of the non-French population were slaves. When the Second
Republic abolished slavery, it also declared that those “colonies puriﬁed of servitude
and the Indian possessions will be represented in the National Assembly” (Duvergier
1848, 194). In the 1871 National Assembly Guadeloupe, Martinique, La Réunion, Senegal, French India, Guyana, and the Algerian departments of Alger, Constantine, and
811

Azzedine Haddour is certainly correct that “Muslims and Jews were subjected to diﬀerent treatment,”
and that this was in large function related to the fact that the potential naturalization of Muslims was
seen as “a political threat to colonization and its political economy” (Haddour 2000, 5). Sophie Beth
Roberts notes that “in order to receive citizenship, Algerian Jews had to choose between the obligations
of citizenship and those of their religious community, giving up their religious personal status for French
civil status” (Roberts 2011, 17). This was not in the initial decree, but was a revision the following year
that required Jews to “renounce their indigenous status before a Justice of the Peace in front of seven
witnesses” in order to be on the electoral roll (Roberts, 2011, 70).
812
Earlier decisions had largely stripped the rabbinical judges of any authority, and naturalization had been
preceded by the extension of the metropolitan consistory system into Algeria. The decree therefore
would have had fewer legal and religious ramiﬁcations than for Algerian Muslims.
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Oran were once again given representation, which they maintained in the Third Republic’s Chamber of Deputies.813 The colony of Cochinchine—which covered much of what
would become southern Vietnam—was given a representative in 1881. All of the colonies
with representation in the Chamber of Deputies had persistently and signiﬁcantly lower
enfranchisement rates, but only in Algeria and Cochinchine did this amount to a disfranchisement of the vast majority of the adult population. Figure 9.4 shows the estimated
enfranchisement rate of the French colonies, as well as the average across metropolitan
French departments (hollow circle), with departmental representation in the elections
of 1871, 1885, 1901, 1909, and 1932.814 The electorate in Cochinchine was especially
reduced, a consequence of there being few French settlers, with an average enfranchisement rate of 0.15% or 3,000 electors over the course of the Third Republic, most of them
civil servants.815
The Algerian enfranchisement rate was quite small, but unlike in Cochinchine, there
was a sizeable electorate—that of French settlers, the indigenous Jews naturalized by
the Crémieux decree, naturalized foreigners, indigenous Muslims who had abandoned
their personal status and were able to naturalize, and after 1919 a restricted number of
indigenous Muslims who were extended the rights of citizenship while maintaining their
personal status.816 The enfranchisement rate when only French citizens are included was
on average 21.1%, closer to the colonial rate than the metropole, which was in part a
813

During debates on the constitutional laws, Lafon de Fongauﬁer had proposed that Senegal and Guyana
should elect one deputy each to the new Chamber. This was initially rejected, and the colonies were
deprived of their representatives until the law of April 8, 1879 (Duvergier 1875, 544).
814
The number of registered electors for the colonies—Algeria included—was not compiled with the
Annuaire statistique de la France , which formed the basis for the French Constituency Dataset. Only
in 1946 were the colonies included, and only in 1909 was Algeria included, the aggregate rather than
the departmental electorates. To get the number of registered electors in each colony, it was necessary
to refer to the Proces-verbaux of the Chamber of Deputies and ﬁnd, shortly after the election, the
veriﬁcation of powers for each elected deputy. These would include the number of registered electors.
Deputies were veriﬁed as they arrived, making it more diﬃcult to ﬁnd the relevant information; in
many cases, the veriﬁcation does not seem to have been reported. Accordingly, the data on colonial
enfranchisement rates is more limited than it is for the metropolitan departments.
815
The Senegalese enfranchisement rate shown in Figure 9.4 is calculated using the number of inhabitants
in the communes as the denominator, rather than the broader population of Senegal. In 1919, the colony
as a whole counted 16,000 electors, from a population of 22,771 citizens, 62,840 residents of the four
communes, and 1,187,830 native subjects, or 1.3% enfranchisement (Roberts 1929, 311). While Senegal
was more inclusive than Algeria and Cochinchine, this was true only in the four communes. This will
be discussed in more detail below.
816
The peoples of Cochinchine remained subject to indigenous law. An 1881 decree extended the terms of
1865 Algerian Sénatus-Consulte, but required knowledge of French—not necessarily literacy—to acquire
citizenship. Various classes of indigenous were exempt from the knowledge of French, including those
decorated with the Legion of Honor. Decree of July 14, 1881 (Laﬀont and Fonssagrives 1890, 411–13).
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Figure 9.4: Enfranchisement Rates in the Colonies

function of the large foreign population.
The lower rates in Algeria and Cochinchine were premised on the fact that the
population continued to be subject to distinct legal codes. As a central principle of
French law, this was contradicted by the fact that in both India and Senegal political
rights had been extended without requiring a renunciation of personal status.817
The citizenship status of Indians and especially Senegalese was an issue of considerable confusion during the Third Republic: they had the right to vote, and yet were
subject to distinct religious civil laws, and were—in some conditions—subject to the code
de l’indigénat, a disciplinary regime codiﬁed in the 1880s. When the Second Republic
extended representative institutions to Senegal and India, it excepted these colonies from
the citizenship requirements: “the indigenous inhabitants of Senegal and Dependencies
817

In both Senegal and the Indian colonies there were sizeable Muslim populations, although India also had
distinct legal systems for the Hindu and the considerable indigenous Catholic population (Deschamps
1997).
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and the French Establishments in India who can prove a residence of more than 5 years
in the said possessions are excused from all proof of naturalization” (Moleur 2000, 70).
In Senegal, political rights were limited to those who were born in one of the full
authority communes, Saint-Louis, Gorée, Ruﬁsque, and after 1887, Dakar. The much
larger population in the rest of the Senegalese territory was thereby excluded. In both
India and Senegal the Cour de Cassation found that even if the indigenous were not
French citizens, having not renounced their personal status, they had the right to vote;
but not being French citizens, they could only vote within the colony and not in any
other French territory. In 1916, the Senegalese deputy Blaise Diagne—the ﬁrst African
elected to the Third Republic’s Chamber of Deputies—secured passage of a series of laws
imposing military service on the residents of the Four Communes and, in return, secured
the extension of citizenship to the “natives” of the communes. This helped secure many
inhabitants in their right to vote, after a purge of the electoral register in 1908, which
explains the decline and the increase in the enfranchisement rate between 1901 and 1919
in Senegal seen in Figure 9.4 ( Johnson 1971, 80 fn.b).
As noted by Patrick Weil, it was possible to naturalize Algerian Muslims “in the status,” and after 1916 there was clear precedent in doing so (2002, 235). But this was only
adopted on a very limited scale in Algeria in 1919. The Third Republic did, however,
extend municipal voting rights to indigenous subjects in Algeria. In 1866 municipal
councils were reorganized to include representation for French citizens, indigenous Muslims and Jews, and foreigners. The qualiﬁcations for Muslim, Jewish, and foreigner
voting were considerably more restrictive than the qualiﬁcations required of French citizens, and the number of councilors allotted to these groups could never be below three
or greater than one third of the total number of councilors (Duvergier 1867, 5-7). In 1870
departmental councils were established, but only with French citizens allowed to vote.
The electors to the national Senate included, indirectly, municipal councilors. And so to
ensure that non-citizens in Algeria would not be included within the popular sovereignty,
the constitutional laws of 1875 stipulated that the senators from Algeria were to be elected
by deputies, to which only French citizens were eligible; by the French citizen members
of the General Council; and by delegates elected by the French citizen members of the
municipal councils, chosen among the French citizen electors of the commune.
In 1884, changes to the municipal law further reinforced European domination of
local political institutions. The European foreigners lost their representatives, as did the
“Israelites”; the former were now entirely excluded and the latter included in the citizen
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electorate. The size of the council’s representation was established by the proportion
of each community, but in greatly unequal terms (Weil 2005, 96).818 Reinforcing this
inequality, French citizens were automatically registered while indigenous Muslims had
to request and have their registration approved (Collot 1987, 96).
Even this restricted electorate was too inclusive for matters dealing with the colonial
budget. In 1898, colony-wide Délégations ﬁnancières were established to counsel the
Governor General and approve the budget.819 As with the municipal councils, there were
to be separate indigenous and citizen electorates. But these were further subdivided in a
corporatist arrangement based on economic interests: agricultural ‘colons’ were allotted
twenty-four representatives, as were ‘non-colons’; nine representatives for Arabs in the
civil territories, six for Arabs in the military territories, and six Kabyles. Each delegation
was to meet individually, although they could be called to meet together.
To be a ‘colon’ elector one had to be a French citizen on the municipal registry,
aged at least 25 years, and possessing and using landed property as the owner, farmer,
or operating manager. ‘Non-colon’ electors had to be French citizens aged at least 25
years, registered on the tax rolls, and not considered ‘colons’—primarily urban property
owners. Both ‘colons’ and ‘non-colons’ had to be resident in Algeria for a minimum
of 2 years, and to have been citizens for a minimum of 12 years (Collot 1987, 218–19;
Goujon and Demonts 1898, 452). While more restricted than the municipal councils,
there was nonetheless an actual electorate. The same cannot be said of the indigenous
representative. The Arabs representing the military territories were chosen by the Governor General from a list of 18 candidates selected by the division commanders, while
the Arabs for the civil territories were elected by the indigenous members of the municipal councils. The Kabyle representatives were elected by the chiefs of the “kharouba.”820
In 1901, the electorate for the French Délégations was 93,000, or 14.8% of the population; the total Muslim electorate was 5,000 or 0.14%, of which approximately 3,400 were
Kabyle rather than Arab.821 In 1908, the right to vote for departmental councils was ex818

For the citizen representation, there were 10 councilors for each 500 citizen inhabitants, 12 for each
1,500, and 16 for each 2,000; for the Muslim representation, there were 2 councilors for communes with
between 100 and 1,000 indigenous inhabitants, with an additional councilor for each 1,000 inhabitants
but never to exceed 6 or a quarter of the municipal representation (Collot 1987, 96).
819
Until 1945, the Algerian budget was prepared by the Governor General, voted on by the Délégations
ﬁnancières and the superior government council, before being sent to Paris for ﬁnal approval (Collot
1987, 205; Goujon and Demonts 1900, 583).
820
These referred to groups of individuals united by kinship.
821
Collot argues that the indigenous Délégations were elected by the taxpayers of the diﬀerent indigenous
taxes—the achour, the zekkat, the hokor, and the lezma. I have been able to ﬁnd no statutory basis
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tended to indigenous Muslims, but the franchise was that of the Délégations ﬁnancières,
rather than the more inclusive municipal qualiﬁcations (Collot 1987, 54). In 1914, the
right of indigènes to vote in municipal elections was expanded to an additional number
of categories, largely enfranchising former soldiers and those who had received various
certiﬁcates of education (Lange 1914, 16).
The most important reform in Algeria during the Third Republic came with the
Charles Jonnart Law of February 4 1919, which extended citizenship “in status” to indigenous Algerians. But unlike the Senegalese law, whose grant of citizenship had been
both “in status” and automatic, in Algeria it was highly qualiﬁed and granted by request.
Only those indigenous males aged 25 years, who were monogamous or bachelors, had
never been convicted of certain crimes, and were resident two years consecutively in
the same commune in France or Algeria, and were included within a list of categories
such as service in the armed forces, functionaries, and property owners could request to
become citizens. There were very few takers, and between 1919 and 1930 only 1,204 were
naturalized “in status,” out of 1,547 requests, while 760 were naturalized by accepting
French civil status (Weil 2002, 240).
More importantly, an accompanying decree of February 6 1919 extended the right to
vote for municipal councils, for the Délégations ﬁnancières, for the general councils, and
for the superior government council.822 The basic forms of municipal government in Algeria were the communes de plein exercice, in areas of predominantly European settlement
and with equivalent powers to those in France; the communes mixtes, limited authority
councils in areas with a small European population and for which only Europeans had
the vote (from 1884); and the douar, set aside for indigenous communities and governed
by the djemaâ, an ostensibly traditional tribal council (Collot 1987, 119–30).823
The 1919 reforms sought to reinvigorate the djemaâs, making them elected bodies
for this claim, and the August 23rd Decree establishing the Délégations provides the qualiﬁcations I
have listed above (1987, 219). When discussing the Conseil Général, for which the qualiﬁcations for the
indigenous electors were the same as the Délégations, he says that there were 5,000 indigenous electors.
This would accord with the qualiﬁcations I have listed, rather than the 90,000 indigenous electors that
he suggests (1987, 219). He also suggests that there were 93,000 citizen electors in 1901; this seems
unlikely, as there were only 9,000 electors in the department of Alger that year, although there were
35,693 in the department by 1910 (Bouveresse 2008, 248). Jacques Bouveresse suggests that there were
60,000 citizen electors in 1905, and 93,106 by 1930 (2008, 83). I believe the latter number reﬂects the
size of the electorate after the 1919 reforms.
822
The latter was a council that would examine the budget. It was composed of 15 general councilors and
16 ﬁnancial delegates, each elected by their peers, 22 government oﬃcials, and 7 members named by
the Governor, of which 4 were notable Muslims.
823
For a list of communes in 1902, see Révoil (1902).
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with tax raising revenues (Thomas 2005, 70). It also provided for a measure of indigenous representation in the communes mixtes, as each djemaâ was to elect a president who
would in turn be a member of the municipal commission of the communes mixtes. And it
extended the right to vote in the communes de plein exercice to indigenous Muslims aged
25 years or more belonging to certain categories, such as former soldiers or property
owners (Bocquet 1920, 82). The right to vote for general councils and the Délégations ﬁnancières was extended to all indigenous Muslims on the municipal electoral lists for the
communes de plein exercice and members of the djemaâs and municipal commissions in the
communes mixtes—but not for the djemaâ electorate (Bocquet 1920, 82; Thomas 2005,
71).824 This measure enfranchised about 93,000 indigenous Muslims in the communes de
plein exercice, approximately 9% of the indigenous population living within these communes, versus 140,000 French electors (23.4% of the total French population); 330,000 in
the djemaâs, approximately 10% of the indigenous population living in these jurisdictions
(Collot 1987, 126); and 103,000 for the general council and Délégations ﬁnancières, 2.1% of
the total indigenous Muslim population.825 Throughout this period, there was near manhood suﬀrage for French citizens in the municipal and general councils, but not in the
Délégations ﬁnancières. From 1884, between 20% and 23% of the French citizen population
could vote in elections for the municipal and general councils, while approximately 12%
could vote in elections for Délégations ﬁnancières.826
The Muslim communities of Algeria were not the only native communities. The
citizenship status of Jews, following the Crémieux decree, was never stable, and revisions
to the decree limited the grant of citizenship to those who were present in, or descended
824

Most sources suggest the Muslim electorate increased to 425,000 (see for instance Michel 2013, 176).
There is some confusion in Collot, as he writes that the Muslim electorate increased to 90,000 in 1919
before shortly after noting that “these reforms [1944-46] increased the electoral body of the second
college from 420,000 in 1919 to 1,200,000 in 1945, 1,330,000 in 1946” (1987, 100, 101). The diﬀerence is
to be attributed to the distinction between the communes de plein exercice and the djemaâs elected in
douars in communes mixtes. There were 90,000 Muslim voters in the communes de plein exercice and
420,000 in the douars communes mixtes.
825
Of the 103,000 electors for the general council and Délégations ﬁnancières, 10,000 of these were members
of the djemaâs and municipal commissions in the communes mixtes (Collot 1987, 56). By a law of
October 19th , 1919, the French citizen members of the municipal commissions of the communes mixtes
were entitled to elect delegates to vote for the department’s Senator. Still, no non-citizen member of
any municipal or general council could vote for the Senators.
826
In the Délégations, there was an enormous discrepancy between the number of electors for the French
citizen ‘colon’ and ‘non-colon’ colleges—with the one constituency in 1934 having 40 electors in the
‘colon’ college and 4-5,000 in the ‘non-colon’—despite each having the same number of representatives.
See the remarks by Galle, Séance of June 12, 1934. Délégations ﬁnancières algériennes : session ordinaire
de Mai-Juin 1934, délégation des non-colons (Gouvernement général de l’Algérie 1934, 1084).

387

of those who were present in Algeria in 1830. This measure excluded the considerable
number of Jews who had emigrated from Tunisia, Morocco, and elsewhere, between
1830 and 1870. Furthermore, the decree applied only with the conﬁnes of the colony as
it was then established. The subsequent conquest of the M’Zab region did not extend
citizenship to the Jewish population there, who were denied citizenship into the 1940s
and beyond.827
Moreover, “anti-Jewish” campaigns in Algeria—organized by colonists with assistance from the broader anti-Semitic movement in France—frequently sought to purge
Jews from the electoral lists.828 An identity card, the ‘titre d’indigénat,’ was required as
proof that they had been included by the decree, which meant Jews could only secure
their status as citizens by proving an earlier status as indigenous. In 1896 Constantine,
for instance, 900 of 1,100 Jewish voters were disfranchised (Roberts 2011, 71).829 The
Crémieux decree was abrogated on October 7, 1940, four days after the Vichy regime
deﬁned the racial status of a ‘Jew’ as someone with three Jewish grandparents, or with
two Jewish grandparents and married to another ‘Jew.’ The political rights of Algerian
Jews were now governed by the laws establishing Muslim political rights, but the community would remain subject to French civil law. And on October 11, the Vichy regime
excluded Jews from the terms of the 1919 Jonnart Law, which would have allowed many
to retain their citizenship (Roberts 2011, 308–10).

The Enfranchisements of the Fourth Republic
Algeria and the Colonies
The Second World War created the opportunity for a radical change. The Crémieux decree was restored, and in 1943 the Comité de la Libération Nationale decided to “attribute
to many tens of thousands French Muslims the entirety of the rights of citizenship without allowing the exercise of these rights to be impeded or limited by objections founded
on their personal status” (Moleur 2000, 65 n.1). The Constituent Assembly of 1945 was
elected by the departments of France and most of the colonies.830 Elections were not
827

“[E]xcept in cases of individual naturalization, the Jews of the M’Zab retained the status of ‘native
Israelite’ until 1962” (Weil 2002, 229).
828
The label ‘antisemite’ was eagerly adopted by the movement in France; in Algeria the label of ‘anti-juive’
was more common, although not exclusive.
829
While the turn of the century was the period of most heightened anti-Semite activity until the 1930s,
periodic but not as extensive disfranchisement eﬀorts continued throughout this period.
830
The non-citizen populations of the protectorates, such as Tunisia and Morocco, were excluded.
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organized in Indochina, where the French no longer were in control (Huard 1991, 378).
The colonial electorates were divided into citizen and non-citizen colleges. But while
all French citizens, including women, could vote in the ﬁrst colleges, only certain categories of non-citizens could vote in the second colleges: “notables évolués”; members of
local assemblies, or quasi-public agencies; state employees; former soldiers; chiefs and
representatives of indigenous collectivities; religious ministers; and certain categories of
diploma holders; the commercial electors to the chambers of commerce.831
In May 1946, the Constituent Assembly passed the Lamine Guèye law—named after
the Senegalese deputy who proposed it—which declared that “all French subjects of
the over-seas territories (Algeria included) have the status of citizen, on the same right
as French nationals of the metropole and of the overseas territories.” The subsequent
constitutional draft largely reproduced the Lamine Guèye law and speciﬁed that “citizens
who do not have French civil status maintain their personal status as long as they have
not renounced it. This status can in no case constitute a reason to refuse or limit the
rights and liberties attached to the status of French citizenship.”832
The electoral law of October 5, 1946, however, considerably reduced the impact of the
extension of citizenship (Guillemin 1958; Figure 9.5). There was increased representation
for the colonies—although far from parity—but the separate colleges would be retained
for Algeria, Equatorial French Africa, and Madagascar.833 The ﬁrst college would include
all citizens with French civil status, while the second included “autochthonous” citizens
who retained their personal status and met certain criteria, which varied depending on
the territory. This was a clear inequality between citizens based on retention of personal
status, in violation of the Constitution. Whereas the Third Republic had maintained the
distinction between citizen and indigène, extending political rights to the latter only in
831

The statistics are for the June 1946 elections to the Constituent Assembly (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques 1947, 408–9).
832
The Fourth Constitution also established the Union Française, an overarching structure between the
Republic of France (which included the bulk of the colonies) and the associated territories (Cameroon
and Togo) and states (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Tunisia, and Morocco). The Union was governed by
the President of France, by a High Council composed of French ministers and representatives of the
associated states, and by an assembly half composed of representatives of metropolitan France and the
rest from the overseas and associated territories and states. In practice, authority remained vested in
the French government. Diﬀerent electoral systems were used across the diﬀerent member states and
territories.
833
West French Africa—Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, Soudan, Niger, Cote d’Ivoire, and Dahomey—had a
single college, as did Togo, the Comoros, and, ostensible, Cochinchine, although this last was acknowledged to be outside of French control. The metropolitan departments elected 544 deputies, Algeria 30,
and the remaining colonies 34.
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Figure 9.5: Enfranchisement Rates in the French Departments and Colonies

India and Senegal, there was now a distinction among citizens.834
By an ordinance of March 7, 1944, various categories of Algerian Muslims, male and
over the age of 21, were extended citizenship, but with the limitation that the status did
not descend automatically to their children.835 All male Muslims aged 21 years were
834

The Somali Coast, the future Djibouti, was only added to the legislation by the law of July 13 1948.
For West French Africa, Togo, Equatorial French Africa, and Cameroun the included categories were
persons who were notable ‘évolués,’ according to the local regulations, or current or former members
of the local assemblies and economic societies, members of the Legion of Honor and various medal
holders, functionaries, those who have worked for two years in a non-temporary position for various
commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, religious ministers, former and current soldiers,
business owners, chiefs and representatives of indigenous collectivities, owners of real estate, and
holders of hunting or driver’s licenses. To this was added, a law of August 27 1946, “all those who can
prove that they can read or write in French or Arabic.” This was not a restriction, but a supplementary
category. For Madagascar and the Comoros, the categories were those who were entitled to vote for the
representative assemblies or any of the categories for the African colonies.
835
In June 2012 the Constitutional Council of France aﬃrmed that those who received citizenship by the
March 7 1944 ordinance did not pass this onto their children. Those who had received citizenship via
the Jonnart law or the Sénatus-Consulte of 1865 were able to pass this status to their children. Decision

390

extended the rights of the Jonnart law of 1919, meaning they could vote in a second
electoral college for municipal councils, departmental councils, and the Délégations ﬁnancières. And by an ordinance of August 17, 1945, the second college was entitled to
vote for deputies to the National Assembly, with the same number of representatives as
the much smaller ﬁrst college.
The October 1946 law maintained this system, but extended the right to vote in the
ﬁrst Algerian electoral college to “French Muslim citizens” and other Muslims included
in one of several additional categories, such as education and military service.836 The
second electoral college continued to be based on the March 7th ordinance. While women
were enfranchised in the ﬁrst college, this was eﬀectively limited to Europeans: previous
grants of citizenship had been exclusively limited to men, and the new supplementary
categories were largely areas in which men would predominate. Muslim women were not
enfranchised in the second college.837 This system was largely the basis for the establishment of the Algerian Assembly—which established a greater degree of autonomy for
the colony—on September 20, 1947, with 60 delegates chosen by the each college.838
In May 1958, commanders of the French army seized control of Algiers, took the
island of Corsica, and prepared to seize Paris. Charles De Gaulle let it be known that
he was willing to proﬁt from the putsch, and shortly afterward the President of the
Republic ceded his place to the General. A new constitution was drafted, and upon its
approval by referendum, the Fifth Republic was inaugurated. For the referendum and
accompanying legislative elections, Muslim Algerian women were enfranchised and a
single electoral college was established. In 1962, a referendum on Algerian independence
was overwhelmingly approved, but with most persons of European descent abstaining.
Figure 9.6 shows the enfranchisement rate in Algeria from 1871 until 1982, both as a
proportion of French citizens and of the total population. Worth noting is the continued
discrepancy in the 1946 elections, the result of the exclusion of female Muslims.839
n°2012-259 QPC June 29, 2012.
The categories were those holding combatant cards from 1914-1918, holders of the Cross of War for
1939-40 or of the Liberation, holders of primary school certiﬁcates, those who had attended secondary
school, elected members of municipal, administrative councils or various agricultural or industrial
societies.
837
The National Assembly did include a provision enfranchising Muslim women in the law of September
20, 1947, but this was to be established by the Algerian Assembly, which never took up the issue.
838
The Algerian Assembly was elected according to the qualiﬁcations of the March 7, 1944 ordinance,
which was more restrictive than the October 5, 1946 law. Elections to the National Assembly continued
to be based on the latter law.
839
The rate of enfranchisement is inﬂated for the ‘citizen’ college in 1946 because those Muslims who were
included by the Ordinance of 1944 were all males over the age of 21. The increased enfranchisement
836
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Figure 9.6: Enfranchisement in the Algeria

The situation was somewhat diﬀerent at the level of local assemblies, and the enfranchisement rate among indigenous Muslims and French citizens—across diﬀerent councils
and assemblies—is shown in Figure 9.7. The exclusive nature of the Délégations is easily
visible, for indigenous as well as French citizens. But so too is the consistently higher
rate of citizen enfranchisement for all of the assemblies—municipal and departmental
councils, as well as the Délégations—a diﬀerence maintained by the enfranchisement
of female citizens in 1946. This diﬀerence in enfranchisement rates magniﬁed the disproportionately small share of representation on these councils that was allowed the
indigenous community.
The Fourth Republic enfranchised many of the subjects of the empire, but it diﬀused
this potential political inﬂuence through segregated electoral colleges, by not enfranchisrate in the 1962 referendum is likely because the FLN had entered into an agreement with the French
government, and thus had ceased abstaining and opposing participation. The decline thereafter is
likely a product of there being a reduced incentive to register during the period of one-party rule.
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Figure 9.7: Enfranchisement in Algerian Local Assemblies

ing women equally across the new demarcation of citizen and ‘autochthonous’ citizen,
and by ensuring that the colonies were never allocated the proportion of representation
to which they were entitled on the basis of population. In 1954 North Vietnam was
formally established, ending the Indochina War. The following year Cambodia declared
its independence, followed shortly after by South Vietnam. In March 1956 Morocco
and then Tunisia declared their independence. In 1956 the ‘loi-cadre’ of Gaston Deferre
established a unique college—in which all classes of citizens voted together— in all the
colonies but Algeria, and devolved considerable executive and legislative powers to the
colonies. In 1958, the colonies were given the option of being a member of the new
French Community, of remaining an overseas territory, or becoming an overseas department. Guinea voted against the new constitution, and thereby chose independence. The
remaining colonies either remained overseas territories or became member states of the
French Community. Over the next two years, almost all of the colonies would declare
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their complete independence. The Community was formally abolished in 1995.
The Exclusions of Women and Soldiers in Metropolitan France
The Fourth Republic also brought important changes to the franchise in metropolitan
France, most importantly the enfranchisement of women. “French women,” note Steven
Hause and Anne Kenney, “voted in national elections before the completion of Notre
Dame Cathedral,” and for over ﬁve centuries “privileged women of all estates retained
the vote, both local and national” (1984, 3).840 The voting rights of certain classes
of women to the First Estate (religious orders) was clearly established by the King’s
instructions of 1789.841 Noble women holding their own ﬁef, girls, widows, and noble
minors, could name a representative in the Second Estate (nobility) to vote on their
behalf.842 But while the elections to the Third Estate were supposedly on the basis of “all
the inhabitants” (Hause and Kenney 1984, 4), there is little evidence that women either
voted or were so entitled.843
Women’s suﬀrage had been the source of political controversy in the Third Republic,
and an equal franchise measure was passed by the Chamber of Deputies in 1919. It was
defeated by Republicans in the Senate three years later, a pattern that would be replicated
several times before the outbreak of WWII. Women’s suﬀrage was not ‘delayed’ or late,
so much as it was consistently defeated, which we will explore in Chapter 11. As with the
political rights of colonial subjects, a regime change was required to achieve any change
to women’s political status, despite a liberalization of their civil status. Women’s right
to vote was ﬁrst established by decree on April 21 1944, by the Provisional Government
840

This right to vote for women was limited to widows, unmarried women maintaining their own household, and married women during the absence of their husbands. Most importantly, it was limited to the
privileged orders. It varied considerably across region and time, and seems to have been more ﬁrmly
entrenched in the north and east than elsewhere.
841
Articles 9 and 11, Convocation des États Généraux, Règlement Général du 24 Janvier, 1789 (Brette 1894,
71–72).
842
Article 20, Convocation des États Généraux, Règlement Général du 24 Janvier, 1789 (Brette 1894, 75).
843
This was noted by contemporaries, and a “Petition of Women of the Third Estate to the King” remarked
that women were “excluded from the national assemblies by laws so well consolidated that they allow
no hope of infringement,” and the petitioners did not ask “for your permission to send their deputies
to the Estates General” as “they know too well how much favor will play a part in the election, and
how easy it would be for those elected to impede the freedom of voting.” “Petition of Women of the
Third Estate to the King,” January 1st , 1789, in Hunt (1996, 60–63). The debates on the election of
Paris’ delegation likewise takes for granted that women were to be excluded. Furet, cites a consultation
“typical of enlightened urban opinion” from December 12, 1788: “If one eliminates the persons under
twenty or twenty-ﬁve years of age from the 700,000 or so individuals who make up the population of
Paris, barely one-half of that number will remain. This half will be reduced to one-fourth, at most, when
women are also removed” (Furet 1988, s68).

394

in Algiers. Supported by the Communists and De Gaulle, the measure was opposed by
the Radical Republicans, as they had opposed it while the dominant party of the Third
Republic.844 Shortly after the Liberation, women voted in municipal elections and then
for the constituent National Assembly.
The other major exclusion of the Third Republic was of soldiers ‘under ﬂags,’ that is
in barracks or on campaign. Disfranchisement occurred at the same time that the French
military was being re-organized in reaction to the loss against Germany: conscription
was established and all male French citizens were required to perform 5 years of military
service, with all those between 20 and 40 years of age eligible to be called upon during
war. There were exceptions for the clergy and teachers, for those pursuing an education,
or if holding a degree, willing to pay 1,500f. The length of service was reduced to three
years in 1889, and to 2 years in 1905, with a corresponding reduction in exemptions
(Flynn 2002, 18–19).
Conscription meant that the denial of the vote to soldiers excluded a considerable
number of persons, primarily young, working class men, between 1.2% and 1.7% of the
population, or approximately 6-8% of the adult male population.845 The Provisional
Government would enfranchise the military by decree on August 17 1945.
Figure 9.8 shows the enfranchisement rate for metropolitan France from 1848 to
1958. The disfranchisement of 1850 is easily visible, as is the enfranchisement of women,
which greatly increased the electorate, taking it from 30% to 60%. Otherwise, the only
other signiﬁcant legislative determinant of the metropolitan enfranchisement rate was
the citizenship law of 1889, which had a long-term but modest impact on the national
enfranchisement rate. One factor worth emphasizing, as it was an important concern
during the Third Republic, is the remarkable stability not just in the enfranchisement
rate but in the number of electors and the size of the population. In 1848, there were
9,977,452 electors; in 1868 there were 9,914,595; in 1878, there were 9,991,872; and
by the end of the Third Republic in 1940 there were 11,849,325. Over the course of
almost one hundred years, the French electorate had increased by only 18%. To put that
in perspective, the English electorate had increased by 41% between 1885 and 1910, a
period in which there was no legislative expansion of the franchise.
844

Even before the decree enfranchised women, Marthe Simard was selected by French established in
Canada as their representative to the Assembly, in 1943.
845
Put another way, those disfranchised by military service amounted to approximately 6% of the actual
electorate.
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Figure 9.8: Enfranchisement in France, 1848-1958

Politics of the Third Republic
The Ascendancy of the Radical Republic
The importance of the Chamber of Deputies to the political life of Third Republic
France is diﬃcult to overstate. While the concurrence of the Senate was required to pass
legislation, it was the Chamber that elected the President, and it was the support of the
Chamber—in which individual deputies had considerable authority—that was necessary
to sustain the Cabinet government. The President had the legal authority to dissolve
the Chamber, with the support of the Senate, and organize new elections, but this was
only used once, in 1877 by President Patrice Mac Mahon. The resulting Seize Mai Crisis
ended with a resounding victory for the republicans, the resignation of the President,
and the desuetude of this authority.
Broadly speaking the dominant political tendencies of the Third Republic were ‘op396

portunist’ or moderate republicanism before 1900, and Radical republicanism after 1900.
This characterization, however, conceals a considerable amount of partisan instability
and change. Léon Gambetta, a leader of the opportunistic faction in the late 1870s, had
been the leader of radicalism in the National Assembly. The Radicals regained a distinct identity when Georges Clemenceau split from the opportunists in 1876, and came
to ascendency after 1900. Having spent the ﬁnal decades of the 19th century posturing as
the principled counter to the opportunists, they were by the 1910s considered to be the
party of opportunism, a judgment that has been shared by most subsequent historians.
For instance, they had consistently held that the Senate should be abolished, or at least
elected by male citizen suﬀrage; in 1907, after they had become the largest party within
the chamber, they dropped this plank in their platform.
To understand the context in which conﬂict over the right to vote occurred, we need
to understand the basic structure of the party system and its development during the
Third Republic. This, however, is made diﬃcult by a couple of factors. Most importantly,
and itself a crucial parameter structuring the politics of the period, is that there were
very few coherent parties that integrated the parliamentary delegation, the local electoral committee, and a national community of party activists. Neither the electoral system used for the bulk of the period—mostly single-member constituencies with run-oﬀ
elections when no candidate won a majority of votes—nor the organization of authority
in the Chamber of Deputies encouraged the formation of nationally organized and disciplined parties. The representatives of constituency sentiment—republican, monarchist,
socialist, nationalist—could coordinate if need be for the second round of voting, and
so there was no pressing need to unite until then. And the organization of the Chamber
of Deputies gave considerable power to individual deputies. For instance, each deputy
had the power of interpellation, the right to interrupt the order of the day to demand
an explanation on an issue by the responsible minister. The response was followed by
a vote on the orders of the day, and if an order was passed adverse to the government
they would likely resign. Lacking the threat that the defeat of a government would lead
to a new election, deputies used the power of interpellation frequently: by 1897 10 ministries had fallen on this basis, and between 1875 and 1940 there were 16 elections but
84 governmental reversals.
Classiﬁcation of political parties is also made diﬃcult by the process of “sinistrisme,”
a term coined to describe the gradual right-wing movement of political parties in France
as they were displaced by new parties to their left (Thibaudet 1932, 29). The early
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radicals around Gambetta were by the 1910s organized as the Fédération Républicaine
(known in parliament as the Union républicaine démocratique), the principal conservative party of the period. The Radical-Socialists of the 1890s were by the early 20th
century the party of the small bourgeoisie and private property, challenged on their
left by the increasingly popular French Section of the Workers International (SFIO). The
SFIO after 1919 was in turn confronted by a left-wing challenge in the Communist Party.
The Communists fractured over the adherence of the party to the Soviet-led Communist
International, and so they faced a challenger from Unité prolétarienne. The result of this
displacement was a confusing situation in which the most right-wing parties not only
disavowed the label of ‘right’ but labeled themselves as parties of the left.
A ﬁnal diﬃculty in classiﬁcation is that there were a number of important issues
that were orthogonal to the left-right seating arrangements in the Chamber of Deputies.
Republicanism or monarchy initially separated the left and right, but a papal bull issued
on February 20, 1892— in French rather than Latin—called for the acceptance of the
Republic, the so called ‘ralliement.’ This was rejected by most organized Legitimists and
bishops, but the emergence of a bloc of Catholic liberals—the ‘ralliés’—helped reduce
the political signiﬁcance of the monarchy/republic divide.846 Republicans continued to
be divided from Catholics, including the ‘ralliés,’ over eﬀorts to suppress the Church’s
political inﬂuence; during the 1880s through 1920 this remained an important dividing
marker between left and right. And generally the left was more supportive of workers’
right to organize, opposed to defense spending, and opposed to the inﬂuence of large
industries and ﬁnancial institutions. But there were also elements of Catholic Legitimists
who supported workers’ syndicalization as part of their vision of a cooperative social
order, a form of collectivism that could ﬁnd adherents on the extreme left and right but
was anathema to the republicans and liberals of the center-left and center-right.
And a number of issues cut clearly across party lines, most notably nationalism
and anti-Semitism. Left-wing republicans had been most insistent on continuing the
war against Prussia after 1870, and most adamant for revenge thereafter. The recent
historical consensus is that the Boulangist movement of the late 1880s—the ﬁrst manifestation of what would become right-wing nationalism of the 1900s—had its strongest
support, and principal organizers, from left-wing republican and socialists constituen846

Both Legitimists and Orléanists ﬁgured among the ‘ralliés’ and among the recalcitrant. The rightist
newspaper La Croix called for a Catholic party—as did the Pope—and acquiesced to accepting the
Tricolor ﬂag only on the condition that the white segment be covered by a picture of the Sacred Heart
(Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 154).
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cies, although much of the ﬁnancial backing seems to have come from Legitimist and
Bonapartist sources (Mazgaj 1987). And until at least 1900, the anti-Semite movement
had support from both the radical left and the right; it was the Dreyfus Aﬀair that helped
make both anti-Semitism and nationalism right-wing in tendency.847
Figure 9.9: Distribution of Party Membership, Chamber of Deputies

Keeping these qualiﬁcations in mind, it is nonetheless possible to formulate a reasonable approximation of the structure and development of party politics in the Third
Republic. Figure 9.9 shows the distribution of party seats according to six main political tendencies: socialism (including communism), radicalism, moderate republicanism,
right-wing or conservative republicanism, monarchism, and right-wing nationalism.848
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Radicals and Socialists continued to invoke anti-Semitic themes, but the internationalism of the SFIO
helped temper the public displays of anti-Semitism among the latter and the legacy of the Dreyfus
Aﬀair helped moot it amongst Radicals.
848
These were calculated by placing the membership of diﬀerent formal groups in the Chamber of Deputies
into the category which best describes them for a given time. It draws on the data in Cole and Campbell
(1989), as well as the Journels Oﬃciel of the period.
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The value of this ﬁgure is that it enables a quick identiﬁcation of the median faction and
its strength relative to the parties to its right and left. For instance, from 1876 until 1900
the median party is the opportunistic republicans, but while in the initial period they
quite clearly dominate the center and the Chamber, by 1901 they are a minority faction
relative to the conservative republicans and the radicals, despite their median position.
Afterwards, the radical party tends to occupy the median, but the necessity of allying
with the socialists and with the opportunistic or moderate republicans is also evident.
Between 1876 and 1900 the Chamber was dominated by moderate republicans, who
were given the name ‘opportunist’ for their willingness to compromise principles—on
everything but the Republic itself—in order to hold power. They gradually opened up
the bureaucracy to install loyal republicans, and they established the key institution that
they believed would republicanize the citizenry: free, mandatory, and secular education.
On various occasions, most notably in 1877 and 1896, they formed the nucleus of a broad
eﬀort to secure republican unity. The rise of the Radicals after 1900 led to a splintering
of the opportunists into a variety of diﬀerent parliamentary groups and parties. But as
the Radicals became more important, they replicated in many ways the behavior of the
opportunists, and transformed from a position of strident criticism of the parliamentary
institutions—and notably the Senate—to their defenders and beneﬁciaries.

The Organization of Parties and Parliamentary Groups
A particular feature of the Third Republic was the importance given to parliamentary
groups, which bore a varying association to political parties. In the National Assembly in 1874 there were at least 8 groups, including the radical Republican Union, the
Left Republicans, the Center-Left, the Casimir-Perier Group, the Center Right, the Reunion of the Moderate Right, and the Extreme Right (Salles 1874). The function of these
groups was to organize support and tactics among their members for various measures,
as well as to agree on candidates for important posts (Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 259).
Membership was not exclusive, and so they were not limited solely to political parties.
A colonial group was formed in the Chamber on June 15, 1892, with 91 deputies; by
1893 there are 120 deputies in the group, 200 in 1902, and 250 in 1936 (Weil 2002,
231). An anti-Semite group was formed in 1898, though it was largely informal; later
that year, as the Dreyfus Aﬀair increasingly became an issue of republican solidarity,
the Radical-Socialist parliamentary group excluded the openly anti-Semitic members
who had been a persistently active minority of their adherents ( Joly 2007, 72). After
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1910 membership on most committees—including the standing Committee on Universal Suﬀrage—was allocated according to the size of the diﬀerent parliamentary groups
(Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 321).
In the late 19th century, the parliamentary groups and individual deputies’ relations
with their own district’s electoral committee were the most important institutional factors conditioning members’ behavior. Until 1901 all associations of more than 20 people
were under strict legal restrictions, and it was only with the relaxation of the association
laws that organized political parties began to emerge. The ﬁrst to organize was the Parti
Républicain, Radical, et Radical-Socialiste, which as the name suggests was an eﬀort to
develop greater coherence between at least two separate self-identifying factions.849 The
core of the Radical party was always the local committee: it was through membership
in the local committee that one was a member in the Radical party, and the committees
jealously guarded their autonomy against the national congress. So too did the parliamentary delegates, who initially at least were in a position of strength given that since
they had been elected before the party was organized they had potentially independent
bases of support. The result was a consistent struggle over whether the national organization could enforce discipline against parliamentarians who did not follow the party
line. Only in 1910 were Radical deputies obliged to join the Radical parliamentary group,
and at no point were they able to enforce voting discipline (Stone 1996, 172-73).
The French Section of the Workers’ International (SFIO), organized in 1906, did require its parliamentary delegates to adhere to the party line, a measure that greatly
enhanced the party’s coordination but that potentially limited the ﬂexibility necessary
to enter into governing coalitions. The French Communist Party was an even more disciplined party with considerable integration of the electoral committees, the national
activists, and the parliamentary delegation. After 1896 the moderate—‘opportunist’—
republicans tended to deﬁne themselves ﬁrst as progressives and then as the Alliance
républicaine démocratique, and they too formed a political party in the ﬁrst decade of
the 20th century (Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 214). There was not, however, a Catholic
party, in the sense of representing the institutional interests and positions of the Catholic
Church (Kalyvas 1996). There were, however, several parliamentary groups that repre849

There had been a radical faction in the Chamber of Deputies since the National Assembly, and the
Socialists were increasingly gaining ground in the constituencies. This had led to an alliance termed
‘Radical-Socialist’ in the 1890s, but not all Radicals nor Socialists adhered to it. The Parti Républicain,
Radical, et Radical-Socialiste sought to extend the breadth of political action for left-wing republicans
by attracting Socialists not-aﬃliated with the Workers’ International as well as Radicals and other
left-wing republicans.
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sented Catholic constituencies and that paid heed to the Church, notable among them
being Action Libérale, which organized into a party in 1901.
Relative to the United States and United Kingdom, political parties were less important in structuring the behavior of individual deputies, until the appearance of the SFIO
in 1906. But deputies were able to coordinate in parliamentary groups, and were highly
reliant on local electoral committees, whose preferences reﬂected varying combinations
of local versus national concerns and networks. They were also enmeshed in other organizations, with the freemasons being especially important for republicans. And the
diﬀerent factions of republicanism showed a remarkable ability to quickly put aside differences when there was an immediate threat to the regime, rather than the latent threat
that they always perceived. As in the U.S. and U.K., French deputies tried to balance the
competing demands of constituency and party opinion, with the former tending to be
more important than the latter.
Party opinion was reﬂected less in the disciplining of members, although expulsion from groups and the withdrawal of support in elections did happen, than in the
opportunities to gain a national audience. Well-received speeches in the Chamber of
deputies could be ordered posted at the city hall of communes across the country, and
newspapers—with clear ideological positions—would report on debates in the Chamber.
In part as a result of these inﬂuences, Chamber debate tended to be much more impassioned, with very diﬀerent forms of rhetoric, than other sites of deputy behavior, such as
committee meetings. Interruptions were constant, it was forbidden to read from a script,
and the site of applause or protests—from the extreme left to the extreme right—would
shift in the course of a single speech, as speakers invoked themes of known relevance to
diﬀerent factions.

Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the basic argument of the French case study and has documented the trajectory of the right to vote in France and the particular exclusions of
the Third Republic. It has outlined the partisan context in which the conﬂict over the
suﬀrage occurred during the late 19th century: a fragmented party system, with individual deputies having considerable inﬂuence, and a consistent leftward movement over
time of the Chamber median. The ‘opportunist’ republicans dominated until 1900, after
which the Radicals were largely in ascendancy. But no one party could govern without
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building a coalition, always unstable, from among the many diﬀerent political persuasions. The next chapter will look at the critical juncture of 1870 to 1877, highlighting
the importance of a radical republican interpretation of French political community in
building a coalition capable of securing the Republic and male citizen suﬀrage. The
republican vision of a legal regime—with citizens’ participation in politics limited to the
exercise of ‘universal suﬀrage’—threatened by monarchy, ‘ceasarism,’ and above-all, the
Catholic Church, would provide a shared language for republican activists, conditioning
their positions on the many proposals to modify the right to vote.

403

Chapter 10
The Republic Through the Side Door, 1870-1877

“Universal suﬀrage says to all, and I know of no more admirable formula for
public peace: be calm, you are sovereign.”
—Victor Hugo, May 21 1850.850

Introduction
The ultimate decision of the French National Assembly between 1871 and 1875 to establish a Republic based on manhood suﬀrage was claimed to be inevitable by many
republicans of the late 19th and 20th centuries. The republic was the only form of government adapted to the modern era, and its necessity reﬂected the logical progression of
civilization and of French history (Fouillée 1884). The Bonapartist Empire had just suffered a resounding defeat, and a monarchical restoration would have been, they insisted,
absurd: monarchy could “obviously not today be the object of any serious political application” (Dorlhac 1890, 7). But the more they insisted on the necessity of the republic,
the more they betrayed their anxieties that it was far from secure (Coignet 1903, 16;
Félix 1908, 213). “The republican idea is making rapid progress,” it was claimed, and
“soon this elementary concept will enter into a great number of French heads, that the
monarchy can no longer exist, under any form; the necessity of the Republic will be
generally recognized” (Leverdays 1892, 334). Soon, they believed; but perhaps not yet.
The republican regime in France was, by contemporary European standards, an
anomaly. Between 1875 and the First World War, the only other European republic
was Switzerland. Between 1870 and 1875—the lifespan of the National Assembly—
the First Spanish Republic had been declared, overthrown, and the Bourbon monarchy
850

Hugo (1937, 202-3)
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restored. Nor had the National Assembly, as republicans regretted, actually proclaimed
the Republic. Rather they had simply casually acknowledged it, a compromise accepted
by non-republicans in the belief it would leave the possibility open for later revisions. The
republicans had wanted a declaration “inscribed at the head of the Constitution,” but
the word was only used in passing, “The legislative power is exercised by two assemblies:
the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. . . The President of the Republic is elected by
the absolute majority of suﬀrages by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a National
Assembly.” As a biographer of Léon Gambetta wrote, “the Republic indeed slipped in
by the side door and not ‘sous la haute porte azurée”’ as they had hoped (Bury 1973,
220, 226).851
Republicans’ own understanding of the Republic’s founding signiﬁcantly shaped the
politics over the right to vote throughout the period, and this experience is the focus of
this chapter. Chapter 9 outlined the patterns of exclusion in the Third Republic, and
described a longer history of enfranchisement, disfranchisement, and manipulation of
the suﬀrage. Interpretations of this history were of crucial importance in informing the
strategies of political operatives during the National Assembly and afterward. The next
chapter will detail how the understandings of political community forged by republicans
in this period structured the behavior of political operatives, advantaging some franchise
projects over others.
In this chapter I detail the eﬀorts to establish the Republic, one that would be secured
from the disorders that had accompanied its earlier appearances. Radical republicans
drew both on longstanding traditions within republican thought but also their own experiences under the Empire to articulate a new narrative of political community. This
narrative enabled them to reassure liberals and conservative republicans, to connect
with constituencies outside of Paris, and ultimately to unite a coalition capable of shaping governing authority. The years 1870 to 1877 were a critical juncture, or perhaps more
accurately, a series of successive critical junctures. But while there was a heightened importance to the choices of well-situated actors, the participants in the drama were not
freed of the ideological legacies of the antecedent regime, and their sensitivity to this
legacy conditioned their behavior and, consequently, the institutions they constructed.
851

The line is from a poem by Victor Hugo, “The brilliant battalions surge, and pass, sacred legion, that the
people had just blessed, through the high azure door, of the dazzling future.” The poem is “To passive
obedience,” which takes as its theme the Bonapartist coup and the passive obedience of soldiers, “whose
cheeks have been tanned by Africa,” who are willing to obey by killing Frenchmen. It was written in
1853.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing how the experiences of the
Second Republic—notably the June insurrections by Parisian working class radicals and
the Bonapartist coup—undermined republican faith in the revolutionary legacy of popular politics and male citizen suﬀrage. By the late 1860s, however, a core group of radical
republicans had cohered around an interpretation of history and of political community that helped reconcile the ambiguities these events had provoked. I then discuss
the period from 1870 to 1875. Radicals entered the National Assembly as a discredited
minority, but the interpretation of French history and political purpose that they had
developed provided them with a strategic roadmap for building a broad coalition—in
the Assembly and in the country—capable of securing a republican regime. And their
reformulation of the ideological legacies of the antecedent regime was essential to successfully defending male citizen voting rights. I conclude by examining the compromises
that secured the republic, and how republicans’ understandings of political purpose both
enabled and were shaped by these compromises.

A New Republican Tradition
The experiences of the 1848 revolution and its aftermath greatly shaped the subsequent
strategies of republicans, especially of the new generation that came of age under the
Empire.852 The June insurrections, the elections, and the coup d’état of December 1851
had unsettled their assumptions about popular sovereignty, universal suﬀrage, and the
revolutionary tradition. The June insurrections by Parisian workers had been directed
not against a monarchical regime, but against the Republic itself; and the men on the
barricades claimed not the liberty of the republicans, but a right to work that veered
toward socialism. The election of Louis-Napoleon and a conservative National Assembly
had undermined republicans’ faith that the will of the nation was for the republic, and
thus should be given full sway through universal suﬀrage. The overwhelming validation
of the coup and the Empire by plebiscite reinforced these doubts.
By the 1860s, however, a network of radical republicans had begun to articulate
an understanding of French political community that allowed them to reconcile tensions
852

Judith Stone’s Sons of the Revolution provides an excellent account of the development of the historical
and political interpretation developed by radicals in the 1860s, “The mid-century upheavals of the 1848
Revolution and the Second Empire deeply marked this generation and profoundly aﬀected the republicanism they would eventually reconstruct during the 1860” (1996, 26). There is a broad consensus
among historians that the Third Republic was structured to a considerable extent by the concerns and
understandings of a new generation of republicans that emerged in the 1860s (Nord 1995, 1-5).
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between their various commitments—to the republic, to private property, and to popular
sovereignty—and suggested a political strategy for obtaining the Republic. The narrative
of political community provided them with a rationale to support male citizen suﬀrage
when many others rejected it. In order to understand the decisions of republicans in the
1870s, and the vision of peoplehood that they propagated in political campaigns and
parliamentary debate, it is necessary to discuss the historical context in which this was
developed.

Universal Suﬀrage and the Revolution of 1848
Throughout the 1830 and 1840s, republicans and many liberals argued that the cause
of the July Monarchy’s endemic corruption was the restricted suﬀrage regime, which
enabled the government to secure the election of its own candidates by bribing or intimidating the small, local electoral assemblies (Huard 1991, 24; Rosanvallon 1992, 278).
‘Universal suﬀrage’ had been a theme in republican thought since 1793, when the Constitution had promised direct manhood suﬀrage only be suspended and eventually replaced. In 1833 the Society for the Rights of Man demanded a single assembly elected by
direct universal suﬀrage (Huard 1991, 26–30). The same year, The New Republican Catechism listed as the ﬁrst principle of republican government that “sovereignty resides in the
universality of the citizens.”853 But these were a distinct minority, and most republicans
did not initially support an immediate establishment of male citizen suﬀrage. Neither
did many socialists, who like Louis Blanc opposed the immediate calling of elections
in 1848 because “for thirty years, the counter-revolution alone has spoken in France. . . .
The education of the masses has been done only by oral instruction, which has always
belonged and belongs still to the enemies of the Republic” (cited in Huard 1991, 35).
That male citizen suﬀrage was established in the days following the collapse of Orléanist monarchy was in large part a matter of contingent circumstance: those republicans, such as Alphonse de Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin who were present in Paris,
and whose active involvement in the February events led to their being selected to
the provisional government, were committed to the principle of male citizen suﬀrage.
Ledru-Rollin, one of the most outspoken proponents of this during the July Monarchy,
was named Minister of the Interior and given the authority to organize elections to the
Constituent Assembly. The elected Assembly would in turn maintain ‘universal suﬀrage’
in the new constitution, with some restrictions for those convicted of certain categories
853

Nouveau catéchisme républicain, by ‘Un Prolétaire’ (1833, 46–47).
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of crime. In what would become an important rallying cry of an increasingly organized
republican sentiment, the constitution of the Second Republic declared that, “sovereignty
resides in the universality of French citizens. – It is inalienable and indefeasible. – No
individual, no fraction of the people can claim to exercise it.”
Before the promulgation of the constitution, however, important cleavages in the
republican coalition had emerged. In the early days of the Revolution, the provisional
government—on the suggestion of socialist Louis Blanc—established public employment
centers (the National Workshops) to relieve the economic distress that both preceded and
followed the revolution. The elections to the Constituent Assembly, however, returned a
moderate and conservative republican majority, which began to crack down on socialist republican leaders. On June 21, 1848, the Executive Committee of the Constituent
Assembly ordered that the National Workshops be closed and that all unemployed persons in Paris either leave immediately, or if under 25, join the army (Stone 1996, 27).
Barricades were put up but within a week the insurrection had been suppressed, with
thousands dead or sent to Algeria.
In December 1848, Louis-Napoleon, whose adulthood had been spent attempting
poorly executed putsches, was elected president in a landslide. His campaign had been
built around an appeal to the working classes through vague promises of social reform,
to the nobility and monarchists as a man of order, and to the rural population as the
defender of property. In the May 1849 legislative elections, the conservative Party of
Order increased its majority of seats, with the moderate republicans losing seats to both
the Party of Order and the newly formed Democratic-Socialists. In June 1849, radicals
allied with Ledru-Rollin tried to stage a coup de force in the Paris streets, against LouisNapoleon whom they blamed for France’s involvement in the repression of the Roman
Republic in support of the Papacy. It was quickly crushed and Ledru-Rollin and others
ﬂed the country.
By-elections in 1850, however, saw the victory of socialist candidates, including some
exiled after June 1848; conservatives were especially incensed at the election of the
socialist and anticlerical candidate Eugène Sue in April 28. They drafted and quickly
passed the law of May 31, 1850, an attempt to purge the electorate of what Adolphe
Thiers, a leading member of the commission that drafted the law and former Prime
Minister under the July Monarchy, memorably called the “vile multitude” (Huard 1991,
53-4).
With very little time, republican activists and newspapers organized a massive peti408

tion campaign. Over 7,000 petitions with 527,000 signatures were collected—over 6%
of the electorate. Petitions described the restriction as “a violation of the constitution,
in the letter and the spirit,” and as “threatening the foundations of the Republic, the
most sacred right.” The new suﬀrage regime replaced a “common right of all the people
by a privilege instituted for a fraction of the people.” “The right of suﬀrage,” declared
one petition, was “inseparable from the right of sovereignty, [and was] manifestly one of
those rights ‘anterior and superior to the positive law”’ recognized by the constitution.854
The disfranchising bill was the inspiration of “men whose entire life is the negation of
republican principles.”
The vast majority of petitions overwhelmingly referenced the constitution’s declaration that, “sovereignty resides in the universality of French citizens.—It is inalienable and
imprescriptible.”855 The petitioners stressed that they represented “the people,” rather
than more dangerous categories such as “workers” ( Jarrige 2004, 4). And they inverted
the suggestion of class warfare that the June insurrections had raised, insisting that it was
the restriction that was re-establishing a “division of classes. . . because it denies to some
what it gives to others. . . It’s anarchy.” The bill divided “citizens into two classes: one
that makes the law, and another that must obey it, for better or worse. . . . [It] resurrects
the struggle between the masters and slaves.”
The petition eﬀort left the conservative majority “dumbstruck,” but they continued
nonetheless ( Jarrige 2004, 4). Supporters of President Bonaparte, however, recognized in
the petition campaign the potential resonance of ‘universal suﬀrage’ as embodying the
ideal of popular sovereignty. They quickly sought to position themselves as its defenders.
They supported a proposed constitutional revision to remove the one-term limit for the
president as a restoration of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ denied by inappropriately limiting the
choice of the elector. The President warned that “if you do not vote [for the revision
of the constitution], the people in 1852 will solemnly manifest the expression of its new
will,” an action that he suggested would be ‘universal suﬀrage’ above the constitution
(Bonaparte 1852, 201). He called for the “re-establishment of universal suﬀrage on the
854

Paragraph 3 of the constitution’s preamble noted the constitution recognized “rights and duties anterior
and superior to positive law.”
855
C//2300 to C//2313 AN. The petitions are organized by department and by commune. I selected
departmental boxes at random, and the pattern was broadly the same. Regional patterns did exist—
Huard notes that the Eure and Gard regions sent considerably more than others, and that the 14,700
signatures collected in the Gard represented approximately 42% of the republican vote (Huard 1991,
62). Jarrige does analyze the geographical distribution (2004, 9), and while there is some correlation
between high disfranchisement areas, there were very few petitions from the Legitimist north-west,
underscoring the degree to which this was primarily a republican eﬀort.
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largest possible basis,” and in November 1851 he proposed its reinstatement (1852, 203).
The proposal was defeated 355-348, but by uniting his own supporters with the left
republicans, he left the Party of Order isolated. On December 2 1851 came the coup
d’état.

The Legacy of 1848 and Republican Anxieties under the Empire
Bonaparte’s “Appel au peuple” explaining his actions emphasized that he had been
elected by “six millions’ suﬀrage” and that in restricting the right to vote the Assembly had violated the constitution and aimed to overturn the Republic. The “people,” he
declared, “were the only sovereign I recognize.” In the decree dissolving the National
Assembly, he announced that “universal suﬀrage is reestablished,” further consolidating
his self-presentation as the defender of universal suﬀrage and popular sovereignty. A
plebiscite was organized for December 20 and 21 to approve the continuation of Bonaparte’s authority and a delegation of powers to him to write a new constitution: the
reported results were 92% in favor. A year later, a referendum on re-establishing the
Empire was approved with 97% in favor. There were legislative elections held in 1852,
1857, 1863, and 1869. The participation rate ranged between 62% in 1852, when the
Party of Order and left-wing republicans had been exiled, to 78% in 1869. Each time
candidates favorable to the government—especially the oﬃcial candidates who received
ﬁnancial backing from the state—won a majority of seats to the Legislative Corps. In
May 1870, another plebiscite was held to approve liberal reforms to the constitution.
Given that the reforms had the backing of the Emperor, a ‘yes’ vote would be interpreted
as “a national ratiﬁcation of the empire” (Cole and Campbell 1989, 47). Only the republican strongholds of Seine and Bouches-du-Rhône, along with Algeria, voted against the
proposal.856
‘Universal suﬀrage’ was central to the regime’s legitimacy, and Louis-Napoleon and
his supporters developed a form of celebratory mass politics organized around a constant reminder of his successful conﬁrmation by popular sovereignty. To celebrate the
plebiscite of 1851, the number of ‘yes’ votes was emblazoned on the façade of Notre-Dame
cathedral (Truesdell 1997, 8). Medals were struck commemorating his “acclamation,”
again including the number of votes. A series of prints was issued celebrating “LouisNapoleon Bonaparte, elected, by virtue of 5,434,226 votes,” a number that would climb
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French citizens in Algeria, which had been denied parliamentary representation since 1852, were entitled to vote for the plebiscite, as were active members of the armed forces.
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to 7,500,000 by 1851. Another series was prepared commemorating “Louis-Napoleon
Bonaparte re-establishing universal suﬀrage, December 2 1851,” the day of the coup.
The broader political movement of Bonapartists was unanimous in its praise of universal suﬀrage. When Henri d’Orléans, one of the pretenders to the throne, denounced
Bonaparte, the Emperor’s supporters rushed to defend him in print, “the best argument
that we have to oppose you [Henri],” wrote one, “is universal suﬀrage, of which you lose
sight of, about which you do not even want to discuss, and with good reason. How
could Napoleon III, whose power rests entirely on this national manifestation, not have
respected it. . . ?” (Anonymous 1861, 8). In a book entitled Napoleon III Standing Before
Universal Suﬀrage, the Record of the Empire, a supporter asked whether “the Empire deserved the support of universal suﬀrage.” “To know [the acts of the Emperor and his
government] is to answer the question. . . The answer, we say, is the 8 million votes that
once founded it and to which it owes its legitimacy” (Davons 1869, 5). Bonapartists even
argued that the motivation for the 1850 disfranchisement was to impede the possibility
that the president would be re-elected by ‘universal suﬀrage’ (Davons 1869, 15). This was
manifestly untrue, but reinforced Louis-Napoleon’s presidency and imperial authority
as embodying ‘universal suﬀrage.’ As late as 1871, after the regime had fallen, a leftwing Bonapartist invoked ‘universal suﬀrage’ to suggest that the people might prefer a
return to the Empire, “if the Republic is government of the people by the people, the
people—that is to say, universal suﬀrage—will say if they want it.”857
The association of the regime with universal suﬀrage—both in its claims to legitimacy and its repeated approval by the electors—gave opponents suﬃcient reason to
denounce it and the idea of an equal voice among citizens in national aﬀairs. And
many of them did. The right—including most (but not all) Légitimists, Orléanists, and
conservative republicans—had never supported it. The Count de Semainville, in an 1871
pamphlet, argued that the ﬁrst law of a conservative government should be to “conﬁde
the destinies of the State to capable and patriotic hands.” This required property or
taxpaying qualiﬁcations, as “universal suﬀrage is an immoral institution, anti-social, insensitive, dissolving and unknown” (Semainville 1871, 3). The National Workshops and
the June insurrection were seen as heralding the arrival of socialism as a potentially
revolutionary force, and the election of Democratic-Socialists to the National Assembly
in 1849 had only further convinced them of the danger of too inclusive a franchise. For
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many on the left—including republicans such as Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin, as well as
socialists and radical republicans such as Louis Blanc—the rural masses had shown in
1848, in 1849, in 1851, and in 1852 that they were neither particularly sympathetic to the
urban working class nor strongly attached to a republican form of government.
And many liberals, who began to rally to the regime in the 1860s, did not trust
male citizen suﬀrage; they were willing to accept it but only so long as it was contained
and manipulated, “universal suﬀrage appears to us today as a pupil held in tutelage by
the government—a benevolent tutelage, an honest protection, a necessary guidance—
certainly! But is it not to be desired that it can do without? Since when is the tutor
elected by the pupil?” Primary instruction was needed to moralize and educate the
people, and without it “universal suﬀrage, that instrument of progress, [is made] a social
danger, a pretext to anarchy, a pattern of servitude” (Talboscq and Delaunay 1864, 9,
36).
Others worried that education would not be enough, that ‘tutelage’ was required. A
procurer-general in Dijon believed “in the instability of the people’s sentiments rather
than in its gratitude and fear that to re-awaken too frequently its belief in its own
sovereignty is likely to lead it into abuse. The masses are not incapable of reason and
good sense, but they are neither suﬃciently enlightened nor wise enough to intervene
regularly in aﬀairs of state.” An academic rector confessed that “universal suﬀrage
frightens me as it frightens every honest man. It carries within it the seeds of catastrophe,
of a social revolution which will break out one day, if we persist with it.” Electoral
manipulation was absolutely necessary, and anything else would “be suicidal.”858
Moreover, many republicans doubted the sagacity of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ and wondered why something as vital as the Republic should be left in the hands of an illinformed and superstitious public. Even before the coup, a considerable number of
republicans were willing to accept the basic premise of the 1850 disfranchisement, that
universal suﬀrage needed to be “cleansed.” Parisian republicans had twice insisted that
elections to the National Assembly be postponed, not trusting the judgment of the rural electorate. And Alphonse de Lamartine, while arguing that the law of May 31 went
too far and “amputated and mutilated” universal suﬀrage, believed that it needed to be
“cleaned of those polluted and too free-ﬂoating elements, which denature it” (Lamartine
1850, 169; Droz 1963, 164). By the late 1860s, the repeated aﬃrmation of Louis-Napoleon
had led many to argue that the “Republic was above universal suﬀrage” (Gensoul 1871).
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Edgar Quinet noted that universal suﬀrage had been taken up by the enemies of liberty,
“a new weapon that they seized when all the others had been wasted” (Quinet 1872, 13).
“If France could perish,” wrote Quinet, “it would be by a false idea of universal suﬀrage
and the power of assemblies” (1872, 19).
In a pamphlet dedicated to positivist philosopher Emile Littré, Louis Gensoul argued
that the republic was necessitated by “invariable law” of social organization, and that
“universal suﬀrage [was] improper for monarchies or republics. . . as ridiculous as asking
[the people] about the movement of the earth or sun” (1871, 9, 48). Universal suﬀrage
would have to “abdicate before science. . . . It must be recognized that the voice of the
people, like the voice of good, is nothing but the voice of ignorance” (Gensoul 1871,
42). “The day will come,” he claimed, “when the government of society will belong to
science, where politics will be no more than science applied by competent men” (Gensoul
1871, 40). Littré defended universal suﬀrage, but argued that it must be conﬁned to
the election of representatives and could not be used in plebiscites. But for the most
part, republican attitudes were reasonably well-assessed by a Bonapartist chronicler:
republicans were irreconcilables, “rejecting with indignation any idea of rallying to the
Empire [and] putting the Republic above universal suﬀrage, above the will of the French,
above the sovereignty of the nation” (de Saint-Amand 1899, 214).
There was, then, considerable opposition to and dislike of ‘universal suﬀrage’ across
the diﬀerent currents of French political life during the empire. Ernest Renan, reﬂecting on the defeat of 1870, believed the empire had made France mediocre, “without
originality or boldness, a plebian without the nobility of the spirit or the sword.” It
would be “impossible to escape such a state with universal suﬀrage” (Renan 1871, 26).
Gustave Flaubert’s Sentimental Education mocked the idea of universal suﬀrage as the
arbiter of talent, “‘No more bachelorships! Down with University degrees!’ ‘Let us preserve them,. . . but let them be conferred by universal suﬀrage, by the people, the only
true judge!’ ” (1869, 143). After the Commune, Flaubert argued that, “the ﬁrst remedy
will be to ﬁnish with universal suﬀrage, the shame of the human spirit. As it is constituted, one sole element prevails to the detriment of all the others: numbers dominate
spirit, instruction, race, even money, which is worth more than numbers.”859 Many of
his contemporaries—monarchist, liberal, and republican—would have agreed.
Not only ‘universal suﬀrage,’ but the entire revolutionary tradition had been thrown
into doubt by 1848. The middle class and bourgeois republicans saw the June insur859
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rection of Parisian workers as class warfare directed against institutions to which they
were committed; the ‘social’ republic was not something with which most of them were
comfortable. Victor Hugo, speaking against the National Workshops in the Assembly,
summarized the republican understanding of the relationship between themselves and
the working class, “the liberty of 89, the republic of 92, July 1830, February 1848; these
great things, who is it who accomplishes them? The thinkers of Paris who prepare them,
and the workers of Paris who execute them.”860
But in addition to the threat posed by socialist gains among the working classes was
the question of whether the revolutionary tradition was compatible with the republic
itself. Even those, such as Hugo, who gloriﬁed a heroic revolutionary iconography of
popular uprisings, believed that June 1848 had been illegitimate, and supported its suppression. “At its core, what was June 1848?” asked Victor Hugo in Les Misérables. It
was “a revolt of the people against itself” (1862, 12). What did the barricade “attack in
the name of the Revolution? The Revolution itself. That barricade—danger, chance,
disorder, terror, misunderstanding, the unknown—had facing it the Constituent Assembly, the sovereignty of the people, universal suﬀrage, the nation, the republic” (1862, 2).
The later attempted insurrection in June 1849 was likewise seen by many as an embarrassing debacle. And republicans of the 1850s and 1860s believed that the combined
eﬀect of June 1848 and June 1849 had been to provoke a conservative backlash, resulting
in the election of Louis-Napoleon, the increased boldness for the Party of Order, the
disfranchisement of 1850, and ultimately the loss of popular support for the republic.
In the 1850s and 1860s, many republicans continued to believe that “a coup de force,
well prepared, energetically executed, would be suﬃcient to overturn, in a few hours,
with a little luck, the enormous imperial ediﬁce, consecrated by millions of suﬀrages”
(Tourneur 1904, 421). But a core network of radical republicans had begun to articulate
an understanding of French political community that reconciled their commitment to
the revolutionary tradition, to the threat of class conﬂict, and to the dangers of universal
suﬀrage. François Furet has pointed to a durable shift in the French republican tradition,
as the republicans of 1848 reinterpreted this tradition in light of their experiences. In
particular, Furet has emphasized the importance of Edgar Quinet—a republican of 1848,
exiled in Switzerland, but who refused to return after an amnesty was declared. In 1865
he published La Révolution, a critical appraisal of 1789. Quinet denounced the Jacobin
legacy, and warned republicans that its central idea, “that a dictatorship is necessary
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to found a free state,” had distorted the democratic tradition, “sometimes proclaimed
openly, other times disguised, it has never ceased to reappear here and there as the
supreme resource” (cited in Furet 1986, 72). Quinet was placing the blame for the coup
not only on the insurrectionists of 1848 and 1849, but on the republican tradition itself.
The publication provoked a heated debate, with his stance denounced by Jules
Michelet—a historian central to the radical tradition—Louis Blanc, and others. But
while Quinet was important, this was in large part because he found a receptive audience among a younger generation of republicans. Notable among them was Jules Ferry,
who defended Quinet by arguing that the times had changed, that “Jacobinism was no
longer a weapon but a peril” and that 1848 had shown the dangers (Furet 1986, 789). Ferry—who would be one of the central architects of republicanism after 1877—was
emblematic of a new generation, who were “ﬁrmly committed to elections as means of
involvement by the citizens” but “mistrustful of appeals to those citizens outside of the
electoral process” (Lehning 2001, 31). Centrally important in the creation of a new form
of republicanism were the Masonic lodges which provided a space in which strategy
could be plotted and republican principles deﬁned (Nord 1995, 14-30). Republicans were
inﬂuenced by Quinet, as they were inﬂuenced by positivists such as Littré; but they were
also inﬂuenced by the democratic utopians who turned to the lodges after the coup.
The result was an important institutional space in which a new, non-Jacobin radical
republicanism could be fashioned.
In its broad outlines, the resulting vision of political community emphasized the central importance of the French Revolution, not as a model of direct popular participation
but as having regenerated the French people. It was to the Revolution that the people
of France owed their property and their distinctive national character. The motivating
ideological purpose of radical republicanism in the 1870s and beyond would be to carry
the Revolution through to its natural end, a parliamentary regime accepted by the entire
country (Furet 1986, 83). To achieve this required a rejection of violent confrontation
and the transformation of the citizenry (Stone 1996, 34; Simon 1868, 5–6).861
For many, the Republic was above choice: the Revolution had changed French national character and property relations, and it alone was adapted to the mores and
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institutions of France. Some things, argued Quinet, stood above the nation, “it was in
the nature of things” that the monarchy had been overturned seven times since the beginning of the century, suggesting that the relation between France, or modern society,
with the republican form of government was a scientiﬁc fact that could not be decided
upon by popular vote (1872, 14; Gensoul 1871).
But whereas this had led many republicans in the 1860s to reject ‘universal suﬀrage,’
radicals sought to re-appropriate it and make it the centerpiece of their understanding of
French political community. This was in part an accommodation to the ideology of the
Bonapartist regime, which was constantly disseminating ‘universal suﬀrage’ as the deﬁning characteristic of the French political community, the only legitimate form by which
a regime could be validated, and the only possible form by which national sovereignty
could be expressed. Bonapartist critiques of the republicans during this period consistently emphasized that they were willing to place the republic above ‘universal suﬀrage,’
a position that republicans recognized as limiting their popular appeal.
The response of radicals was to invert this claim, to insist that they were the real
defenders of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ and that only they understood the reforms necessary to
give it full sway. The republic was “in principle above decision,” but because only the
republic could preserve universal suﬀrage; in a republic new leaders could be chosen,
while in a monarchy this could only be done through revolution, which republicans
“want no more of” (Pajot 1871, 8). Louis Blanc argued that “universal suﬀrage itself can
do nothing against the republic, because the present generation cannot conﬁscate the
right of future generations. . . If universal suﬀrage established a monarchy, a hereditary
monarchy—which supposes immutability—universal suﬀrage would commit suicide and
would lose, by this very act, its very reason for existence.”862
More commonly, however, radicals argued that the electoral system of the Bonapartist
regime was intended to constrain and shackle ‘universal suﬀrage’ and that as a result
the popular will was not genuinely expressed through elections in the Empire. ‘Universal
suﬀrage’ needed to be freed from the conﬁning strictures of corruption, oﬃcial candidates, and localism. It would be through ‘universal suﬀrage’ that class conﬂict would be
resolved, and “universal suﬀrage, once made the master, would suﬃce to. . . establish all
the freedoms, all the institutions which we are seeking to bring about.” Only universal
suﬀrage could achieve “the moral and material emancipation of the greatest number,
and [it] best ensures social equality in laws, actions, and customs”(Tourneur 1904, 94).
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It would be through republican government and ‘universal suﬀrage’ that the danger
of class conﬂict could be overcome. The republicans “warned of the dangers of class
polarization,” and insisted that “their alliance purposely cut across classes” (Elwitt 1975,
21). And so they mixed promises of equalization with assurances to respect property and
a disclaiming of leveling, that their program meant, “not the equalization of wealth, but
only of narrowing the gap by assuring to all the means of escaping misery, and placing
a modest comfort within the reach of the greatest number” (Ribert 1869, 73). But this
program of class conciliation required the full and free expression of ‘universal suﬀrage.’
Henri Allain-Targé argued that “the enrichment of France. . . coincides exactly with the
advent of democracy and liberty,” that a “government of free universal suﬀrage” would
lead to wealth (Allain-Targé 1868, 22). The people, it was claimed, had had time to
“reﬂect on the ideas born in 1848. They have abandoned utopias, empiricism, fantasies; but in undertaking their electoral responsibilities, they have
become perfectly convinced of [universal suﬀrage’s] own moderation and
power. . . . [They want] the political liberty that merges the ranks and reunites men of all origins and all professions under the same ﬂag, in a single
goal: liberty, the doctrine of which has deﬁnitively conquered the primitive
socialist theory, that is to say, the communist and dictatorial principle.”
Once ‘universal suﬀrage’ was freed, argued Allain-Targé, then administrators would rein
in the deﬁcits that taxed the middle class and workers and proﬁted only a small sliver of
the population.
And they had another response, even more important, to the claim that the Empire
had been legitimated by the will of the people. The only reason—they claimed—that
the people supported Bonaparte was because they saw in him the Revolution and the
Republic itself. Louis-Napoleon, claimed Gambetta, had support among the rural population because they associated him with the Revolution, “Bonaparte appeared to [the
peasant] as the natural protector of his interests.... [T]hey attribute to Napoleon the Civil
Code, which is the shield, the holy ark where they ﬁnd the guarantee of their domain.”
The peasantry believed,
“that Napoleon is ‘Robespierre on horseback’! Well, he must be pulled
oﬀ his horse. We must not permit Napoleon, either in history or in his
descendants, to beneﬁt from this admirable conquest of the soil that we
owe to the Revolution. We must break with this tradition. We must prove
to the peasant, rather, that it is to the democracy, to the Republic, to our
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predecessors that he owes not only his land, but his right; for it is by the
Revolution alone that he became a property owner and a citizen.”863
The radical republicanism of the 1860s and thereafter would adopt—quite explicitly—a
posture of conservatism: it had been the initial revolution that had regenerated France,
and established the essential bases upon which a new political community rested. ‘Universal suﬀrage’ played an important role in this reformulation of republicanism to the
revolutionary tradition: if ‘universal suﬀrage’ could be given its most “radical application,” the direct action of the barricades and crowds would be illegitimate; electoral
politics would henceforth be the only appropriate form of popular political participation
(Lehning 2001).
The guiding principle of radicalism at the end of the 1860s was “sovereignty of the
people, organized in a fundamental and complete manner. . . . Scientiﬁcally applied, this
principle alone can complete the French Revolution and found for all time real order,
absolute justice, plenary liberty, and genuine equality” (Reinach 1881a, 396).864 It was a
vision “at once radical and conservative,” and one that “only the Republic could achieve”
(Reinach 1880b, 39). Radicals’ explanations of French history and character informed
their strategies during the ﬁnal years of the Empire, during the Government of National
Defense, and during the National Assembly; it helped sustain their conﬁdences as they
set out to organize and disseminate republicanism throughout the country; and it helped
assure key political factions and constituencies that they could be trusted to govern. But
there was no linear progression, and by the time the work of the National Assembly
began in earnest, the radicals—and their most important ﬁgure, Léon Gambetta—were
seen as discredited, blood-thirsty Jacobins, by monarchists, certainly, but by most liberals
and conservative republicans as well.
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Critical Junctures
The Danger of Jacobin Radicalism
In elections to the imperial Legislative Corps in 1869, the young republican lawyer Léon
Gambetta was invited to stand as a candidate for both Marseilles and a working class
district of Paris known for its political radicalism, Belleville. He had recently made
a name for himself by defending a newspaper editor, prosecuted by the government
for organizing the commemoration of a deputy killed opposing the coup d’état in 1851.
Gambetta used the opportunity to publicly denounce the imperial regime, and he quickly
shot to prominence as an uncompromising member of a new generation of republicans.
He was elected in both Marseilles and Belleville, and while he sat for the former, it was
the commitments undertaken in the latter that marked him as one of the most promising
or dangerous republicans in the country. In his electoral address, he argued that the
most “radical application of universal suﬀrage” was required, which entailed reforms to
ensure that it was free from all shackles imposed by the imperial regime. The election of
Gambetta, wrote the chair of the 1869 electoral committee in Belleville, “was the worthy
prelude to the glorious battles of the future. What a striking spectacle to see these male
citizens, all workers, so vigorously leading the charge for liberty” (Tourneur 1904, 14).
On July 19, 1870 France declared war on Prussia; in September Louis-Napoleon and
100,000 soldiers were defeated and captured at Sedan, on the border with Belgium. The
Republic was proclaimed at the Paris city hall, and a provisional government was named,
including Gambetta as Minister of the Interior. The socialists had been unprepared, and
their lack of a presence at City Hall ensured that the provisional government was solidly
republican (Mayeur 2008, 97). A delegation headed by Adolph Crémieux was sent from
Paris to Tours to organize the government in the provinces, but it quickly became clear
that the delegation was not up to the task. After all the major ﬁgures of the provisional
government refused, Gambetta was given broad authority to go to Tours and direct the
government from there. On October 7, he escaped a now surrounded Paris by hot-air
balloon, the act for which he is probably most remembered today. He would direct the
war eﬀort, ﬁrst from Tours and then from Bordeaux, with near-dictatorial authority until
January 1871. And while much of the political elite believed that the war had already
been lost, and that capitulation was essential, Gambetta insisted on “war to the utmost.”
Gambetta, according to Thiers, was a “furious fool” (Chastenet 1968, 155). When Paris
capitulated in January, the Government of National Defense agreed to an armistice and
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elections to a National Assembly, which would negotiate a peace.
The events of 1870 to 1871 saw a heightened responsiveness of outcomes to individual
choices and contingency, the deﬁning features of a critical juncture (Kelemen and Capoccia 2007). But they also reveal the instability of these decisions, as many were overturned
or subsequently limited. Crémieux, the Minister of Justice, was able to secure a grant of
citizenship to the indigenous Jews of Algeria on October 24, although the measure had
been under consideration by the ministers of the Empire. And Gambetta was initially
able to secure a decree impeding former members of the regime, anyone who had been
an oﬃcial candidate, or any family member of the pretenders to the throne from eligibility for the February 1871 elections. But Gambetta was ultimately overruled on this,
and no additional qualiﬁcations were required to be elected. The Crémieux decree fared
somewhat better, but the citizenship of Algerian Jews was only secured after months of
eﬀort, and after a minister in the new government proposed its abrogation. And even
then the measure was considerably limited in its application.
But while the Government of National Defense was not able to consolidate all of the
changes that they undertook, their actions did have a longer-term consequence in many
domains, shaping the politics of the next several years. They reinstituted elections to
municipal and departmental councils, which would become important sites of republican
organizing. The plebiscite of 1870 had convinced Gambetta of the importance of an organizing campaign “to spread our principles, our doctrines, your aspirations, among the
populations of the countryside.”865 And in order to build up local republican inﬂuence,
Gambetta, while Minister of the Interior, replaced nearly the entire prefectorial personnel in the departments, naming 136 prefects and sub-prefects of which the vast majority
were republicans, justifying this on the basis that a new regime required prefects whose
loyalty could be assured (Mayeur 2008, 106–7).
Changes to the administration in Algeria were also relatively secure. Justifying his
actions to a hostile National Assembly, Crémieux argued that “all our decrees on Algeria
were in the same spirit: they all tended to substitute a civil regime for a military regime”
(Crémieux 1871). But while Crémieux was able to secure the inclusion of Algerian Jews,
the simultaneous establishment of civil regime on the basis of the metropole helped
ensure the continued exclusion of indigenous Muslims. An imperial decree of 1870
had reorganized the department-level general councils, with indigenous Jews, indigenous Muslims, foreigners, and French citizens each electing community representatives,
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although the number of representatives was not proportional across the communities.866
The Government of National Defense, however, repealed the decree, claiming that it
violated French “legal principles, as it conferred the right of election and eligibility, in
political matters, to those who are not French citizens or naturalized” (Duvergier 1870,
491). Instead, they extended the right of French citizens to vote for the councils on the
same basis “as in the other 89 departments of France, [with] French citizens or naturalized French being the only electors and eligible.” Some indigenous representation
was considered advisable, and so a perfect assimilation of Algerian general councils to
the French was not feasible. Six subordinate indigenous Muslim members, named by
the prefect of the department, were also to sit on the councils, with preference given
to notable indigenes who could understand French, so that they could, “on their own,
realize the spirit of the discussions and the liberating intentions of France” (Duvergier
1870, 491). This basic arrangement would be conﬁrmed in 1875.
Longstanding republican commitments to limiting political rights to citizens and to
extending French institutions to the colonies ensured that an important avenue for local
political participation was closed to Algerian Muslims. Crémieux’s position as Minister
of Justice ensured the success of a measure that subsequent ministries, operating in
a context of greater stability, opposed. But much of what was accomplished by the
Government of National Defense was either undone or considerably modiﬁed, and its
policies in many ways made more likely a monarchal restoration.
Gambetta’s actions left him a discredited symbol of Jacobin radicalism (Chastenet
1968, 178). After the defeat at Sedan, Gambetta had carefully sought to adhere to the new
republican emphasis on legality and the illegitimacy of crowd politics. When the news
of Louis-Napoleon’s capture reached Paris, Gambetta left a session of the Legislative
Corps to plead with the crowd to avoid any violence or disorder, “Paris, at the moment,
holds in its hands not only the salvation of the country, but the salvation of the French
Revolution. . . . I will rejoin my colleagues and I swear that the night will not pass, or midday tomorrow, without us [the legislature] having undertaken energetic measures, worthy
of the people. But we must not appear to be deliberating under pressure from outside”
(Reinach 1880a, 396). But his actions under the Government of National Defense gave
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his opponents opportunity for presenting him as an unreconstructed Jacobin.
When a French army commanded by a general who had earlier engaged in private
negotiations with the Empress surrendered at Metz, Gambetta denounced it in proclamations to the population and soldiers as “treason by oﬃcers.” This was bitterly resented
by many oﬃcers, and seemed to suggest an inability to recognize the reality of the situation (Chastenet 1968, 147). In re-establishing elections to the departmental councils,
Gambetta provoked considerable hostility among local notables and the bureaucracy.
He believed the councils to be “the worst assemblies of the Empire, the home of all
bonapartist conspiracy” whose reorganization was required to give satisfaction to “both
to the rights of universal suﬀrage and to republican opinion.” He went further, and requested the newly installed republican prefects prepare lists of functionaries and teachers
who were “gravely compromised in the fallen regime,” and gave them authority to replace instructors. And in November, he announced the creation of Bulletin of the French
Republic, which was to aid in the instruction of the people in republican principles,
“every Sunday, obligatorily, and even several times during the week, if possible, the instructor of each commune will lead to the assembled inhabitants. . . the principal articles [of the Bulletin]. . . . The instructor will focus
particularly on raising awareness of articles on doctrine or history, which
have as their object the enlightenment of the spirit of the people, to teach
them in their political and social rights as well as the corollary duties, and
to demonstrate that essential truth that the Republic alone can assure by
its institutions the liberty, greatness, and future of France” (Mayeur 2008,
110-11).
His eﬀorts to displace local authority, to continue the war at all costs, and to use the
opportunity of a wartime emergency to instill republican principles—to mix politics with
war—were all seen as evidence of the sort of radicalism that made the republic anathema
to many liberals and monarchists (Bury 1971). And in part for this reason, moderate and
conservative republicans saw in him, and the radical republicans of whom he was an
undisputed leader, a threat to the possibility of securing the republic. He would be
called to account before an inquiry, in which the Government was portrayed as run by
radicals bent on continuing an unwinnable war. Conservatives and monarchists would
refer to him as the Dictator in Assembly debates and on the campaign, hoping to ensure
the insinuation of Jacobin radicalism stuck.
While the critical juncture period was not ended with the forming of a National
Assembly, the political dynamics did enter a more predictable form. The elections of
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February 1871, in which many departments could not participate because of German
occupation, returned 675 deputies, with monarchists winning approximately two-thirds
of the seats, and with Orléanists the largest and Bourbon Légitimists the second largest
political faction. The elections were “a condemnation of [Gambetta’s] policies and indeed of all that he had stood for” (Bury 1973, 9). The former Orléanist and conservative
minister Adolphe Thiers, who had even before Sedan called for a peace and who had
subsequently tried to arrange negotiations between Prussia and the Government of National Defense, was elected in 26 departments on the “peace list.”867 On February 17, he
was named “head of the executive power of the Republic,” but for this to pass the Assembly a preamble had to be added, “the National Assembly, custodian of the sovereignty
authority, considering that it is important, while waiting until the institutions of France
are decided upon, to immediately provide for the necessity of government and the conduct of negotiations.”868 On March 10, in what became known as the Bordeaux Pact,
Thiers promised “to deceive no one. . . to prepare no constitutional solutions behind your
backs,” and to not come out for one regime or another (Bury 1973, 20).
On February 16, a number of republican deputies resigned in protest of the cession
of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, including Gambetta. This ultimately was to his advantage, as it allowed him to avoid taking part in the suppression of the Paris Commune
in May 1871. But the fact that the heaviest ﬁghting occurred in Belleville, that his close
conﬁdant Arthur Ranc had brieﬂy been a member, and that a number of extreme-left
radicals who adhered to the Commune resigned shortly after Gambetta, combined to
ensure that conservatives would try to associate him with it. And for these very reasons
the Commune was seen by most radicals as presenting a grave danger to the prospect
of a republican regime: it was the repeat of 1793, 1848, and 1849, and surely would be
followed by its own conservative reaction. Gambetta’s friend and adviser Eugène Spuller
summed up what many of them feared, that the republic had “perhaps received her
death blow and we shall have to spend our lives bringing up a new generation capable of
founding it have having for a moment hoped to found it ourselves” (Bury 1973, 21). And
instead of simply negotiating the peace, as many republicans claimed was the purpose of
the elections to the Assembly, it was increasingly apparent that the monarchist majority
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in the National Assembly intended to continue in oﬃce and organize a new constitution.

The Conservative Radicals
On March 10, 1871, two months before the suppression of the Commune, Thiers gave a
speech in the Assembly summarizing the state of the country, and denying the repeated
claims of the diﬀerent factions to represent the will of the people. “You are divided,”
he told the deputies, “and do you know why? Because the country is, and what I say
is known throughout the world, and you must recognize this diﬃculty, because in recognizing it you can overcome it.” This division, he continued, was between those who
“believe that France can only ﬁnd a deﬁnitive peace under a constitutional monarchy”
and those who, “just as sincerely, believe that with the institutions that you have been
given, with that grand institution of universal suﬀrage, that with the movement of the
spirits, with that agitation that is being produced throughout the world and in the center of all governments, that there is something leading today’s generations toward the
republican form.”869
He discussed the divisions of both factions, but gave a special warning to the republicans. There were those who believe that the republic, even when it is governed by
others, is still the republic. But there were others, “who will not admit the existence of
the Republic except when it is in their hands.” He reminded them that the Republic
existed, that all the reorganization that would be done by the National Assembly would
be done under the auspices of the Republic.
“Now don’t come to us and say, ‘don’t sacriﬁce the Republic!’ I will respond,
‘do not lose it yourselves!’ The Republic is in your hands, and will be
the prize of your wisdom and nothing else. . . . Every time you will raise
inopportune questions, every time that despite yourselves. . . you appear to
be, I will saw the conﬁdents or the accomplices without your wanting to
be,. . . of men of disorder,. . . in accepting the appearance of complicity, you
will hit the Republic with the most violent blow that she could receive.”
Thiers was telling the republicans, radical and conservative alike, that they might be able
to secure the Republic, so long as they disassociated themselves from the revolutionary
tradition that had always invited reaction. Unsurprisingly, given the ideas they had developed during the previous decade, Thiers’ advice resonated with the young generation
of radical republicans.
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The radicals, now organized in a parliamentary group called Union Républicaine,
spent the early years of the National Assembly trying to build a coalition capable of
securing the Republic. This meant a moderate tone in public addresses, for which the
earlier ideological work of the 1860s left them well-prepared. And it meant disseminating
radical ideology, especially the radical interpretation of the Revolution and their role
as its inheritors, to the countryside. And it meant re-asserting their commitment to
universal suﬀrage in a way that emphasized its conservatism but did not lose them
support among their most active partisans. The Republic and universal suﬀrage, they
would argue, were the established institutions of the country.
After resigning in protest of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, Gambetta took a break
from politics. He marked his return on June 26 1871 with a speech in Bordeaux, only
a month after the suppression of the Commune. Those who had always “slandered
democracy” had also sought to “attribute the excesses of the last months to the Republic.”
He insisted on the need for republican unity, believing that “thanks to the union of the
diverse nuances of republican opinion, we can give to France the sight of a disciplined
party, ﬁrm in its principles, hard-working, vigilant, and absolutely resolute to convince
France of its ability to ability to govern.” Gambetta explicitly referenced Thiers’ claim
that the future would go to the wisest, to the most worthy. “To the wisest! To the
worthiest! Perfect!” he said, “it is a bet that we must accept.” They would show the
public and their opponents, by producing “republican solutions” to every question that
arose, that “we are a party of government capable of directing the country’s aﬀairs, the
party of intelligence and reason, and that it is among men adhering to our principles
that we will truly ﬁnd the guarantees of science, of disinterestedness, and of order.”
“Yes, we will be respectful of your authority, respectful of your legality, but
we will not abandon the right to critique and reform. And, as we have never
asked for favors from anyone, we will let universal suﬀrage decide between
those who disdain and those who had the patience and the constancy to ﬁght
for the Republic and liberty.”870
This was not just a message to conservatives and moderate republicans. It was also an
eﬀort to instruct the republican party in the appropriate form of opposition. The stance
of legal opposition that he was advocating was a character of the age and time, “it is
certain that the age, I will say heroic, chivalric of the party has passed, since the realization of a party of its hopes.” The French Revolution must be completed, he continued,
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but again he stressed, that “I mean by this word. . . the diﬀusion of the principles of
justice and reason by which it was inspired and I entirely reject its identiﬁcation by our
enemies with violent enterprises.”871 Today, under a republican regime, the character of
opposition had changed, “it must press and regulate, it must not destroy.”872 “We will
now,” he remarked a few months later, “found a moderate and rational Republic which
will save France” (Bury 1973, 28).
Gambetta’s close friend and adviser, Spuller had advised Gambetta to be “a Republican O’Connell, touring the countryside, travelling from town to town, constantly
orating, making the public aware of him, aware of a Republican programme and of
a Republican party as an active progressive force, rallying the scattered troops of Republicanism throughout France” (Bury 1973, 65). He spent the next several years, and
especially the summer and fall of 1871, doing exactly this, repeating consistently the narrative that radical republicans had fashioned during the 1860s; he was, as an opponent
called him with contempt and which he adopted with pride, a “traveler and salesman for
the democracy.”873
By the summer of 1871, republican societies were being organized throughout the
country, holding meetings geared toward organizing for by-elections in which the radical
message of republican conservatism was constantly repeated (Mayneur 2008, 153). As
Gambetta’s biographer has remarked, the “importance of these Republican committees
in the provinces can hardly be overestimated” (Bury 1973, 51). Gambetta recognized that
a successful republican movement would require a broad coalition, one that adhered to
republican principles but that was not exclusive. Certain groups did need to be excluded,
“proven leaders of monarchist intrigues and plots, all those who were the servants of the
pretenders, who were the agents of anti-patriotic disorder.” But it was also important to
“distinguish between the leaders and those who followed them, because these might be
of good faith, they might just be lost!... You see, sirs, that my idea is this: separate the
leaders from their supposed army; the army can enter into the ranks of the democratic
party.”874
But there were limits in how far they could go in this regard, and the more that
the radical leaders sought to moderate their tone or appeal to conservative republicans
and liberals, the more they had to worry about maintaining their base. In Grenoble,
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on September 26, 1872, Gambetta gave a speech that caused a fury, and which was
subsequently “quoted in innumerable speeches and books” (Bury 1973, 114). In a speech
meant to appeal to his radical base, he asked whether the bourgeoisie had not “reﬂected
on what is happening. . . . Have they not seen, since the fall of the Empire, a new
generation, ardent, however content.”
“Have we not seen appear, all across the country,—and I want very much to
highlight this new generation of the democracy,—a new political candidate,
a new personnel of universal suﬀrage? Have we not seen the workers of the
cities and the countryside, the working world to which the future belongs,
make its entrance into political aﬀairs? Is this not the characteristics warning
that the country,—after having tried so many forms of government,—wants
ﬁnally to turn to another social stratum (couche sociale) to experiment with
the republican form?”
The line met with prolonged sensation, as the crowd cheered in delight. “Yes!” he
continued, “I suspect, I feel, I announce the arrival and the presence, in politics, of a
new social stratum that has been busy for almost 19 months, and which is certainly far
from being the inferior of its predecessors” (Reinach 1880c, 101). This line would be
quoted in thousands of publications throughout the remainder of the Third Republic,
and the radicals would repeat it ceaselessly during campaigns across the country in the
1870s.
Conservatives—monarchists and republicans—were incensed at what seemed to be
an invitation to class divisions. One conservative liberal rejected Gambetta’s distinction
of ‘two Frances,’ insisting that “we are all French and equal; there are whigs and toryes
[sic], but there are not two Frances.”875 Thiers said that it was “provoking class war”
(Bury 1973, 117). In the Assembly, Gambetta explained that these social strata had been
“created by the French Revolution, favored in their development by the application of
the ideas, the theories, and the laws of the French Revolution” and that they had become
conscious of their existence thanks to universal suﬀrage (Reinach 1880d, 42).876
It was in many ways a continuation of the vision of the people that radicals had
been advancing for years. They had talked incessantly of “the people, petits bourgeois,
workers and peasants have every day a clearer perception of the connection between their
aﬀairs and politics,” who wished “to have their own representatives and soon they will
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provide them” (Bury 1973, 48). Gambetta had insisted that education alone, “obligatory,
free, and. . . absolutely secular,” could “unite the classes, because despite the law there
are still classes, no matter what anyone says” (Reinach 1880b, 174). Jules Simon, in La
Politique Radicale, noted that “when we speak of the re-establishment of classes, you are
indignant. You should be. When we speak of the rich and the poor, and we say that
there are rights for the rich that do not exist for the poor, you are indignant. You again
should be” (Simon 1868, 246). The radical program had always promised to “equalize the
classes, dissipate the so-called antagonism between the cities and the countryside. . . and
by the diﬀusion of science for all, return to the country its moral and political vigor”
(Reinach 1880b, 39).
But it was now informed by the experience of organizing, of corresponding with
republicans across the country, and of seeing their reaction to public speeches. All of
this had been restricted under the Empire, and the radicals were increasingly convinced
that the people were for the republic, and that even in the countryside and small towns
new social strata—the plural form becoming increasingly frequent—were emerging. In
a series of by-elections in July 1871, the radicals had picked up an additional 35 seats,
with 38 going to moderate republicans. Only 12 monarchists had been elected. And
between July 1871 and September 13, 1874, the combined republican vote in by-elections
was 5.7 million, against 2.5 million for the monarchists and 700,000 for the bonapartists
(Salles 1874). The radicals were increasingly emboldened, and the conservatives increasingly worried that their chance to found a monarchy, or even a transitional conservative
republic, was going to be lost.

Moral Order and the Defense of ‘Universal Suﬀrage’
Even before the convening of the National Assembly, conservatives and monarchists had
begun to prepare various schemes to restrict ‘universal suﬀrage,’ which they all agreed
was dangerous for the power that it gave to numbers and to the working class. H. Druon
in 1871, shortly after the elections, had asked whether a taxpaying qualiﬁcation might
be desirable, “sure, a taxpaying electoral corps displeases us as much as anyone. But
come on, to ask that every citizen, to be admitted to the right to vote, pay a direct
contribution, no matter how small, would this be too rigorous?” (Druon 1871, 8). “The
religion of universal suﬀrage,” wrote another, “still has its devotees who proﬁt from it, but
I no longer see any believers who defend it. . . . In the same way that certain republicans,
run out of arguments, invented the republic above universal suﬀrage, the theorists of
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universal suﬀrage avoid the embarrassment of defending it by denying anyone the liberty
of attacking it” (Rondelet 1871, 7–8). The Legitimist pretender to the throne declared
that France must have “a universal suﬀrage honestly practiced,” which to his supporters
meant a restricted franchise with multiple stages of indirect elections or with more votes
for wealth and heads of families (Huard 1991, 108). The Orléanist monarchists, for their
part, were adamant that ‘universal suﬀrage’ needed to be greatly curtailed. The diﬀerent
factions all believed that the character of the new regime was inextricably bound to
the question of the suﬀrage. “The electoral law,” wrote the Catholic journalist Henri
Lasserre, “is the entire Constitution” (Lasserre 1873, 1).
In February 1873, monarchists and conservatives modiﬁed the electoral system in an
eﬀort to stem recent by-election losses. From now on, a majority rather than plurality
of votes was required, and this majority had to equal at least one-quarter of the total
number of registered voters. It was opposed by many republicans as implying an abandonment of list ballot, but it was insisted upon by conservatives as necessary so that
“universal suﬀrage was not the victim of a surprise.” “We must organize a sort of right
of appeal against the ﬁrst ballot, and it is that right of appeal that we are re-establishing
with this law” (Duvergier 1873, 31).
But an organized eﬀort to restrict the franchise would begin, as in 1850, only with
the election of a radical deputy in Paris. Adolphe Thiers decided that the only unelected
member of his government, Charles de Rémusat, a former Orléanist minister, should
stand in a Paris district. Rémusat’s adherence to the republic was doubtful, and accordingly he should have been opposed by Gambetta for violating the policy of opposing all
non-republican candidates. But the local radical committees were decided on the matter,
and nominated Désiré Barodet, the former mayor of Lyons who had been deposed by
the government when the city’s municipal council was suppressed for replacing Church
schools with secular ones. Gambetta changed his mind, the result of “pressure from [the
radical] ‘tail’. . . pressure from obscure clubs and committees, groups that. . . were said to
have been organizing for months, pressure from freemasons and pressure from all those
among whom ‘the old leaven of the Commune’ was said to be working” (Bury 1973,
141).877
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The radicals campaigned on a three-part program: (1) the immediate dissolution of
the Versailles Assembly, (2) the absolute integrity of universal suﬀrage, and (3) the convocation of a constituent assembly. It was the second point that “most viscerally gripped
radical opinion” and became the central issue on which the election was fought (Wartelle
1980, 613), “The vote to which Parisians are called must have a decisive meaning and
inﬂuence. Their vote must save the Republic and universal suﬀrage from the perils that
threaten them.”878 The immediate peril was a proposal in the Thiers cabinet to restrict
the franchise (Bury 1973, 144).
The campaign was considered by contemporaries one of the major moments in
Parisian history, the “ﬁrst election à l’américaine,” and it would ultimately have longterm repercussions (Wartelle 1980, 601).879 During the campaign, the Thierist candidate
was forced to embrace universal suﬀrage, recognizing that failure to do so was likely
to cost him the election. But in doing so, he estranged the conservatives and split the
coalition between them and the monarchists. “M. Barodet,” the Economist remarked,
“can count on the votes of three-fourths of the [Republican] party. An alliance between
the moderate Republicans and the Conservatives might have returned Count de Rémusat, but he has estranged many of these latter by his address, in which he promises to
maintain the Republic and to preserve universal suﬀrage intact.”880 Barodet, a relatively
unknown ﬁgure, defeated the chosen candidate of the President on the ﬁrst ballot, 52.2%
to 39.2%.
The prefect of police bemoaned that so soon after the Commune, Paris could have
elected by such a large majority “a man who represented the defeated doctrines of
the month of May 1871” (Wartelle 1980, 602). The rightist press was incensed. Even
more worrying, for the right, was that Rémusat had been supported by the bulk of the
moderate republicans, including the highly inﬂuential positivist Emile Littré (Rosanvallon
1992, 316). And even the centrist and liberal Revue des Deux Mondes noted that “for some
time, the radicals are accustomed to strange victories. Radicalism wants to show its
question was Edouard Portalis, the editor of a radical newspaper called The Corsair (Bury 1973, 140). In
Wartelle’s account, Gambetta is a much more active ﬁgure supporting the candidacy, and encouraging
the Union Républicaine to support it (1980, 606-07).
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force.” For a government that wants to be “genuinely, essentially conservative,” a new
electoral law would have to be prepared.881 With the defeat of Rémusat the right and
conservative republicans were radicalized, and “universal suﬀrage is ﬁrst among the
accused” (Rosanvallon 1992, 316). On May 19, less than a month after the election, Jules
Dufaure, a close associate of Thiers, introduced a measure to restrict the franchise by
requiring two years residence and increasing the causes for loss of political rights. This
would be muted, however, as the monarchists, supported by a number of deputies from
the liberal center, rushed through a motion expressing non-conﬁdence in the President’s
cabinet, on the grounds that it would not be suﬃcient to ﬁght the advance of radicalism
and defend moral order. Thiers was defeated by 14 votes, and resigned shortly after.
Patrice Mac Mahon—a Legitimist general—was named president, with the Orléanist
Albert de Broglie as Prime Minister in a government of moral order, committed to the
suppression of radicalism and a monarchical restoration.
In 1871 a Belgian writer gave voice to strong currents of French thought when he asked
whether “experience shows us how much the moral and political level has been elevated
in France by twenty-years of practice with universal suﬀrage?” In the aftermath of the
Commune, “the. . . great argument of the educative virtue of universal suﬀrage resembles
a bloody irony” (Devaux 1871, 21). This skepticism and even hostility toward universal
suﬀrage characterizes the vast majority of the material produced during a remarkable
public discussion provoked by the overturning of Thiers. The pamphlets, books, newspaper articles, and, insofar as the government of moral order allowed, public meetings
advocating various suﬀrage schemes only increased when the National Assembly in December 1873 named a ‘Commission Relative to the Constitutional Laws’—the so-called
Commission of Thirty.882 The Commission was dominated by Legitimists, and the rapporteur, the Duke of Batbie, was explicit in stating that the purpose was to “react against
the law of numbers” (Rosanvallon 1992, 316). While there were some exceptions, most
of the proposals aimed at reducing the force of ‘numbers,’ either by additional qualiﬁcations, by mediating ‘universal suﬀrage’ through indirect elections, by providing greater
weight to certain classes of voters, or by re-founding the suﬀrage by some scheme of
interest-based representation.
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Writing before the overturning of Thiers, one commentator had remarked that it
had been a quarter of a century since France had universal suﬀrage, and “far from
being a sign of moral and political progress, we are forced to see in [it] an index of the
most humiliating degradation” (Lapeyre 1872, 3, 6). This would be the near unanimous
conclusion of almost all conservatives who intervened in the discussion. “If the France
of the July Monarchy,” argued one author “could embrace a perspective over the entire
period that has gone by from 48 to our day, turned to look at universal suﬀrage. . . she
would have the right to say to it: consider the acts of your past.” The author listed various
acts of the Empire (Battanchon 1873, 3). “Universal suﬀrage,” the author continued,
“direct and by list ballot, is in itself irrational and absurd. . . It has almost never been
respected in practice by its most ardent promoters. . . The establishment of authoritarian
socialism will depend on it” (Battachon 1873, 8).
Another recognized that taxpaying qualiﬁcations “no longer have the ﬂavor of the
day,” but insisted we “must conquer this repugnance and pronounce resolutely” and
suggested a draft franchise law, the ﬁrst article of which was “universal suﬀrage is maintained. But whoever does not pay taxes is not an elector” (Dolbeau 1874, 4–5). Fernand
Nicolaÿ had some advice to those who were being told that ‘universal suﬀrage’ was the
desire of the people: “Stop listening” (Nicolaÿ 1875, 4). He called for plural votes, in order
to moralize the suﬀrage by representing intelligence, the family, and property. Frequent
reference was made to the degradation of the Empire, and Bonapartists were accused
of “striv[ing] to excite once again the unintelligent masses to reconquer the lost ground
and reconstitute the empire.” But the republicans, for the monarchists, were little better,
and their “principles in the matter of the suﬀrage are, at base, identical with those of
cesarisme, demand an appeal to the nation. . . in the hopes of see arrive a new Chamber
of deputies of their opinion, and in suﬃcient numbers to dominate the situation” ( Jacob
1874, 3-4).
But there were some ostensible Bonapartists who opposed universal suﬀrage as well.
Edouard Petit, a Knight in the Legion of Honor and the administrator of a public assistance bureau in the 3rd arrondissement, submitted a “simple detail of which nobody
is ignorant. . . [T]he man who has recourse to public assistance (often, alas, by his own
fault), appears at the poll with those who contribute all their charges, even those which
the miserable has imposed on them” (Petit 1873, 4–5). “For twenty years, under the protection of a legendary name and the support of the countryside, France prospered. By
our misfortunes, the charm is broken, and universal suﬀrage becomes every day more
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menacing” (Petit 1873, 8).
Many Legitimists, but by no means all, had come to terms with ‘universal suﬀrage,’
and even set out to reformulate its meaning, “universal suﬀrage is the application of the
principles of Christianity to the electoral law; it makes all French equal before the ballot
box as the religion of Jesus Christ recognizes them as equal before God” (De Roys 1872,
1). This was not a new tendency, and as early as the 1830s some Legitimists had come
to blame the July revolution not on the actions of the King but on the electoral law of
1817.883 The position of the pretender, that ‘universal suﬀrage’ should be maintained
by being “honestly practiced,” was repeated ad nauseum (Rosanvallon 1992, 318). But
while proclaiming their adherence to its principle, they also insisted that it must be
reformed, “the equality of intelligences is as impossible as the equality of wealth. . . . For
universal suﬀrage to produce good results, it must be organized in such a manner than
the most intelligent men enlighten those who are the least, and these, when it comes
time to take a decision outside of their competence, listen to the councils of their fellow
citizens” (De Roys 1872, 2).884 A ‘Picardy Peasant’ argued that universal suﬀrage should
be maintained, but that it should be based on corporations, with “all the French artists
electing artists, all the tailors electing tailors, all the men of letters electing men of
letters. . . ” (1875, 2).
One of the more interesting interventions, which would have increased relevance
near the end of the Third Republic, was a proposal by Ferdinand Jacob that contrasted
the 1789 declaration of the rights of man to the 1848 constitution. The ﬁrst proclaimed
that “sovereignty resides in the nation,” while the later constitution proclaimed that
“sovereignty resides in the universality of French citizens” ( Jacob 1874, 6). As a result, it
was a lie that ‘universal suﬀrage existed.’ Moreover, the exclusion of children under 21
was equally a denial of the sovereignty of the nation. But what was the nation? It was
everyone speaking the same language, having as its basis the family, of which the father
was the head ( Jacob 1874, 7-8, 13). His proposal would have enfranchised the head of
families, above the age of 21. If the husband died or lost his political rights, then the
wife would have the right to vote. Both men and women who were not married could
vote once they were 25 years of age.
These ideas and more were ﬂoated during the meetings of the Commission of 30.
883
884

Scipion, Marquis de Dreux-Brézé, Archives parlementaires, 2nd series, vol.68, March 30, 1834, pp.193-94
The Legitimists who supported a broad electorate in the 1830s had limited their proposals to
taxpayers—still much more inclusive than liberals and even many republicans of the period—and
had always insisted on indirect elections.

433

Raising the minimum age to 25 had broad support among the conservatives, although
some worried that it would be seen as going too far in breaking with past tradition
without achieving much in the way of the intended reduction. An extension of the
residence period was also considered, as was a distinction between those born in a
commune and those born outside: for the former 6 months residence would suﬃce,
while for the latter three years would be required. This had the advantage of maintaining
the franchise for small farmers while greatly disfranchising the urban proletariat (Huard
1991, 110). Its defect in the eyes of conservatives was the ‘absurdity’ of enfranchising the
returned vagabond at the expense of the newly installed merchant.
Other deputies discussed the return to a property qualiﬁcation, while the idea of
some form of education requirement—or plural voting for those with diplomas—had
considerable support. Some cautioned against both of these, such as rightist Eugène
Tallon who argued that restrictions based on property or education were misguided,
“capacity is diﬃcult to establish. If it resides in good sense and reason, we see illiterate
men who have more than baccalaureates. It would be dangerous to base it on diplomas;
all the ambitious and the degenerate generally have these.”885 But while some insisted on
caution, the commission was becoming increasingly the site for conservative fantasies
about constructing their ideal electorate. The centrist-liberal Revue de Deux Mondes,
which had supported a restriction of the franchise, had not been expecting the spectacle
of Legitimist deputies considering plural voting, family voting, or corporate voting,
declared the commission to be “obviously the victim of an illusion. It misunderstands: it
was not created to deliver itself to the study of these fantasies” (Rosanvallon 1992, 322).
In 1872, De Castellane, a monarchist deputy who was insistent on the need to establish the suﬀrage on a new basis, described his reading of the political landscape
regarding the franchise,
“Among the republicans, some. . . want to establish a distinct suﬀrage for the
cities and for the countryside. . . ; others demand that only citizens knowing
how to read and right be admitted to the vote. Among the monarchists, same
divergence of views. . . . Only the Bonapartists have conserved an unlimited
admiration for the current form of universal suﬀrage” (Castellane 1872, iv).
Many republicans, especially the moderate and conservative ones, had supported a restriction of the franchise. By the summer of 1874, however, many of them had come
885
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to accept ‘universal suﬀrage.’ This was in no small amount the result of the radicals’
success in keeping to a strategic posture of moderation and restraint.
The legacies of the Bonapartist period were especially important in the ﬁght over
‘universal suﬀrage.’ For one, the interpretation of the revolutionary tradition that they
had developed in the 1860s helped radicals dissuade their more extreme supporters
against the coup de force. This option had always important appeal among radicals in
the Union Républicaine, including the still active Louis Blanc, and it only became more
so as the regime harassed republican activists and closed oﬀ avenues of legal political
activity. The day after Thiers’ defeat, the radical newspapers printed an appeal for calm
with over 1,500 signatures, with the topmost names being the leaders of the Union—with
Gambetta and Louis Blanc foremost among them (Bury 1973, 154). Insofar as they would
be able to maintain their partisans from engaging in agitation, they believed they could
secure the support of the conservative republicans who had supported Thiers in a broad
republican coalition.
But also of considerable importance was that the radicals had been—again since
the 1860s—invoking ‘universal suﬀrage’ as central to their political project. ‘Universal
suﬀrage’ had been a central legitimating trope of the empire, which had constantly
reminded male citizens of their role in the national sovereignty. Instead of rejecting
it, radical republicans campaigned on the insistence that they were the true defenders
of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ associating themselves with a broadly resonant understanding of
political community, “the Republic is the form, I won’t say natural, but necessary, of the
sovereignty of the people.”886 In both the National Assembly and on the campaign trail
they associated ‘universal suﬀrage’ with the development of the ‘new social strata’ that
radicals argued had been making their presence known in by-elections since July 1871.
“We want no Republic,” said Gambetta, “which is not based upon that sovereignty of
universal suﬀrage which you have so disdainfully called the sovereignty and brutality of
numbers and treated almost as though it were an abject tyranny” (Bury 1973, 136). And
radicals campaigning on ‘universal suﬀrage’ were winning.
The criticism of La Revue was echoed by rightists and conservatives, who were increasingly worried that allowing the commission to pursue a restriction of the suﬀrage
would result in them violating the highly resonant understandings that linked universal
suﬀrage with citizenship and popular sovereignty. Moreover, Bonapartists candidates
had begun winning more seats, and had been calling for an appeal to the people since
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1871, “universal suﬀrage alone can destroy the work that it has enacted by four solemn
plebiscites. Make an appeal to the people, if you dare. . . . And once the people have
pronounced, it will be criminal to not submit to its uniquely sovereign will.”887 The
victories of radicals and Bonapartists gave force to what was already a broadly shared
interpretation of French history, that the disfranchisement law of 1850 had entailed disastrous consequences.888 Conservatives were anxious that the emphasis of republican
campaigning on ‘universal suﬀrage’ and the increased support that seemed to result were
manifestations of the concept’s popular resonance.
The day of his defeat, Thiers told the National Assembly that it was, in his opinion,
impossible “today to call into question the principle of universal suﬀrage.” He was one
of the authors of the disfranchising law of May 1850. Today, however, he “believe[ed] it
to be sovereignly imprudent to even think of touching it. But it can still be regulated,
moralized, cleansed” (Calmon 1879, 210–11). When Thiers spoke before the Commission
of 30 his appearance caused a sensation, as he admitted that he had been wrong in
1850. The Bonapartist coup “made clear to me that we had put a dangerous weapon
in the hands of an adventurous man. This caused me considerable reﬂection. There is
always a danger of placing a weapon in the hands of those who can present themselves
to the country announcing that they will re-establish universal suﬀrage” (Rosanvallon
1992, 330). Many conservatives were beginning to feel the same way, worried about
“tempt[ing] a bold coup by the reestablishment of a restrictive franchise” (Lasserre 1873,
60). “Universal suﬀrage” might be “nothing else but the invasion of the barbarians into
the political order,” but to suppress it, “although many quietly desire it, without daring
to admit as much in their speeches or to tempt it in their actions” would be as dangerous
as maintaining it (Lasserre 1873, 78, 19).
But most of the writers who noted that ‘universal suﬀrage’ could not be questioned
nonetheless proposed considerable modiﬁcations, and sometimes even disfranchisement.
Renan believed that “every measure, like the law of 31 May, 1851 [sic] having as its goal
the deprivation of citizens from a right they have exercised for twenty-three years would
be a blameworthy act.”889 But he also proposed, as with many of the Legitimists, that
“the suﬀrage, while remaining perfectly universal, is no longer direct; it is to introduce
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degrees of suﬀrage” (Renan 1871, 86). Hippolyte Taine believed “it very likely that
universal suﬀrage will be maintained,” because it was impossible to get rid of it, “liberal
opinion, or at least, popular opinion, is for it; this is why many who do not like it very
much will consent to keep it, so as to not remove the sympathies of the multitude from
the new government” (Taine 1872, 8). Still it had to be organized, and the law had to
accommodate the “taxpayers” level of intelligence (Taine 1872, 9). “What is the political
party that would dare risk such unpopularity?” asked another writer. “We see that,
despite the fears of some, universal suﬀrage imposes itself as a necessity and by that its
future is assured” (Lapeyre 1872, 3–4).890
Conservatives in the Commission believed that changing it in its substance would
“raise a formidable resistance in the country. The institution of universal suﬀrage is a
misfortune, no doubt, but it has existed for more than 20 years. It has set down deep
roots in the country.”891 The institution had “entered into our mores. The country holds
to it. By mutilating it, we would raise passions and bring about cruel disappointments
for us.”892 As Gabriel Hanotaux, a republican politician, reﬂected years later, the conservatives “with their customary prudence. . . refrained from advertising their sentiments [in
favor of abrogating ‘universal suﬀrage’; but they cherished them at the bottom of their
hearts” (Hanotaux 1903, 37).
The broad resonance that gave conservatives pause was not free-ﬂoating. Rather
it was encouraged by and embedded in the organizational eﬀorts of the republicans,
who both recognized its central place in French citizenship and sought to entrench the
republic by associating it to ‘universal suﬀrage’ in their campaigns. The Société l’Union
890
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Républicaine inscribed ‘universal suﬀrage’ at the top of their program,
“in the goal of arriving at the realization of the principles contained in
the formula, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, [the Society] adopts, as the
basis for the political constitution of France, (1) the Republic is one and
indivisible, founded on universal suﬀrage, with a National Assembly and
ministers named and revocable by this Assembly; (2) Municipal councils,
in each commune, elected by universal suﬀrage and having the sole right to
name and to recall mayors and adjuncts—the law shall limit their powers.”893
Republican journals were founded to “maintain the right of universal suﬀrage.” The
newspaper Le Suﬀrage Universel was founded in Bordeaux in 1873, and explained in its
prospectus that its purpose was to defend “universal suﬀrage, the basis of our institutions
and the only guarantee of our interests” (Bouchon 1901, 542). As the republican committees organized, they began requiring pledges and promises from their candidates “of a
more and more pressing character with reference to the suﬀrage” (Hanotaux 1903, 620).
And they claimed the legacy of universal suﬀrage as the essential character of French
republicanism. An 1873 pamphlet, entitled “Le Suﬀrage Universel,” was published and
distributed by la Société d’instruction républicaine. This tract appealed to those sympathetic to the “ﬂag of order,” namely those constituencies that had returned a monarchial
majority in 1871 and which the republicans were now seeking to organize. Universal
suﬀrage was not only crucial to the republican tradition, but was the “only legitimate
authority” that could provide order in a time of turmoil, “The republic and universal
suﬀrage are two words for the same proposition. . . . Hereditary monarchy excludes elections: republicanism demands them. Monarchy alienates the liberty of future generations
and fatally condemns us to future revolutions; the Republic assures order through the
constant exercise of national sovereignty” (Millaud 1873, 30).
The purpose was not just to cast themselves as defenders of resonant French understandings of citizenship. Rather, by organizing a campaign around ‘universal suffrage’ republicans could both associate the institution with the Republic—rather than
the Empire—and underscore its popular resonance to conservatives. And the explicit
claim was that any revision of ‘universal suﬀrage’ would itself be a dangerously provocative act, that social order required its acceptance in full. “Let no one be fooled,” wrote
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Gambetta’s newspaper, La République française, “not since 31 May 1850 has a French
assembly had to decide on a subject as grave or as dangerous.”894 Whether conservatives feared a revolution, a coup d’état, or simply electoral defeat was unclear; any too
aggressive restriction might make any of these more likely.895 But the belief that there
would be costs to restricting the franchise was becoming increasingly embedded in the
expectations of conservative political operatives. “Universal suﬀrage,” had supported
Gambetta, he claimed. “If you would like, let us make the appeal to France: she has
already pronounced, and she will pronounce again between you and me.”896
In March of 1874, the Commission of Thirty released its report on the suﬀrage.897
The president of the commission, Anselme Batbie, began by insisting that vote was not
a right, but a public function, requiring tact and ﬁrmness from the citizen. He regretted
that France, instead of proceeding by partisan competition to incremental increases to
the electorate, had “brusquely” jumped to universal suﬀrage during a revolution. And he
informed the deputies that the great majority of the commission believed that “it would
be good to temper the power of numbers, until now without a counterweight, by adding
the representation of interests.” This was the clear desire of the commission, and yet
admitted Batbie, they were not able to agree on how to accomplish this goal.
Batbie went through the various proposals, and was explicit that the reason they were
rejected was that they were not certain to provide checks on the power of the working
classes. Multiple votes for fathers might change the total but not the proportions between
the diﬀerent classes; multiple votes for taxpayers would not be enough to “dominate universal suﬀrage.” The same was true with the other proposals, including a high property
qualiﬁcation for eligibility, a personal taxpaying qualiﬁcation, distinct representation of
persons and property, election by two degrees—which, Batbie recalled, had elected the
“most revolutionary Assemblies” of French history (1791 and 1792). But the essential motivation given by Batbie for the commission’s not adopting these reforms was “the fear
of upsetting the most lively and suspicious feeling among us, equality.” Throughout the
commission’s sessions costs had been anticipated from violating the strictures of ‘univer894
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sal suﬀrage.’ “The right of suﬀrage is a function, it is not an absolute right,” they would
repeatedly claim; “but we cannot mutilate it, nor suppress it, but only regulate it.”898
The disfranchising law of 1850 had operated primarily by heightened residency requirements and an expanded list of oﬀenses for which political rights were lost or suspended. The framers had relied on these factors because there were constitutional limitations against a property or taxpaying qualiﬁcation and against raising the age limit. The
drafting of the proposed law of 1874 took place without such constitutional restrictions,
and yet the ﬁnal product was very similar. While there was no constitutional limitation,
there was an ideological one: the possibility of there being a cost to directly attacking
‘universal suﬀrage’ was embedded in the expectations of the commission members. The
commission tried to “keep the terminology of universal suﬀrage,” insisting in the report,
the debates, and in the provisions of the law itself that their project maintained universal
suﬀrage. The ﬁrst article read “electors, for the nomination of deputies, are all French
aged 25 years and enjoying their civil and political rights.” With the exception of the
increased age qualiﬁcation, this was nearly identical to the constitution of 1848.899 Other
than the age limit, no new franchise qualiﬁcation was explicitly established. It was only
in the procedures establishing the electoral register that the major disfranchisement was
accomplished, and these were defended on the grounds that it was necessary to be able
to establish an elector’s identity so as to prevent voter fraud.
The registration requirements varied according to whether the citizen was born in
the commune.900 If he was, then he need only be resident 6 month. If he was born
elsewhere, he would need to be resident three years. Additionally, all taxpayers were
automatically registered—after the term of residence—while those who did not pay a
personal tax had to request registration. Persons who did not meet these qualiﬁcations
could still register, but had to go through additional procedures. In communes with
fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, they could request to be registered but needed to bring
witnesses or written testimony as to their identity. It would be then be up to a decision
of the municipal commission. In cities with more than 2,000 inhabitants, the proof
needed to be a registered lease, the declaration of a father or mother or other senior
relatives living with the elector, by the employers of workers living in their homes, or
898
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by an aﬃdavit provided by the mayor on the testimony of three electors who had been
automatically registered, with proof of having resided for the requisite amount of time.
The list of oﬀenses for which one was deprived of the right to register was expanded
to encompass an extensive list of individual crimes and forms of punishment. The bill
was well summarized by the moderate republican Delorme, “In two words, keep the
label ‘universal suﬀrage’ while suppressing, by procedural means, two to three million
voters.”901 The majority of these two to three million would have been disfranchised
by the age qualiﬁcation, and the primary security against working class voting was by
making registration and identiﬁcation a burdensome process.
Opposing the bill in the Assembly, the radicals employed the rhetoric that they had
been using in campaigns across the country. The bill was a “mutilation” of universal
suﬀrage, a “deﬁance against the entire country.”902 Gambetta tied to it the ‘new social
strata,’ “there are four generations of Frenchmen that you will be removing from the circle
of public life, that you will be depriving.”903 They insisted on the conservative character
of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ and recalled the dangers revealed in 1850, “We plead with you,
as conservatives, to do nothing that could risk putting the people onto the revolutionary
or plebiscitary path.”904 Even Ledru-Rollin, again a member of a National Assembly,
adhered to the radical script, “How in a country where are as many property-owners
as there are electors, can you worry that the Republic will not be conservative!”905 “It
has now been twenty-six years that universal suﬀrage is practiced in this country. . . it
is a principle deeply anchored in the political habits of the country that you will be
attacking.”906
The attack on ‘universal suﬀrage’ was an attack on France itself. How many times,
asked Louis Blanc, “must we remind you of what came of the law of 31 May [1850]? How
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many times before you understand the fatal chain that linked the dismemberment of
universal suﬀrage to the dismemberment of France?”907 Moderate republicans stressed
that while the commission’s ideas might be fascinating, and worthy trying elsewhere, they
went against the grain of French political community, “Are they adapted to our mores?
Are they adapted to our social system? Are they adapted to the country? It’s that, it
seems to me, which the authors of these projects have not suﬃciently considered.”908
And republicans were eager to emphasize that they understood this fact, even if the
conservatives did not, “on our benches. . . we embrace universal suﬀrage for itself, as
itself, because it is the only peaceful and regular expression of the democracy and
national sovereignty. . . . It is the great arbitrator and great paciﬁer.”909
This language was picked up by the center-left liberals as well, who implored the
conservatives not to debate the electoral law, “I am ﬁrmly convinced that if we enter into
a discussion of the electoral law we are entering into an area where conciliation will be
very diﬃcult. . . we will ﬁnd there darkness and war rather than light and peace.”910 One
member of the center-left traced the history of the country from the Estates-General,
arguing that it had always been based on a broad franchise—except after 1817, which
ended in two revolutions. Laws must take into account the social milieu, and “here the
circumstances, the milieu, is universal suﬀrage, which exists uncontested in this country
for twenty-ﬁve years.”911
The bill was not vigorously defended by conservatives, with the most vocal participant insisting that the bill did not go far enough. The problem for the extreme-right was
that the bill still recognized the sovereignty of the people, “the sovereignty of individuals
in assembly.” “All citizens are sovereign! Far from being born sovereign, they are born
subject: there is the truth. Subjects, that is to say subjected to the necessities where his
origin, of its mores, its misfortunes, or its glories. . . have placed the nation to which he
belongs.”912 But for the most part the bill’s supporters stuck to the position that it was
“a regulation of universal suﬀrage, maybe even a timid reform, but loyal and sincere”913
They rejected the historical interpretation raised by radicals, claiming that “our project
is not based on the law of 31 May [1850], it does not tend to reproduce it but to correct
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it.”914 And they loudly disclaimed any hostility to ‘universal suﬀrage,’ angrily responding
to republicans who mocked their claims to having “never been its adversary.”915
The bill passed on second reading, with 364-294 in favor. The extreme-right, the
Union of Rightists, and the Center-Right voted 315-3 in favor of the bill. More important,
and surprising, given the antipathy of many moderate republicans toward ‘universal
suﬀrage,’ was that the diﬀerent republican parliamentary groups voted 240-4 against
the bill. Despite the hostility that many republicans had expressed toward ‘universal
suﬀrage’ under the empire, they were nearly unanimous in voting against the bill. This
included republicans such as Edgar Quinet and Emile Littré, both of whom voted against
the bill. But it also included new converts to the republican cause—notably Thiers
and Rémusat, who were now increasingly convinced that the Republic was the regime
that divided the country the least but also that republicans would be able to ensure
social order. The center-left, liberals with varying commitments to either a conservative
Republic or a liberal monarchy and toward whom much of the radicals’ conservative
discourse was dedicated to win over, voted 72-39 against the bill. This was an important
victory for the radicals, as was their success in maintaining republican unity. They had
eﬀectively rallied the entirety of the republican and much of the conservative factions in
the Chamber around a male citizen suﬀrage; that they were able to do this before the
question of whether the new parliament would have one or two chambers or how the
president would be selected is even more impressive. But it was not enough, and the
republicans would need to ﬂip at least 35 of the 39 liberals who voted in favor of second
reading in order to defeat the bill.916
Ultimately, this would not be necessary, as the Batbie bill would be withdrawn. Republican organizing around ‘universal suﬀrage’ had increased conservatives’ expectation
that there would be costs to tampering with what was clearly a resonant theme of national identity. This trepidation encouraged the abandonment of most of the extreme
proposals in the Commission, as well as to the circuitous means of disfranchisement in
the bill itself. But if the Commission of Thirty had been hesitant before the possibility of
public backlash regarding the parliamentary suﬀrage, the commission on municipalities
914
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was more audacious. The voting qualiﬁcations were largely the same as in the Batbie proposal, with universal suﬀrage but diﬀerentiated residence depending on place of
birth. But the various Legitimist proposals rejected by the Commission of Thirty as too
risky were adopted for the municipalities: additional representatives elected by the mostheavily taxed in the commune, the cumulative vote to ensure minority representation,
and double votes for fathers with two or more children.917
But in the Chamber a suﬃcient number of conservatives were anxious about appearing to go too far, and after a debate that recapitulated many of the same themes,
a center-left deputy close to the Orléanist prime minister oﬀered an amendment that
would allow the most taxed citizens to be specially consulted in exceptional cases.918
The republicans quickly accepted the amendment and with the support of the center-left
and much of the right the amendment passed 361 to 316. The next day the head of
the commission tried to withdraw the bill, but this was denied.919 The bill was eﬀectively abandoned by the conservatives, and the republicans and center-left successively
amended it, lowering the voting age to 21, removing some of the burdens to registration,
and removing plural voting.
After this, the right’s position on the electoral law collapsed. There had been a strong
desire to have the electoral qualiﬁcations be the same, allowing for a single electoral register. The developments regarding the municipal franchise indicated that the committee
stage of the parliamentary electoral law would suﬀer a similar fate, as the center-left
rallied to the republican position. By blocking eﬀorts to radically reorganize the municipal franchise, republicans believed that they had secured the principle of universal
suﬀrage. Gambetta’s newspaper announced that, “universal suﬀrage is saved. It remains
the fundamental law of French society. It is a deﬁnitive conquest” (cited in Rosanvallon
1993, 329).920
The Batbie commission resigned, and a new commission was appointed, a majority
of whom had rejected the initial proposal. A year later, on July 22 1875, two center-left
members who had become active supporters of the republic released the report of the
commission. The report’s ﬁrst line read, “universal suﬀrage is the very foundation of our
public law; it is through it that national sovereignty lives and reigns.” ‘Universal suﬀrage’
917
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This was based on an 1837 law, and allowed the most taxed citizens to have special representation for
meetings concerning a few speciﬁc ﬁscal areas.
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The conservatives were able to secure a re-centralization of authority in which the mayors and commune
adjuncts were named by the central government (Schmidt 1990, 52; Rosanvallon 1992, 329).
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was born of the ideas that “triumphed in 1789” and although the country had tried
several times to organize the constitution in on a diﬀerent basis, each time “the base
on which they want to base a new constitution was too narrow.” And, when “recently
ingenious minds had invented schemes whose object was to more to suppress the right
to vote than to organize it, we were able to judge just how much, in our day, such
eﬀorts must be in vain.”921 “The principle of sovereignty of the people,” announced the
rapporteur in November shortly before the law’s ﬁnal passage, “have risen to the state of
political dogma in this country.”922

Conclusion
The ﬁght over male citizen suﬀrage was only one aspect of the ﬁght over political order
between 1870 and 1877, and not necessarily the most important. After the government
of ‘moral order’ had been declared in June 1873, monarchists recognized this to be their
best and possibly last chance to establish an ideal regime. The Orléanists and Legitimists
agreed that the Legitimist pretender—the Count of Chambord—would take the throne;
as he had no children, an Orléanist would follow (Hanson 2010, 1038). In July 1871, the
pretender issued a manifesto in which he insisted that he would not accept the throne
unless the tricolor ﬂag was replaced with the white ﬂag of the Bourbons. It had been
assumed that he would modify his position, and the Legitimist President Mac Mahon
warned that the oﬃcer corps would rebel if the tricolor was abandoned (Hanson 2010,
1041). After June 1873, the entreaties, including from Pope Pius IX became more urgent.
But in October 1873 he issued another manifesto, making it clear he would not budge.
It is not obvious that if Chambord been willing to compromise that the monarchy
could have been restored. Monarchists did not give up hope immediately, though they
were increasingly despairing that the only option available was a conservative, and transitional Republic. The constitutional laws were slowly being drafted and debated, and
a proposed ﬁrst article that “the government of the Republic is composed of two chambers and a president” was defeated for its inclusion of the word Republic. On January
30 1875, a Catholic deputy sitting in the center-left—Henri Wallon—proposed that the
ﬁrst article read, “the President of the Republic is elected by the absolute majority of
suﬀrages by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies reunited in a National Assembly.
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He is elected for seven years. He is re-eligible.” The term ‘President of the Republic’ had
been in use since 1870; it did not necessarily foreclose the possibility of future revisions.
After heated debate, it passed 353 to 352.
It was far from a complete victory. Republicans did not like the large grant of powers
ostensibly given to the President. More importantly, a Senate had been established,
intended to be the conservative stronghold, and elected by the departmental councils
and by elected delegates of the municipal councils (in eﬀect through indirect male citizen
suﬀrage). On May 16 1876, President Mac Mahon once again tried to install a government
of ‘moral order,’ dismissing the new republican ministry. The constitutional crisis—the
Seize Mai crisis—resulted in new elections, and a resounding defeat for the President.
In 1879, the republicans gained control of the Senate, and the President resigned a few
weeks later.
Pierre Rosanvallon remarks that, “the victory of universal suﬀrage. . . seems in many
ways to have been the result of resignation, the collapse of resistance; it was more of
a forfeit than a ﬁght” (1992, 324). Something similar could be said for the Republic.
These outcomes were obviously not solely the product of ideas, but the ideas of political
community and partisan purpose that the radicals had formulated in the 1860s and
1870s were of central importance. They enabled the republicans to cohere around a
narrative that had appeal well beyond their traditional constituencies. By rehabilitating
‘universal suﬀrage’ in republican thought, the radicals were able to associate themselves
and the Republic with what had become under the empire a highly resonant idea of
national sovereignty.
The period was a critical juncture, with a heightened sensitive to the political agency,
and enabled the republicans to achieve a durable shift in governing authority. But the institutions and ideologies of the antecedent period continued to be important. ‘Universal
suﬀrage’ had become a highly resonant component of national identity. By recognizing,
accommodating, and celebrating this change radicals were able to undermine what had
appeared to be a large majority in favor of extensive disfranchisement. In short, they
adapted themselves to resonant understandings of political community, but re-articulated
and appropriated these for their own purposes. The result was the co-foundation of the
Republic by those most opposed to it. Gambetta delighted in “this spectacle of Republicans by birth sitting in opposition to Monarchists who have been converted and
compelled by the cohesion of the Republican party and the legality of the Republic to
accomplish the reforms which it demands” (Hanotaux 1903, 253; Hanson 2010, 89).
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In 1878, the radical republican—and future Boulangist—Alfred Nacquet remarked
that, “Universal suﬀrage is among us a settled fact, one of the institutions accepted by
all, which we will never reconsider, except but to consider perfecting its improvement.
It is even the only institution that has become absolutely national, which is now one
with the nation. . . . [W]hatever constitutional form that the future can give us, we can
aﬃrm that universal suﬀrage will be its base” (Strauss 1878, 10). The vision of ‘universal
suﬀrage’ that the radicals had helped instill was, as the republican Prime Minister described himself, “profoundly republican and profoundly conservative” (Nye 1993, 154). If
universal suﬀrage were allowed to “function in the plenitude of its sovereignty, there is
no possibility of revolution, because there is no more revolution to tempt, no more coup
d’état to dread when France has spoken” (Rosanvallon 1992, 338).
But republicans especially would continue to live in dread. The Republic, they believed, was far from secure, but “ﬁnds itself today in the presence of its adversaries,
without any other allies but the law and the sovereign voice of universal suﬀrage” (Salneuve 1875, 159, 168). The defeat by Germany had left the country’s political elite deeply
anxious about its future prospects. But even more threatened was the Republic itself.
French society had been reconstructed by the Revolution but there remained a very important exception, the continued adherence of the mass of the population to Catholicism
(Reinach 1880b, 22–23). All republicans agreed that, “universal suﬀrage demands the
diﬀusion of public education” (Ribert 1869, 51–2). This was a central commitment of the
League for Instruction, who clandestinely circulated the 1789 Declaration of the Rights
of Man and the Citizen and believed compulsory, secular, primary education was the
“indispensable corollary” to universal suﬀrage (Auspitz 1982, 3, 60). Republican citizens
would have to be made, and so central to the republican program were institutions designed to accomplish this goal. Republicans needed to “make everyone educated and a
soldier. . . that must be the task of the generation to which we belong.”923 As Gambetta
famously announced in 1877, “clericalism. There’s the enemy!”
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April 18, 1872 (Reinach 1880b, 262).

447

Chapter 11
Exclusion and Stability in the Third Republic

“The principles of 1789 and the republican spirit demand government by the people
and for the people, by all the people and for all the people, without any limit”
—Paul Brouad (1905, 17).
“Universal suﬀrage can only reasonably function in societies suﬃciently homogenous to form a political ‘community”’
— François-Jules Harmand (1919, 349–50).

Introduction
The Third Republic was not much loved during its time, and in a referendum in 1945, it
was rejected by all but 3% of voters. But the Third Republic merits attention. It remains
the longest-surviving post-1789 regime, and is the only French republican regime that did
not begin or end in a coup d’état. As precarious as it turned out to be, a stable political
order was consolidated. And it was during the Third Republic that many familiar aspects
of French political identity were reshaped and institutionalized. The idea of France as
a secular, democratic republic, born of the Revolution, is a dominant understanding of
political community today; it was not in 1870, and the dissemination of this idea was in
large part the work of the Third Republic, and one of its central purposes.924
Chapter 9 outlined the shifting developments of the right to vote in French history,
924

Its success should not be exaggerated. On July 10th , 1940, eighty parliamentarians, all but fourteen
of them Radicals, Socialists, or Communists, watched in horror as 569 of their senatorial and deputy
colleagues voted Marshall Pétain all governmental power, “the dissolution of the republican regime.”
Its dissolution was the result of a defeat, but defeat had been greeted as an opportunity to “dig the
grave of the Republic”—a “divine surprise”—by anti-republicans who had always held it in disdain
(Alexander 2003, 2–3). It was Charles Maurras—the far right editor of L’Action Française—who greeted
the installation of General Pétain as a “divine surprise.”
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emphasizing in particular the exclusions of the Third Republic. Chapter 10 examined
how radical political operatives developed a narrative of political community that enabled them to sustain a broader coalition at crucial moments during the National Assembly. This chapter focuses on debates over voting rights during the Third Republic,
examining the role of ideas of political community on political behavior and outcomes.
The argument of this chapter parallels that of Chapters 5 and 8: the ideas of political community forged during an antecedent critical juncture provided operatives with
relatively coherent rationales and incentives for pursuing and supporting some projects
rather than others. Republican investment in and dissemination of these ideas helped
make them a constitutive aspect of political order: they provided a shared language and
set of stable assumptions that enabled activists and politicians to gauge the implications
of certain projects on their own political prospects.
Central to republicanism’s rhetoric of political community was the citizen, an abstracted individual presumed to be an equally constitutive unit of the national sovereignty
and equally subject to the law (Lehning 2001, 5). Sovereignty resided in the universality
of citizens, and its only legitimate expression was through ‘universal suﬀrage,’ which
in the post-1871 republican narrative was “essentially a means of order and stability”
(Rosanvallon 1992, 337). The Revolution was rehabilitated, but through ‘universal suffrage,’ it was claimed, the revolutionary tradition was now a thing of the past. Through
‘universal suﬀrage,’ social reforms could be gradually worked out within speciﬁc domains and not requiring any utopian and dangerous overarching transformation of the
structure of society. “There is no social remedy,” claimed Gambetta, “because there is
not one social question. There are a series of problems to resolve, diﬃculties to overcome, varying with the place, the climate, habits, sanitary state, and economic problems
that change within the interior of a single country.” There was no “social panacea, but
everyday there is progress to be made, but not an immediate, deﬁnitive, and complete
solution” (Gambetta 1875, 111–12).
Political operatives believed that the electoral successes of republicans were due to
the popular resonance of this language. This belief encouraged republican political
operatives to adopt the rhetoric and behavior implied by this narrative of political community, and encouraged groups seeking support from republican politicians to employ
this rhetoric and adhere to the ideas’ strictures. This helped generate a broad republican
political culture, the most remarkable and long-lasting outcome of the Third Republic.
But success also informed the political strategies of those hostile to the regime, who
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sought to accommodate themselves to these resonant narratives while appropriating and
refashioning these for their own purposes. Royalists and nationalists would likewise place
‘universal suﬀrage’ and national sovereignty at the center of their political projects, but
conceived of these in very diﬀerent ways; they would articulate a counter-narrative of
political community, one that provided an alternative prescription for political order and
which helped sustain a counter-culture opposed to the parliamentary Republic.
And precisely because of the formative conditions of the regime, of central importance to the republican understanding of political community was the incessant threat
posed by these counter-narratives. The embattled character of the Republic—the persistent need for all republicans to put aside their diﬀerences in defense of the regime—
provided a further legitimation for supporting some franchise projects while opposing
others, most obviously in the case of women’s voting rights. But anxiety for the regime
also helped unite republicans around changes to the electoral system, an embrace of the
indirectly elected Senate, the disfranchisement of conscripted soldiers, and the project
of imperial expansion.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing the centrality of ‘universal
suﬀrage’ in Third Republic France, emphasizing how its resonance helped condition
political behavior. The ever-present danger that ‘universal suﬀrage’ might reject the Republic, however, encouraged a project of gradually creating republican citizens; proposed
changes to the franchise and electoral system were defended and denounced in terms
of this objective.925 I then turn to an examination of how the language of republican
citizenship was invoked to defend proposed disfranchisements, enfranchisements, and
ongoing exclusions in the colonial empire. A similar discourse centering on the capacity
for citizenship was important in structuring debate over women’s suﬀrage, but to this was
joined a republican rhetoric of regime insecurity, which greatly constrained the options
available for activists. Republican arguments that Catholic women posed a mortal threat
to the regime both rallied republican political operatives around exclusion and limited
the ability of the women’s suﬀrage movements to form a broader coalition. I conclude
by examining the discursive mechanisms by which the understandings of French republicanism were enforced, as well as important shifts and counter-narratives that developed
during this period.
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‘Universal suﬀrage’ was frequently treated as an agent, the sovereign capable of deciding between
candidates.
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The Insecure Republic and the Civilizing Empire
The idea of ‘universal suﬀrage’ was at the center of republican discourses over French
political community in the Third Republic. It consisted of the belief that “the totality
of adult citizens” have suﬃcient interest and competence to vote: “a ﬁction, certainly.
A convention, yes. But it is the soul of the regime” (Buisson 1910, 152–3). Republicans
believed that ‘universal suﬀrage’—by which they almost always meant an adult male
citizen franchise with a relatively short residence qualiﬁcation—was the “inevitable form
of democracy, and democracy is the inevitable form of modern societies” (Fouillée 1884,
103; Schérer 1884, 73). More importantly, they believed that ‘universal suﬀrage’ was
central to a French republican political community (Andrieux 1906, 233). It was both
the legacy of the Revolution and the means by which the French cycle of revolution and
reaction could be broken.
“The Revolution of 48,” wrote Senator Edmond Schérer, “like our other previous
revolutions, had been the victory of a riot.” It had not come from the “nation,” but from
the Parisian proletariat. The Third Republic, it was claimed, would be a deﬁnitive break
in French history, because it had been chosen by ‘universal suﬀrage’ (Schérer 1884, 11, 15).
Republicans stressed both its conservative character as well as its potential radicalism.
‘Universal suﬀrage’—often anthropomorphized as a speaking and deliberating agent—
was described as cautious, and deeply attached to the institutions of the country. But
to stave oﬀ a growing socialist movement to their left, republicans also stressed the
potential of ‘universal suﬀrage’ to achieve progressive reforms, including the reduction
of taxation, the progressive income tax, and the right to strike: “there was no reform so
radical that it could not be accomplished by universal suﬀrage” (Renault 1893, 395).
While diﬀerent activists and strands of republican politics all broadly agreed that
through the regular operation of ‘universal suﬀrage’ progressive reforms could be achieved
while property and social order was secured. Edouard Lockroy, a leading radical politician of the late 19th century, argued that, “most of those who compose that which we
call the working class expects his freedom and his emancipation only from justice and
equity of the representatives of universal suﬀrage (Applause on the extreme left).” But
he also insisted upon the unique role of the radicals in reconciling the classes, noting
that there were “two parties among workers: that which I will call the party of universal
suﬀrage, and that which has been called in the Senate the party of force and violence”
(Lockroy 1883, 17). The core claim of republican ‘universal suﬀrage,’ was that by including all citizens there would be no need to engage in revolution: “an appeal to force, in a
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country governed by universal suﬀrage, is not only useless, but is a crime. In a tyranny,
insurrection is the ﬁrst duty; in a republic, it is an attack against the liberty of thought,
a return to barbarism” (Renault 1893, 395).926
While radical republicans often spoke of ‘universal suﬀrage’ in terms bordering on
the sublime, the institution was not without its critics (Fouillée 1895, 156–7; Schérer
1884, 17)). Deputies and political theorists frequently bemoaned the corruption that they
believed was its consequence, of voters demanding personal favors and public oﬃces of
their representatives. And the representation of the electorate’s preferences was itself
seen as potentially problematic, with Edmond Schérer noting that ‘universal suﬀrage’
had made it impossible for France ﬁght a war, no matter how just or necessary (1884,
27-8). All of its contradictions, argued Alfred Fouillée, came down to its fundamental
antimony: “the right of suﬀrage, equally shared by all as a common property, and the
capacity, which only really exists for a certain number”.
Underlying these concerns was a persistent worry that the electorate might vote
against the Republic. Responding to radical demands for a directly elected Senate, Jules
Ferry asked a republican audience whether they wished “to expose the entire republican
organism to the shifting wind of universal suﬀrage, which are transitory and repairable
under a Constitution formed of three powers, but which would be irreparable with a single and sovereign assembly?”927 In large part because of the conditions of its formation,
the republican vision of political community was constantly anxious, and believed the
Republic was almost always threatened.
In the 1880s, the threat came from monarchism, and the growing political movement
around General Georges Boulanger. In the late 1890s, the Dreyfus Aﬀair convinced
republicans of a threat to the Republic from a conspiracy implicating the Church, the
anti-Semite movement, and Legitimists in the army (Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 178–
926

Camille Pelletan described radicalism’s “one raison d’être. . . [as] precisely to exclude any use of force,
demanding instead peaceful reforms. . . . Otherwise we have revolutions for a few months. . . and then
reaction for several years. . . . The greatest beneﬁt of a Republic based on universal suﬀrage has been to
save France form these ominous alternatives” (Stone 1996, 134). Stone notes that this was a change in
radicalism, a movement away from more populist and anti-parliamentary stances. This is partly true,
although it has an earlier parallel in Gambetta’s move toward opportunism. But it is also reﬂective of
the growing centrality of the 1870s radical understanding of French political community. The language
of universal suﬀrage as the regular focal point of political participation was increasingly resonant, and
even those who had taken more radical positions earlier on were now either persuaded or found it
useful to participate in this discourse.
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Jules Ferry, October 2nd , 1887. Speech in Saint-Dié (Robiquet 1893, 94). Ferry’s language was echoed
by the right, who worried that revolutionaries would “bravely” defy universal suﬀrage. Raoul-Duval,
Journal oﬃciel, Débats. Chambre des Députés, November 6th , 1886, vol.2, p.1743
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207). The nationalists were a threat in the run-up to WWI, assassinating a leader of
the socialist movement, Jean Jaurès, in 1914. In the immediate post-war period, there
was considerable concern with the growing strength of the Communist Party, continuing
earlier concern with anarchist and syndicalist organizing in the labor movement. In 1894
an anarchist had assassinated the president of the Republic Marie-François Sadi Carnot,
provoking a sharp curtailment of civil liberties. In the 1930s the fascist Ligues provoked
considerable anxiety among republican political operatives.
Republicans would invoke shared anxieties that there was a latent opposition to the
regime in French society. The most persistently identiﬁed source of anti-republicanism
was the Catholic Church, which had organizational links with rightist parties and the
army, ran its own separate school system, and had a presumed near total control over
women. Michelet and others had attacked the Church’s control over education, especially
the education of women: “our wives and our daughters are being raised, are being
governed, by our enemies” (Michelet 1845, 6). But if this emphasis on the insidious role of
the Church was not new, it was nonetheless a central theme of republican discourse in
the Third Republic, and almost all republicans stressed that “Catholic institutions and
beliefs were. . . obstacles to genuine popular sovereignty, limiting the citizens’ ability to
act autonomously” (Stone 1996, 120).
The left and the right had their own forms, with the right being obsessed with
freemasonry and the left being obsessed with the Catholic Church (Parry 1998, 163).928
The presence of large alien populations in many departments was also framed as a
source of danger, in the form of a class of people whose attachment to the nation
and the Republic was questionable at best. Unlike French citizens, aliens were not
required to complete a lengthy period of military service, a state of aﬀairs that worried
republicans who saw military service as key means of assimilating a culturally diverse
nation (Brubaker 1992, 104–8). And even after the naturalization law of 1889, republicans
expressed a worry over culturally foreign elements in French society, who were not only
alien but even more under the control of the Church than the French. In opposing the
rising tide of anti-Semitism in Algeria, one deputy cited a republican who worried about
“the neo-naturalized descend[ing] in the streets today to take the Jewish citadel, and I
dread seeing them rise tomorrow to assault another citadel, obedient to those who will
928

A monarchist pamphlet, for instance, warned electors to be on guard: “Back Freemason! Father, ﬂee
him, avoid him like the plague. It is he who killed our kings and our priests, chased away the religious
orders, massacred millions of innocent men; it is him, henchman of Satan, who everyday fans the ﬂames
of discord and civil war” (Aper 1881, 17–18).
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speak of liberty while they are preaching. I fear that at that moment the naturalized
foreigners will help the reactionaries mount an assault of that other citadel to which we
all adhere, an assault on the republican citadel.”929
And considerable portions of both the left and right were obsessed with the supposed
power of Jews. When “Citizen Pelletan,” gave a speech against “ﬁnancial feudalism” to
the Free-Thinkers Federation, he was using a term he frequently resorted to describe the
Rothschilds and other Jewish bankers: “If clericalism is the enemy, ﬁnance is not any less
so.”930 But the groundswell of support for anti-Dreyfusards and the potential coalitions
they revealed deeply worried republicans, and seemed to underscore persistent hostility
to the Republic. The result of anti-Dreyfus organizing was a renewed eﬀort to secure
republican unity (Mazgaj 1987, 304).931

The Need for Republican Citizens
The invocation of these threats helped reinforce the moderate and conservative character
of republicanism, which many believed was crucial for securing suﬃcient electoral and
institutional support for the regime (Mayeur and Rebirioux 1988, 215). But to preserve
the regime against the supposed latent and insidious hostility of the Church, peasants
would have to be made not only into Frenchmen, but into republicans (Lehning 2001;
Weber 1979). While republican political operatives were convinced that the army was an
eﬀective mechanism for achieving the former, they were not so convinced that it was for
the latter. In republican rhetoric, the anti-Dreyfus coalition had been actively plotting a
coup in coordination with army oﬃcers.932 This underscored another persistent threat
929

Monbrun, cited by Thomson, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, Chambre des Députés, November 11th , 1898,
p.2179
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“Deux cérémonies civiles” (Lebey and Queillé 1893, 53). See Stone (Stone 1996, 126). The monarchist
right would likewise invoke Gambetta’s phrasing, declaring “The Jew, There is the Enemy” (Martinez
1890).
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This is not to say that anti-Semitism ceased to have left-wing constituencies after 1898. They certainly
did. Rather, the left became more hesitant to embrace explicit anti-Semitic tropes, a tendency that
increased with the new predominance of the ‘International’ variant of socialism in the French Section
of the Workers’ International. But older forms of radical and socialist anti-Semitism, such as the
denunciation of “ﬁnancial feudalism” persisted well into the 1930s. In the French context after the
1890s, nationalism referred to a rejection of individualism and a belief in the essential primacy of the
nation as an organic unit of society. Republicans insisted upon patriotism as a distinct concept.
932
A member of the Chamber of Deputies, Paul Déroulède, and a general had decided to coordinate a
coup attempt after the state funeral for president Félix Faure. Déroulède was to bring his supporters,
and they would harangue the general to lead the honor guard to the presidential palace. General de
Pellieux decided not to participate, and asked another general to lead the troops. When he failed to
convince the new general to mount a coup, Déroulède insisted he be arrested. He was charged with
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against the Republic, albeit one that was implicated with both the Church and opponents
of the parliamentary regime. “It is upon [the army],”wrote Gambetta in 1876, “upon its
bad disposition carefully maintained and stimulated towards the republicans, that the
reactionaries of all kinds are speculating” (Porch 2003, 7).
Republicans were divided over the best approach toward the army, but those who
came to oﬃce in the 1880s, including Ferry and Gambetta, believed that maintaining
the neutrality of the army was essential for preserving the Republic. During the National Assembly, Gambetta had broken with radicals to support a provision in an army
recruitment bill on the grounds that “we must impede, in the home of the military family,
political dissention.”933 And disfranchisement, which led to the army being referred to
as “la grande Muette”—the great mute one—was largely supported by an oﬃcer class
that remained dominated by Legitimists and believed the army should be a sacred space
separate from politics working for the restoration of France from the degeneracy of
parliamentary democracy (Charnay 1964; Flynn 2002, 19–20).
The Dreyfus Aﬀair led to renewed tensions between republicans and the army. The
radical republican tradition opposed treating the army as “a body distinct from the
nation”; they supported conscription and sought to reduce the number of exemptions.934
But they were deeply anxious that the army was not loyal to the republican regime.
In the 1904 aﬀaire des ﬁches it was learned that the republican anticlerical Minister of
War was keeping records of the political and religious leanings of oﬃcers, and assigning
promotions on this basis. And throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries there was
a “persistent Radical concern to republicanize the military services, which were major
institutional supports for antirepublican sentiment” (Stone 1996, 133). But Radical eﬀorts
to republicanize the army and reduce its spending ultimately undermined support for
the ﬁrst Radical governments between 1902 and 1906, and like the opportunists they
became increasingly supportive of the military and imperialism: “The reason for the
budding aﬀection between the republic and the army was a simple one: soldiers were
increasingly convinced that republicans sought to resurrect French military power” (Porch
2003, 9).
But if the army was a suspect means of creating republican citizens, secular schools
treason, but was acquitted after insisting that he would continue to organize resistance to the regime
(Read 2012, 277). Both the Napoleonic and Orléanist pretenders had organized troops to enter France
in the event the coup succeeded.
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Carnot to the electors of the Seine, 1869 (Tourneur 1904, 115).
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were considered to be the republic’s greatest weapon. And free, compulsory, secular
schools were seen as a necessary corollary to ‘universal suﬀrage.’ For some, it was a prerequisite and education should ideally precede any extension of the franchise. But more
common in radical discourse was the claim that only through ‘universal suﬀrage’ could
mass, secular education have suﬃcient political support: “without universal suﬀrage, we
would not have so instructed the people of France, so as to not leave the electors in
ignorance” (Renault 1893, 390).
The electoral system and voting qualiﬁcations, however, were not just a determining
factor for whether education could be extended. They were important means for creating
republican citizens in their own right. It was a common belief among republicans that
“only the unobstructed exercise of the vote could create an independent citizen” (Stone
1996, 176). And among the chief sources of obstruction, argued radicals, was the inﬂuence of local notables, employers, and petty questions of personality, which could only
be overcome with a diﬀerent electoral system. In the early years of the republic, radicals
were insistently calling for departmental list voting: instead of voting in relatively small,
single-member districts, radicals wanted voters to be pooled into a department wide
electorate where they would vote for multiple deputies, ideally on a party list.
This would not only encourage the formation of programmatic parties, but would
itself be a means of republicanizing the citizen, by forcing him to look beyond the petty
concerns of his local community. Gambetta desired departmental list voting so that
elections would “preserve their political character, that [electors] be removed from toorestrictive inﬂuences, from what we used to call the spirit of the ‘clocher.’ Those who
want to see engaged in the electoral competition ideas rather than personalities, doctrines of government rather than miserable personal passions.”935 Jean Jaurès claimed
that universal suﬀrage, if properly organized, “places above the inﬁnite variety of local
interests a great political idea, and will demand in a loud and clear voice the accomplishment of a program of reforms (Very good! Very good! on the extreme left).”936
Nor was it simply about encouraging a greater role for ideas, a terrain on which
republicans could not imagine being defeated. It was about allowing the national
sovereignty to recognize itself, and to choose what must be its true interest, the re935

Gambetta, Annales de l’Assemblée Nationale, vol.31, June 4th , 1874, p.306. The ‘clocher’ refers to the
belfry of the communal parish church, and it was a widely used term of denigration for small-town and
rural life.
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p.886
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public. Had single-member district voting been in place in the early 1870s, claimed
Gambetta, republican candidates would not have won:
“do you imagine that if. . . we had consulted France by district voting, that
the authority of the verdict would have been as decisive as it was, that it
would have had such an immense inﬂuence on the leader of executive and
on the parties? No, sirs, do not fool yourselves. One might consider district
voting as a sort of broken mirror in which France would not have recognized
itself. . . . If you have a Republic, it is by the authority of departmental voting
that you have it.”937
Departmental voting was adopted in the 1880s. Although the Prime Minister, Jules
Ferry, was less convinced of the inherently emancipatory and republicanizing power of
departmental voting, he stressed that additional republican organizing was necessary to
realize its potential.
“We must give to department list voting. . . the necessary means of action.
Departmental voting will be a great danger if republican France is not up
to the duties that it imposes. I know well that the Republic is founded, that
it is stronger than the factions that threaten it, but it would be a sovereign
imprudence to sleep on and to count indeﬁnitely on this thought. You,
republicans, are the true teachers of the liberty of this country; you are
truly in charge of souls. The future belongs to the vigilant; it is by work,
by struggle that a party conquers and conserves the right to exist and to
govern.”938
His anxieties over the possible danger of departmental voting were, in his and many
other republicans, conﬁrmed by the meteoric rise of General Boulanger.
Boulanger took advantage of the quirks of French electoral law to create momentum
for a political movement dedicated to revenge on Germany, revision of the constitution,
and, argued republicans, the restoration of the monarchy. Because there was no limitation on how many seats a candidate could contest—and no prohibition on sitting
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members from contesting seats—he was able to contest and win repeated by-elections
across the country. And the departmental list system would extend his popularity to
candidates aligned with him. His victory in a January 1889 by-election in the Seine
department provoked fears of a coup and was seen as posing a clear threat to the republicans: were he able to repeat his success in a general election, persons running on his
list would likely take all 38 seats for the department, a dynamic that could be repeated
in every department of France (Cole and Campbell 1989, 55).
Republicans drew heavily on their rhetoric of the 1870s to insist on burying all factions to avoid any fragmentation of the republican forces. Radicals had been pushing for
revisions to the constitution, notably extending direct ‘universal suﬀrage’ to the Senate.
The opportunists had been willing to consider some revision, but now turned against
anything that might give the Boulangists an opportunity to increase its power. And the
appearance of a threat to the regime led to the abandonment of departmental voting
and the system by which candidates could run in multiple districts, which had heretofore
been defended as a necessary implication of universal suﬀrage.939 “The republican party
has always defended electoral liberty,” claimed the bill’s rapporteur; “but if we today are
supporting single-member district voting, it is because we ﬁnd in its reestablishment a
safeguard,” a means of “destroying” the danger to the Republic.940 They did not abandon their insistence that the country was for the Republic, although their doubts were
certainly revived. Rather, they argued that the Boulangists were deceiving the country:
“if the adversaries of the Republic would clearly present themselves before universal
suﬀrage with their program, ﬂying their ﬂag, indicating their hopes, if they would say
who they are and where they are going, if they would frankly declare their opposition to
republican institutions,” then the result would not be in doubt.941 When this comment
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provoked angry exclamations from the right, another republican shot back “you have
never dared cry ‘Down with the Republic!’ You lack directness.”942
Importantly, conservatives now saw in the rhetorical resonance of ‘universal suﬀrage’
their own political opportunity. What we see from the republicans is “a fear of departmental list voting, which hides poorly their fear of universal suﬀrage. After having
worshipped universal suﬀrage as an idol, why do you now break it like a cheap toy?”943
Republicans were now justifying the district level voting in the same terms as they had
defended departmental voting, “so that the next elections are a sincere expression of
the sentiments of the country, of the national will.” And the country, for them, was
synonymous with republican sentiment: “the republican country has not been fooled,
its instinct has not betrayed it, and from all parts of the country it demands a change.
(From the right: ‘Oh c’mon!’).”944
The government re-established single-member districts, although many radicals would
remain opposed to this into the early 20th century. They prohibited by-elections for the
remaining parliamentary term, denied the right of candidates to stand in more than
one constituency, and charged Boulanger and others with conspiracy against the state.
Republicans would draw heavily on the experience, and in the subsequent investigations
would insist on the anti-republican character of the boulangist movement. Their rhetorical invocation of the threat to the regime was a sincere belief as well as a means of
building coalitions and appealing to diﬀerent republican constituencies.
While re-aﬃrming the insecure basis of the Republic, if anything the experience only
underscored the centrality of ‘universal suﬀrage’ to French political identity. The supporters of Boulanger argued that the republicans had engaged in a “plot against universal
suﬀrage.” To “suppress Universal Suﬀrage,” they argued, “our governors have imagined a
very cunning tactic.” They did not “dare to attack Universal Suﬀrage directly,” so instead
they dissolved parliament and calling new elections as the boulangist gained momentum,
by foreclosing any change to the Senate, and by returning to the single-member district
voting (Belleval 1888, 8). This critique had its origins in the Bonapartist conception of
universal suﬀrage, but it would have new resonance amongst the nationalist right. Despite persistent doubts, among republicans and conservatives, as to the wisdom of male
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citizen suﬀrage, they were now, rhetorically at least, equally committed to it and each
posturing as its true defenders.
And so all future debates over changes to the franchise or electoral systems would see
the defenders of a proposal insisting that they were trying to organize or allow for the
full expression of ‘universal suﬀrage’ and national sovereignty, while their critics would
charge them with attempting to mutilate it. Charles Benoist, a right wing republican,
who would increasingly move toward opposing the republican regime, wrote On the Organization of Universal Suﬀrage, in which he argued that in practice, “the nation one an
indivisible, is fragmented, and national sovereignty is divided up” (Benoist 1895, 17–19).
He insisted that universal suﬀrage could not be reverse, but argued that the process of
dividing national sovereignty into atomized individuals was disastrous. He would be,
as president of the new standing Committee on Universal Suﬀrage in the Chamber of
Deputies, one of the most important promoters of proportional representation in the
Third Republic (Gicquel 2003; Huard 1991, 158). Most conservatives, however, were
more restrained in their criticism of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ but almost all believed that it
was accomplished and had to be accepted and organized (Mineur 2010). The “salvation
of France,” argued one pamphlet with strong royalist sympathies, “is in universal suffrage.” The author advised the elector that “generally no one is more conservative than
the chatelaine, noble or bourgeois, of the village; and, unless there is palpable proof the
contrary, vote for him. . . . Leave the talkative lawyers at the bar, the doctors and veterinarians to their clientele, lest they neglect them, and leave the grocer at his counter”
(Aper 1881, 17).
Radicals calling for constitutional revision in the early 1890s framed this as the “restitution of French democracy. . . by ﬁnally permitting universal suﬀrage to prevail. On the
day when national sovereignty will be assured, on that day only will the country be safe
from scandals, crises and revolutions.”945 Radicals opposing proportional representation
insisted it was an “essentially monarchical regime. . . . We are under the regime of universal suﬀrage, which has as its principle majority rule. . . .You want us to accept a new
system, which will be the ﬁrst stab in the back of universal suﬀrage.”946 Representatives from Algeria, denouncing property, age, and naturalization restrictions for French
citizens to vote for the Délégations ﬁnancières, described these as “Bizarre. . . a denial
of our democratic principles, of that which we hold most dear, universal suﬀrage.”947
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Radicals would insist that ‘universal suﬀrage’ remained “today the only resource remaining to France for achieving its civilizing work and to retake possession of itself. It is
under its ﬂag that we ﬁght; it is to its deﬁnitive emancipation that we consecrate our
eﬀorts. Its enemies are those of the Republic and of France; its defenders are those of
the Revolution” (Laisant 1892, 73).
The incentive to debate the franchise in terms of who would best protect and extend
it came from the expectation that it was a resonant theme in French national identity; and
as diﬀerent groups began to pick up this rhetoric, in an eﬀort to gain traction for their
relevant political projects, its centrality to French political culture was correspondingly
increased. The behavioral pattern of praising ‘universal suﬀrage’ and posturing as its
defenders was incentivized in an increasing set of situations, ensuring that it was a
self-reinforcing ideological institution for much of the Third Republic.
Many republicans had supported single-member districts, believing that it encouraged the local organizing that would be needed to sustain the Republic; if singlemember districts were abandoned, argued one, “an entire group of departments, almost a province, will escape the Republican Action. All the ground won by ten years
of persistent eﬀorts will be lost.”948 After the boulangist experience, even the Parisian
radical republicans turned to organizing the communes, while following the moderate
republicans in emphasizing the act of voting as the most important focus of political
participation. Given the dangers revealed by departmental voting, it was among the
safest way of ensuring the dissemination of republican principles.

The Exclusions of Republican Citizenship
The same themes of republican insecurity and the exigencies of citizenship were relevant
in debates over the right to vote for the indigenous subjects of the empire and the female
subjects of the metropole. But if the same themes were present, their logic was not
equally applied. The capacity for the indigenous subjects or women to be republican
citizens was diminished, as these categories were understood to be especially shaped by
nature and religion. The former called into question whether they could ever be capable
of the duties of citizenship; and the latter their willingness to be equal citizens as well as
the degree to which they were autonomous individuals with a will of their own.
Both nature and religion were implicated in the capacity of French males as well,
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but never to the same extent. The ‘Latin-ness’ of the French was frequently invoked in
political debates, and there was a longstanding tradition that the division of classes in
French society was really a division of races, between the noble Frank and the plebian
Gaul (Weber 1991). But for the most part this was politically irrelevant in debates over
French male citizens’ political rights. As we have discussed, the religious beliefs of French
male citizens was an issue of concern for republicans, but it was not a suﬃcient basis
for exclusion from the suﬀrage, although it could certainly be considered in staﬃng
the bureaucracy and military oﬃces. But for much of the Third Republic Islam in
particular was seen as absolutely incompatible with the obligations and privileges of
French citizenship.
To be clear, neither the exclusion of women nor of the indigenous was the product
of or motivated by republican understandings of political community. Deputies and
political writers were quite explicit that political rights could be extended in the colonies
only if they were compatible with the maintenance of French sovereignty (Mallarmé
1900, 125–26).949 And while imperialism was often defended in terms of the country’s
presumptuous ‘civilizing mission,’ it was just as often defended in terms of geopolitical
and economic interests. And in debates over women’s civil and political rights, deputies
were frequently explicit that they were concerned with maintaining control over their
wife’s property, the upbringing of their children, and obedience in the family. “The
family,” argued one deputy, “it must be defended at all costs. . . . Could a wife, without
the authorization of her husband, perform a task that undertakes his ﬁnancial liability?
Would she have the right? No, you wouldn’t dare support it!”950
But there were also opponents of imperialism, among the radical republicans in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and among the international Socialists and the
Communist Party thereafter; and many republicans who saw imperialism and indigenous
populations political rights as necessary correlates. And the radicals, who were the major
force opposing women’s suﬀrage in the post-WWI years, had also been the party most
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committed to women’s civil rights and was the party most associated with feminists, male
and female. To understand why more progress was accomplished in extending political
rights to the indigenous populations than to women, and why the party supportive of
feminism was opposed to women’s suﬀrage, we need to understand the implications of
these policies on republican narratives of political community.

Political Rights of Indigenous Subjects
In both 1881 and 1885, Jules Ferry was forced from oﬃce following political controversy
and public uproar over imperial conquests (Lewis 1962, 136). Votes in favor of the Tonkin
expedition were tallied by extreme-left journalists and treated as attacks on the republic,
a position shared by many radicals as well (Vaughan 1885). In part because of the
belief that the Republic was threatened, however, republicans and even radicals came
to embrace the project of a building up a massive overseas empire. The empire would
secure the Republic by restoring national glory and by serving as a source of geopolitical,
economic, and demographic strength for the eventual achievement of ‘revenge’ against
Germany.951 And ultimately the Third Republic saw the largest and most rapid imperial
expansion in French history.
France extended parliamentary representation to many, but not all, of its colonies,
and the limitation of suﬀrage to citizenship, a longstanding principle in French republicanism, provided a discursive frame for justifying exclusions that parliamentary critics
saw as unjust from the 1880s onward.952 The central questions regarding the political
rights of indigenes were whether or not non-citizens could vote and what was required to
be considered a citizen. Underlying this was a longstanding principle of French republicanism, namely that the colonies were an integral part of the nation, and all the rights
enjoyed by French citizens were to be equally enjoyed in the colonies. In short, that
the French colonies should be assimilated to the legal system and civil administration
of the metropole. But over the course of the Third Republic there was an ongoing and
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shifting debate between ‘assimilation’ and ‘association’ as two diﬀerent visions of how
France should relate to its colonies, with political operatives drawing on diﬀerent strands
of each to advance or rebut calls for increased political rights in the colonies.
Assimilation meant two distinct things. The ﬁrst meaning was a long-established
tradition in French republicanism, that conquest should be accompanied by either the
immediate or gradual extension of French civil administration and law to the colony, such
that it would be a simple extension of the metropole (Girault 1895, 68; Lewis 1962, 141).
The second meaning was that assimilation required the formation of French republican
citizens, “to make them into Frenchmen: they are educated, they are granted the right
of suﬀrage, they are dressed in the European mode, our laws are substituted for their
customs, and in a word, native assimilation is pursued” (Girault 1895, 68). The process
of assimilation, in this sense, was very much akin to the process of making Frenchmen
and republicans within the metropole, and republicans were “in the same respect to
these colored peoples as we are with respect to our peasants. We owe education to the
former as to the latter.”953
Many stressed a unique French capacity for assimilation: “we would go voluntarily
to the inferior races, and since our mixed race is to us, under all climates, beautiful,
fecund, and vigorous, we are more colonizing than the English, because no law of ‘struggle for life’ requires us to exterminate the indigene, destroy the autochthonous races”
(Bonnetain 1885, 201). But almost all insisted upon the liberating intentions of republican traditions, and assimilation was an important ideological mechanism by which
republican democracy could be reconciled with imperial subjugation.954 As Paul Dislère
claimed, assimilation has “been greatly favored amongst us by the triumph of republican
ideas” (Dislère 1886; Ageron 1978, 196; Demontès 1906, 502; Leroy-Beaulieu 1874, 327).
By the end of the 19th century, however, an alternative vision was being aggressively
promoted, that relied on the “universal law of the struggle for life” to argue that the
colonies should be treated as sites of domination for purposes of economic exploitation,
and that the notion of assimilating “inferior races” was a utopian idea (Harmand 1919,
153–55; Saussure 1899). While each had its adherents and the two concepts were con953
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stantly juxtaposed against the other, in political rhetoric the distinction between the two
visions was often blurred (Lewis 1962).955 But at its core, the debate between association
and assimilation as contrasting visions of how the republic related to the empire rested
on diﬀerent understandings about the moral and political prerequisites of republican
citizens.
Both assimilation and association provided grounds for enfranchisement and exclusion. The great act of republican assimilation was almost always claimed to be 1848,
when slavery was abolished and the freed men were declared citizens with the right to
vote (Lara 2007). Deputies calling for the enfranchisement of indigenous Algerian Muslims often invoked the principle of republican assimilation.956 But assimilation was very
often invoked to justify exclusions, the extension of representation but with no exceptions to the principle that only citizens could have political rights. Assimilation, in this
usage, meant “a situation in which the French citizens of a colony enjoy all the legal
guarantees accorded to the French of the metropolis” more than it did the civilizing of
the indigenous population (Lewis 1962, 142).
Theorists of association were insistent that “democratic institution, founded on equality and liberty, cannot be transported to the [colonies], and universal suﬀrage, in truth,
is there a monster” (Harmand 1919, 350).957 And yet because associationists denied the
necessity to transport the rights of citizenship and ‘universal suﬀrage,’ they were able to
oﬀer their own prescriptions for inclusion. Stephen H. Roberts argued that “there is no
reason at all why deputies should be elected by universal suﬀrage in certain colonies.”
“Why cannot a restricted franchise be introduced in all? This would mean,
of course, that the negroes in the Antilles and the Senegalese communes
and the Indians of the French towns would be deprived of some of their
rights, but after all, they number only 400,000 out of France’s 56 million
native subjects, and the general gain would compensate for the individual
loss” (Roberts 1929, 82).
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That is, association allowed for an inequality between citizens and for precisely this
reason enabled a limited enfranchisement of indigenous subjects.
What made assimilation potentially exclusionary was the requirement that political
rights be limited to citizens, with citizenship understood to be incompatible with the
maintenance of distinct personal statuses. But to the recurring surprise of deputies,
supposedly bedrock principles of French constitutional law were violated in India and
Senegal.958 Every few years a controversy over Indian and Senegalese voting rights
would erupt. Each time a large portion of the Chamber expressed surprise that the
electors were not French citizens. One deputy explained to the Chamber that it “would
be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd any legislation that gives these 72,000 [Indian] electors, who are
not French, have nonetheless the right to choose a deputy . . . . What I ask the Chamber
to remember is that these electors are not French citizens.”959 A deputy from Algeria
was especially concerned that non-citizens might be voting; he placed great stress on the
possibility that there voting rights were the result of administrative decree, a dangerous
concentration of authority in one person. “No one,” he insisted “can give them the right
to vote in political elections, if it is not France herself represented by her parliament.”
A few moments later he raised the bar even higher, now claiming that “the Constitution
alone can decide if there are one or several ways to be a French citizen. It is a question
of principle.”960
The principle that only citizens could vote was closely implicated with the republican
tradition that the citizen had to be an individual who stood on a plane of legal equality
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with others, without distinct personal statuses determining what legal code would be
applied. Hindus, Jews, Christians (in India), and above all Muslims who were governed
not by French but by religious, caste, or tribal law in civil matters were considered to
be privileged classes with distinct statuses incompatible with republican citizenship. But
in both India and Senegal, political rights were extended without the indigenous having
to abandon their personal status.961 Underscoring the question’s broader implications,
the Algerian deputy asked whether “the Muslims, in Senegal and India, and in some
other colonies, have not retained their personal status or whether they are subject to the
requirements of the Civil Code.”962 If so, this violated the principles of “our essentially
unitary legislation” that denied “indigenes or settlers, negroes, whites, yellows, or blacks
[] the right to vote if they are not subject to French law.”963 When the deputy from
Guadeloupe argued against the ending of parliamentary representation, d’Estournelles
assured him that Guadeloupe was not included in the bill. The diﬀerence, as one deputy
yelled out, was that colonies such as Guadeloupe, La Reunion, and Martinique “were
subject to the civil code.”964
But the debate never turned solely on the question of citizenship as a legal status.
Cultural, racial, and class concerns were always invoked. “With our habitual mania for
assimilation,” argued one deputy, “we have made a French department with a municipal
council, general council, district council, a deputy, a senator, and we have imprudently
conferred our electoral rights to Hindus who speak Tamil, Bengali, or Hindustani, but
who do not speak French and know absolutely nothing about France.”965 D’Estournelles
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asked whether, “these electors, who do not have a civil state, who do not speak a word
of French, do they pay taxes?” When one deputy responded that they paid taxes to
their particular community, d’Estournelles shot back, “No, they do not pay our taxes.”966
The indigenous electors were not culturally French, and they were not subject to French
law. At this point another republican deputy yelled out that, “the electors inscribed
at the welfare oﬃce certainly vote well!”967 The indigenous were suspect from a class
perspective as well.
The concern with the class composition of the indigenous electorate was most often
expressed in terms of whether they could exercise the independent moral judgment that
‘universal suﬀrage’ required. A “large portion of the black electors of Senegal,” it was
claimed, “go to the polls without knowing what they are doing.”968 The indigenous electorate was described as “oblivious,” and it was warned that they drowned out “colonists
and even the mulattos. . . . In reality, only the chiefs vote.”969 This critique was applied to
India and Senegal but also to those colonies where the electors were citizens, implicitly
questioning the reality of their citizenship. The inﬂuence of patrons over voters meant
that “there is no universal suﬀrage,” in India and Senegal, but also in colonies were the
voters were citizens.970 Some deputies rejected the suggestion that the indigenous did
not deserve the right to vote because of their poverty or for not paying taxes, arguing
that “we are not living under a property suﬀrage. Our public law has roots elsewhere
than in the payment of taxes.”971 But even the supporters of expanded electoral rights
for the indigenous argued that “nobody has ever supported giving the right of suﬀrage
to all the poor population who cannot even understand what a ballot is and who will
vote however the administration tells them to.”972 A more important theme raised by
defenders of colonial representation was that the Republic owed its very existence to
colonial delegates to the National Assembly, as “when the Republic was established by
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a one vote margin, there were ten votes in favor from colonial representatives.”973 By
associating the colonies with the Republic, they sought to claim for their constituents a
status as culturally French, either in addition to or instead of a legal status. One deputy
argued that the “Guyanese people are eminently French. . . . What needs to be known is
whether France intends to have subjects in its colonies, or if on the contrary its goal is to
treat us as French citizens.”974 The deputy from Senegal insisted that in his colony there
“are tribes who are profoundly devoted to France,” who were French in every way that
mattered, even if they were not citizens. But he also reminded the Chamber that “there
is an entire colony of whites, men who have come here and risked their health and work
hard, as there are no idlers and there are very few bureaucrats in that country.”975
Importantly, both the class composition of the electorate and the allegations of fraud
had diﬀerent eﬀects than similar concerns in France. The working class of the metropole
was often considered to be in a precarious state, possibly lacking the necessary independence for republican citizenship (Stone 1996, 123). There was fraud in the colonial
elections, but this was also true of French elections.976 When a deputy asked how “can
the blacks escape the inﬂuence of people who, for example, provide them a livelihood,
such as the representatives of commercial establishments,” he was asking a question
that was raised by conservatives and radicals in France.977 But anxiety over the French
working classes was very rarely coupled with proposals for restrictions on the vote; more
common was the call for new measures to protect the voter, such as the private voting
booth introduced in 1912. In the colonies, these concerns led to demands for increased
restrictions and the suppression of representation.
Deputies frequently raised another basis for the questionable citizenship of the
colonists. “These indigenous electors, who do not speak our language, who do not
pay our taxes, are they at least subject to military service? No.”978 There was no legal
requirement that an elector have performed his military service, although after 1898
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deputies needed to have performed theirs. But it was a highly resonant theme in republican thought. And it was precisely because deputies recognized this resonance that the
representatives of Algerian settlers were especially opposed to any suggestion of indigenous military service. Speaking before a meeting of the Algerian délégations ﬁnancières,
Emile Morinaud, a former anti-Semite and future Republican Socialist deputy claimed
that,
“it would already be serious, excessively serious for the future domination
of this country, to subtract from the code of the indigénat or the repressive
tribunals, the 7,000 or 8,000 indigenes who each year would be leaving
the barracks and to grant them the diminished taxes. I would like to know
what the administration is going to do when they have before them these
indigenes, half-French, and others who will have stayed indigenes. . . . The
day when such a misfortune [conscription] will pass, there will immediately
form in the parliament a group that demands the conferring of voting rights
to the natives, and this group will quickly conquer public opinion. Why?
Because it would rest on a principle now recognized by all civilized peoples.
What is the hallmark of the citizen? Compulsory military service. Whoever
owes military service is at the same time a citizen, and has the right to
vote.”979
Morinaud outlined a scenario in which after 20 years there would be “100,000 French
electors against 160,000 indigenes. . . . It would be the complete ruin of French domination here.” More tactfully, others suggested that conscription raised “very grave and
delicate questions” of citizenship and political rights, and did their best to sidestep the
matter.980
The critique of the colonial franchise, whether it was by citizens or the indigenous, asked whether it was in accordance with republican principles that men who were
“French in name only, neither soldiers nor taxpayers,” had the right to decide on taxes
979

Morinaud, Délégations ﬁnancières algériennes, assemblée plénière, April 14th , 1908, 73, 74 (1908, 70–
74); see also Ajam (rapporteur), Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, February 18th , 1910,
p.927. The assemblies of Algeria “fear seeing the number of indigenous soldiers increased in a large
proportion.”
980
Carpot, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, February 18th , 1910, p.924. The question
of colonial conscription was motivated in part by a desire to reduce the length of service for French
conscripts, which in turn was defended on the grounds that it was undermining the need for procreation,
an obsession of French political leaders in the Third Republic. Both conscription in the colonies and
the broader imperial project were often framed in terms of increasing the aggregate size of the French
population. “West French Africa,” claimed one governor general, “constitutes a marvelous reservoir of
men for France.” Quoted by Messimy, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, February 18th ,
1910, p.932

470

and on war and peace.981 In short, they were not French republican citizens. “We
may have put the cart before the horse,” argued one deputy, and before giving “blacks
the rights of citizens, we should have taught them the duties.”982 D’Estournelles, after describing the electors of Senegal in terms that emphasized their racial diﬀerence,
the cultural foreignness, their alleged non-contribution and dependency, as whether the
Chamber “ﬁnds it reasonable. . . that the electors so deﬁned exercise the same rights as
French citizens.”983
In 1905 an Inspector General was sent from Paris to inquire into the electoral system in the Senegal. He was shocked that non-citizens were voting, and warned that if
the indigenous were ever to organize eﬀectively “we would see the General Council and
Municipal Councils composed exclusively of native Muslims who would retain their customary law while having a civil jurisdiction over [our] special tribunals. In the future, the
deputy from Senegal could conceivably not even be a French citizen!”984 The Senegalese
administration began a purge of the electorate but resistance by the mayor of Dakar
ultimately led to a court case. On July 24, 1907, the Cour de Cassation maintained
what had been an administrative decision without legal foundation, that only those born
within the limits of the Senegalese communes were eligible to vote. But the decision also
aﬃrmed that both Indians and Senegalese were not citizens, and their rights were now
clearly established as exceptions.985
In 1914 the Senegalese-born deputy Blaise Diagne was elected to the Chamber of
Deputies. His election was immediately contested on the grounds that he was not a
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citizen, a claim that again surprised many deputies and which the rapporteur had to
carefully explain as “exceptional” ( Johnson 1971, 83–84; Moleur 2000).986 And the
rapporteur stressed that even if he was not a citizen, Diagne was not culturally foreign;
he was “of the Catholic religion, married in France [to a French wife], and seems to have
renounced his personal status.”987 Ultimately, there was little desire among the radical
majority in the Chamber of Deputies to turn away the ﬁrst African and indigenous
deputy elected to the Third Republic, especially as it was increasingly evident that war
with Germany was likely. And drawing on the republican tradition of political rights as a
correlate of military service, Diagne’s ﬁrst act was to request that the conscription law be
applied to the four communes of Senegal, and in return secured support for legislation
declaring the “natives” of the communes to be French citizens.

The Case of Algeria
It was the question of citizenship and political rights in Algeria that most concerned
political elite. Algeria was in one sense a model of assimilation, and with increasing
frequency in the early 20th century political leaders insisted that all the civil and political
rights of France were operative in Algeria.988 As a primary textbook explained, “in
Algeria, as in France, there is universal suﬀrage. If one is not French by origin, one can
become so by naturalization. . . . The indigenous Muslims are not citizens, but French
subjects” (Bernard and Redon 1906, 169).
The terms in which the right to vote for indigenous Algerian Muslims were debated
was broadly similar to those concerning the other colonies. The principle of citizenship
as incompatible with distinct personal statuses was stressed even more, deputies insisint
“it is not acceptable that there would be two categories of citizens in France, one obligated to observe all French law” while the other is not.989 But the unique situation
of Algeria—with sizeable foreign, French settler, and Jewish communities living among
a much larger indigenous Muslim population—led early on to proposals to distinguish
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between citizens and even to recognize intermediary categories between the citizen and
the subject.990
A source of considerable political conﬂict in Algeria was that the power of the French
settlers had been diluted by the Crémieux decree of 1870 and the naturalization law of
1889. “They complain,” summarized the governor of Algeria in 1899, “that the legislation
of 1870 and 1889, combined with the electoral legislation, undermines what they believe
to be their legitimate inﬂuence, namely the preponderance to which they believe they
have a right.”
“We are, they say, the representatives of the conquering race, we are the
artisans of colonization, we are the richest producers of this French colony;
we are even more, we are the creators of French families that will maintain
the preponderance of our race. We are electors!... We have electoral divides,
as in every possible electorate, and it is painful to us, it is humiliating to
us, to ﬁnd that the arbiters of the situation are foreigners and indigenous
Israelites” (Paoli 1904, 162).
To remedy this, the governor described three diﬀerent options for changing the voting
qualiﬁcations. The ﬁrst alleged that universal suﬀrage, “the participation of all the
adult and male inhabitants of a country in its sovereignty,” does not exist in Algeria
(Paoli 1904, 162). This proposal would extend the suﬀrage by extending citizenship to
all French indigenes. The most restrictive proposal would require all electors to know
how to read and write in French (Paoli 1904, 162). The intermediary position, which
he favored, would have two degrees of naturalization, the ﬁrst giving civil rights, and
another “aimed at incorporating deﬁnitively into political society one who had already
entered into civil society.”991 As one radical opponent of the proposal described it, “the
governor general supports a measure whose innocent, soft, inoﬀensive character you will
appreciate; he is a partisan of electoral reform. . . that leaves to Jews all their civil rights,
but removes only their political and electoral rights.”992
The context in which the governor made these remarks was an ongoing ‘anti-Jewish’
campaign, whose central premise was that the Crémieux decree had been a mistake
and needed to be abrogated or corrected, and a political backlash against the growing
990
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number of citizens naturalized by the law of 1889. “These Italians,” said one antiSemite deputy, “are not French except in name.” In both cases the overarching concern
was that a culturally dissimilar group, whose traditions made them unﬁt for republican
citizenship, had been inappropriately integrated into the political community.993
The belief that the Crémieux decree and naturalization acts were mistakes extended
well beyond the anti-Semite movement, and arguments against them were framed in
republican terms, that citizenship had been conferred before they were ready for republican citizenship. The Crémieux decree had never been popular, and almost as soon
as it was proclaimed eﬀorts began to reverse it. Others tried diﬀerent tactics to deal
with what they saw as the premature integration of Algerian Jews. In 1886 the radical
leftist Camille Sabatier introduced legislation that would reform the consistories of Algeria, the main institutional intermediary between the state and the Jewish communities.
“Suddenly naturalized,” Sabatier explained, “the Algerian Israelites initially showed a
generalized and vivid repugnance to a legal order that forced them to undertake military service.” But once they realized that the new order was likely to remain, “they
sought only to take from their new situation all the proﬁt they can,” by determining the
outcome of elections. Algerian Jews, he claimed, had not been prepared by education
“for the new responsibilities of the citizen.”994
The claim that Jewish and ‘neo-naturalized’ Algerians’ citizenship was illegitimate
was the accompaniment to a systematic eﬀort to restrict political participation, most
aggressively in the case of Jews. A ‘titre d’indigénat’ was required as proof of having been
included by the decree, a form of voter identiﬁcation that was often diﬃcult to obtain
and which resulted in large-scale disfranchisement of Jewish voters in 1896 (Roberts
2011, 71). But the suspect citizenship of Jews and the naturalized was reﬂected in the
Délégations ﬁnancières, which limited voting rights to agricultural property owners and
taxpaying urban settlers who had been resident in Algeria for 2 years and French citizens
for a minimum of 12 years, were described by many as a “wise limitation of universal
suﬀrage” and they marked a clear shift in policy from the goal of assimilating Algerian
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institutions to those in the metropole (Thomas 1899, 55; Mallarmé 1900, 125–26; Goujon
and Demonts 1898, 452).995
Proposals for political rights for indigenous Algerians ranged from those that proposed the extension of equal citizenship en bloc, similar to the Crémieux decree’s naturalization of Jews, to political rights without citizenship, to the extension of citizenship
‘in status’ to a limited category of person.996 There was very little support for the mass
extension of citizenship, because it would swamp the settlers—who were seen as the genuine French citizenry—and because it was widely believed that the earlier experience of
the mass naturalization had been a failure.997 The most frequently invoked reason to not
extend citizenship en masse, however, was that it would be a violation of religious liberty.
The Muslim’s personal status, it was insisted, was “the sum of all the rules that should
determine the life of a Muslim family.”998 To demand naturalization as a condition of
voting rights was “to demand the abandonment of their religious faith.”999 Not only was
France pledged to respect the religion, mores, and customs of the indigenous Algerians,
but to do otherwise would violate republican principles: “it is not in the republican
tradition to. . . impose on someone the renunciation of a status that to them might be
995
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dear.”1000
Alternatively, political rights could be granted without citizenship. But this also
would swamp the settler population unless separate electoral colleges were used. Even
in this case there was little support for ‘universal suﬀrage’ in the indigenous college, as
this would mean that the representatives would have diﬀerent moral stature, some being
elected on the basis of ‘universal suﬀrage’ and others elected on the basis of a restricted
franchise.1001
The third and most important option was a very limited extension of citizenship to
some categories of Muslims ‘in status.’ This had been proposed on several occasions
before WWI, but had not met with much success. In 1916, however, the Diagne law
extended citizenship in status to all persons born in the four Senegalese communes.
That measure had been premised on military conscription, and the service of indigenous
Algerians in the war was likewise marshaled in defense of political rights.1002 In 1910 it
was argued that the enlightened indigenes saw “in military service an opportunity to be
closer to France, to be more intimately mixed up in French life”; during the course of the
War, it was claimed “the indigenes proved that they are French.”1003
The 1919 law considerably extended the right to vote in Algerian municipalities, and
was justiﬁed on the grounds that “no matter how much we are tempted otherwise, we
always come back to the ideas of the men of the revolution, the principles of liberty,
1000
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equality, and of justice.”1004 But the municipal electoral rights of the indigenous were
strictly limited; the portion of their representation on the councils was ﬁxed at less than
their population size and they were not able to be elected as mayor.1005
But the main cause of controversy was the proposal to allow a limited category of
Muslims the right to naturalized ‘in status.’ The bill’s rapporteur acknowledged that
this was a very limited naturalization, but argued that “the indigenous Muslims are not
assimilated enough or close to us for it to be possible to naturalize them or to confer
civil and political rights, resulting in the status of citizen.”1006 Instead, the government’s
position was that which had been suggested in 1899, the creation of an “intermediary
status, for all indigenes who by their personal situation, by the degree of their evolution,
or by the services they have rendered, are up to the task of usefully participating in
public life, and to consent, through themselves or their representatives, in managing the
aﬀairs of the community.”1007 The objective now was to assimilate the indigene over a
very long time frame, and even this process would be less assimilation than “an evolution
of the indigenes in their own civilization.”1008
The embrace of association and intermediary statuses gave the Algerian representatives resonant grounds upon which to attack the bill. The grant of citizenship in
status was a violation of French republican principles: “If they are citizens, they must be
treated the same as all other French citizens (Very good!).”1009 And the very fact that the
Muslim would not renounce his status—which all insisted was essential to his religious
beliefs—made him unﬁt for citizenship. The indigenous says “‘you have educated me, I
am French like you.’ Well if he is French like us, then he should become French.”1010
From the early debates on indigenous voting rights until the defeat of the last prewar proposal in the mid-1930s, by far the most important reason given to deny the
ﬁtness of the Algerian indigenes for republican citizenship were speciﬁc precepts of
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Islam. “Koranic law, that’s monarchy by divine right. The republican tradition, even with
regards to the indigenous, does not accept that.”1011 The opposition to indigenous voting
rights argued that it would be inappropriate to create a class of voters or representatives
“who would be allowed to vote to modify the laws to which they refuse to submit.”1012
There were some who rejected this reasoning, noting that “it is perfectly possible that
the indigenous Muslims legislate with us here, as we legislate for the indigenous Muslims
without them (Applause on the extreme left).”1013 But the claim that the indigenous
should not participate in the formation of laws to which they were not subject was usually
joined with the claim that their religious beliefs made such participation illegitimate.1014
Opponents of indigenous voting invested considerable amount of rhetoric in the
claim that the speciﬁc precepts of Islam precluded the possibility of republican citizenship, with the legal rights accorded by Islam to fathers and husbands most frequently
invoked (Surkis 2011, 48).1015 “How could we conceive,” deputies asked on several occasions, “of French citizens allowed to possess and sell slaves, violate their daughters
by forcing them to consent to a union, or to sell them like vile livestock.”1016 “Could
we concede to citizens,” asked another, “the privilege of committing genuine crimes
against the family? Isn’t it already too much that we tolerate it among subjects?”1017
What the Muslims wanted, it was claimed, was access to political rights as well their
“Muslim law, which allows the father to sell his new-born daughter, as a supposed marriage, the law that allows him to repudiate his wife.”1018 The Muslim’s personal status
was “based on masculinity, especially in matters of inheritance, polygamy, divorce [repudiation], and paternal control over marriage.” Were political rights extended to the
1011
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indigenous without requiring renunciation of personal status, then “the man who can
coerce his prepubescent daughter could, by his representative, decide on a reform on
marriage applicable to the French.”1019 There were some exceptions to the assertion
that polygamy was central to Islam; and there were some exceptions to the claim that
polygamy was incompatible with republican citizenship.1020 But for the most part supporters of indigenous political rights stressed that the institution of polygamy was dying,
that “the Muslim personal status is fading little by little.”1021
Islam was not alone in being considered incompatible with republican citizenship;
so too was Catholicism, but with much less severity.1022 The solution to the Catholic
question was assimilation through education, and “without doubt, little by little, the personal status of the Catholic is being erased.”1023 But there was very broad agreement
that Islam was stronger “cement” than Catholicism or Judaism, that it was less susceptible to assimilation.1024 “The Koranic law has a considerable hold over individuals,” its
strictures the basis of the family and all social and political relations.1025 Assimilation
was, if not futile, certainly a distant possibility: “the application to a religious society
of the legislation of a secular state, whose entire evolution has had precisely as its goal
liberty from all religious holds, cannot go without diﬃculties.”1026 Islam was a potentially invincible “obstacle to the penetration of modern ideas,” with all eﬀorts at reform
impeded by “this fatalist religious mentality, this immutable religious society whose ev1019
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ery precept. . . would be in opposition with those that govern our secular and democratic
society.”1027 The Arab in particular was singled out as having a “mentality essentially
diﬀerent from ours. There is something ﬁxed about him, irreducible even.”1028 Even the
slightest suggestion of assimilation had led to a mass exodus of Muslims from the city of
Tlemcen, as the indigenous feared the French intended to “prohibit the wearing of the
veil.”1029
Supporters of political rights believed that “Islam will not escape the laws of evolution,” but this would be measured in generations, maybe even centuries.1030 As a result,
full and equal political rights would have to wait, or possibly denied altogether.1031 “Naturalization of the indigenous, assimilation, universal suﬀrage, drop it. Leave in Marseilles
the Immortal principles. Do not export the Declaration of the rights of man” (Benoist
1892, 179). By the 1930s, the principle of naturalization ‘in status’ had been established, but under highly restrictive conditions that few indigenous Algerians met. Many
deputies accused “the French administration” of not wanting “to make French citizens
out of French subjects.”1032
In the 1920s various measures failed to pass, despite increasing political activism.1033
In 1935 Maurice Viollette withdrew a proposal to increase Algerian political rights and
expand the number of citizens ‘in status,’ recognizing that it had little prospect of passage. The next year, a similar measure with the support of the Popular Front government
was withdrawn in the face of Algerian settler protests. The Third Republic did extend
municipal voting rights to the indigenous Algerians; a very limited recognition of citizenship ‘in status’ was provided. In other colonies, political rights were given without regard
to citizenship, or citizenship was accorded en masse without renunciation of personal
status. That the right to vote for the National Assembly was not extended to Algerian
Muslims was not inevitable, but rather was one possible choice among others.
1027

Moutet, Annex n.4383, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Documents, March 1st , 1918, p.328
Duroux, Journal Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, March 22nd , 1935, p.372; Thomson, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre
des Députés, Débats, November 7th , 1918, p.2915; Carpot, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés,
Débats, February 18th , 1910, p.926
1029
Governor General of Algeria, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, February 9th , 1914, p.596
1030
Moutet, Annex n.4383, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Documents, March 1st , 1918, p.328;
Governor General of Algeria and Driant, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, February 9th ,
1914, p.591
1031
Régnier, Journal Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, March 22nd , 1935, p.377
1032
Doizy, Journal Oﬃciel, Chambre des Députés, Débats, November 7th , 1918, p.2919
1033
Moutet. Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, Sénat ,December 20th , 1922, p.4347
1028

480

Women and the Republican Regime
Women’s suﬀrage ﬁnally received sustained attention on the ﬂoor of the Chamber of
Deputies in 1919, when the Committee on Universal Suﬀrage proposed legislation that
would give the right to vote for women in municipal and department councils. The
Committee had delayed on women’s suﬀrage for more than a decade, consistently prioritizing proportional representation; when this ﬁnally passed, the Committee was now
willing to move forward. Women would not be enfranchised for elections to the Chamber
of Deputies; moreover, women would not be allowed to be elected as delegates for the
departmental senatorial elections—an eﬀort to maintain the distinction between municipal voting and participation in the national sovereignty. This was despite the fact that
women could participate in electing mayors and the delegates, both of whom did vote
for Senators.
During the course of debate, two major amendments were proposed: the ﬁrst would
join to the bill a scheme of family voting, in which the father—or absent a father, the
mother—could cast ballots for his children, and the second would establish immediate
an equal suﬀrage for all elections. The ﬁrst proposal received considerable support, and
was couched in terms of repopulating a country devastated by war. It was defeated
by a vote of 281-200, with a quarter of the Chamber not voting (Hause and Kenney
1984, 224). The equal franchise amendment, however, passed by a landslide, 329-95.
Every faction voted in favor, with the Socialists and the right wing parties voting 97%
and 90%respectively in support. The conservative republicans, which included Catholics
rallied to the regime, voted 82% in favor. Only the Radicals showed any sign of hesitation,
voting 59% in favor. But as Hause and Kenney have pointed out, over 100 deputies did
not cast a ballot, including a quarter of Radicals (1984, 225). And most importantly, only
one member of the Radical government headed by Clemenceau voted in favor, with the
remaining 18 members abstaining, an “obviously conscious policy” (1984, 226). Even 12
of the 33 Radicals who had come out publicly in support of the bill either voted against it
or abstained (Hause and Kenney 1984, 226). Even this level of radical support, however,
was clearly overstated. The most vocal radical opponent of the bill supported, both the
equal suﬀrage amendment and ﬁnal passage, on the grounds that a more extreme bill
would be more likely to be rejected by the Senate.
And sure enough, after delaying consideration for three years, the Senate voted 156134 against even beginning debate on the individual articles. This number also likely
inﬂates the degree of support, as conservatives and right-wingers wanted to add the
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family vote, which they could do only after consideration on the individual articles had
begun. But the Radical opposition was even more striking in the Senate, with 75% of
voting members rejecting the bill, the only party to vote against it. The measure was
defeated by 24 votes; over the next eleven years, an equal women’s suﬀrage bill would be
defeated by the Radicals in the Senate in 1928, 1929, 1932, and 1933, with the proportion
of the party opposed climbing to 88% by end. By contrast, the number of conservatives
who opposed the bill dropped from 38 to 6 (Smith 1997, 343).
What French radicals saw in Islam’s treatment of women, they also saw to a lesser
degree in France itself, a religiously motivated subordination of women. One deputy
introducing a women’s suﬀrage bill argued that in France “the oriental and Semitic tradition of absolute disdain for women’s very nature is now generally abandoned.”1034 In
fact, debates over women’s suﬀrage among republicans were dominated by the overarching question of whether they were, and whether they could be, ﬁt for republican
citizenship.
Throughout the 19th century the Catholic emphasis on women’s obedience had a
counterpart in the republican belief that women were not ﬁt for citizenship. While earlier
periods of republicanism can hardly be described as welcoming to women as individual
citizens, the revolution of 1848 had seen a sustained critique of the traditional home by
socialists and others. Partly in response to this, the republicans in the Third Republic
were especially insistent on the inappropriateness of women’s political participation, as
many had come to “regard the revolutionary critique of the traditional home, like the
call to armed insurrection, as a cause for the disastrous end of the Second Republic”
(Stone 1996, 53).
That the radical party was ultimately the major institutional force that impeded
women’s suﬀrage throughout the ﬁrst 44 years of the 20th century is at least somewhat
paradoxical. The early wave of French feminism had developed in large part in radical anticlerical circles, and the radicals had been crucially important in strengthening
women’s education, legalizing divorce, and beginning in 1907 included in their electoral
platform a promise for the “gradual extension of the rights of women,” alongside public
assistance for pregnant and poor women, and legislated maternity leave (Evans 2013;
Stone 1996, 334). They were not strident feminists, but they were the party that the
feminist movement believed was most closely aligned with their ambitions. While it was
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not the only factor militating against women’s suﬀrage, radicals had come to see the
exclusion of women as vital to maintaining the republican character of the regime. In
the 1870s, Léon Richer, a pioneering French feminist, argued that, “at the present time
it would be dangerous—in France—to give women the political ballot. They are in great
majority reactionaries and clericals. If they voted today the Republic would not last
six months” (Bidelman 1976, 106). Supporters of women’s suﬀrage would continue to
confront this argument into the 1940s.
In 1910, Ferdinand Buisson released a report on “The Right to Vote for Women” (Buisson 1910; Hause and Kenney 1984, 129). The objection that women would undermine the
Republic, remarked Buisson, “was particular to France and to the present moment. . . .
To give the suﬀrage to women in the commune or the state is to throw onto the electoral
balance an enormous weight that will go toward the side of reaction. . . . [T]o date, in
France, she has remained under the inﬂuence, not to say the domination, of the clergy”
(Buisson 1910, 157). Buisson acknowledged that “there is some truth to these fears, that
they had been with foundation twenty or thirty years ago, we do not deny.” But he
insisted that this had changed: “we are no longer in a time when more than ﬁfty percent
of women do not know how to read. . . . The secular school has spread many new habits:
women are now accustomed to the formula, the priest in Church, the instructor in the
school, the mayor in city hall” (1910, 157). The women of today were very far from the
“peasants of Seize Mai when it comes to government by priests” (1910, 158).
Others disagreed.1035 Radical deputies warned that women’s suﬀrage would “capsize the boat. And the boat is the republican regime. . . . After all, who can blame us
republicans, who want to keep intact the Republic.”1036 Other radicals recalled the interpretation of revolutionary innovations provoking reaction, and traced out the sequence
of events that were the consequence of universal suﬀrage being extended in 1848: the
coup d’état of 1851, the dictatorship of the empire, the war of 1870, the Commune, the
loss of Alsace-Lorraine, “namely, everything that the Republic avenged when it took the
ﬂag of France, despite the loss of 1,700,000 heros, to plant it triumphantly in Strasbourg. . . . No more vain experiences, no more foolish adventures. And it is a foolish
adventure that you are proposing.”1037 “Do you want,” asked the rapporteur in the Senate, “to leave to a feminine majority the power to dispose, without a counterweight, of
1035
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the destinies of the country.”1038 In other Catholic countries where women had been
enfranchised, “you know the consequences, the relative triumph of the Catholic centrist
parties.”1039 In the Senate the bill’s rapporteur was hostile to the project, and argued
that “women, at the present moment, have not yet received suﬃcient civic instruction,
she goes to Church in too large numbers, submits to the guidance of the priest for us
not to worry that this guidance will extend outside of the Church into the voting hall to
convince women to through a ballot in the box against the republic.”1040
Left-wing supporters of women’s suﬀrage denied these claims, but they also suggested that they were true until very recently. Responding to republicans who believe “it
will compromise the republic, because women are generally conservative, reactionary,
and will send us a reactionary majority,” radical deputy Fernand Merlin conceded that
“Before the war, you could have feared that the French woman might not have suﬃcient
independence, and that notably in political and confessional questions, she would not
bring the necessary impartiality and the conditions of free examination. Those times
have changed.”1041 And he even characterized a society in which the “women’s role consists of staying in the home and taking care of the children” as “an ideal society. . . .
Unfortunately, that’s not the case,” as economic changes had led to the necessity of
women working.1042 But others were more insistent, and responded that the “reactionary
coalitions” that had appeared in the past and were being warned of again, had been the
reactionaries of the “terriﬁed French bourgeoisie.”1043 It was not the uneducated masses
then, and it would not be the uneducated masses now. And republicans, acknowledging that “at the present moment great progress remains to be accomplished in political
education of the masses in order to raise them to the task not of their rights but their
political duties.” But the political education of women could only come through enfranchisement, as “it is by becoming a citizen that we learn how to conduct ourselves as a
citizen.”1044
In addition to the theme of republican insecurity was the question of women’s citizenship. Some argued that the fact that women were legally subordinated to men in the
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Civil Code was meant they were not on a plane of equality with men, and thus were
not equal citizens; it was even suggested that this was similar to the privileged orders,
that the subordination of women placed them above men in the law.1045 But this was a
distinctly minority position. Much more common, however, was the argument that they
lack either a natural capacity to perform the duties of republican citizenship, or that
they had not yet been suﬃciently educated.
In the 1870s Gambetta had been approached to join the Association for the Rights of
Women. His response was that women’s rights could only be achieved in the Republic,
and so raising these as a political issue would have to wait until the Republic was secured:
“we shall reach this goal,” he wrote a correspondent, “by maintaining the Republican
constitution and by extending education in ﬂoods” (Bury 1973, 46). In 1919 this was
still the line of many radicals, which received the opprobrium of the socialists: given
all the eﬀorts undertaken by the radicals, all the promises made for equalizing women’s
education, “if we must wait until women’s education is completed, what a condemnation
of our regime.”1046
While many treated it as a question of women’s education, others insisted on a
natural and inevitable diﬀerence between the sexes “Despite our egalitarian ideals,”
wrote Fouillée, “we have not come to desire women having the right to vote.”
“We understand that their political incapacity is too large, that their liberty
of judgment and conscience is reduced, that they are also more or less under
the tutelage of their husband or their confessor. In a word, we cease to be
naively egalitarian when it concerns the equality of persons of diﬀerent sexes,
only to become so once again when it concerns persons of the same sex with
very diﬀerent capacities” (Fouillée 1884, 120, fn4).
This was if not a unanimous position in the early Third Republic, it was certainly
dominant among elite opinion (Stone 1996, 123). In 1874 an inﬂuential political thinker
argued that women were unﬁt for the franchise because she “is less able to generalize and
engages less with political questions.” This was in part for the same reasons that radicals
insisted on departmental voting for men, because their social conditions were supposedly
conﬁned. But where the male rural villager could be saved by education and by raising
his perspective beyond the town-square, women’s situation was the product of nature
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(Rozy 1874, 27–28). Others went further, arguing that the lifestyle of Parisian women—
balls, parties, brunches—had left “Parisian women. . . , according to the anthropologists,
[with] a brain that raises them only slightly above negro women” (Fouillée 1895, 123).
Not only were women by nature unﬁt for politics, but “above all the French woman. . . is
an essentially delicate being.”1047 Others asked whether they really thought “that in the
family, the wives do not have enough liberty, that the young girls respect the head of the
family too much?”1048
Some argued that only the male could be a citizen, because only men could ﬁght.
“How can you give civic rights to those who cannot undertake the obligations of the
citizen? Women, not being soldiers, cannot be electors” (Buisson 1910, 154). Some
opposed the idea of fundamental diﬀerences.1049 But most supporters of women’s suﬀrage
argued that it was because of their distinct nature and unique form of contributions that
they merited the vote, stressing not only contributions during the war but also that
women’s cooperation would be needed to replenish the manpower lost by the war.1050
By 1919, the women’s suﬀrage movement had support across the political spectrum,
from socialists to Catholics. But many conservatives were using the occasion to present
their own understanding of the political community, one that sought to change the basis
of national sovereignty and ‘universal suﬀrage.’ Supporters of the family vote insisted
that, “the principle of the democratic regime is that all sovereignty resides in the nation.
The Declaration of the rights of man says formally, ‘all citizens have the right to consent
personally or by their representatives in the formation of the law, which is the expression
of the general will.”1051 But both women and children were excluded by limiting the
vote to adult males, and the nation, not “a composite mass of individuals. . . [but] an
association of families,” was accordingly not represented.1052
Against this radicals and socialists invoked the importance of ‘universal suﬀrage,’
claiming that the bill was fundamentally a rejection of its basic principle.1053 “By our
system,” argued the republican socialist Jean Bon, “the citizen is only a citizen when,
1047

Lefebvre du Prey, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, pp.2299-2300; Augagneur, Journal Oﬃciel,
Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2306
1048
Labrousse, Journal Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, November 14th , 1922, p.1342; Régismanset (president of the
committee), Journal Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, November 21st 1922, p.1373
1049
Bon, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 20th , 1919, p.2349
1050
Doizy, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 8th , 1919, p.2236, 2234; D’Estournelles de Constant. Journal
Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, November 16th , 1922, p.1361
1051
Roulleaux-Dugage, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2306
1052
Massabuau, Journal Oﬃciel, Sénat, Débats, November 21st 1922, p.1375
1053
Flandin (rapporteur), Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2310

486

by the development of age, he can enjoy his civil and political rights. Therefore the
child is not a citizen.”1054 Another claimed to “speak for those who are still attached
to universal suﬀrage,” and warned that the family vote would be a grave compromise
of the principle.1055 And, having denied the claim that the regime was threatened by
women’s suﬀrage, opponents of the family vote turned around and argued that “the day
that we will vote, not as oneself, but because one has some social or intellectual quality,
universal suﬀrage will no longer be universal. . . . The republican government, vigilant
guardian of our Constitution,. . . will tell us once again that it is the regime of France that
is at stake.”1056 The bill was defeated, but with suﬃciently broad support to encourage
further eﬀorts (Naour and Valenti 2005).
Radicals did not want to vote against ‘universal suﬀrage,’ and most accounts stress
that a speech by René Viviani urging deputies to “join ourselves to the boldness of [the
Revolution’s] thought. . . and to not always retreat from the traditions of idealism that
is its heritage,” was especially important in rallying the radical majority (Hause and
Kenney 1984, 225).1057 But they also believed that women’s suﬀrage would weaken the
Republic, and had a persuasive basis for mustering their party membership and the
Senators against the bill (Hause and Kenney 1984, 242). The language of a republic
besieged, which republicans had been employing since the 1870s, helped unite the party
against the measure, and the party’s national congress re-aﬃrmed its opposition to
enfranchisement throughout the 1920s. “From the point of view of principle, we are all
in agreement,” noted one of the most committed opponents of women’s suﬀrage, “it is
then only a question of opportunity.”1058

Political Change and the Republican Party
The ideas of French republicanism were a crucial factor underlying the political order
of the Third Republic. The claim that ‘universal suﬀrage’ was the basis of republican
institutions, the association of the right to vote to citizenship, and the latent threat posed
by monarchists, anti-Semites, fascists, and above all Catholics were recurring themes in
parliamentary debates. And the discourse of deputies often reﬂected an attempt to
1054

Bon, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2310
Lafont, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2310
1056
Lafont, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 15th , 1919, p.2311
1057
Viviani, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 20th , 1919, p.2353
1058
Augagneur, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May 8th , 1919, p.2237; see alsoBon, Journal Oﬃciel, Débats, May
20th , 1919, p.2349
1055

487

invoke these ideas in order to shape the behavior of their colleagues.
Deputies sought to remind each other of the costs of violating the strictures of republican citizenship, by framing their issues within a longer republican tradition, by
invoking the need for unity of the republican party, and by warning each other that they
would soon have to reckon with public opinion, expressed through ‘universal suﬀrage.’
In defense of colonial representation, republicans would try to frame any disfranchisement as breaking with the principles of the republican tradition: “all of the Assemblies
of the Republic, all republican governments, since the convention until the provisional
government of 1870, have never ceased to proclaim the right of the colonies to representation.”1059
In support of women’s enfranchisement, they would cite republican traditions—
although, given the republican tradition, there was less to cite—but they would also
stress that it had been endorsed by men of sound radical and republican principle:
“when men such as Léon Bourgeois, Viviani, Painlevé and Poincaré and so many other
republicans have told us that women deserve the right to vote, I cannot imagine that
I could reinforce their arguments. They have given me satisfying guarantees.”1060 The
invocation of the republican tradition and listing of “great republicans” were frequent
patterns among deputies seeking to either build support for their positions, or to insulate
themselves from the charge of heterodoxy.1061 “I am an old republican,” said one deputy
in favor of women’s suﬀrage, “and I can say that we founded the Republic with the aid of
women. During the great ﬁghts that occurred, our wives accompanied us in the political
manifestations, and despite advice to the contrary, they rallied to the republican regime
and they helped us ensure that it triumphed.”1062 Not only was the cause of women’s
suﬀrage rightfully a republican one, but the concerns that the clergy might in some issues
give ‘contrary advice’ to women were overblown.
And the charges of heterodoxy were many. An opponent of proportional representation treated this as a denial of ‘universal suﬀrage,’ and when there were protests at one
of his remarks from the right-wing benches, he used the opportunity to remind those on
his left of their republican commitments.
“Ah! I understand protests from my right; but I won’t ﬁnd protests from
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my left, because the left has been engaged in the defense and safeguarding
of this constitutional principle since 1848 and will not retreat. The left will
remember that it is here because of the will of the majority of their electors; it
will ensure the respect of that legislation born in 1848 in the epoch where we
proclaimed that essential right of the citizen, that inalienable right: universal
suﬀrage. . . .”1063
The right was likely to support the bill regardless; it was to the members of his own
coalition that he was speaking, reminding them that at least some of their republican
constituents would see support for the change as violating the strictures of ‘universal
suﬀrage’: “you want us to approve an unacceptable law which has already been rejected,
to lead us to a situation against which the entire republican left will protest constantly
and against which the republican country will protest with even more energy.”1064 Louis
Martin warned his fellow radicals of the consequences of consistently opposing women’s
suﬀrage. The women’s suﬀrage movement, which was largely radical in political orientation, might decide that party loyalties are weaker than popular loyalty to the Church, and
would reason that “since standing between me and the right to vote is a party, maybe
I should direct my propaganda against this party that blocks me from voting, rather
than directing it against the Church.”1065 Viviani asked in disbelief whether there could
really be “republicans. . . who would break with the permanent idealism of the republican
tradition, and refuse to women their vote? (lively applause).”1066
The socialists often taunted the radicals for deviation of principle, an attempt to
encourage behavior by suggesting a competition for the democratic and republican constituencies. One socialist deputy addressed himself “to the republicans, to the democrats
that still hold some prejudices. . . , because we socialists, who feel as though we are the
true heritors of the democratic tradition.” At this point republicans started yelling their
protests. “If you are co-heritors,” he continued, “let us make our heritage grow together.”1067 Another socialist warned against the tendency toward opportunism: “We
heard from Mr. Augagneur a reasoning that has been heard here since. . . the Republic,
which we like to call bourgeois, was installed. They say we are agreed in principle, but
the time has not come. That was the great political argument of the opportunists, and of
the politics picked up by the radicals.”1068 The Radicals had always diﬀerentiated them1063
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selves from the opportunists for their commitment to principle. Socialists reminded them
that they had become just as bad, both provoking radicals and signaling the grounds on
which they would oppose them in campaigns.
When the supporters of women’s suﬀrage began to realize the threat posed by the
family vote, they pulled out all the rhetorical stops in a sustained campaign to defeat it.
The bill’s reporter tried to rally republicans against the measure by insisting that “we do
not and cannot want it. We have always defended the republican doctrine, that universal
suﬀrage can only be exercised directly.”1069 He even warned that the acceptance of
the family vote would be a slippery slope, leaving them open to the accusation that they
voted against ‘universal suﬀrage’ for men. The family vote would imply the principle that
those who vote “do so on account of certain rights justiﬁed by their social utility, but
justiﬁed tomorrow—and watch out!—by the utility of their competency or their capital.”
At which point the president of the committee jumped in, “we go straight to a property
qualiﬁcation.”1070
And deputies were right to try and remind their colleagues of the potential costs to
violating the strictures of republicanism, as there were network of republicans, radicals,
and others watching the speeches and voting patterns of deputies to call attention to any
deviation in principle. Henri Rochefort, a former Communard who would become one of
the principal supporters of Boulanger and then of the anti-Semites, regularly published
newspapers or magazines that pointed out republican deviations from their principles.
In one pamphlet he announced that, “we will learn, on each page of this volume, how
those who wildly applauded Gambetta as he cried ‘Clericalism, there is the enemy!’ have
voted” (Vaughan 1885, iii). Each deputy in the Chamber was listed, with a brief critical
or supportive description and in bold lettering stating how they voted on the Tonkin
expedition, on maintaining a papal ambassador, on a state budget for religion, and on
‘universal suﬀrage.’1071
Deputies also invoked a narrative of republicanism to insist upon unity against the
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threat of the moment. During the Dreyfus Aﬀair, for instance, there was an eventual
eﬀort to rally republicans in support of Dreyfus and against anti-Semitism as a Catholic
eﬀort to suppress other religions, in violation of the traditions of the French Revolution. The Radical platform of 1902 insisted that “there are no longer socialists, Radicals,
or moderates; there is only the republican ﬂag on one side and on the other that of
counterrevolution” (Stone 1996, 205). Gaston Thomson, a non-anti-Semite deputy from
Algeria, denounced the anti-Semite movement as the product of “disillusioned republicans” who were willing to start a civil war. He described how republican unity between
progressives and radicals, forged “at the moment of Boulangism, at the hour when it was
needed to create a unity and agreement within the republican party,” broke down: “antiSemitism. . . ruptured the accord.” But stressing the embattled nature of non-anti-Semite
republicans in the colony, he also described how he had “joined my eﬀorts to those republicans of Algeria—and thank God, there are still many—that remain convinced that
tyrannical and violent anti-Semitism oﬀends the Republic itself in its principles and its
doctrines.”1072
The republican language of political community was invoked to underscore the need
to maintain republican unity, to pressure allies, and to threaten rivals. And the resonance
of this narrative did condition the behavior of deputies, and even non-republicans found
it necessary to accommodate themselves to the republican narrative. Some members of
the right early on sought to persuade their colleagues to accept the increasing resonance
of ‘universal suﬀrage’ and the Republic:
“Is the Republic not for everybody?... In this country of universal suffrage. . . the greatest fault, in my opinion, that could be committed by the
right of this Assembly. . . would be to encourage, by their attitude, the belief
that they only consider the Republic a transitory accident. . . . The present
necessity of accommodating ourselves to the form of government that universal suﬀrage has perseveringly preferred for ten years, is binding on the
best of us.”1073
In an attack on the SFIO, which had broken with the radicals after a decision of the
International to no longer collaborate with bourgeois parties, Clemenceau described the
socialists’ dilemma as both wanting revolution but stuck within the ideological terms of
the radical republic. When a speaker known for revolutionary rhetoric was campaigning
1072
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for an SFIO deputy, claimed Clemenceau, the deputy asked him to refrain from any talk
of revolution, as they were in a moderate town. They preach revolution, but then when
they “appeal to the working classes they tell them, ‘You must use the legal instruments
that the Republic has provided you.”’1074 Republicans accused the anti-Semites of the
same dilemma, of trying to accommodate their rhetoric to the strictures’ of republicanism. So the “Jewish question, in Algeria,” is described as a “social and patriotic question
and not a confessional question. . . . They say very loudly that here it cannot be a quarrel
of race, a religious quarrel (No! No! on the right), because they know well that this
would raise the unanimous protest of the French people, who want equality of all before
the law, with a formidable force.”1075 And the anti-Semites would themselves stress their
republican credentials: “in Algeria there are only republicans, and we do not know a
reactionary party.”1076
While the two major strands of republicanism that came out of the critical juncture
of 1871-1877 were the dominant political forces in the Third Republic, the terms of
debate were never solely deﬁned by the ideologies and narratives of these parties. The
emergence of ﬁrst the SFIO and then the Communist Party as well-organized rivals
to the Radicals was accompanied by a restructuring of preferences across the political
spectrum. The organization of the SFIO helped displace ‘national’ with ‘international’
socialism on the left, resulting in anti-Semitism being a predominantly right-wing rather
than left-wing phenomenon in France. Similarly, in the late 19th century, the far-left had
opposed imperialism and had called for the suppression of the colonial representation,
Algeria excepted. But with the advent of the SFIO their position began to change, and
left-wing deputies now insisted that it was “not the universal suﬀrage of the indigenes
that was to blame” for electoral fraud.1077
But the limitations of Third Republican ideology imposed serious constraints on the
women’s suﬀrage movement. In 1937, the Radical Party congress adopted an informal
commitment to municipal voting rights for women. Cécile Brunschvicq, head of the
Union Française pour le suﬀrage des femmes, rejected the protests of a fellow suﬀragist,
Louise Weiss: “Come now my dear! A republican such as you will never convince me
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that she is in favor of the immediate right of suﬀrage. . . . Our duty is clear. Maintain
the regime” (1980, 200). While women’s suﬀrage was supported by both the communists
and socialists, the fact that the feminist movement had early on associated itself with
the Radical party had left much of the far-left grassroots uninterested in a ‘bourgeois’
political issue. There was an important women’s suﬀrage movement on the right, but
engaging in such a coalition would only give further resonance to the Radical discourse
of a Catholic threat. The prospects for a broad coalition in support of women’s suﬀrage
were very slim, and deputies frequently referenced the seeming lack of such a coalition
in explaining why they would vote against.1078

Conclusion
Concerns with the compatibility of the people to norms of republican behavior and
rationality were implicated in debates over the right to vote across all social categories.
The working class had a potentially revolutionary character, a tradition of direct action
that became even more threatening after the Boulangist movement suggested it could
be turned against the republic. The people in the countryside and small towns were
potentially under the inﬂuence of local notables, or worse, the clergy. The non-European
colonial population was potentially under the control of tribal chiefs, and their capacity
to make informed and independent judgment was often denied.1079 Moreover, their
‘Frenchness’ was always suspect, in terms of legal status and culture. For some, such as
Maurice Viollette, the belief that “the personal status is the entirety of Islam” meant that
other modes of citizenship had to be considered.1080 For many others, however, it ruled
out the possibility of citizenship altogether (Besson 1894, 340). Women were often denied
a natural capacity for citizenship, because of their alleged delicacy, sentimentality, and
inability to perform military service. And even when deputies conceded women’s natural
equality, they could nonetheless question their current ﬁtness for republican citizenship
on the allegation that they were under clerical inﬂuence and would threaten the regime.
The exclusions and inclusions of the Third Republic were not caused by these ideas.
But the invocation of these ideas in political discourse did help reinforce the political
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order, and signaled costs and opportunities to disfranchising or enfranchising projects,
leading to important but still limited reforms in colonial political rights and the repeated
defeat of any measure of women’s suﬀrage. After World War II, the Fourth Republic
enfranchised considerable portions of the indigenous populations of the Cote d’Ivoire,
the Sudan-Niger, the Guinea, Dahomey-Togo, Cameroon, Madagascar, the Equatorial
African colonies, and Algeria. Women were given the vote in metropolitan France, and
over a decade later, throughout the French Union. In the years after 1946, commentators
presented the enfranchisement of the colonial subjects as “the crowning achievement of
a reform movement” rooted in the Third Republic (Boisdon 1956; Moleur 2000, 65), the
natural “evolution” of citizenship (Gonidec 1959, 748). Success had merely required the
collapse of the regime.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion

Democratic Exclusion
Dankwart A. Rustow insisted that democracy, as a “system of rule by temporary majorities,” required that “the boundaries must endure, the composition of the citizenry
be continuous” in “order that rulers and policies may freely change.” National unity,
in which “the vast majority of citizens. . . have no doubt or mental reservations as to
which political community they belong to,” was the one precondition for democratization (Rustow 1970, 350). By contrast, I argue that the process by which boundaries of
political community are established, maintained, and reconﬁgured is a central dynamic
of democratization itself. Rather than a pre-condition, beliefs about political community
and belonging both structure democratizing processes and are reconﬁgured by these.
The objective of this project was to demonstrate the empirical and theoretical importance of disfranchisement and enduring exclusions to democracy, and to oﬀer a potential
explanation that moved beyond functional claims as to what a democracy does and does
not need to focus on what political operatives want and how they go about getting
it. Both the theoretical explanation and the empirical research were premised upon
the assumption that very often, decisions about inclusion and exclusion reﬂect conﬂict
and negotiation not between abstract categories of ‘mass’ and ‘elite’ but between (often elected) oﬃcials, supervised by and sometimes directly engaging with networks of
political activists outside of governing institutions. Insofar as this is true, the resulting
patterns of democratization and exclusion will reﬂect, to some extent, the particular
understandings and strategies of the relevant activists and oﬃcials.
The central theoretical claim was that ideas of political community shape the decisions of political operatives, and are ultimately reﬂected in patterns of institutional
change. Ideas of political community provide a relatively coherent framework by which
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political operatives can decide what they want, and how to go about getting it. To be
clear, the desire to no longer be subjected to the strict penal codes imposed on free
blacks, on Irish Catholics, on French indigenes was not simply an idea that people had.
These were real oppressions, and the desire to be done with them was not an ideational
fancy.
But how to defend or overcome these oppressions was not always obvious, and even
when there was broad agreement on a course of action, success almost invariably required entering into political coalitions with groups whose material interests were not
obviously at stake. The ideas examined here were less important as motivating principled action contrary to self-interest than they were in giving a relatively coherent reason
for a diverse set of actors to believe their mutual interests were best served by adhering
to speciﬁc principled commitments. In short, ideas helped persuade diverse groups of
the value of a particular solidarity, that whiteness was more essential than religion, that
religious liberty was more important than the dangers of Catholicism. But the speciﬁc
content of these ideas were not simply persuasive. Even those who did not have a sincere
attachment to these principles might often expect costs to be associated with violating
their strictures, or opportunities to be opened by participating in the associated behavior. Ideas shaped the understandings of self-interest and conditioned the behavior of
many who were not persuaded by the ideas at all, but who recognized their resonance
and importance to possible constituents and party leaders.
As an organizing device, the particular role of ideas was divided between periods of
critical junctures and political orders. Put succinctly, persuasion matters more in the ﬁrst
while conformity is more important in the second. Scholars have argued that ideas are
central in periods of heightened uncertainty, precisely because they can provide a script
for action (Blyth 2002). Ideological commitment helps hold together a coalition and
coordinate activists around a single goal, potentially giving the most ideological party
an advantage over others (Hanson 2010). These advantages should not be exaggerated.
A coherent commitment to civil and religious liberty helped hold together a broad
coalition in support of Catholic Emancipation; it would not have achieved its object had
it not been for the threat of a civil war. But the ability of the Catholic Association to
hold together, to force the issue, was itself reﬂective of the ideological commitments of its
activists, who imagined a new relationship between the people and governing authority—
a social movement operating in constitutionally legitimate fashion and founded on a
mass membership basis.
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But these ideas are important outside of critical junctures, during periods of stable
political order when the balance between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ shifts toward the former. They do so by providing a set of behavioral prescriptions with an expectation of
social or political costs for their violation; and the belief in their resonance encourages
further investment in the behavior the ideas prescribe. This impacts democratization
and exclusion by signaling potentially higher costs for some positions rather than others, an intuitive claim but one that is usually chalked up to a stable and exogenously
given political culture rather than the constitutive commitments of a political coalition
and the institutions it has build to help enforce these commitments.
The distinction should not be exaggerated. Political operatives are always acting
within contexts of political order, and they are rarely so constrained by this that alternatives are unimaginable. Nonetheless, the case studies were organized with these
diﬀerent emphases in mind. The theoretical framework outlined suggested a series of
predictions about the patterns of behavior we should expect to see from political leaders
and operatives, and broad support for these were found in each of the case studies.

Ideas and Coalition-Building
A central means by which ideas constitute interests is by providing a rationale for diverse
groups to work together, by providing an account of how their interests relate to each
other and to a given policy or regime that is suﬃcient to persuade activists that their
interests will be well-served by allying together. In short, they can be essential for purposes of coalition-building, by linking together issues that may not be obviously joined.
We should expect, then, to see evidence of ongoing eﬀorts by party leaders to encourage,
among activists and a broader constitution, understandings of political community that
the leaders believe will reconcile potentially divergent factions and support their claim
to govern. And insofar as party leaders are operating within a political order broadly
hostile to their objective, they will advance understandings of political community that
both accommodate resonant features of the existing order as well as seek to transform
it. Those seeking the enfranchisement of a class seen as outside the political people will
attempt to reinterpret the existing order of peoplehood in an eﬀort to assert that they
are not violating the strictures of peoplehood properly understood.
In the United States case study, there were eﬀorts by key party ﬁgures—none more
so than Thomas Jeﬀerson—to articulate an understanding of republicanism that drew
on an increasingly resonant discourse of contribution and popular sovereignty. This
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discourse was not the product of the Jeﬀersonians; themes of contributory citizenship
had long been a feature of American political discourse, but they were a distinctly minority tendency until the Revolution. What the Jeﬀersonians were able to do was to
eﬀectively draw on this discourse to build a broad-based coalition against the Federalists. This coalition posed its own dilemmas, however, and over the ﬁrst few decades
of the 19th century the party repeatedly found itself split over the question of slavery
and what was coming to be seen as its correlate, the citizenship rights of free blacks.
While this did not immediately entail the articulation of the ‘white male republic’—the
claim that free blacks had never been considered as potential members of the political
community—both party leaders and activists increasingly emphasized the incompatibility of free blacks in a white republic.
Later in the antebellum period, anti-slavery and abolitionist activists wrestled with
the resonance of a racial narrative of American democracy. They all insisted that Jeffersonian republicanism was anti-slavery, and that the revolutionary principles required
a republic in which slavery was to be placed on the road to extinction. For many, antislavery principles were joined with ‘white republicanism,’ an appropriation of a resonant
language of political community for a new purpose. Others argued for the separation
of civil, political, and social equality, to redeﬁne the form of equality that was necessary
to a republic and the form that was incidental. But many others embraced a more radical re-conceptualization of the American people, which while claiming the Revolution
and republican tradition more explicitly rejected any accommodation to the white male
republic.
The role of party leaders was more important in the United Kingdom, where there
was a clear and sustained eﬀort from the beginning of the 19th century until the 1830s
to stitch together a possible coalition in support of Catholic Emancipation, repeal of the
Test and Corporation Acts, and parliamentary Reform. Dissenters, many of whom were
anti-Catholic, often desired the separation of repeal from Catholic Emancipation, rightly
believing that their own cause stood a much better chance of passage. The political
leadership of the Irish Catholic community, for its part, often stressed the importance
of separating the project of parliamentary reform from emancipation, again believing
that their cause stood a better chance of passage. Various factions at times sought to
accommodate their demands so as to not violate the terms of the Protestant Constitution, arguing that emancipation was needed to secure the Anglican Church. The true
traditions of England, they argued, were religious toleration and liberty, and only insofar
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as this was realized could the Anglican Church be secured. By the time the repeal of the
Test Act was passed, there was little doubt among Whigs that the broad coalition would
hold together, that the Dissenters would not then close the door on the Catholics. This
was in large part because of eﬀorts to associate the two causes, by constantly invoking
“the cause of civil and religious liberty” at the club meetings and feasts that helped bring
together a broader network of activists.
The French case likewise shows evidence of political leaders attempting to maintain a
political coalition by developing narratives of the country’s political history and purpose,
and by posturing as the defenders of this purpose. Under the empire there had been
signiﬁcant eﬀorts at reconstituting the republican tradition so as to break the cycle of
revolution and reaction, although given restrictions on political organizing these eﬀorts
occurred primarily in the free mason lodges and other sites crucial to maintaining a
republican identity. But with the fall of the Empire and the calling of the National Assembly, the parliamentary leaders of the republican faction quickly took the opportunity
to both build up a dense network of supporters in the countryside and to disseminate a
vision of republicanism that could reassure urban radicals, conservative small property
owners, as well as moderate republicans and liberals who initially supported either a
conservative republic or a liberal monarchy. Radicals embraced the cause of ‘universal
suﬀrage,’ which the Empire had made its own and propagandized as central to French
identity, reconﬁguring it to stress a limited form of political participation that was both
radical and conservative.

Ideas and Political Order
The other central role of ideas was suggested to be most important during periods of
political stability, in which they functioned as benchmarks against which the behavior of
coalition members can be assessed. And so we should expect that legislator behavior
will reﬂect an eﬀort to signal their continued adherence, or to question the adherence of
others, to the understandings of political community that are either central to a political
party or believed to be broadly resonant with important constituencies and the broader
public. The predicted behavioral form was that legislators would reveal in their rhetoric a
belief that there are costs associated with violating the strictures of political community.
This was seen in each of the case studies as well, with political operatives calling
attention to how support or opposition to a given proposal ﬁt with the narrative of
political community that was central to the party or to broader political identity. In the
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United States political activists would remind each other that they were taking positions
that would be judged harshly by public opinion, and they were explicitly conscious of
the impact of their decisions and rhetoric on the broader national coalition. Support
for black suﬀrage was aggressively tied to abolitionism in an eﬀort to underscore the
measure’s radicalism and their disregard for the Union. In so doing, delegates to state
constitutional conventions reminded their opponents and even their fellow partisans that
there were costs to violating the strictures of the ‘white male republic.’ In the United
Kingdom, the incompatibility of Tory rule with civil and religious liberty was constantly
invoked in an eﬀort to underscore to Liberal MPs the importance party unity. Partisans
both in favor and against given franchise changes not only defended their own positions
as compatible, even necessitated, by Liberal principles, but asked their co-partisans how
they could continue to call themselves Liberals or how they would dare to face Liberal
electorates if they took a diﬀerent position. And in France republican principles and
the need for republican unity were especially important in underscoring to deputies
which positions would be seen as acceptable to the government and to the network of
republican electoral committees.
Debates were never solely about attempts at persuasion, although this did indeed
occur. Rather, they were eﬀorts to signal or question soundness to narratives of political
community in which political parties and outside constituencies were invested. The
discourse of representatives reminded and warned others that they should anticipate
costs for taking political positions or supporting policies that potentially violated the
strictures of political community. As such, they made some projects more worthwhile,
more likely to lead to political advancement, than others, with the long-run eﬀect of
shaping the patterns of democratization and exclusion across the three countries.

Democratic Exclusion
Democratic exclusion, in the form of disfranchisements of existing voters as well as the
enduring exclusions of some categories of persons from otherwise democratic regimes,
was a central aspect of three critical cases of democratization. By failing to pay attention
to such exclusions, theorizing on democratization fails to account for recurring patterns
that were deeply implicated in the processes by which the vote was expanded. By placing
disfranchisement and exclusion ﬁrmly in the past, as that which democratization has
gradually overcome, we potentially blind ourselves to its reoccurrence or to continued
exclusions that we—as others before us—might see to be morally unproblematic.
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This project has sought to rectify this oversight, by calling attention to exclusionary
processes during periods of democratization and operating under consolidated representative regimes. Its limited scope, however, warns against excessive generalizations.
The United States, United Kingdom, and France might be classic cases of democratization; but they might not be typical. Moreover, their historical importance might not
necessarily imply that the lessons garnered from these cases will apply to the contemporary period. As Francisco Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan (1997) have
demonstrated, over the course of the twentieth century national factors have become less
important relative to international ones in determining the contours of the franchise, and
the right to vote “has become institutionalized worldwide as a taken-for-granted feature
of national citizenship and an integral component of nation-state identity” (1997, 735).
Citizenship itself, however, can be exclusionary, and in some cases quite dramatically
and intentionally so. In the United States, Europe, Africa, and elsewhere, the growth of
long-term resident populations without citizenship are raising questions of democratic
legitimacy, as restrictive conditions for the acquirement of citizenship have led to a
sizeable portion of the population who are subject to the authority of the state without
the full and equal capacity to participate in the selection of the government. Citizenship
need not be the only basis for political rights, and a growing number of states have
enfranchised aliens—albeit on diﬀerent terms than citizens or limited to a select category
of aliens.
The argument for resident alien voting rights has almost everywhere been expressed
in terms that stress the fact of community membership, even if this membership is not
recognized through extension of citizenship. That is, advocates for alien voting are
calling into question the degree to which the legal status of nationality or citizenship
maps onto the ‘genuine link’ between a community and an individual. In its place, they
have advanced a claim to being within the boundaries of the political community, and
accordingly have sought to unsettle the association between understandings of political
peoplehood and citizenship. Conﬂict over the political rights of persons deemed to be
outside the community continues, and likely will for the foreseeable future.
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